While Congress did agree on the fiscal year 2024 defense budget and that dissention has thrown defense spending into the void of the Continuing Resolution (CR) through at least 8 March 2024, thanks to an 18 January 2024 vote. Beyond the threat of government shutdown and with it pay and benefits for uniform and civilian employees of the Department of Defense (DoD,) a CR’s effects significantly impact new and ongoing acquisition programs, as well as operations and now aid packages to Ukraine and Israel still frozen in Congressional impasse. While a CR is better than a government shutdown it has significant negative effects. William LaPlante, the undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, said on the subject of a CR, “Depending on the ruleset … you only get [a] percentage of last year’s budget, and you get it in increments,” he said at a Politico event. “Number two, you can’t do new starts, you can surge, and everything basically slows down.” Congress must agree quickly on the FY2024 Defense Budget or risk current and future acquisition programs and ongoing operations.
What is a Continuing Resolution (CR?)
There are a total of 12 appropriations bills needed to be passed to operate the entire government for a year. A Continuing Resolution is a condition that exists when Congress cannot agree to enact appropriation bills to keep all aspects of government funded on 1 October at the start of the new fiscal year. When this does not happen Congress can use a “Continuing Resolution” as a, “temporary measure to fund government activities for a limited time” in order to avoid a partial or complete government shutdown. A CR gives Congress additional time to debate in order to fully fund the government for the entire fiscal year. For this fiscal year Congress has already implemented three CRs that have accounted for funding from October 2023 to 8 March 2024. That means that the DoD will have operated on a CR for a total of five of twelve months of the fiscal year if its appropriation act is passed on the schedule currently in place.
“DOD has started the fiscal year under a CR for 13 of the past 18 years (FY2002-FY2019) and every year since FY2010 excluding FY2019. The amount of time DOD has operated under CR authorities during the fiscal year has tended to increase in the past 10 years and equates to a total of more than 39 months since 2010.”
These late starts have lasting financial implications. In late 2017 for example, the Navy reported that over the course of the decade of the 2010’s CRs cost the service $4 billion dollars in funds needed for new construction, repair, and maintenance. Then Navy Secretary Richard Spencer stated,
“We have put $4 billion in a trash can, poured lighter fluid on it, and burned it,” Navy Secretary Richard Spencer said in remarks at a U.S. Naval Institute forum in Washington. “Four billion is enough to buy a squadron of F-35s, two Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, 3,000 Harpoon missiles. It’s enough money to buy us additional capacity that we need. Instead, it’s lost, because of inefficacy in the ways of the continuing resolution.”
Sequestration, automatic spending cuts that occur through the withdrawal of funding for certain government programs significantly impacted the submarine maintenance program, in the 2010’s and was likely one of the root cause of low submarine readiness in the present. CRs have been reported to have inflicted severe damage on specific navy programs in the 2010’s decade including the Zumwalt class destroyer and the Littoral Combat ship (LCS) that were further damaged in their execution due to lack of funds. This damage to both new construction and maintenance functions of the fleet have also delayed its growth to levels required to compete with China and Russia. In 2018, then-CNO Admiral Jonathan Greenert reported to Congress that,
“we need a Navy of 450 ships.” A government-funded study concludes the United States needs 14 aircraft carriers (the Navy has 10 operational), 160 cruisers and destroyers (the Navy has 84), and 72 attack submarines (the Navy has 52).” Even the more modest 355 ship fleet goal that Congress enacted into law in 2016 was likely damaged by periods of sequestration in the 2010’s decade.
Even if Congress does pass the finalized fiscal year 2024 defense appropriations bill in March 2024, there will be damage done to long-term Navy acquisition programs designed to grow the fleet to compete against China and Russia, as well as support short-notice, crisis deployment like the one ongoing in the Eastern Mediterranean as the Israel/Hamas war continues. Overall, if the CR process continues for a whole year the navy would lose 6% of its overall budget ($15.2b) that could grow as high as $28b due to what Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro described in Congressional testimony last month as continuing misalignment of funds to programs. Overall for the service that means the loss of one Constellation class frigate and one Virginia class submarine from the present year’s budget along with two small amphibious ships. The planned AUKUS partnership with Australia to provide that close U.S. allies with nuclear submarines could also be threatened by the threat of more CRs and sequestration.
