Trans-Atlantic Security in Baltic II: New Polish Government with Changes in the NATO Eastern Flank
The MOC
By
Ewa A. Andryjalowicz
January 25, 2024
The recent overthrow of the Polish government at the ballot box signals significant potential changes in the security posture of NATO’s strongest ally in Eastern Europe.
After the last parliamentary elections in Poland (October 2023), Donald Tusk from the center left K.O. (Civic Platform) returned to the position of Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland, replacing former conservative Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki from the PiS party (Law and Justice). With the new government, there may be changes in national defense policy, for instance, within the Maritime Spatial Development Plan(s) (MPS).
The critical strategic document (MPS) established priorities in sea use, which constitute an essential basis for resolving conflicts in Polish maritime areas. Poland adopted this Plan for internal sea waters, territorial seas, and exclusive economic zones by regulation of the Council of Ministers in 2021.
According to this document, the strategic goal of the state’s maritime policy was to increase the share of the maritime economy in the Polish GDP and to increase employment in the Polish maritime economy. The cross-sectoral policy provided the framework to replace the sectoral approach to managing naval affairs with a more comprehensive approach. All this was possible thanks to the elevation of maritime matters to the level of the Government of the Republic of Poland.
The maritime policy of the Republic of Poland included such priorities as strengthening and securing the development of ports, increasing the competitiveness of maritime transport, increasing maritime safety, improving the state of the sea and coastal defense, strengthening the naval economy based on knowledge and skills, supporting the sustainable use of natural resources of the oceans and seas and improving the management of marine areas. Among the mentioned directions, the most important priority was to strengthen the position of Polish ports, increase maritime transport’s competitiveness, and ensure marine economy safety.
The former Polish government developed the first maritime spatial development plan (2019), containing a unique analysis of the importance given to defense and national security in key policy documents on naval space, the use of naval space for national defense and security, and planned investments in maritime areas in terms of defense and national security, taking into account actual and potential conflicts with other uses of the sea.
However, the new Polish government may cause significant changes in priorities and approach to maritime policy in the Baltic Sea. Here are potential changes that may occur in Polish maritime policy after the new government took power in November last year:
New political priorities and greater focus on climate change and a green environment:
First, Poland’s new, pro-EU government may have other priorities than further investments in maritime security. It may place greater emphasis on climate and environmental protection in maritime policy, consequently leading to changes in the budget allocation for climate change, green energy, and the orientation of Polish policy. Despite significant successes in clean energy and energy security, Poland remains dependent on fossil fuels. For Poland to meet the requirements of all sectors, it would have to increase the share of renewable energy sources and reduce carbon dioxide emissions. The new government may try to do it much faster and could rely mostly on clean energy by 2024, which may lead to problems in maritime policy. Poland’s maritime infrastructure is not yet ready for a quick transition to ecological energy, and this could harm the navy.
Economic and investment considerations:
Second, the new government may change financial incentives and priorities related to maritime industries such as shipping, offshore energy, and port development. They could implement policies to support some sectors, reduce the government’s involvement in others, and terminate some contracts with the U.S., U.K., or South Korea. For instance, on November 29, 2023 in Warsaw, the event’s main goal was to present the KSS-III Batch II variant of the submarine currently equipped with the most modern unit in the Korean Navy. Moreover, the PiS government in May 2023 announced the reactivation of the submarine “Orka.” program This effort aims to procure submarines with Cruise Missiles for the Polish Navy and is supposed to be launched later this year, but whether this project will start is also questionable.
It may be challenging to predict changes, in what the new Polish government may introduce, and whether it will continue financing this equipment or transfer these expenses to other priorities. Such a scenario may occur because of a new government.
Current Speaker of the Polish Parliament Holownia announced that the new government may invalidate contracts signed by the previous PiS government. The newly elected Minister of National Defense, Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz, also mentioned that the new Ministry of National Defense management will review contracts with the South Korean industry. If it considers it possible to place orders for equipment for the Polish industrial army, this will happen, although it is difficult to predict.
