The U.S. cannot afford a Boomer Gap (No, Seriously)
The MOC
By
Blake Herzinger
November 30, 2023
The United States Navy’s submarine service has a proud and storied history. It reaches back to the nation’s founding, during the Revolutionary War, when David Bushnell sailed a hand-cranked wooden bathysphere, the ferociously-named Turtle, into battle. With the advent of America’s nuclear-powered submarine force in 1954, the United States has retained a considerable qualitative edge in the subsea domain. As military friction intensifies between the United States and the Peoples Republic of China — particularly with regard to China’s ability to threaten U.S. surface ships with its considerable magazine of anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles — the U.S. nuclear submarine force will be increasingly called upon for its ability to provide persistent, undetected presence and unparalleled combat strength. However, without considerably increased investment in the U.S. Navy, the costs of development and acquisition of a new class of ballistic missile submarine could hollow out its surface fleet.
The U.S. Navy operates three types of nuclear-powered submarines: nuclear powered attack submarines (“SSNs”), nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines (“SSGNs”), and nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (“SSBNs”). Only the SSBNs carry nuclear weapons. They are the U.S. Navy’s chief contribution to the nation’s strategic nuclear deterrent, as one of the U.S. nuclear triad’s three legs. This role is currently filled by the Ohio-class SSBN, a class of 14 boats built between 1974 and 1997. The newest of the class is nearly three decades old. Replacing the Ohio-class on time is the Navy’s “top priority” — and rightly so. Ensuring that the most survivable leg of the nuclear triad is modernized and ready to act when called upon is a matter of strategic importance for deterring adversaries and assuring U.S. allies as adversaries’ capabilities are rapidly developing. The final Ohio-class submarine will reach the end of its planned service life in 2040, leaving no space for delays in the Columbia-class SSBN program set to replace them. However, the transition is not without obstacles. These must be addressed now to avoid problems later, lest the Columbia program fall victim to the same pitfalls as the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ships, Zumwalt-class destroyer, and Ford-class nuclear powered aircraft carrier — all of which were plagued by delays and design problems.
Delays with the new SSBN’s design as well as from critical supply chain nodes have already been reported on, as well as the program’s rising costs. Issues in these early stages have a tendency to snowball, causing starts and stops around the fleet as insufficient resources are diverted to resolve deficiencies in one place, leaving gaps in others. The fact that U.S. Navy leaders have pledged to complete the Columbia-class transition at all costs is only somewhat reassuring. Without a more robust budget for the Navy that emphasis could very well come at the cost of other platforms the Navy needs. Navy procurement plans started highlighting this budget crunch in 2014 — seven years before the first Columbia-class was even procured its costs were forcing the Navy to forego other important acquisitions in the surface fleet.
Twelve Columbia-class SSBNs will deploy around the world on nuclear deterrent patrols from the U.S.’ two SSBN bases: Kings Bay, Georgia and Bangor, Washington. Traditionally, these deployments are conducted quietly, with tight operational security. This is to ensure that the submarines can remain undetected by adversaries that might seek to target and/or neutralize them, to blunt the ability of the U.S. to respond to a nuclear attack. During a deployment, SSBNs generally do not make public appearances or host ship visits abroad and typically remain submerged unless absolutely necessary to take on equipment or consumable stores (like food). However, in recent years, upticks in nuclear-backed escalation have brought about more muscular signaling with these vessels, including an appearance of USS West Virginia (“SSBN 736″) in the Arabian Sea in 2022 and a 2023 port call in Busan, South Korea by USS Kentucky (“SSBN 737”).
Nuclear deterrence issues were paramount in foreign policy conversations during Cold War as the U.S. and USSR jockeyed for global dominance and threatened one another with annihilation. But these fell from the limelight after the dissolution of the USSR. During the brief unipolar moment, the United States was largely unchallenged militarily, let alone in the nuclear domain. That is now changing. Russia threatens nuclear use in Eastern Europe while North Korea’s Kim Jong Un parades his own intercontinental ballistic missiles through the streets of Pyongyang and tests nuclear devices. China, too, is rapidly upgrading and expanding its nuclear arsenal, including its own survivable seaborne deterrent.
