Transatlantic Security in Baltic: How Realistic is Poland’s Concept of protecting NATO’s Eastern Flank against Russian Aggression?​

The MOC
Photo from the Polish Ministry of Defence.

By Ewa A. Andryjalowicz

The central turning point in the Baltic Sea is Poland’s new Strategy in the Eastern Flank area and Poland’s willingness to become the strongest European military to provide security to all NATO allies. After Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, Poland developed a new strategy plan in 2017 to expand its ability to eliminate any possible threat and secure its land, air, and sea borders. The Polish governments’ assumptions seem reasonable and possible – but how realistic?

Poland’s geographical location plays a vital role in understanding its foreign policy and concerns about potential threats to its sovereignty. The most sensitive part of Poland’s borders is, from the Polish and NATO point of view, the “Suwałki gap,” also called the “Suwałki corridor.” This north-eastern area between Poland and the Lithuanian border between Belarus and the Russian exclave of the Kaliningrad Oblast spans over 40 miles. Experts have referred to the Suwałki gap in various ways, even calling it NATO’s “Achilles heel,” “soft underbelly,” “weakest point,” “most defenseless area,” and even “the most dangerous place on earth.” After Poland and the Baltic States joined NATO in 1999, this weak area acquired exceptional strategic and military importance. Moreover, on the east side, the Polish-Ukraine border is over 300 miles long, and the Belarussian-Polish border is almost 300 miles long. From Poland’s perspective, the closeness of those borders became even more critical after Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea –Ukrainian territory.

Figure 1. Photo from Ryan White for Defense News.

Poland realized that Russia could still invade a sovereign state, also potentially violating Polish borders — well known from previous decades. That is why the Polish government, faced with growing new threats from Russia since the end of the Cold War, began to view this country again as a potential aggressor. Russia’s attack on Georgia in 2008, its annexation of Crimea in 2014, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 proved to Poland how unpredictable Russia can be and can potentially attack a NATO member state at any time. Taking this eventuality into account and being aware of the potential threat in the area of ​​the Baltic countries, Poland began to seriously prepare for armament in order to not only to secure its country and the eastern flank but also ensure the sovereignty of NATO countries’ borders.

Poland’s Concept of Protecting the Baltic Sea Area

Poland’s 2017 Defense Concept from the Polish Department of Defense is very promising to protect the Baltic Sea and mitigate Russia’s possible aggression against NATO’s eastern flank. With this concept, Poland wants to play an essential role in this region because it is the strongest country on NATO’s eastern flank, both militarily and financially. Poland is focusing on the three most crucial points of its Strategy in countering a potential attack from Russia: 1. Military Reinforcement (production); 2. Investments in Defense and Purchases of Military Equipment; and 3. Recruitment and Training

1. Military Reinforcement (Production)

The Ministry of National Defense decided to increase the Navy’s defense spending, yet it receives the most minor investment and still lags behind the land and air forces. It is worth adding that Poland currently has equipment such as Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigate ships; additionally, two new Polish-made corvettes, which are still in service, and smaller support ships and technologically advanced equipment, including two batteries of NSM anti-ship missile systems. It should also be emphasized that in the distant future,in 2034, three new frigates will enter service in the Polish Navy. Poland has also created new Special Forces to protect critical maritime infrastructure. It will be responsible for safeguarding, for example, the strategic gas terminal in the north-western port of Świnoujście and the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline connecting Europipe II with Poland. Those recently established Special Forces are a part of the JW FormozaTrust the Sea (the Polish special forces military unit). It also began construction of the first Miecznik-class frigate in Gdynia. The new naval missile units are essential because they constitute Poland’s shield in the Baltic Sea. As part of the Miecznik program, the Polish government will acquire three frigate-class ships by 2032: the Navy’s most modern armed units available.

2. Investments in Defense and Purchases of Military Equipment

Poland has increasingly increased its military spending since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began. Since then, they have signed many contracts with the USA and South Korea for hundreds of tanks and howitzers. Poland also purchases Patriot air defense systems, HIMARS missile launchers, and F-35 combat aircraft from the United States. According to statistics, in 2023 Poland will spend 3.9% of its GDP on the defense budget, which means that it is currently in first place in the ranking of all NATO countries spending the most GDP. The Polish government intends to exceed those spendings up to 4% in 2024. It is also worth noting that Warsaw is buying hundreds of naval missiles for $ 2 billion. Apart from that, Minister of National Defense Mariusz Błaszczak signed a contract to deliver two new naval missile units that join the existing Naval Strike Missile anti-ship system. This contract will allow the Polish military to increase its coastal defense capabilities along the Baltic Sea.

3. Recruitment and Training

Another example of the Polish concept of protecting the NATO eastern flak is the Recruitment of soldiers, airmen, and sailors. The Polish armed forces recorded the highest Recruitment in 2022 since the end of compulsory military service. Moreover, the annual two-week, extensive naval exercise program in the region of Nothern Coasts is another example of Poland’s concept of protecting the eastern flank due to investments that started on September 9, 2023. It includes over 30 warships and 3,200 personnel from 14 nations who participate in this training in the Baltic Sea, primarily on the coasts of Estonia and Latvia, with a primary goal to focus on high-end warfare and the collective defense of NATO allies.

For several reasons, the Polish concept of protecting NATO’s eastern flank against Russian aggression may be successful. First, because Poland invests in defense and security in terms of government spending on defense (currently more than any NATO member state); second, it conducts broadly understood investments in the arms sector, production, and purchase of equipment; and third, Poland shows training, increased military conscription and raises the importance of the Polish military, and above all the Navy, which is also necessary to defend NATO’s eastern flank. However, Poland alone can not secure the whole of the NATO eastern flank; it needs its neighbors and the U.S. to mitigate or overcome potential Russian aggression.

What should be done is establishing and executing a collective doctrine of defense of the eastern flank, which should come into force as soon as possible. Such a joint pact will be able to dissuade Russia from its potential desire to invade NATO’s eastern flank or to show its military strength and thus deter Russia from any attempts to attack the strategic area of ​​the Baltic Sea, which is very important for NATO’s security.

 

Ewa A. Andryjalowicz, M.A. is a Researcher, Analyst, and Advisor at the House of Representatives in Germany and a multilingual international affairs professional with several years of research experience in Defense and Security Policy, concentrating on transatlantic (E.U./U.S.) long-term collaboration. She can be found on LinkedIn or contacted via e-mail at eandryjalowicz@gmail.com.


The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.