Former Minister of National Defense, Mariusz Błaszczak (PiS), stated that the new government’s termination of contracts concluded by the previous government with Korea could weaken Poland’s security and expose it to real danger from Russia. He also emphasized that the annulment of the South Korean agreement would harm the Polish arms industry because the deal assumes the supply of equipment and its production in Poland as part of broad industrial cooperation between the two countries.
Legal framework and defense spending
Third, changes in government may lead to changes in national legislation and regulatory frameworks, which may impact maritime law, border security, or maritime energy policy.
Some opinion leaders suggest that financing for modernization may collapse starting in 2024.
In June 2023, the Polish Ports Congress 2030 was necessary for investors and Poland to discuss the future and directions of development of Polish ports and access to new technologies and opportunities in the construction industry, increasingly larger ships, cargo volumes, and today, it is questionable.
It is worth mentioning that Poland’s defense budget in 2023 was still worth USD 20 billion and willing to achieve a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of over 10% in 2024–2028. The key sectors of the Polish defense market are currently military land vehicles, missiles, and anti-missile defense systems, but also include warships and surface combatants, submarines, underwater combat systems, and marine engines, expanding the possibilities of maritime use of the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS). And all this may change.
Only in the last three years, between 2019 and 2021, did the PiS government spend almost EUR 1 billion on investments in port infrastructure in Poland, one-third more than the previous K.O. (Civic Platform), which is again in power. The last two years have brought much higher investments than the earlier years before the PiS government. Investments in port infrastructure included expenditure on improving port infrastructure and building new facilities. With the takeover of power in Poland, the new government may return to a financing mode similar to that of years ago, when defense spending was much lower.
It is also worth mentioning that Poland could hypothetically order more Miecznik frigates, but what the new Polish government decides is challenging to predict.
As a consequence, all these changes may lead to reduced effectiveness of naval operations on the eastern flank and weaken it in strengthening NATO’s security in this region.
Ewa A. Andryjalowicz, M.A. is a Researcher, Analyst, and Advisor at the House of Representatives in Germany and a multilingual international affairs professional with several years of research experience in Defense and Security Policy, concentrating on transatlantic (E.U./U.S.) long-term collaboration. She can be found on LinkedIn or contacted via e-mail at eandryjalowicz@gmail.com.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Ewa A. Andryjalowicz
The recent overthrow of the Polish government at the ballot box signals significant potential changes in the security posture of NATO’s strongest ally in Eastern Europe.
After the last parliamentary elections in Poland (October 2023), Donald Tusk from the center left K.O. (Civic Platform) returned to the position of Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland, replacing former conservative Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki from the PiS party (Law and Justice). With the new government, there may be changes in national defense policy, for instance, within the Maritime Spatial Development Plan(s) (MPS).
The critical strategic document (MPS) established priorities in sea use, which constitute an essential basis for resolving conflicts in Polish maritime areas. Poland adopted this Plan for internal sea waters, territorial seas, and exclusive economic zones by regulation of the Council of Ministers in 2021.
According to this document, the strategic goal of the state’s maritime policy was to increase the share of the maritime economy in the Polish GDP and to increase employment in the Polish maritime economy. The cross-sectoral policy provided the framework to replace the sectoral approach to managing naval affairs with a more comprehensive approach. All this was possible thanks to the elevation of maritime matters to the level of the Government of the Republic of Poland.
The maritime policy of the Republic of Poland included such priorities as strengthening and securing the development of ports, increasing the competitiveness of maritime transport, increasing maritime safety, improving the state of the sea and coastal defense, strengthening the naval economy based on knowledge and skills, supporting the sustainable use of natural resources of the oceans and seas and improving the management of marine areas. Among the mentioned directions, the most important priority was to strengthen the position of Polish ports, increase maritime transport’s competitiveness, and ensure marine economy safety.
The former Polish government developed the first maritime spatial development plan (2019), containing a unique analysis of the importance given to defense and national security in key policy documents on naval space, the use of naval space for national defense and security, and planned investments in maritime areas in terms of defense and national security, taking into account actual and potential conflicts with other uses of the sea.
