The Osprey COD Aircraft: Versatile Logistics for the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps
The MOC
By
Richard R. Burgess
November 7, 2023
In early December 2023, the U.S. Navy will de-activate one of its two fleet logistics support squadrons, VRC-30, which flew the Grumman C-2A Greyhound carrier-onboard delivery (“COD”) aircraft. The closure will leave only one other C-2A squadron, VRC-40, which also will be de-activated over the next two years. For decades, these VRC squadrons, plus one other, VR-24, provided two-plane C-2A detachments to deploying aircraft carriers, and serviced carriers conducting training off the coast. The C-2A, a derivative of the E-2 Hawkeye carrier-based radar warning aircraft, carried personnel, mail, spare parts, and other priority cargo to and from the carriers and shore bases.
For the first time in more than a generation, a newly built COD aircraft has entered service with the fleet. The Bell-Boeing CMV-22B Osprey tiltrotor transport aircraft takes off and lands vertically or in a short takeoff/landing mode. The CMV-22B is changing the COD concept of operations and is giving Navy intra-theater logistics a new flexibility and operational effectiveness.
Transport and Logistics
The CMV-22B is a derivative of the Marine Corps’ MV-22B Osprey transport, which has operated for more than 15 years in support of Marine Corps expeditionary units. The main differences between the CMV-22B and the MV-22B are minimal: the CMV-22B is equipped with a high-frequency radio — for long-range communications — extra fuel capacity, improved fuel dump capability, improved lighting for cargo handling, and a public address system.
The CMV-22B was first deployed in August 2021 on board the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (“CVN 70”). The timing was not coincidental. Also making its first deployment was the Lockheed Martin F-35C Lightning II strike fighter, also on-board Carl Vinson. The CMV-22B was needed because—unlike the C-2A—its cargo bay is able to accommodate the power module of the F135 engine of the F-35C. Every carrier deploying with F-35Cs on board will also carry a detachment of CMV-22Bs.
The Navy has established three squadrons of CMV-22Bs. The squadrons—known as Fleet Logistics Multi-Mission Squadrons (VRMs)—include VRM-30 at Naval Air Station North Island, California; VRM-40, to be located at Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia; and VRM-50, the fleet replacement squadron, with the role of training Osprey crews at North Island.
VRM-30 has been deploying three CMV-22Bs in each detachment, a change from the typical two-plane detachments of C-2As on deploying carriers. This change in itself gives a carrier strike more flexibility and capacity in its logistics.
Range and Landing Capabilities
The vertical flight capability of the CMV-22B changes the pattern and flexibility of carrier operations. Aircraft carriers, because of the nature of their flight operations, operate flight cycles with pre-set launch and recovery times. Frequently, because of such factors distance from air bases, weather constraints, and other contingencies, the COD operations must be conducted outside of normal carrier flight cycles. Aircraft often must be re-positioned on the flight deck to recover and launch the C-2As.
Not so much with the CMV-22B. Like a helicopter, a CMV-22B can land in a relatively small area of the carrier’s flight deck, making the Osprey’s flight operations much less disruptive to a carrier’s launch and recovery cycles. The vertical flight capability also enables the CMV-22B to land at sites other than airfields. The CMV-22B has a range—1,150 nautical miles with 6,000 pounds of cargo—comparable to that of the C-2A. The aerial refueling capability of the CMV-22B also can extend its range and adds greater safety to operations at sea.
Figure 1. A CMV-22B Osprey, assigned to the Titans of Fleet Logistics Multi-Mission Squadron (VRM) 30, prepares to take off from the flight deck of the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70). Image from the U.S. Navy.
Advantages of the CMV-22B versus Alternatives
Strike group logistics also derive flexibility and capability with the CMV-22B. Helicopters have, for decades, been the preferred method for delivering personnel and cargo to escorting warships, including cruisers and destroyers. Helicopters still will carry the burden of this role, but the CMV-22B’s cargo bay has greater capacity than the MH-60 helicopter. (The larger MH-53E helicopter is scheduled for retirement in 2025.) And for ships which have no space to land an Osprey, the CMV-22B has a cargo hook for carrying stores externally. Another advantage of the Osprey is that, if needed, it can deliver cargo to a surface ship directly rather than having the cargo transferred on the carrier deck to a helicopter for further delivery.
