The Fleet in Being in the 21st Century: A Book Review
The MOC
By
Michael D. Purzycki
March 19, 2026
With the world’s attention focused on the war in Iran, maritime observers can point to the role of the U.S. Navy in destroying the Islamic Republic’s military assets. From carrier-based aircraft striking targets on land to a U.S. submarine sinking an Iranian frigate in the Indian Ocean, modern American naval might is apparent in this conflict. At the same time, as American planners decide how to deter aggression by China and Russia, there are lessons from the past that can help them prepare.
In 1690, England and France were in the midst of one of their many wars. In the Nine Years’ War, England and several allies were reacting to French King Louis XIV’s invasion of the Holy Roman Empire. However, France was not the only enemy English King William III had to worry about. Having ousted his father-in-law James II two years earlier, William was in Ireland trying to stamp out the last resistance to his control of the British Isles as the French navy appeared off the English coast.
An Anglo-Dutch fleet stood between King Louis’ ships and the English coast. At the Battle of Beachy Head, Admiral Arthur Herbert, 1st Earl of Torrington, saw that he was outnumbered, and chose to fight the French from a distance rather than engaging them head-on. Explaining his actions to his superiors, he wrote, “most men were in fear that the French would invade; but I was always of another opinion; for I always said, that whilst we had a fleet in being, they would not dare to make an attempt.”
The term “fleet in being” thus entered the naval lexicon. While major battles are often the most memorable actions navies perform, simply having a fleet in the right place at the right time can also be an effective use of maritime assets. Likewise, the mere presence of an enemy fleet, especially in an unexpected location, makes strategists’ jobs more difficult.
In a new book from Naval Institute Press, Deterrence and Denial: The Power of Fleets in Being, a variety of scholars analyzes different countries’ use of fleets in being over the past three hundred years, looking for lessons modern navies can learn. The volume’s editor is historian Sarah C.M. Paine, who for 25 years taught strategy and policy at the U.S. Naval War College. She has coedited books on such naval subjects as blockades, commerce raiding, coalitions, expeditionary warfare, and non-military uses of navies. YouTube viewers with an interest in geopolitics may recognize Dr. Paine from videos hosted by podcaster Dwarkesh Patel, including her discussion of the different mentalities of maritime and continental powers.
Victory at sea does not come only from firepower and technology. It also comes from leaders’ employment of the tools at their disposal in clever ways. Constraints on raw power can force naval and political leaders to think creatively about how best to defend their nation’s interests. The case studies discussed in Deterrence and Denial teach many lessons as to how a fleet in being may, depending on circumstances, help a country make efficient use of limited naval strength.
For example, in the years leading up to the First World War, Imperial Germany undertook a massive naval buildup, with the goal of replacing Britain as the world’s predominant naval power. This policy, however, simply led Britain to expand its fleet even further, and to draw closer politically to Germany’s main continental rivals, France and Russia. When the war began, The Imperial German Navy was not strong enough to confront Britain’s Royal Navy on the high seas.
The German surface fleet thus spent most of the war acting as a de facto fleet in being, protecting the North Sea coast against a possible British attack, with the notable exception being the Battle of Jutland. The U-boat became Germany’s most destructive offensive maritime weapon. Even though Germany lost the war, it could be argued that the naval aspect of its war effort was quite successful. However, if Berlin had sought a defensive fleet from the outset, rather than an armada to rival Britain’s, it could perhaps have achieved the same naval result at a significantly lower cost.
A ‘fleet in being’ need not always be used to defend its country’s homeland. Placing one further away can compel an adversary to disperse forces it might otherwise be able to concentrate. During the Cold War, long distances separated the Soviet Baltic, Black Sea, Northern, and Pacific Fleets, making it exceedingly difficult for them to gather in the event of a conflict with NATO. Turkey could close the Dardanelles if it chose, while sailing from the Baltic to the Atlantic required passing Denmark, Norway, Britain, and Iceland. NATO’s control of these chokepoints also meant it could sever Soviet commercial ties to large parts of the world.
