Türkiye and the Russo-Ukrainian War: Cynicism and Opportunism in the Black Sea
The MOC
By
Frederik Brekk
February 20, 2024
Türkiye in the Black Sea
Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Türkiye, ever the opportunistic actor, has closely followed the war’s development in hopes of further boosting its status as a leader, mediator, and trade partner in the Black Sea. Such ambitions have been further augmented by Türkiye’s neo-Ottoman turn throughout the 21st century, which has reinforced Ankara’s interest in positioning itself as a major and relevant power in regional affairs. While Ankara has the tendency to view its southern and eastern flanks through a prism of national security and energy issues, often in competition with Greece, the Republic of Cyprus (RoC), Syria, and the Kurds, its strategy in the Black Sea differs, and has become more pronounced following Russia’s invasion. To its north, Türkiye’s strategy has been underpinned by several foreign policy goals:
Maintaining a balance of power between itself and Russia
Mitigating external (i.e., Western and non-littoral states) influence and positioning itself as an essential leader in the region
Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and full-scale invasion eight years later, Türkiye has amended its Black Sea strategy several times to combat rising Russian aggression and a growing fear that the West is incapable of, or uninterested in, ensuring Türkiye’s security. At the same time, since 2022 Türkiye has grown in importance for a heavily sanctioned Russia and has offered a mutually beneficial economic lifeline to Moscow (e.g., through increased bilateral trade and energy imports). As such, Russia’s full-scale invasion has opened the door for Türkiye to take on a greater role in the Black Sea region as a leader, mediator, and trade partner, cynically reaping benefits from the chaos on its northern border.
Maintaining the Balance of Power
Despite a widespread belief that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Russian President Vladimir Putin share a unique relationship and understanding which extends to their two states’ engagement, particularly in the realms of trade, energy, and foreign policy, the reality is much more ambiguous. While the two states have regularly cooperated in areas such as pipeline and nuclear power plant construction as well as the occasional arms deal, the common denominators in most Russo-Turkish engagement are pragmatism and opportunism – mutually beneficial agreements and forms of quid pro quo coexist with direct and managed competition in certain spheres of interest (e.g., in the Middle East).
Due to the other Black Sea states’ general lack of substantial naval power, the region has largely been viewed as a primarily Russo-Turkish domain. This has prompted Ankara to foster closer ties with the other Black Sea states as a way of countering growing Russian influence and aggression in the region. Such behavior has become acutely noticeable in Türkiye’s engagement with Ukraine – Ankara believes that should Ukraine fall under Russian rule in some form, it would significantly alter the balance of power in the region and, as such, has taken measures to ensure Ukraine’s survival. Examples include the sale of Bayraktar TB2 drones and two Ada-class corvettes (whose fate remains uncertain given the Montreux Convention likely prevents these ships from passing through the Bosphorus and reaching Ukraine), as well as an allocation of approximately $36 million to the Armed Forces of Ukraine for the purchase of Turkish military and dual-use goods. By strengthening Ukraine’s military capabilities, Türkiye has helped position Russia and Ukraine as counterweights to each other – in theory, ensuring greater deterrence and stability in the Black Sea, at least for Ankara.
The Black Sea as Mare Clausum
Ankara has regularly expressed its desire to mitigate external (particularly transatlantic) influence within the Black Sea region. An important nuance, however, is that this does not necessarily translate into a foreign policy strategy against the West, but rather one without it (unlike Russia, which, naturally, positions itself against the West in much of its foreign policy goals). This preference is heavily influenced by Ankara’s perception that the US and other Western states do not take Turkish security concerns seriously – evidence includes the US’ decision to supply Kurdish militant groups with weapons on Türkiye’s eastern border, color revolutions in the early 2000s which were perceived to destabilize the regions involved, and the West’s hesitance to act following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014.
Türkiye’s desire to mitigate external influence in the Black Sea is coupled with its desire to entrench its position as a regional leader. One facet of this desire is the relatively recent Mavi Vatan doctrine. Taking its name from a massive naval exercise held in 2019, Türkiye’s Mavi Vatan (meaning “Blue Homeland”) doctrine has become an influential phenomenon within Turkish political, military, and foreign policy circles. The doctrine should not be interpreted as a clearly delineated naval doctrine, but rather as a statement of intent emphasizing Ankara’s need and desire for a strong and capable blue-water navy. The general consensus is that Mavi Vatan is predicated on three factors: an expansion of Türkiye’s zone of influence through a larger navy and overseas military bases (e.g., in Africa and the Persian Gulf), a greater role for Türkiye’s navy in energy-related geopolitical competition, coercive efforts, and naval diplomacy, and supporting the upward trend in Türkiye’s indigenous defense industry.
