U.S. Maritime Priorities for a New Era of Competition
The MOC
By
Ambassador Robert C. O’Brien (ret.)
December 21, 2023
This is a unique time in world history. The optimism of the early post-Cold War period has been replaced by a renewed understanding that Great Power conflict has returned with a vengeance to shape 21st century geopolitics. Wars in Europe and the Middle East demand U.S. attention and impact important U.S. interests.
Meanwhile, China – the greatest threat America has encountered since at least World War II – is arming itself at an astonishing rate and seeking to aggressively assert its primacy in the Indo-Pacific and, increasingly, across the globe. The Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”) poses an existential threat to liberty and the American way of life. The U.S. will need to use all the available tools of its national power to protect the United States and its partners around the world. The U.S. Navy is one of those key tools.
The rise of The People’s Liberation Army Navy (“PLAN”) eclipses U.S. maritime power, and by extension U.S. national power, and a concomitant American failure to invest appropriately in the future of its seapower. The U.S. has a shrinking Navy suited for the past three decades, not the next three. Seapower requires constant tending and investment. Failure to make required investments will reap enormously negative consequences for U.S. national security for years to come, if not remedied now.
America’s diminished fleet size and readiness is a reflection of how Washington bureaucrats neglect Navy requirements and budgets. For too long, they have taken for granted American maritime primacy and assumed the U.S. would not face a peer competitor like the PLAN. It is long past time to shed these dangerous illusions.
The U.S. needs to build a navy that will deter adversaries and, if necessary, decisively defeat adversaries in battle. The Navy officially says it requires at least 381 ships to adequately fulfill its mission and defend American interests around the world. A former Chief of Naval Operations even stated the correct number is closer to 500 ships. Reaching 381 ships is not some unattainable goal. It represents the absolute bare minimum to uphold core U.S. national interests. Yet, it is one the U.S. continuously fails to meet, year after year, even as threats to U.S. interests and American maritime supremacy grow more acute.
According to the Congressional Budget Office assessment of the Navy shipbuilding plan for 2024, under the most optimistic scenario, “If the Navy adhered to the schedule for purchases and ship retirements outlined in its 2024 plan, by 2053 the number of battle force ships would increase from 290 today to 367.” This schedule is twenty years too late and still falls short of bare minimum requirements, even under the most optimistic scenario. The fleet will be smaller over the next decade than it is today. America’s superior submarine technology was once a key component of deterrence. Now almost 40 percent of U.S. attack submarines are out of commission for repairs. This situation is entirely unacceptable.
Meanwhile, China’s navy has more than 370 ships and submarines and is on track to reach 435 battle force ships by 2030. It is time for American political leaders to recognize that this reality. America’s greatest adversary is running circles around the U.S. when it comes to shipbuilding, and there remains no credible plan for America to catch up. Options exist, and failure is not one of them. Leaders in the Navy and in Washington need to adopt outside the box thinking to remedy this problem, beginning with bipartisan legislation to undertake a national program of shipbuilding expansion that increases the number of construction and repair yards available.
While it is important to be ready to fight in 2050, China may not be on America’s schedule. The U.S. needs to be able to fight and win sea battles today and tomorrow, not just in the hypothetical budgetary “out years.” Like the Two Ocean Navy Act that prepared the Navy for victory in World War II, Congress needs a Carl Vinson today who is willing to make difficult choices to expand our shipbuilding and repair industrial base to accomplish the fleet size our admirals require for deterrence. Senator Wicker’s shipbuilding legislation, the SHIPYARD Act, would be a first step in the right direction.
While there is a critical need to boost shipyard productivity and to field more advanced capabilities on our ships, the Department of Defense’s own procurement policies have contributed to our current decline. Contractors have been saddled by the Navy with numerous change orders on designs, which could significantly delay the program and lead to cost overruns.
Furthermore, our Navy has long been built around our carrier force. It is true, that in a crisis, the president does ask, “where are the carriers?”. But as Dr. Jerry Hendrix, senior fellow of the Sagamore Institute, has pointed out, America’s carriers are losing relevance as they become more vulnerable to modern missiles. To ensure our most potent platform remains so, the U.S. need to invest in its carrier air wings to increase their range, so that they can strike targets from outside the PLA’s Anti-Access/Area Denial zones.
Inexplicably, the Navy is continuing its plans to retire ships approaching their service life end. This is not a time to scrap America’s navy. “Divest to Invest” is a cliché and a bad one at that. The policy underlying it is a recipe for decline and mediocrity, not deterrence and strength. Instead, the Navy should pursue service-life extensions for many ships currently slated for retirement, such as the Ticonderoga-class cruisers, flight I and II DDGs and Los Angeles–class attack submarines. The Navy should also recall into service ships such as the remaining sturdy Perry-class frigates that are in the ready-reserve fleet until the future frigate program has adequate numbers. Of course, these priorities must be funded by Congress and the White House.
Seen from both history and current events, the ability to project power by sea, to defend America, to protect our economic interests and to keep American citizens safe is indispensable for U.S. national security. The U.S. is witnessing a significant decline in America’s seapower, and with it, America’s fundamental national power. During the Trump Administration, the challenge of America’s diminishing naval power was a top issue. The President himself even required naval architects and contractors to come to the Oval Office to explain why key programs were delayed and over budget. Today, finding and implementing solutions to this crisis will require leadership in Congress, the White House, and the Pentagon who are clear eyed about the threats America faces but also prepared to take innovative and unprecedented measures that are necessary to right this ship.