Moscow’s solution was to maintain squadrons at strategic locations. After Israel’s victory over Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in the 1967 Six-Day War, Egypt gave the Soviets access to Alexandria and Port Said, where they could refuel ships and monitor the United States Sixth Fleet. This allowed the Soviets to maintain a Mediterranean Squadron, and during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, while the U.S. airlifted supplies to Israel, Soviet vessels resupplied Egypt and Syria. In 1972, in return for military aid, South Yemen gave the Soviets access to Aden and Socotra, enabling them establish an Indian Ocean Squadron, as well.
Keeping up far seas flotillas is expensive, however. While the Soviet Union in the late Cold War was the world’s number two naval power, its many economic weaknesses made it impossible to maintain or replace the ships needed for its squadron in being strategy. This is a warning to any country considering or undertaking a naval buildup: make sure your domestic economy rests on strong foundations.
The United States and its two major rivals all face a variety of long-term economic challenges that can compromise their ability to project military power. The U.S. has a weak
Looking at potential American conflicts with China and Russia, the fleet in being concept could suit the U.S. In the Western Pacific, the fact that the U.S. keeps a carrier strike group in Japan creates a dilemma for China if it invades Taiwan: should it attack American ships in Japanese ports, thus leading Japan to enter the war on America and Taiwan’s side? Similarly, deploying U.S. forces to secondary theaters could stretch the People’s Liberation Army Navy thin, forcing it to devote assets to protecting interests like Middle Eastern oil supplies. Washington might therefore consider asking more Indo-Pacific countries for permission to base vessels in their harbors.
Russia began modernizing its navy, especially its , elements of fleet in being thinking can be found in the concepts Russia employs for its navy, such as “active defense” (“exhausting and bleeding large enemy forces,” in the words of Russia’s Ministry of Defense) and “fleet survivability.” Here the lessons of the Anglo-German naval standoff of World War One resonate: if Russia goes to war with NATO, what will it choose as its equivalent of the devastating U-boat?
Deterrence and Denial is valuable reading for anyone looking to learn more about asymmetric uses of nations’ maritime power, both successful and failed. Like any naval force, a fleet in being has its limits, but under the right circumstances it can be an effective use of a country’s naval capacity. A long-lasting maritime nation is one that thinks creatively about how to use its strength at sea.
Michael D. Purzycki is an analyst, writer, and editor based in Arlington, Virginia. He has worked for the United States Navy, Marine Corps, and Army.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Michael D. Purzycki
With the world’s attention focused on the war in Iran, maritime observers can point to the role of the U.S. Navy in destroying the Islamic Republic’s military assets. From carrier-based aircraft striking targets on land to a U.S. submarine sinking an Iranian frigate in the Indian Ocean, modern American naval might is apparent in this conflict. At the same time, as American planners decide how to deter aggression by China and Russia, there are lessons from the past that can help them prepare.
In 1690, England and France were in the midst of one of their many wars. In the Nine Years’ War, England and several allies were reacting to French King Louis XIV’s invasion of the Holy Roman Empire. However, France was not the only enemy English King William III had to worry about. Having ousted his father-in-law James II two years earlier, William was in Ireland trying to stamp out the last resistance to his control of the British Isles as the French navy appeared off the English coast.
An Anglo-Dutch fleet stood between King Louis’ ships and the English coast. At the Battle of Beachy Head, Admiral Arthur Herbert, 1st Earl of Torrington, saw that he was outnumbered, and chose to fight the French from a distance rather than engaging them head-on. Explaining his actions to his superiors, he wrote, “most men were in fear that the French would invade; but I was always of another opinion; for I always said, that whilst we had a fleet in being, they would not dare to make an attempt.”
The term “fleet in being” thus entered the naval lexicon. While major battles are often the most memorable actions navies perform, simply having a fleet in the right place at the right time can also be an effective use of maritime assets. Likewise, the mere presence of an enemy fleet, especially in an unexpected location, makes strategists’ jobs more difficult.
In a new book from Naval Institute Press, Deterrence and Denial: The Power of Fleets in Being, a variety of scholars analyzes different countries’ use of fleets in being over the past three hundred years, looking for lessons modern navies can learn. The volume’s editor is historian Sarah C.M. Paine, who for 25 years taught strategy and policy at the U.S. Naval War College. She has coedited books on such naval subjects as blockades, commerce raiding, coalitions, expeditionary warfare, and non-military uses of navies. YouTube viewers with an interest in geopolitics may recognize Dr. Paine from videos hosted by podcaster Dwarkesh Patel, including her discussion of the different mentalities of maritime and continental powers.