The expansion of Türkiye’s naval capabilities can, in part, also be understood as a form of deterrence against Russia’s historically larger and superior navy, particularly in the Black Sea. That being said, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet has suffered significant losses following Moscow’s invasion in 2022 and, as such, may offer the Turkish navy greater influence and deterring power in the region, at least temporarily. Further, Türkiye’s booming indigenous defense industry, which has grown to include weapon systems such as tanks, amphibious assault ships, fighter jets, and drones, including the undeniably popular Bayraktar TB2, can be viewed as a testament to Ankara’s progress toward greater autonomy and autarky in global affairs through the mitigation of reliance on foreign arms (e.g., see the Türkiye-US F-35 debacle) as well as Ankara’s aspiration to become a global power (a requisite of which is usually possessing a significant indigenous defense industry).
Lastly, due to the Montreux Convention, Türkiye views itself as the gatekeeper to the Black Sea, which only strengthens Ankara’s belief that the region should remain a mare clausum under Turkish and Russian purview. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion, through the Montreux Convention, Türkiye has prevented both Russian and non-littoral (i.e., Western) warships from entering the Black Sea, thus ensuring, to a degree, a form of regional balance. While this stance has benefited Moscow more than the West (e.g., Ankara has blocked minesweepers loaned to Ukraine by the UK), as the war drags on and Russia incurs further naval losses, this will undoubtedly have an impact on the balance of power within the Black Sea region as Russia is unable to replenish its dwindling Black Sea Fleet with warships from elsewhere.
The Economic and Diplomatic Benefits of Cynicism
When considering the economic and diplomatic benefits Türkiye has reaped from the ongoing war to its north, it is useful to understand that much of what benefits Türkiye also benefits Erdoğan. Most Turkish voters see the economy as their biggest concern and, as such, both Türkiye’s and, especially, Erdoğan’s survival are inextricably linked to the state of the country’s economy and foreign trade. This has, at least in part, informed Ankara’s demonstrated indifference toward Western criticism, particularly regarding its continued, and even growing, relationship with Moscow. Not only has Türkiye refused to enforce Western sanctions on Russia following the latter’s full-scale invasion, but has also profited handsomely from this decision. In 2022 alone, the number of Russian firms in Türkiye saw an increase of 670%. Further, the two countries’ bilateral trade volume exceeded $65 billion in 2023, essentially tripling over the last five years. It is, however, worth mentioning that a portion of this trade increase is likely due to Türkiye’s role as an intermediary for countries seeking to continue exports to Russia while also avoiding sanctions-related penalties.
Ankara also mediated between Russia and Ukraine regarding a Black Sea grain corridor. While the deal has since collapsed, and Kyiv is currently utilizing an alternative route for shipping its grain abroad, Ankara’s role in the initial deal was widely seen as a diplomatic victory (indeed, this accomplishment boosted Türkiye’s reputation in the Global South, which had been inordinately harmed by the cessation of Ukrainian grain shipments). That being said, it was not a purely philanthropic endeavor – Türkiye imports the majority of its wheat from Russia and Ukraine and also sought a discount on wheat imports from Ukraine in return for its role in the discussions.
The Russo-Turkish relationship is also influenced by the countries’ cooperation within the energy sphere. As an essential component of Türkiye’s economic stability and future (and for a country which, in 2020, imported 99% of its natural gas and 93% of its oil from abroad), energy has continued to play a crucial role in Türkiye’s foreign policy calculations. The country’s booming energy demand – between 2000-2019, Türkiye’s gas demand alone increased by approximately 426.4% – and, until recently, lack of indigenous energy resources, has forced Ankara to depend heavily on various external actors, not least Russia.