However, the new Polish government may cause significant changes in priorities and approach to maritime policy in the Baltic Sea. Here are potential changes that may occur in Polish maritime policy after the new government took power in November last year:
New political priorities and greater focus on climate change and a green environment:
First, Poland’s new, pro-EU government may have other priorities than further investments in maritime security. It may place greater emphasis on climate and environmental protection in maritime policy, consequently leading to changes in the budget allocation for climate change, green energy, and the orientation of Polish policy. Despite significant successes in clean energy and energy security, Poland remains dependent on fossil fuels. For Poland to meet the requirements of all sectors, it would have to increase the share of renewable energy sources and reduce carbon dioxide emissions. The new government may try to do it much faster and could rely mostly on clean energy by 2024, which may lead to problems in maritime policy. Poland’s maritime infrastructure is not yet ready for a quick transition to ecological energy, and this could harm the navy.
Economic and investment considerations:
Second, the new government may change financial incentives and priorities related to maritime industries such as shipping, offshore energy, and port development. They could implement policies to support some sectors, reduce the government’s involvement in others, and terminate some contracts with the U.S., U.K., or South Korea. For instance, on November 29, 2023 in Warsaw, the event’s main goal was to present the KSS-III Batch II variant of the submarine currently equipped with the most modern unit in the Korean Navy. Moreover, the PiS government in May 2023 announced the reactivation of the submarine “Orka.” program This effort aims to procure submarines with Cruise Missiles for the Polish Navy and is supposed to be launched later this year, but whether this project will start is also questionable.
It may be challenging to predict changes, in what the new Polish government may introduce, and whether it will continue financing this equipment or transfer these expenses to other priorities. Such a scenario may occur because of a new government.
Current Speaker of the Polish Parliament Holownia announced that the new government may invalidate contracts signed by the previous PiS government. The newly elected Minister of National Defense, Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz, also mentioned that the new Ministry of National Defense management will review contracts with the South Korean industry. If it considers it possible to place orders for equipment for the Polish industrial army, this will happen, although it is difficult to predict.
Former Minister of National Defense, Mariusz Błaszczak (PiS), stated that the new government’s termination of contracts concluded by the previous government with Korea could weaken Poland’s security and expose it to real danger from Russia. He also emphasized that the annulment of the South Korean agreement would harm the Polish arms industry because the deal assumes the supply of equipment and its production in Poland as part of broad industrial cooperation between the two countries.
Legal framework and defense spending
Third, changes in government may lead to changes in national legislation and regulatory frameworks, which may impact maritime law, border security, or maritime energy policy.
Some opinion leaders suggest that financing for modernization may collapse starting in 2024.
In June 2023, the Polish Ports Congress 2030 was necessary for investors and Poland to discuss the future and directions of development of Polish ports and access to new technologies and opportunities in the construction industry, increasingly larger ships, cargo volumes, and today, it is questionable.
It is worth mentioning that Poland’s defense budget in 2023 was still worth USD 20 billion and willing to achieve a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of over 10% in 2024–2028. The key sectors of the Polish defense market are currently military land vehicles, missiles, and anti-missile defense systems, but also include warships and surface combatants, submarines, underwater combat systems, and marine engines, expanding the possibilities of maritime use of the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS). And all this may change.
The evidence shows that the previous government wanted to spend over 4% of GDP on Poland’s defense and security in 2024; the new government might be willing to cut this budget.
Only in the last three years, between 2019 and 2021, did the PiS government spend almost EUR 1 billion on investments in port infrastructure in Poland, one-third more than the previous K.O. (Civic Platform), which is again in power. The last two years have brought much higher investments than the earlier years before the PiS government. Investments in port infrastructure included expenditure on improving port infrastructure and building new facilities. With the takeover of power in Poland, the new government may return to a financing mode similar to that of years ago, when defense spending was much lower.
It is also worth mentioning that Poland could hypothetically order more Miecznik frigates, but what the new Polish government decides is challenging to predict.
As a consequence, all these changes may lead to reduced effectiveness of naval operations on the eastern flank and weaken it in strengthening NATO’s security in this region.
Ewa A. Andryjalowicz, M.A. is a Researcher, Analyst, and Advisor at the House of Representatives in Germany and a multilingual international affairs professional with several years of research experience in Defense and Security Policy, concentrating on transatlantic (E.U./U.S.) long-term collaboration. She can be found on LinkedIn or contacted via e-mail at eandryjalowicz@gmail.com.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.