Victory at sea does not come only from firepower and technology. It also comes from leaders’ employment of the tools at their disposal in clever ways. Constraints on raw power can force naval and political leaders to think creatively about how best to defend their nation’s interests. The case studies discussed in Deterrence and Denial teach many lessons as to how a fleet in being may, depending on circumstances, help a country make efficient use of limited naval strength.
For example, in the years leading up to the First World War, Imperial Germany undertook a massive naval buildup, with the goal of replacing Britain as the world’s predominant naval power. This policy, however, simply led Britain to expand its fleet even further, and to draw closer politically to Germany’s main continental rivals, France and Russia. When the war began, The Imperial German Navy was not strong enough to confront Britain’s Royal Navy on the high seas.
The German surface fleet thus spent most of the war acting as a de facto fleet in being, protecting the North Sea coast against a possible British attack, with the notable exception being the Battle of Jutland. The U-boat became Germany’s most destructive offensive maritime weapon. Even though Germany lost the war, it could be argued that the naval aspect of its war effort was quite successful. However, if Berlin had sought a defensive fleet from the outset, rather than an armada to rival Britain’s, it could perhaps have achieved the same naval result at a significantly lower cost.
A ‘fleet in being’ need not always be used to defend its country’s homeland. Placing one further away can compel an adversary to disperse forces it might otherwise be able to concentrate. During the Cold War, long distances separated the Soviet Baltic, Black Sea, Northern, and Pacific Fleets, making it exceedingly difficult for them to gather in the event of a conflict with NATO. Turkey could close the Dardanelles if it chose, while sailing from the Baltic to the Atlantic required passing Denmark, Norway, Britain, and Iceland. NATO’s control of these chokepoints also meant it could sever Soviet commercial ties to large parts of the world.
Moscow’s solution was to maintain squadrons at strategic locations. After Israel’s victory over Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in the 1967 Six-Day War, Egypt gave the Soviets access to Alexandria and Port Said, where they could refuel ships and monitor the United States Sixth Fleet. This allowed the Soviets to maintain a Mediterranean Squadron, and during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, while the U.S. airlifted supplies to Israel, Soviet vessels resupplied Egypt and Syria. In 1972, in return for military aid, South Yemen gave the Soviets access to Aden and Socotra, enabling them establish an Indian Ocean Squadron, as well.
Keeping up far seas flotillas is expensive, however. While the Soviet Union in the late Cold War was the world’s number two naval power, its many economic weaknesses made it impossible to maintain or replace the ships needed for its squadron in being strategy. This is a warning to any country considering or undertaking a naval buildup: make sure your domestic economy rests on strong foundations.
The United States and its two major rivals all face a variety of long-term economic challenges that can compromise their ability to project military power. The U.S. has a weak
Looking at potential American conflicts with China and Russia, the fleet in being concept could suit the U.S. In the Western Pacific, the fact that the U.S. keeps a carrier strike group in Japan creates a dilemma for China if it invades Taiwan: should it attack American ships in Japanese ports, thus leading Japan to enter the war on America and Taiwan’s side? Similarly, deploying U.S. forces to secondary theaters could stretch the People’s Liberation Army Navy thin, forcing it to devote assets to protecting interests like Middle Eastern oil supplies. Washington might therefore consider asking more Indo-Pacific countries for permission to base vessels in their harbors.
Russia began modernizing its navy, especially its , elements of fleet in being thinking can be found in the concepts Russia employs for its navy, such as “active defense” (“exhausting and bleeding large enemy forces,” in the words of Russia’s Ministry of Defense) and “fleet survivability.” Here the lessons of the Anglo-German naval standoff of World War One resonate: if Russia goes to war with NATO, what will it choose as its equivalent of the devastating U-boat?
Deterrence and Denial is valuable reading for anyone looking to learn more about asymmetric uses of nations’ maritime power, both successful and failed. Like any naval force, a fleet in being has its limits, but under the right circumstances it can be an effective use of a country’s naval capacity. A long-lasting maritime nation is one that thinks creatively about how to use its strength at sea.
Michael D. Purzycki is an analyst, writer, and editor based in Arlington, Virginia. He has worked for the United States Navy, Marine Corps, and Army.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.