Despite this precarious situation, Türkiye envisions a future where it develops into a regional energy hub, rather than a simple pipeline corridor – something which has previously limited Ankara’s capacity to maneuver geopolitically. An essential pillar of Türkiye’s energy hub ambitions would be close cooperation with Russia, and recent developments have suggested that both Ankara and Moscow fully understand this. Russian exports of gas to Türkiyemore than doubled on the year in October 2023 and a recent Türkiye-Bulgaria gas deal has raised concerns regarding Russian attempts to return to pre-war levels of gas exports to Europe by utilizing Türkiye’s energy infrastructure.
At the same time, Ankara has invariably remained conscious of its overdependence on Russian energy resources and has been exploring alternative sources – examples include Israel, Azerbaijan, Qatar, and newfound indigenous gas deposits in the Black Sea. Prior to Israel’s invasion of the Gaza Strip in October 2023, there were hopes of enhanced energy cooperation between Türkiye and Israel – either in the form of exported Israeli liquefied natural gas (LNG) or the, albeit far-fetched, construction of an Israel-Türkiye underwater gas pipeline. For the foreseeable future, however, these prospects remain highly improbable. Another alternative is the expansion of gas infrastructure between Türkiye and its stalwart ally Azerbaijan. The two states have already begun construction of a gas pipeline between Türkiye and Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan exclave – a potential further connection between this exclave and Azerbaijani territory through the Zangezur corridor (should Baku decide to annex this land too) would enhance Türkiye’s energy security. Should Ankara muster the political will and economic resources to expand its domestic LNG facilities, it could also see increased supply from Qatar, both a staunch ally and, until recently, the world’s top LNG-exporting country (not to mention a country with which Türkiye maintains strong military ties). LNG is also less influenced by geopolitical developments than, for example, pipelines, and thus offers Ankara greater flexibility going forward. Lastly, Türkiye recently discovered gas deposits equaling roughly 710 billion cubic meters within its exclusive economic zone in the Black Sea, valued at more than $500 billion. Türkiye claims it is enough to supply all Turkish households’ and industries’ energy needs for the next 15-20 years. These gas deposits offer Ankara much-needed breathing room, particularly if Russia attempts to manipulate its energy exports to Türkiye for geopolitical gains (as it has already attempted elsewhere).
As such, the recent increase in Russian energy exports to Türkiye should be considered an opportunistic and temporary deviation from Türkiye’s standard energy strategy. The cheaper price and greater abundance of Russian energy resources following its isolation from Western markets is being taken advantage of by a cynical Ankara and will continue as long as relevant conditions persist. Meanwhile, Ankara will no doubt continue seeking alternative energy sources in order to shore up its energy security, acutely aware of the threat excessive energy dependence on Russia poses.
Ankara’s Regional Priorities
It is essential to remember that Ankara’s strategic choices in the Black Sea region are not only informed by its engagement with Russia, Ukraine, or any other Black Sea actors, but also by its security concerns to its south and east, which are considered more pressing when considering matters of national security. To the south there are territorial disputes with Greece and the RoC, particularly within the context of underwater gas deposits. To the east Türkiye is dealing with Syria (the ongoing civil war and millions of refugees which have fled to Türkiye) and the Kurds (who are seen as terrorists and are regularly scapegoated in Turkish political discourse). As such, Ankara’s strategy to its north will likely be one which prioritizes more manageable goals, such as promoting regional stability and reaping economic and diplomatic benefits whenever possible, while also ensuring it does not overextend itself. Türkiye will likely continue its close cooperation with Russia in trade and energy while continuing to hedge against growing Russian regional aggression through continued support for Ukraine and expanded energy cooperation with third actors (e.g., Azerbaijan and Qatar).
Although the gradual deterioration of Türkiye’s domestic political, institutional, and business environments throughout the 21st century have reduced the country’s soft power capabilities, it remains an astute, if not cynical and opportunistic, regional actor. When the war in Ukraine eventually comes to an end, and treaties must be signed, it is not unthinkable that such discussions will take place in Türkiye. Such an accomplishment would undoubtedly boost Erdoğan’s reputation both at home and abroad as a global leader, mediator, and statesman, and likely informs much of Ankara’s foreign policy decisions in the Black Sea region.