Ambassador Robert C. O’Brien (ret.) served as the 27th U.S. national-security adviser from 2019–2021.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Your investment in the Center for Maritime Strategy supports the U.S. Sea Services by empowering policy-driven maritime security research, advocacy, and education.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Ambassador Robert C. O’Brien (ret.)
This is a unique time in world history. The optimism of the early post-Cold War period has been replaced by a renewed understanding that Great Power conflict has returned with a vengeance to shape 21st century geopolitics. Wars in Europe and the Middle East demand U.S. attention and impact important U.S. interests.
Meanwhile, China – the greatest threat America has encountered since at least World War II – is arming itself at an astonishing rate and seeking to aggressively assert its primacy in the Indo-Pacific and, increasingly, across the globe. The Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”) poses an existential threat to liberty and the American way of life. The U.S. will need to use all the available tools of its national power to protect the United States and its partners around the world. The U.S. Navy is one of those key tools.
The rise of The People’s Liberation Army Navy (“PLAN”) eclipses U.S. maritime power, and by extension U.S. national power, and a concomitant American failure to invest appropriately in the future of its seapower. The U.S. has a shrinking Navy suited for the past three decades, not the next three. Seapower requires constant tending and investment. Failure to make required investments will reap enormously negative consequences for U.S. national security for years to come, if not remedied now.
America’s diminished fleet size and readiness is a reflection of how Washington bureaucrats neglect Navy requirements and budgets. For too long, they have taken for granted American maritime primacy and assumed the U.S. would not face a peer competitor like the PLAN. It is long past time to shed these dangerous illusions.
The U.S. needs to build a navy that will deter adversaries and, if necessary, decisively defeat adversaries in battle. The Navy officially says it requires at least 381 ships to adequately fulfill its mission and defend American interests around the world. A former Chief of Naval Operations even stated the correct number is closer to 500 ships. Reaching 381 ships is not some unattainable goal. It represents the absolute bare minimum to uphold core U.S. national interests. Yet, it is one the U.S. continuously fails to meet, year after year, even as threats to U.S. interests and American maritime supremacy grow more acute.
According to the Congressional Budget Office assessment of the Navy shipbuilding plan for 2024, under the most optimistic scenario, “If the Navy adhered to the schedule for purchases and ship retirements outlined in its 2024 plan, by 2053 the number of battle force ships would increase from 290 today to 367.” This schedule is twenty years too late and still falls short of bare minimum requirements, even under the most optimistic scenario. The fleet will be smaller over the next decade than it is today. America’s superior submarine technology was once a key component of deterrence. Now almost 40 percent of U.S. attack submarines are out of commission for repairs. This situation is entirely unacceptable.
Meanwhile, China’s navy has more than 370 ships and submarines and is on track to reach 435 battle force ships by 2030. It is time for American political leaders to recognize that this reality. America’s greatest adversary is running circles around the U.S. when it comes to shipbuilding, and there remains no credible plan for America to catch up. Options exist, and failure is not one of them. Leaders in the Navy and in Washington need to adopt outside the box thinking to remedy this problem, beginning with bipartisan legislation to undertake a national program of shipbuilding expansion that increases the number of construction and repair yards available.
While it is important to be ready to fight in 2050, China may not be on America’s schedule. The U.S. needs to be able to fight and win sea battles today and tomorrow, not just in the hypothetical budgetary “out years.” Like the Two Ocean Navy Act that prepared the Navy for victory in World War II, Congress needs a Carl Vinson today who is willing to make difficult choices to expand our shipbuilding and repair industrial base to accomplish the fleet size our admirals require for deterrence. Senator Wicker’s shipbuilding legislation, the SHIPYARD Act, would be a first step in the right direction.
While there is a critical need to boost shipyard productivity and to field more advanced capabilities on our ships, the Department of Defense’s own procurement policies have contributed to our current decline. Contractors have been saddled by the Navy with numerous change orders on designs, which could significantly delay the program and lead to cost overruns.
Furthermore, our Navy has long been built around our carrier force. It is true, that in a crisis, the president does ask, “where are the carriers?”. But as Dr. Jerry Hendrix, senior fellow of the Sagamore Institute, has pointed out, America’s carriers are losing relevance as they become more vulnerable to modern missiles. To ensure our most potent platform remains so, the U.S. need to invest in its carrier air wings to increase their range, so that they can strike targets from outside the PLA’s Anti-Access/Area Denial zones.
Inexplicably, the Navy is continuing its plans to retire ships approaching their service life end. This is not a time to scrap America’s navy. “Divest to Invest” is a cliché and a bad one at that. The policy underlying it is a recipe for decline and mediocrity, not deterrence and strength. Instead, the Navy should pursue service-life extensions for many ships currently slated for retirement, such as the Ticonderoga-class cruisers, flight I and II DDGs and Los Angeles–class attack submarines. The Navy should also recall into service ships such as the remaining sturdy Perry-class frigates that are in the ready-reserve fleet until the future frigate program has adequate numbers. Of course, these priorities must be funded by Congress and the White House.
Seen from both history and current events, the ability to project power by sea, to defend America, to protect our economic interests and to keep American citizens safe is indispensable for U.S. national security. The U.S. is witnessing a significant decline in America’s seapower, and with it, America’s fundamental national power. During the Trump Administration, the challenge of America’s diminishing naval power was a top issue. The President himself even required naval architects and contractors to come to the Oval Office to explain why key programs were delayed and over budget. Today, finding and implementing solutions to this crisis will require leadership in Congress, the White House, and the Pentagon who are clear eyed about the threats America faces but also prepared to take innovative and unprecedented measures that are necessary to right this ship.
Ambassador Robert C. O’Brien (ret.) served as the 27th U.S. national-security adviser from 2019–2021.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.