The Grand Voyage of the Amerigo Vespucci and Italy’s Lost Opportunities​

By Anna Matilde Bassoli

In 1907, the largest American fleet ever put out to sea left the anchors at Hampton Roads, Virginia, to sail the world’s oceans for the first time. The Great White Fleet, as it has been passed down in history, was not only a substantial demonstration of strength and presence but also a key strategic step in President Theodore Roosevelt’s grand plan for America’s naval status. Among similar celebrations, on a sunny day of early June this year, the Italian Navy tall ship Amerigo Vespucci–a 92-year-old nearly 330-feet long training sailing vessel–departed the crowded port of Genoa where authorities and citizens reunited to bid farewell to the ocean ambassador of Italian culture and craftmanship. Although this picturesque image seems to portray the Italian “new look” on defense and security, reality strikes differently. The mission of the Amerigo Vespucci is to promote Italian soft power’s assets around the world. However, as the country with the highest number of UNESCO world heritage sites on its territory and sound channels of soft power promotion for culture and artisanal production, Italy does not need more soft power projection. In this respect, the Grand Voyage of the Vespucci is a lost opportunity for Italy to do what it needs the most: set a clear Indo-Pacific strategy.

Figure 1. The Amerigo Vespucci. Photo from MassLive.

The striking comparison between the purposes of the two cruises is crucial to understand the current movers and shakers of Italian foreign policy. On the one hand, Giorgia Meloni’s polar star is the Italian national interest, broadly defined from support for ‘Made in Italy’ production, to strengthen Italy’s role in European affairs. On the other hand, her government has focused on revitalizing Italian defense through new partnerships and investments on high-tech hardware, even promising to increase Italian defense budget to meet NATO requirements. The connection between these two drivers of the Italian government is restoring the country’s credibility to fulfill its regional aspirations and ensuring it has an equal place at the table of great countries. Credibility is a vital necessity for Meloni, who is navigating her role as the first far-right female Prime Minister of a G7 country.

In this respect, the recent reconsideration of Italy’s role as the Western European docking point of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (“BRI”) plays a key role in Giorgia Meloni’s calculations. Originally signed under the First Conte’s government, Italy’s participation in BRI has always been controversial, and Giorgia Meloni has always been well aware of  how this initiative impacted Italian credibility abroad. In the same breath, Meloni’s quest for credibility is reverting the direction of Italian focus; if in 2019, China came to Europe to court Italy, now Italy looks at the Indo-Pacific. And not as China’s friend.

For now, Italy’s pivot to the Indo-Pacific has resulted in renewed defense talks in the Indian Ocean and a stronger partnership with Japan. Yet, the lack of a formal strategy and the strong alignment with European objectives highlights the overlap between credibility and national interests that fuels the strategic logic of the Meloni’s government. The reasoning is simple: if Italy follows suit in the Indo-Pacific–where all great powers, including European senior partners like France and Germany are heading–then Italy will not only count as a significant power, but it will also demonstrate its reliability and finally shake off its controversial reputation towards China.

However, there are two important flaws in the Meloni’s government’s logic. For starters, Italy is a late-comer when it comes to the Indo-Pacific, and so far, its engagement has consisted of the deploying the multipurpose offshore patrol vessel Nave Francesco Morosini for a five-month mission in 2023 and planning to deploy the aircraft carrier Cavour at the end of 2023 (at the earliest). Although these deployments will signal resolve over Italy’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific, it is unclear what the Italian national objectives are, especially since Italy has yet to publish its own Indo-Pacific strategy. This leaves the Italian pivot to the Indo-Pacific highly dependent on European affairs and the elections looming ahead. Meloni must hope for a sweeping success to change the balance of power in the European Union (“EU”), with no guarantee that France and Germany will leave Italy the space of major player that the country so desperately craves. In this respect, Italy’s lack of a formal strategy independent of European objectives highlights its strategic tension between credibility and national interest. Without a thoughtful strategy, the necessity to deal with its partners’ role in the Indo-Pacific and Meloni’s attachment to Italian national interest risks colliding.

Second, pivoting to the Indo-Pacific requires a solid maritime strategy, but a maritime strategy is only as credible as the strength of a country’s naval force. In this respect, sending a training tall ship to tour the world in such a crucial moment for Italian naval focus is hardly a savvy strategic choice. Rather, this move demonstrates how Italian maritime strategy is still in-between its traditional lack of seapower culture and Italy’s new aspirations in the Indo-Pacific that need a strong maritime posture to fulfill their quest for credibility. Some observers have noticed that Italy is stepping beyond its historical focus in the Mediterranean, which constrains Italy’s interests into a regional dimension.

Can Italy’s Mediterranean strategy serve as a guide for its future Indo-Pacific strategy? There are two critical elements that make Italy’s pivot to the Indo-Pacific dangerously susceptible to the stormy waters of Italian politics. It is unclear what successes Italy can account for in its Mediterranean strategy. Not only has the Mediterranean Basin recently reached a recent–and precarious–stability after the 2011 Arab Spring wave, but Italy has only recently developed its new strategic plan for the Mediterranean. Truth is, Italy displayed a realpolitik attitude when it came to the Mediterranean, especially towards Libya, but this is hardly a gameplay that will work in the Indo-Pacific where Italy has no traditional stake and geopolitical presence.

Finally, Italy’s Indo-Pacific pivot will never be complete due to the complex dynamics of the Mediterranean that still populate Italian domestic politics. The new EU deal with Tunisia to curb the migration flow and intricated Franco-Italian relations in Sub-Saharan Africa, especially in the wake of the recent coup in Niger, highlights how the Mediterranean–and especially the migration route–will always be Italy’s main strategic front. Therefore, it is unlikely that Italy will ever be completely committed to the Indo-Pacific, whether on its own initiative or in concert with its transatlantic partners.

Italy’s pivot to the Indo-Pacific demonstrates how immature Italian maritime strategy remains. Driven by want for regional and international credibility instead of sound goals and an assessment of appropriate means, Italy risks a hard fight to maintain its commitments and its “new look” credibility in the eyes of allies and partners, especially across the pond. Rather than focusing on the Indo-Pacific as the new, shiny geopolitical ground of the 21^st century, Italy should reassess its maritime strategy and formulate clear goals to prevent tensions between its interests and its allies’ priorities. But, as Theodore Roosevelt understood at the beginning of the 20^th century, navies’ world tours are not for bolstering cultures but showing off naval assets and cementing sea power. The Amerigo Vespucci is not sailing towards these goals, and surely, it will not give Italy the maritime credibility it needs for its pivot to Asia.

 

Anna Matilde Bassoli is a second-year graduate student at Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program. She also holds a Master of Letters in Strategic Studies from the University of St Andrews. She currently works for the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. The views expressed in this article are the sole opinions of the author and do not reflect the views of Georgetown University or the Security Studies Program.

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The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.