Frederik Brekk is an independent political and security analyst with a focus on Russia and Türkiye. He has conducted research at several universities and think tanks on topics such as defense, security, terrorism, Russian and Turkish politics and foreign policy, and the Arctic. He graduated from UCL in 2022 with dual master’s degrees in politics, security, and international relations in Eurasia and from the University of Rochester in 2018 with a bachelor’s degree in Russian language and literature.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Frederik Brekk
Türkiye in the Black Sea
Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Türkiye, ever the opportunistic actor, has closely followed the war’s development in hopes of further boosting its status as a leader, mediator, and trade partner in the Black Sea. Such ambitions have been further augmented by Türkiye’s neo-Ottoman turn throughout the 21st century, which has reinforced Ankara’s interest in positioning itself as a major and relevant power in regional affairs. While Ankara has the tendency to view its southern and eastern flanks through a prism of national security and energy issues, often in competition with Greece, the Republic of Cyprus (RoC), Syria, and the Kurds, its strategy in the Black Sea differs, and has become more pronounced following Russia’s invasion. To its north, Türkiye’s strategy has been underpinned by several foreign policy goals:
Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and full-scale invasion eight years later, Türkiye has amended its Black Sea strategy several times to combat rising Russian aggression and a growing fear that the West is incapable of, or uninterested in, ensuring Türkiye’s security. At the same time, since 2022 Türkiye has grown in importance for a heavily sanctioned Russia and has offered a mutually beneficial economic lifeline to Moscow (e.g., through increased bilateral trade and energy imports). As such, Russia’s full-scale invasion has opened the door for Türkiye to take on a greater role in the Black Sea region as a leader, mediator, and trade partner, cynically reaping benefits from the chaos on its northern border.
Maintaining the Balance of Power
Despite a widespread belief that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Russian President Vladimir Putin share a unique relationship and understanding which extends to their two states’ engagement, particularly in the realms of trade, energy, and foreign policy, the reality is much more ambiguous. While the two states have regularly cooperated in areas such as pipeline and nuclear power plant construction as well as the occasional arms deal, the common denominators in most Russo-Turkish engagement are pragmatism and opportunism – mutually beneficial agreements and forms of quid pro quo coexist with direct and managed competition in certain spheres of interest (e.g., in the Middle East).
Due to the other Black Sea states’ general lack of substantial naval power, the region has largely been viewed as a primarily Russo-Turkish domain. This has prompted Ankara to foster closer ties with the other Black Sea states as a way of countering growing Russian influence and aggression in the region. Such behavior has become acutely noticeable in Türkiye’s engagement with Ukraine – Ankara believes that should Ukraine fall under Russian rule in some form, it would significantly alter the balance of power in the region and, as such, has taken measures to ensure Ukraine’s survival. Examples include the sale of Bayraktar TB2 drones and two Ada-class corvettes (whose fate remains uncertain given the Montreux Convention likely prevents these ships from passing through the Bosphorus and reaching Ukraine), as well as an allocation of approximately $36 million to the Armed Forces of Ukraine for the purchase of Turkish military and dual-use goods. By strengthening Ukraine’s military capabilities, Türkiye has helped position Russia and Ukraine as counterweights to each other – in theory, ensuring greater deterrence and stability in the Black Sea, at least for Ankara.
The Black Sea as Mare Clausum
Ankara has regularly expressed its desire to mitigate external (particularly transatlantic) influence within the Black Sea region. An important nuance, however, is that this does not necessarily translate into a foreign policy strategy against the West, but rather one without it (unlike Russia, which, naturally, positions itself against the West in much of its foreign policy goals). This preference is heavily influenced by Ankara’s perception that the US and other Western states do not take Turkish security concerns seriously – evidence includes the US’ decision to supply Kurdish militant groups with weapons on Türkiye’s eastern border, color revolutions in the early 2000s which were perceived to destabilize the regions involved, and the West’s hesitance to act following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014.
Türkiye’s desire to mitigate external influence in the Black Sea is coupled with its desire to entrench its position as a regional leader. One facet of this desire is the relatively recent Mavi Vatan doctrine. Taking its name from a massive naval exercise held in 2019, Türkiye’s Mavi Vatan (meaning “Blue Homeland”) doctrine has become an influential phenomenon within Turkish political, military, and foreign policy circles. The doctrine should not be interpreted as a clearly delineated naval doctrine, but rather as a statement of intent emphasizing Ankara’s need and desire for a strong and capable blue-water navy. The general consensus is that Mavi Vatan is predicated on three factors: an expansion of Türkiye’s zone of influence through a larger navy and overseas military bases (e.g., in Africa and the Persian Gulf), a greater role for Türkiye’s navy in energy-related geopolitical competition, coercive efforts, and naval diplomacy, and supporting the upward trend in Türkiye’s indigenous defense industry.