A year-long CR would also significantly harm the existing fleet. It would also mean the loss of $4.6b in operations and maintenance costs for a force that is overworked and under-maintained to support 1/3 of its overall strength constantly deployed. The last issue has outsized effects as maintenance delays will further exacerbate Navy ship readiness after two decades of deployments in support of the global war on terror, combined with multiple periods of deferred maintenance. The CR harms sailors directly as well, with $2.2b less for service member pay, moving costs, housing and mental health programs for a workforce already struggling to meet recruiting goals.
Construction of the 2ndColumbia class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) however will commence construction despite the CR implementation. This specific exemption was written into the CR resolution and allows the navy to avoid the class falling further behind in construction. The Navy has already been forced to extend the life spans of the existing Ohio class SSBN’s in order to maintain the most survivable element of the nation’s nuclear deterrent force.
CRs and Sequestration are Just Bad.
Delays in the appropriation of defense funds harm national security. They harm not only the services and uniformed members but also the businesses waiting to build new defense systems or serve the needs of existing systems and personnel. Reform of the Defense budgeting process to the level of the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986 should be on the table. Greater agility in funding to include two-year execution of funds, the separation of capital improvement defense spending, operations and maintenance for existing systems should be considered. Defense personnel spending should perhaps be broken out as specific federal budget line rather than be combined into one massive budget. There is often unexpected complexity cost in growth and amalgamation of resources, such as the vulnerability of the large and complex budget package to subversion for one special interest group effort. Congress must act, not only to appropriate this year’s defense funding, but also to reform the complex defense budgeting process to allow swift passage of key, necessary funding that sustains U.S. national security.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Dr. Steven Wills
Figure 1: Virginia class SSN USS Arkansas under construction in Newport News in September 2023.
While Congress did agree on the fiscal year 2024 defense budget and that dissention has thrown defense spending into the void of the Continuing Resolution (CR) through at least 8 March 2024, thanks to an 18 January 2024 vote. Beyond the threat of government shutdown and with it pay and benefits for uniform and civilian employees of the Department of Defense (DoD,) a CR’s effects significantly impact new and ongoing acquisition programs, as well as operations and now aid packages to Ukraine and Israel still frozen in Congressional impasse. While a CR is better than a government shutdown it has significant negative effects. William LaPlante, the undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, said on the subject of a CR, “Depending on the ruleset … you only get [a] percentage of last year’s budget, and you get it in increments,” he said at a Politico event. “Number two, you can’t do new starts, you can surge, and everything basically slows down.” Congress must agree quickly on the FY2024 Defense Budget or risk current and future acquisition programs and ongoing operations.
What is a Continuing Resolution (CR?)
There are a total of 12 appropriations bills needed to be passed to operate the entire government for a year. A Continuing Resolution is a condition that exists when Congress cannot agree to enact appropriation bills to keep all aspects of government funded on 1 October at the start of the new fiscal year. When this does not happen Congress can use a “Continuing Resolution” as a, “temporary measure to fund government activities for a limited time” in order to avoid a partial or complete government shutdown. A CR gives Congress additional time to debate in order to fully fund the government for the entire fiscal year. For this fiscal year Congress has already implemented three CRs that have accounted for funding from October 2023 to 8 March 2024. That means that the DoD will have operated on a CR for a total of five of twelve months of the fiscal year if its appropriation act is passed on the schedule currently in place.
The Effect of a CR on the Navy in the Past
Continuing Resolutions buy time for Congress to complete debate and act, but they come at significant cost, especially to the services. In 2019 the Congressional Research Service (CRS) reported,
“DOD has started the fiscal year under a CR for 13 of the past 18 years (FY2002-FY2019) and every year since FY2010 excluding FY2019. The amount of time DOD has operated under CR authorities during the fiscal year has tended to increase in the past 10 years and equates to a total of more than 39 months since 2010.”
