The Fragile High Mast of Empire; British Royal Navy Cruising Strategy; Then and Now​

The ongoing deployment of the British carrier strike group to the Indo-Pacific, named Operation High Mast,” was in the news this week for both regular and unusual reasons. The strike group is  participating in the semi-annual Pacific exercise Talisman Sabre but it also came under fire from American Under Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby, who purportedly commented that the United States did not want the U.K. naval group in the Pacific and preferred that it instead cover Britain’s own near abroad, perhaps in the North Atlantic or Mediterranean Sea. Opinions differ on where and when U.S. allies should deploy in support of U.S. operations, but Operation High Mast is not a new concept. It is a scaled down version of the early twentieth century global voyage of the U.S. Great White Fleet. This concept, with the modern label of a “cruising strategy,” has been employed by the U.K. Royal Navy on numerous occasions; from the largely successful Empire Cruise of 1923-1924, and the disastrous mission of Force Z, which included the namesake of the present HMS Prince of Wales currently conducting Operation Highmast. A cruising strategy is a good way for a power with limited resources to “show the flag” with its arguable best ships in support of wider geostrategy. It does however have significant limitations in that the cruising force might not be in the right place at the right time to directly impact national policy.

Twentieth Century Cruising Strategies

Modern cruising strategies in both peace and war have the origins in the twentieth century beginning with the voyage of the Great White Fleet in 1907-1909. The brainchild of President Theodore Roosevelt, the U.S. Navy deployed its most modern battleships on a circumnavigation of the globe to demonstrate America’s naval power and reach in the wake of the Russo-Japanese War. The Japanese Imperial Navy defeated and scattered its Russian counterpart in the Pacific and then went on to sink or capture nearly the entire Russian Baltic Fleet battle force that had been rushed from Europe to the Far East to salvage the declining Russian fortunes of war. Roosevelt intended that the “Great White Fleet” would prove that the battle effectiveness of a steam-powered squadron could be maintained over a long voyage, in contrast to the Russian experience, that later was known as the “Voyage of the Damned”. The Great White Fleet’s successful voyage was said to have sent a deterrent message to the Japanese and proclaimed the might of the U.S. Navy to thew world community. Some observers have suggested it was one of the starting points of U.S.-Japanese great power rivalry which led to war between the two nations less than forty years later, with Great White Fleet junior officers like future Admiral William “Bull” Halsey leading the fight against the Imperial Japanese fleet.

Since 1945 the U.S. Navy has been large enough to deploy to multiple world oceans without the need a cruising strategy. Cruises for public affairs purposes have been undertaken such as the 1964 cruise of the new nuclear-powered carrier USS Enterprise, and cruisers Long Beach, and Bainbridge in Operation Sea Orbit. Sea Orbit was conceived by U.S. Navy Admiral John S. McCain Jr , who saw the mission as a modern, nuclear version of the Great White Fleet to demonstrate how nuclear-powered ships could operate free of many land-based logistics.

The Royal Navy’s Cruising Strategy

The U.K. Royal Navy’s twentieth century cruising strategy has a mixed record. In 1923-1924, the new battlecruiser HMS Hood, and the earlier battlecruiser HMS Repulse executed what was billed as the “Empire Cruise” designed to show the flag in the more remote areas of the British Empire, especially in the Southwest Pacific and Australia, waters. The Royal Navy Deputy Chief of Staff noted in the cruise proposal to the First Sea Lord as an opportunity to, “give our own ships more experience of long distance cruises and of waters practically unvisited by the Navy at large for nearly 20 years”.

The Empire cruise was successful in showcasing British naval technology and power to friends and foes alike, but the lack of persistence of modern capital ships in remote waters undermined any lasting deterrence effects. Just eighteen years later, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill dispatched HMS Repulse again to the Southwest Pacific, but this time in company with the new battleship HMS Prince of Wales to serve as a deterrent to Japan to joining the conflict already underway between Germany and Italy and the now embattled Britain standing alone against the Fascist alliance. Japan had however already decided on war and embarked on conflict against both the United States and Great Britain on 7 December 1941. Churchill’s small deterrent force, now titled Force Z, was now employed quite different from his intentions. A combat task force including Prince of Wales and Repulse under the command of Vice Admiral Sir Tom Phillips sought to destroy Japanese transports invading Malaya. Operating without air cover or support, Phillips’ small force was attacked and sunk by Japanese land-based aircraft on 10 December 1941. In many ways, the destruction of Force Z represented the end of independent deployable and supportable global British seapower.

Operation Highmast in 2025

Eighty-four years after the loss of Force Z, and forty seven years after the last British conventional take off and landing carrier (HMS Ark Royal,) left active service, the Operation Highmast flagship HMS Prince of Wales currently embarks just two strike fighter squadrons which amount to less than twenty five aircraft. These F-35B 5^th generation strike aircraft that are much more capable than the Harrier VSTOL aircraft employed but the previous Invincible-class light carriers, and even the FG-1 Phantom and Blackburn Buccaneer aircraft carried in Ark Royal. However, quantity has a quality all its own, however, and the limited aircraft embarked in the strike group limits its offensive capabilities.

HMS Prince of Wales also relies heavily on Commonwealth and allied navy ships to provide escorts, making it more a Commonwealth and Allied strike group. Its combat logistics are limited by the lack of an assigned full spectrum, Royal Fleet Auxiliary, with the last carrier deployer RFA Fort Victoria laid up awaiting a refit and crew. RFA Tidespring provides a more limited replenishment capacity.

The real question remains whether it’s more important to have twenty four more F-35B aircraft in the Western Pacific alongside hundreds of U.S. navy fixed wing carrier aircraft, or as the core perhaps of a rotational European carrier deployment in the Eastern Mediterranean or Red Sea region. It also remains unclear whether the shrinking Royal Navy and Royal Fleet Auxiliary can continue to source global cruising strategy deployments like Operation Highmast. U.S. Under Secretary Colby may have a point in that while having allies in support of operations is good, where they appear and in what context those operations take place matter. A regular, rotational European carrier presence in the Mediterranean or Red Seas might be a better use of allied carrier aviation than infrequent Pacific deployments.

Dr. Steve Wills is the Navalist at The Center for Maritime Strategy.

The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.