Russia’s SSBN force began an upgrade as early as 1996, when the keel was laid for the first of its Project 955 Borei-class boats, the Yuri Dolgorukiy; however, budget issues in post-Soviet Russia caused such severe delays that the Yuri Dolgorukiy was not accepted by the Russian Navy until 2013. While the first three Borei-class included hull sections from uncompleted Akula-class and Oscar-class submarines, the improved Borei-II will form the majority of Russia’s at-sea deterrent, replacing all older classes of ballistic missile submarines in Russia’s Northern and Pacific Fleets. China’s ballistic missile capability is immature but making relatively rapid developments. In 1981, China launched its first SSBN, the Xia-class, but the vessel was so limited in its capabilities that it is assessed never to have completed an armed deterrent patrol. The PLAN’s subsequent Type 094 Jia-class made significant improvements, particularly in terms of quieting and ability to launch a more sophisticated nuclear missile. And according to U.S. defense analysts, this represents China’s “first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent.” Even the Type 094, however, is louder than U.S. and Russian SSBNs built in the 1970s, prompting the PLAN to undertake development of its next-gen SSBN, the Type 096, which is expected to join the fleet in the late 2020s or early 2030s, operating alongside the 6 Type 094 SSBNs already in service.
In the face of these accelerating challenges, the United States cannot afford to let its own seaborne deterrent lag behind competitors’ and adversaries’ capabilities. The spectre of nuclear use is a horrible one, but the way to ensure it remains a remote possibility is for the United States to retain the strength and capability to dissuade others from resorting to such an attack. Funding and focus on the Columbia-class submarine transition over the decade ahead will be the determining factor in retaining that strength. It will require sustained emphasis from both sides of the political aisle, as well as from the taxpayer, to ensure the program’s success.
Blake Herzinger is an American navalist. He served as an active-duty intelligence officer and is the co-author of Carrier Killer, focused on the PLAN’s antiship ballistic missile program. He has been a Life Member of the Naval Institute since 2018 and is the Director for Membership in the Navy League’s Singapore Chapter. The views expressed in this article do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Government.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Blake Herzinger
The United States Navy’s submarine service has a proud and storied history. It reaches back to the nation’s founding, during the Revolutionary War, when David Bushnell sailed a hand-cranked wooden bathysphere, the ferociously-named Turtle, into battle. With the advent of America’s nuclear-powered submarine force in 1954, the United States has retained a considerable qualitative edge in the subsea domain. As military friction intensifies between the United States and the Peoples Republic of China — particularly with regard to China’s ability to threaten U.S. surface ships with its considerable magazine of anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles — the U.S. nuclear submarine force will be increasingly called upon for its ability to provide persistent, undetected presence and unparalleled combat strength. However, without considerably increased investment in the U.S. Navy, the costs of development and acquisition of a new class of ballistic missile submarine could hollow out its surface fleet.
The U.S. Navy operates three types of nuclear-powered submarines: nuclear powered attack submarines (“SSNs”), nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines (“SSGNs”), and nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (“SSBNs”). Only the SSBNs carry nuclear weapons. They are the U.S. Navy’s chief contribution to the nation’s strategic nuclear deterrent, as one of the U.S. nuclear triad’s three legs. This role is currently filled by the Ohio-class SSBN, a class of 14 boats built between 1974 and 1997. The newest of the class is nearly three decades old. Replacing the Ohio-class on time is the Navy’s “top priority” — and rightly so. Ensuring that the most survivable leg of the nuclear triad is modernized and ready to act when called upon is a matter of strategic importance for deterring adversaries and assuring U.S. allies as adversaries’ capabilities are rapidly developing. The final Ohio-class submarine will reach the end of its planned service life in 2040, leaving no space for delays in the Columbia-class SSBN program set to replace them. However, the transition is not without obstacles. These must be addressed now to avoid problems later, lest the Columbia program fall victim to the same pitfalls as the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ships, Zumwalt-class destroyer, and Ford-class nuclear powered aircraft carrier — all of which were plagued by delays and design problems.