These late starts have lasting financial implications. In late 2017 for example, the Navy reported that over the course of the decade of the 2010’s CRs cost the service $4 billion dollars in funds needed for new construction, repair, and maintenance. Then Navy Secretary Richard Spencer stated,
“We have put $4 billion in a trash can, poured lighter fluid on it, and burned it,” Navy Secretary Richard Spencer said in remarks at a U.S. Naval Institute forum in Washington. “Four billion is enough to buy a squadron of F-35s, two Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, 3,000 Harpoon missiles. It’s enough money to buy us additional capacity that we need. Instead, it’s lost, because of inefficacy in the ways of the continuing resolution.”
Sequestration, automatic spending cuts that occur through the withdrawal of funding for certain government programs significantly impacted the submarine maintenance program, in the 2010’s and was likely one of the root cause of low submarine readiness in the present. CRs have been reported to have inflicted severe damage on specific navy programs in the 2010’s decade including the Zumwalt class destroyer and the Littoral Combat ship (LCS) that were further damaged in their execution due to lack of funds. This damage to both new construction and maintenance functions of the fleet have also delayed its growth to levels required to compete with China and Russia. In 2018, then-CNO Admiral Jonathan Greenert reported to Congress that,
“we need a Navy of 450 ships.” A government-funded study concludes the United States needs 14 aircraft carriers (the Navy has 10 operational), 160 cruisers and destroyers (the Navy has 84), and 72 attack submarines (the Navy has 52).” Even the more modest 355 ship fleet goal that Congress enacted into law in 2016 was likely damaged by periods of sequestration in the 2010’s decade.
Effects of a CR on the Navy into 2024
Figure 2: lower amidships hull of USS Constellation under construction at Fincantieri Marine, WI, 2024
Even if Congress does pass the finalized fiscal year 2024 defense appropriations bill in March 2024, there will be damage done to long-term Navy acquisition programs designed to grow the fleet to compete against China and Russia, as well as support short-notice, crisis deployment like the one ongoing in the Eastern Mediterranean as the Israel/Hamas war continues. Overall, if the CR process continues for a whole year the navy would lose 6% of its overall budget ($15.2b) that could grow as high as $28b due to what Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro described in Congressional testimony last month as continuing misalignment of funds to programs. Overall for the service that means the loss of one Constellation class frigate and one Virginia class submarine from the present year’s budget along with two small amphibious ships. The planned AUKUS partnership with Australia to provide that close U.S. allies with nuclear submarines could also be threatened by the threat of more CRs and sequestration.
A year-long CR would also significantly harm the existing fleet. It would also mean the loss of $4.6b in operations and maintenance costs for a force that is overworked and under-maintained to support 1/3 of its overall strength constantly deployed. The last issue has outsized effects as maintenance delays will further exacerbate Navy ship readiness after two decades of deployments in support of the global war on terror, combined with multiple periods of deferred maintenance. The CR harms sailors directly as well, with $2.2b less for service member pay, moving costs, housing and mental health programs for a workforce already struggling to meet recruiting goals.
Construction of the 2nd Columbia class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) however will commence construction despite the CR implementation. This specific exemption was written into the CR resolution and allows the navy to avoid the class falling further behind in construction. The Navy has already been forced to extend the life spans of the existing Ohio class SSBN’s in order to maintain the most survivable element of the nation’s nuclear deterrent force.
CRs and Sequestration are Just Bad.
Delays in the appropriation of defense funds harm national security. They harm not only the services and uniformed members but also the businesses waiting to build new defense systems or serve the needs of existing systems and personnel. Reform of the Defense budgeting process to the level of the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986 should be on the table. Greater agility in funding to include two-year execution of funds, the separation of capital improvement defense spending, operations and maintenance for existing systems should be considered. Defense personnel spending should perhaps be broken out as specific federal budget line rather than be combined into one massive budget. There is often unexpected complexity cost in growth and amalgamation of resources, such as the vulnerability of the large and complex budget package to subversion for one special interest group effort. Congress must act, not only to appropriate this year’s defense funding, but also to reform the complex defense budgeting process to allow swift passage of key, necessary funding that sustains U.S. national security.
Dr. Steven Wills, Navalist