The expansion of Türkiye’s naval capabilities can, in part, also be understood as a form of deterrence against Russia’s historically larger and superior navy, particularly in the Black Sea. That being said, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet has suffered significant losses following Moscow’s invasion in 2022 and, as such, may offer the Turkish navy greater influence and deterring power in the region, at least temporarily. Further, Türkiye’s booming indigenous defense industry, which has grown to include weapon systems such as tanks, amphibious assault ships, fighter jets, and drones, including the undeniably popular Bayraktar TB2, can be viewed as a testament to Ankara’s progress toward greater autonomy and autarky in global affairs through the mitigation of reliance on foreign arms (e.g., see the Türkiye-US F-35 debacle) as well as Ankara’s aspiration to become a global power (a requisite of which is usually possessing a significant indigenous defense industry).
Lastly, due to the Montreux Convention, Türkiye views itself as the gatekeeper to the Black Sea, which only strengthens Ankara’s belief that the region should remain a mare clausum under Turkish and Russian purview. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion, through the Montreux Convention, Türkiye has prevented both Russian and non-littoral (i.e., Western) warships from entering the Black Sea, thus ensuring, to a degree, a form of regional balance. While this stance has benefited Moscow more than the West (e.g., Ankara has blocked minesweepers loaned to Ukraine by the UK), as the war drags on and Russia incurs further naval losses, this will undoubtedly have an impact on the balance of power within the Black Sea region as Russia is unable to replenish its dwindling Black Sea Fleet with warships from elsewhere.
The Economic and Diplomatic Benefits of Cynicism
When considering the economic and diplomatic benefits Türkiye has reaped from the ongoing war to its north, it is useful to understand that much of what benefits Türkiye also benefits Erdoğan. Most Turkish voters see the economy as their biggest concern and, as such, both Türkiye’s and, especially, Erdoğan’s survival are inextricably linked to the state of the country’s economy and foreign trade. This has, at least in part, informed Ankara’s demonstrated indifference toward Western criticism, particularly regarding its continued, and even growing, relationship with Moscow. Not only has Türkiye refused to enforce Western sanctions on Russia following the latter’s full-scale invasion, but has also profited handsomely from this decision. In 2022 alone, the number of Russian firms in Türkiye saw an increase of 670%. Further, the two countries’ bilateral trade volume exceeded $65 billion in 2023, essentially tripling over the last five years. It is, however, worth mentioning that a portion of this trade increase is likely due to Türkiye’s role as an intermediary for countries seeking to continue exports to Russia while also avoiding sanctions-related penalties.
Ankara also mediated between Russia and Ukraine regarding a Black Sea grain corridor. While the deal has since collapsed, and Kyiv is currently utilizing an alternative route for shipping its grain abroad, Ankara’s role in the initial deal was widely seen as a diplomatic victory (indeed, this accomplishment boosted Türkiye’s reputation in the Global South, which had been inordinately harmed by the cessation of Ukrainian grain shipments). That being said, it was not a purely philanthropic endeavor – Türkiye imports the majority of its wheat from Russia and Ukraine and also sought a discount on wheat imports from Ukraine in return for its role in the discussions.
The Russo-Turkish relationship is also influenced by the countries’ cooperation within the energy sphere. As an essential component of Türkiye’s economic stability and future (and for a country which, in 2020, imported 99% of its natural gas and 93% of its oil from abroad), energy has continued to play a crucial role in Türkiye’s foreign policy calculations. The country’s booming energy demand – between 2000-2019, Türkiye’s gas demand alone increased by approximately 426.4% – and, until recently, lack of indigenous energy resources, has forced Ankara to depend heavily on various external actors, not least Russia.
Despite this precarious situation, Türkiye envisions a future where it develops into a regional energy hub, rather than a simple pipeline corridor – something which has previously limited Ankara’s capacity to maneuver geopolitically. An essential pillar of Türkiye’s energy hub ambitions would be close cooperation with Russia, and recent developments have suggested that both Ankara and Moscow fully understand this. Russian exports of gas to Türkiye more than doubled on the year in October 2023 and a recent Türkiye-Bulgaria gas deal has raised concerns regarding Russian attempts to return to pre-war levels of gas exports to Europe by utilizing Türkiye’s energy infrastructure.