Delays with the new SSBN’s design as well as from critical supply chain nodes have already been reported on, as well as the program’s rising costs. Issues in these early stages have a tendency to snowball, causing starts and stops around the fleet as insufficient resources are diverted to resolve deficiencies in one place, leaving gaps in others. The fact that U.S. Navy leaders have pledged to complete the Columbia-class transition at all costs is only somewhat reassuring. Without a more robust budget for the Navy that emphasis could very well come at the cost of other platforms the Navy needs. Navy procurement plans started highlighting this budget crunch in 2014 — seven years before the first Columbia-class was even procured its costs were forcing the Navy to forego other important acquisitions in the surface fleet.
Twelve Columbia-class SSBNs will deploy around the world on nuclear deterrent patrols from the U.S.’ two SSBN bases: Kings Bay, Georgia and Bangor, Washington. Traditionally, these deployments are conducted quietly, with tight operational security. This is to ensure that the submarines can remain undetected by adversaries that might seek to target and/or neutralize them, to blunt the ability of the U.S. to respond to a nuclear attack. During a deployment, SSBNs generally do not make public appearances or host ship visits abroad and typically remain submerged unless absolutely necessary to take on equipment or consumable stores (like food). However, in recent years, upticks in nuclear-backed escalation have brought about more muscular signaling with these vessels, including an appearance of USS West Virginia (“SSBN 736″) in the Arabian Sea in 2022 and a 2023 port call in Busan, South Korea by USS Kentucky (“SSBN 737”).
Nuclear deterrence issues were paramount in foreign policy conversations during Cold War as the U.S. and USSR jockeyed for global dominance and threatened one another with annihilation. But these fell from the limelight after the dissolution of the USSR. During the brief unipolar moment, the United States was largely unchallenged militarily, let alone in the nuclear domain. That is now changing. Russia threatens nuclear use in Eastern Europe while North Korea’s Kim Jong Un parades his own intercontinental ballistic missiles through the streets of Pyongyang and tests nuclear devices. China, too, is rapidly upgrading and expanding its nuclear arsenal, including its own survivable seaborne deterrent.
Russia’s SSBN force began an upgrade as early as 1996, when the keel was laid for the first of its Project 955 Borei-class boats, the Yuri Dolgorukiy; however, budget issues in post-Soviet Russia caused such severe delays that the Yuri Dolgorukiy was not accepted by the Russian Navy until 2013. While the first three Borei-class included hull sections from uncompleted Akula-class and Oscar-class submarines, the improved Borei-II will form the majority of Russia’s at-sea deterrent, replacing all older classes of ballistic missile submarines in Russia’s Northern and Pacific Fleets. China’s ballistic missile capability is immature but making relatively rapid developments. In 1981, China launched its first SSBN, the Xia-class, but the vessel was so limited in its capabilities that it is assessed never to have completed an armed deterrent patrol. The PLAN’s subsequent Type 094 Jia-class made significant improvements, particularly in terms of quieting and ability to launch a more sophisticated nuclear missile. And according to U.S. defense analysts, this represents China’s “first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent.” Even the Type 094, however, is louder than U.S. and Russian SSBNs built in the 1970s, prompting the PLAN to undertake development of its next-gen SSBN, the Type 096, which is expected to join the fleet in the late 2020s or early 2030s, operating alongside the 6 Type 094 SSBNs already in service.
In the face of these accelerating challenges, the United States cannot afford to let its own seaborne deterrent lag behind competitors’ and adversaries’ capabilities. The spectre of nuclear use is a horrible one, but the way to ensure it remains a remote possibility is for the United States to retain the strength and capability to dissuade others from resorting to such an attack. Funding and focus on the Columbia-class submarine transition over the decade ahead will be the determining factor in retaining that strength. It will require sustained emphasis from both sides of the political aisle, as well as from the taxpayer, to ensure the program’s success.
Blake Herzinger is an American navalist. He served as an active-duty intelligence officer and is the co-author of Carrier Killer, focused on the PLAN’s antiship ballistic missile program. He has been a Life Member of the Naval Institute since 2018 and is the Director for Membership in the Navy League’s Singapore Chapter. The views expressed in this article do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Government.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.