The speed of the CMV-22B is twice that of the H-60 helicopter, and the range of the CMV-22B is nearly three times that of the H-60, factors which would enable escort ships in a strike group to operate farther away from the carrier and still be tethered to airborne logistics. This would facilitate Distributed Maritime Operations, especially when strike group ships operate in a disaggregated manner. The range also would enhance the ability of a carrier strike group to support logistics, if needed, for expeditionary advanced base operations of the Marine Corps.
The range and vertical flight capability of the CMV-22B also give it an expanded medical evacuation capability. A Marine Corps MV-22B recently demonstrated the ability to hover over a ballistic-missile submarine at sea and deliver cargo by hoist. An Osprey could evacuate a medical patient from a submarine much farther at sea and speed the patient to a medical facility much faster than could a helicopter, a capability that would be less disruptive to covert submarine operations.
Figure 2. U.S. Navy sailors load an F-35C Lightning II power module onto a CMV-22B Osprey. Photo from the U.S. Navy.
Lastly, the CMV-22B has most of its parts in common with the much more numerous Marine Corps MV-22Bs, a factor which could ease maintenance issues and help sustain readiness. The Navy has ordered a total of 48 CMV-22Bs, the last of which are scheduled to be delivered by June 2026. The aircraft’s versatility may demonstrate an advantage of increasing procurement beyond the current program. Osprey production is winding down, and at some point in the next few years the line will shut down.
In recent years, Navy and Marine Corps leaders have placed increasing emphasis on modernizing logistics, given the vast expanse of the Pacific theater with the need for modernized and more flexible logistics to support the distributed maritime forces deployed to the theater. The CMV-22B, a welcome modernization in any theater, is a particularly timely addition to the U.S. Pacific Fleet, providing logistics support especially to the Navy and Marine Corps F-35C squadrons now routinely deploying that 5th-generation strike fighter to the Western Pacific.
Richard R. Burgess, a former naval flight officer, is senior editor of Seapower magazine.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Richard R. Burgess
In early December 2023, the U.S. Navy will de-activate one of its two fleet logistics support squadrons, VRC-30, which flew the Grumman C-2A Greyhound carrier-onboard delivery (“COD”) aircraft. The closure will leave only one other C-2A squadron, VRC-40, which also will be de-activated over the next two years. For decades, these VRC squadrons, plus one other, VR-24, provided two-plane C-2A detachments to deploying aircraft carriers, and serviced carriers conducting training off the coast. The C-2A, a derivative of the E-2 Hawkeye carrier-based radar warning aircraft, carried personnel, mail, spare parts, and other priority cargo to and from the carriers and shore bases.
For the first time in more than a generation, a newly built COD aircraft has entered service with the fleet. The Bell-Boeing CMV-22B Osprey tiltrotor transport aircraft takes off and lands vertically or in a short takeoff/landing mode. The CMV-22B is changing the COD concept of operations and is giving Navy intra-theater logistics a new flexibility and operational effectiveness.
Transport and Logistics
The CMV-22B is a derivative of the Marine Corps’ MV-22B Osprey transport, which has operated for more than 15 years in support of Marine Corps expeditionary units. The main differences between the CMV-22B and the MV-22B are minimal: the CMV-22B is equipped with a high-frequency radio — for long-range communications — extra fuel capacity, improved fuel dump capability, improved lighting for cargo handling, and a public address system.
The CMV-22B was first deployed in August 2021 on board the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (“CVN 70”). The timing was not coincidental. Also making its first deployment was the Lockheed Martin F-35C Lightning II strike fighter, also on-board Carl Vinson. The CMV-22B was needed because—unlike the C-2A—its cargo bay is able to accommodate the power module of the F135 engine of the F-35C. Every carrier deploying with F-35Cs on board will also carry a detachment of CMV-22Bs.
The Navy has established three squadrons of CMV-22Bs. The squadrons—known as Fleet Logistics Multi-Mission Squadrons (VRMs)—include VRM-30 at Naval Air Station North Island, California; VRM-40, to be located at Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia; and VRM-50, the fleet replacement squadron, with the role of training Osprey crews at North Island.