At the same time, Ankara has invariably remained conscious of its overdependence on Russian energy resources and has been exploring alternative sources – examples include Israel, Azerbaijan, Qatar, and newfound indigenous gas deposits in the Black Sea. Prior to Israel’s invasion of the Gaza Strip in October 2023, there were hopes of enhanced energy cooperation between Türkiye and Israel – either in the form of exported Israeli liquefied natural gas (LNG) or the, albeit far-fetched, construction of an Israel-Türkiye underwater gas pipeline. For the foreseeable future, however, these prospects remain highly improbable. Another alternative is the expansion of gas infrastructure between Türkiye and its stalwart ally Azerbaijan. The two states have already begun construction of a gas pipeline between Türkiye and Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan exclave – a potential further connection between this exclave and Azerbaijani territory through the Zangezur corridor (should Baku decide to annex this land too) would enhance Türkiye’s energy security. Should Ankara muster the political will and economic resources to expand its domestic LNG facilities, it could also see increased supply from Qatar, both a staunch ally and, until recently, the world’s top LNG-exporting country (not to mention a country with which Türkiye maintains strong military ties). LNG is also less influenced by geopolitical developments than, for example, pipelines, and thus offers Ankara greater flexibility going forward. Lastly, Türkiye recently discovered gas deposits equaling roughly 710 billion cubic meters within its exclusive economic zone in the Black Sea, valued at more than $500 billion. Türkiye claims it is enough to supply all Turkish households’ and industries’ energy needs for the next 15-20 years. These gas deposits offer Ankara much-needed breathing room, particularly if Russia attempts to manipulate its energy exports to Türkiye for geopolitical gains (as it has already attempted elsewhere).
As such, the recent increase in Russian energy exports to Türkiye should be considered an opportunistic and temporary deviation from Türkiye’s standard energy strategy. The cheaper price and greater abundance of Russian energy resources following its isolation from Western markets is being taken advantage of by a cynical Ankara and will continue as long as relevant conditions persist. Meanwhile, Ankara will no doubt continue seeking alternative energy sources in order to shore up its energy security, acutely aware of the threat excessive energy dependence on Russia poses.
Ankara’s Regional Priorities
It is essential to remember that Ankara’s strategic choices in the Black Sea region are not only informed by its engagement with Russia, Ukraine, or any other Black Sea actors, but also by its security concerns to its south and east, which are considered more pressing when considering matters of national security. To the south there are territorial disputes with Greece and the RoC, particularly within the context of underwater gas deposits. To the east Türkiye is dealing with Syria (the ongoing civil war and millions of refugees which have fled to Türkiye) and the Kurds (who are seen as terrorists and are regularly scapegoated in Turkish political discourse). As such, Ankara’s strategy to its north will likely be one which prioritizes more manageable goals, such as promoting regional stability and reaping economic and diplomatic benefits whenever possible, while also ensuring it does not overextend itself. Türkiye will likely continue its close cooperation with Russia in trade and energy while continuing to hedge against growing Russian regional aggression through continued support for Ukraine and expanded energy cooperation with third actors (e.g., Azerbaijan and Qatar).
Although the gradual deterioration of Türkiye’s domestic political, institutional, and business environments throughout the 21st century have reduced the country’s soft power capabilities, it remains an astute, if not cynical and opportunistic, regional actor. When the war in Ukraine eventually comes to an end, and treaties must be signed, it is not unthinkable that such discussions will take place in Türkiye. Such an accomplishment would undoubtedly boost Erdoğan’s reputation both at home and abroad as a global leader, mediator, and statesman, and likely informs much of Ankara’s foreign policy decisions in the Black Sea region.
Frederik Brekk is an independent political and security analyst with a focus on Russia and Türkiye. He has conducted research at several universities and think tanks on topics such as defense, security, terrorism, Russian and Turkish politics and foreign policy, and the Arctic. He graduated from UCL in 2022 with dual master’s degrees in politics, security, and international relations in Eurasia and from the University of Rochester in 2018 with a bachelor’s degree in Russian language and literature.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.