The U.S. Navy’s Hybrid Fleet: Getting More Mission Ready Players on the Field​

The MOC

By George Galdorisi

In an address at a major military-industry conference, then-U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Michael Gilday revealed the Navy’s goal to grow to 500 ships. The “hyrbid fleet” would include 350 crewed vessels and 150 uncrewed maritime vessels.  His successor, Admiral Lisa Franchetti, has embraced this goal. The Chief of Naval Operations Navigation Plan for America’s Warfighting Navy presents Admiral Franchetti’s plan to scale robotic and autonomous systems and integrate them with crewed platforms, pointing directly to the goal of a 500-ship hybrid fleet. 

The reason for this commitment to uncrewed maritime vehicles is clear. During the height of the Reagan defense buildup in the mid-1980s, the U.S. Navy evolved a strategy to build a “600-ship Navy,” resulting in 594 total ships in 1987. That number has declined steadily during the past 35 years, and today the Navy has less than half the number of commissioned ships than it had then.  

Admiral Franchetti noted in her Navigation Plan that absent a large infusion of resources, it will not be possible to build a bigger traditional navy in a few short years—hence the focus on a hybrid fleet.  The rapid growth of the technologies that make uncrewed surface vessels (USVs) increasingly capable and affordable has provided the Navy with a potential way to put more hulls in the water. As explained in the Navigation Plan, the goal is to “put more mission ready players on the field in the shortest possible time.” 

However, Congress has been reluctant to authorize the Navy’s planned investment of billions of dollars in USVs until the Service can come up with a concept of operations (CONOPS) for using them. The Navy has announced plans to procure large numbers of uncrewed systems—especially large and medium uncrewed surface vessels—but a CONOPS has not yet emerged. Additionally, while the composition of the future Navy’s crewed vessels is relatively well understood—based on ships being built and being planned—what those uncrewed maritime vessels will look like, let alone what they will do, has yet to be fully determined. This helps explain why Admiral Franchetti has placed such an emphasis on a disciplined and focused introduction of uncrewed surface vessels into the hybrid Navy Fleet. 

The Navy has taken several actions to define what uncrewed maritime vessels will do and thus has accelerated its journey to have uncrewed platforms populate the fleet. These include publishing an UNMANNED Campaign Framework; standing up an Uncrewed Task Force; establishing Surface Development Squadron One in San Diego and Unmanned Surface Vessel Division One in Port Hueneme, CA; and conducting a large number of exercises, experiments and demonstrations where operators have had the opportunity to evaluate uncrewed maritime vessels. 

All of these initiatives will serve the Navy well in evolving a convincing CONOPS to describe how these innovative platforms can be leveraged, posing two important questions: 

  1. How will these platforms get to the operating area where they are needed (for example, the Western Pacific)? 
  2. What missions will they perform once they arrive? 

The answer to the first question is that the Navy has committed to obtaining a number of large uncrewed surface vessels (LUSVs). An evolving CONOPS is to marry various sizes of uncrewed surface, subsurface and aerial uncrewed vehicles to perform missions that the U.S. Navy has—and will continue to have—as the Navy-After-Next evolves. The Navy can use the evolving large uncrewed surface vessel as a “truck” to move smaller USVs, unmanned underwater vehicles, and unmanned aerial vehicles into the battle space to perform a number of important Navy missions such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and mine-countermeasures (MCM). 

While there are a wide range of medium uncrewed surface vessels (MUSVs) that can potentially meet the U.S. Navy’s needs, there are three uncrewed surface vessels that are furthest along in the development cycle. All are currently in production, are fully operational, and use commercial-off-the shelf (COTS) uncrewed systems that have been employed in recent Navy and Marine Corps events. They are: 

  • The Leidos Sea Hunter, and its sister ship, Sea Hawk, are the largest of the three. The Sea Hunter is a 132-foot-long trimaran (a central hull with two outriggers).  
  • The Maritime Tactical Systems Inc. (MARTAC), catamaran hull, unmanned surface vehicles (USV) include the MANTAS T12 and the Devil Ray T18, T24 and T38 craft. These USVs feature a modular and open architecture design. 

All three of these MUSVs are viable candidates to be part of an integrated uncrewed solution CONOPS. I will use the MANTAS and Devil Ray craft for a number of reasons. First, they come in different sizes with the same hull, mechanical and electrical (HME) attributes. Second, the Sea Hunter is simply too large to fit into the LUSVs the Navy is considering. Third, the CUSV is the MUSV of choice for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Mine-Countermeasures Mission Package, and all CUSVs scheduled to be procured are committed to this program.  

This scenario and CONOPS is built around an Expeditionary Strike Group underway in the Western Pacific.  This Strike Group includes three LUSVs under supervisory control from a large amphibious ship. Admiral Gilday suggested this CONOPS in early 2022 when he noted that he: “Wants to begin to deploy large and medium-sized uncrewed vessels as part of carrier strike groups and amphibious ready groups in 2027 or 2028.” The Navigation Plan reinforces this initiative by noting that the Navy’s overarching goal is to: “integrate mature uncrewed capabilities into all deploying carrier and expeditionary strike groups by 2027.” 

Depending on the size that is ultimately procured, the LUSV can carry a number of T38 Devil Ray uncrewed surface vehicles and deliver them to a point near the intended area of operations. The T38 can then be sent independently to perform the ISR mission or, alternatively, can launch one or more T12 MANTAS USVs 

For the MCM mission, the LUSV can deliver several T38s equipped with mine-hunting and mine-clearing systems (all of which are COTS platforms tested extensively in Navy exercises). These vessels can then undertake the “dull, dirty and dangerous” work previously conducted by sailors who had to operate in the minefield.  

While the full details of how this CONOPS plays out is beyond the scope of this article, this innovative approach accomplishes an important goal. If the U.S. Navy wants to keep its multi-billion-dollar capital ships out of harm’s way, it will need to surge uncrewed maritime vessels into the contested battlespace while its manned ships stay out of range of adversary A2/AD systems, sensors, and weapons. 

To be clear, this is not a platform-specific solution, but rather a concept. When fleet operators see a capability with different size unmanned COTS platforms in the water working together and successfully performing their missions, they will likely press industry to produce increasingly capable platforms to perform these missions.  

This disruptive capability delivered using emerging technologies can provide the U.S. Navy with near-term solutions to vexing operational challenges, while demonstrating to a skeptical Congress that the Navy has a CONOPS to employ the unmanned systems it wants to procure.

 

George Galdorisi is a career naval aviator and national security professional. His 30-year career as a naval aviator culminated in fourteen years of consecutive service as executive officer, commanding officer, commodore, and chief of staff. Additionally, he led the U.S. delegation for military-to-military talks with the Chinese Navy. He is the author of 18 books, including four New York Times bestsellers. His most recent book, “Algorithms and Armageddon: The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Future Wars, was published by the U.S. Naval Institute Press this year.


The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.