VRM-30 has been deploying three CMV-22Bs in each detachment, a change from the typical two-plane detachments of C-2As on deploying carriers. This change in itself gives a carrier strike more flexibility and capacity in its logistics.
Range and Landing Capabilities
The vertical flight capability of the CMV-22B changes the pattern and flexibility of carrier operations. Aircraft carriers, because of the nature of their flight operations, operate flight cycles with pre-set launch and recovery times. Frequently, because of such factors distance from air bases, weather constraints, and other contingencies, the COD operations must be conducted outside of normal carrier flight cycles. Aircraft often must be re-positioned on the flight deck to recover and launch the C-2As.
Not so much with the CMV-22B. Like a helicopter, a CMV-22B can land in a relatively small area of the carrier’s flight deck, making the Osprey’s flight operations much less disruptive to a carrier’s launch and recovery cycles. The vertical flight capability also enables the CMV-22B to land at sites other than airfields. The CMV-22B has a range—1,150 nautical miles with 6,000 pounds of cargo—comparable to that of the C-2A. The aerial refueling capability of the CMV-22B also can extend its range and adds greater safety to operations at sea.
Figure 1. A CMV-22B Osprey, assigned to the Titans of Fleet Logistics Multi-Mission Squadron (VRM) 30, prepares to take off from the flight deck of the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70). Image from the U.S. Navy.
Advantages of the CMV-22B versus Alternatives
Strike group logistics also derive flexibility and capability with the CMV-22B. Helicopters have, for decades, been the preferred method for delivering personnel and cargo to escorting warships, including cruisers and destroyers. Helicopters still will carry the burden of this role, but the CMV-22B’s cargo bay has greater capacity than the MH-60 helicopter. (The larger MH-53E helicopter is scheduled for retirement in 2025.) And for ships which have no space to land an Osprey, the CMV-22B has a cargo hook for carrying stores externally. Another advantage of the Osprey is that, if needed, it can deliver cargo to a surface ship directly rather than having the cargo transferred on the carrier deck to a helicopter for further delivery.
The speed of the CMV-22B is twice that of the H-60 helicopter, and the range of the CMV-22B is nearly three times that of the H-60, factors which would enable escort ships in a strike group to operate farther away from the carrier and still be tethered to airborne logistics. This would facilitate Distributed Maritime Operations, especially when strike group ships operate in a disaggregated manner. The range also would enhance the ability of a carrier strike group to support logistics, if needed, for expeditionary advanced base operations of the Marine Corps.
The range and vertical flight capability of the CMV-22B also give it an expanded medical evacuation capability. A Marine Corps MV-22B recently demonstrated the ability to hover over a ballistic-missile submarine at sea and deliver cargo by hoist. An Osprey could evacuate a medical patient from a submarine much farther at sea and speed the patient to a medical facility much faster than could a helicopter, a capability that would be less disruptive to covert submarine operations.
Figure 2. U.S. Navy sailors load an F-35C Lightning II power module onto a CMV-22B Osprey. Photo from the U.S. Navy.
Lastly, the CMV-22B has most of its parts in common with the much more numerous Marine Corps MV-22Bs, a factor which could ease maintenance issues and help sustain readiness. The Navy has ordered a total of 48 CMV-22Bs, the last of which are scheduled to be delivered by June 2026. The aircraft’s versatility may demonstrate an advantage of increasing procurement beyond the current program. Osprey production is winding down, and at some point in the next few years the line will shut down.
In recent years, Navy and Marine Corps leaders have placed increasing emphasis on modernizing logistics, given the vast expanse of the Pacific theater with the need for modernized and more flexible logistics to support the distributed maritime forces deployed to the theater. The CMV-22B, a welcome modernization in any theater, is a particularly timely addition to the U.S. Pacific Fleet, providing logistics support especially to the Navy and Marine Corps F-35C squadrons now routinely deploying that 5th-generation strike fighter to the Western Pacific.
Richard R. Burgess, a former naval flight officer, is senior editor of Seapower magazine.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.