Sweden as an Ally: Implications for the Royal Swedish Navy and NATO
The MOC
By
Gonzalo Vazquez
June 4, 2024
More than two years after Oslo first expressed its desire to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Sweden became the alliance’s 32nd member in March 2024. Like neighboring Finland, Sweden asked to join the alliance after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine; however, its negotiations were more protracted due to concerns expressed by NATO-members Turkey and Hungary. In April, shortly after accession, the Swedish Defense Parliamentary Committee released a new report for the 2026-2030 period: “Strengthened Defense Capability: Sweden as an Ally”. The 300-page report contains assessments on the current state of the Swedish Armed Forces and their contributions to national security, as well as a number of recommendations moving into the future.
The document aspires to be the blueprint for Sweden’s national military effort over the next six years, with a focus on strengthening its military posture and deterrence capabilities in light of Russia’s threat to Europe’s and NATO’s collective security. Sweden’s report comes shortly after Norway released its own “Norwegian Defense Pledge”, an ambitious proposal by Oslo to end its holiday from history by ramping up its defense spending and strengthening the capabilities of its Navy.
Just like Norway, Sweden’s naval capabilities stand out as a key component of the Nordic nation’s efforts to ensure the waters of the Baltic Sea and Europe’s northern flank remain free and open. The report’s release highlights an increased awareness of the growing threat that Moscow in general and the Russian Navy in particular pose to European security—and the crucial role that NATO’s naval forces will be called to play in upholding freedom of navigation and the rules-based order at sea. Most importantly, it sets a valuable example for other NATO nations to follow suit, especially those who have neglected and under-resourced their naval capabilities in spite of their natural inclination to the sea.
The Future of the Royal Swedish Navy
The Defense Parliamentary Committee’s report sheds light on three different modernization efforts that the Swedish Navy is currently undertaking, providing additional details on the future of Swedish surface, submarine, and amphibious forces.
The report indicates that the Visby corvettes will be equipped “with anti-aircraft missile systems and improved sensors for air, surface and underwater reconnaissance” in their mid-life upgrade (MLU). It also recommends extending the service of the two Gavle-class corvettes and the two Stockholm-class patrol vessels until the delivery of the future Lulea-class vessels, which is expected to take place in the early 2030s. The report also stresses is the need to further develop sea mine clearance capabilities, for which “the procurement of new torpedo mine for submarines will be initiated.” Lastly, Sweden’s coastal missile capabilities are in need of an expansion and subsequent organization into two units “to increase both availability and endurance.”
The submarine force was widely considered to be one of Sweden’s strongest military assets coming to NATO. The report stresses “the unique operational environment in the Baltic Sea region poses special requirements.” The submarine division is expected to remain at five units: three of the currently active Gotland-class (of which the Halland will be the last to undergo its MLU) and the two units of the Blekinge-class to be delivered in the 2030s as a replacement of the two Södermanland-class also in service. Furthermore, it is also noted that “the Armed Forces intends to implement a program to create conditions for long-term supply of submarines” beyond 2035, a goal for which they strongly recommend “that preliminary design of a new generation of submarines should be initiated” to replace the three units of the Gotland-class around the late 2030s and early 2040s.
Lastly, the committee “believes that the development of the two maritime amphibious battalions should continue” to enhance Sweden’s amphibious forces and that the addition of a third should be considered over the following decade. To strengthen the Navy’s capabilities to conduct amphibious warfare, new boats with direct fire capability will be delivered to the battalions and older boats for transportation will be replaced.
Overall, the report suggests a renewed emphasis on strengthening Sweden’s naval and maritime assets following its accession to NATO. Just like its neighbor in Oslo, Stockholm will seek to solidify its geostrategic position to better cope with the increased threats from Russia and other foes.
The Royal Swedish Navy in NATO
Last month, Sweden took part in NATO’s annual North Atlantic-based ASW exercise Dynamic Mongoose in the Norwegian Sea, deploying one of its Gotland-class submarines. As highlighted by U.S. Navy Rear Admiral Thomas Wall, the Commander Submarines NATO, “[t]hey bring the experience of a submarine crew well versed in shallow water operations so to have them in our Allied maritime force composition firmly enhances our collective defense in the region.”
With Sweden’s accession to NATO, its naval forces will make an important contribution to the alliance’s maritime posture and naval capabilities—particularly in the Baltic region. As professor Sebastian Bruns discussed back in 2022:
“The Swedish Navy brings to the table a wide experience in national and territorial defense at sea and in the protection of commercial shipping, two core naval missions spanning a wide spectrum. Moreover, the Swedish Navy has some experience in multilateral maritime operations such as the EU’s counterpiracy mission ATALANTA (2010) and the UNIFIL maritime task force (2006-2007).”
Undoubtedly, Sweden’s accession to NATO offers an important opportunity for the alliance to continue strengthening its maritime posture and sea control efforts in the Baltic Sea. Both Finland and Sweden bring to the table important capabilities and great expertise in the shallow waters of this “flooded meadow”.
Still, as the recently announced efforts of both Sweden and Norway indicate, much work remains to be done until the Atlantic alliance completely recovers the maritime mentality that effectively deterred Soviet aggression decades ago. To achieve this, members must adequately resource their naval forces to properly meet the emerging challenges from Russia, particularly those which have neglected their naval capabilities and overall maritime mentality in spite of their natural inclination to sea.
Gonzalo Vázquez is a junior analyst with the Spanish Naval War College’s Center for Naval Thought. He has previously worked as an intern at the NATO Crisis Management and Disaster Response Center of Excellence (CMDR COE) in Sofia, Bulgaria.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Gonzalo Vazquez
More than two years after Oslo first expressed its desire to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Sweden became the alliance’s 32nd member in March 2024. Like neighboring Finland, Sweden asked to join the alliance after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine; however, its negotiations were more protracted due to concerns expressed by NATO-members Turkey and Hungary. In April, shortly after accession, the Swedish Defense Parliamentary Committee released a new report for the 2026-2030 period: “Strengthened Defense Capability: Sweden as an Ally”. The 300-page report contains assessments on the current state of the Swedish Armed Forces and their contributions to national security, as well as a number of recommendations moving into the future.
The document aspires to be the blueprint for Sweden’s national military effort over the next six years, with a focus on strengthening its military posture and deterrence capabilities in light of Russia’s threat to Europe’s and NATO’s collective security. Sweden’s report comes shortly after Norway released its own “Norwegian Defense Pledge”, an ambitious proposal by Oslo to end its holiday from history by ramping up its defense spending and strengthening the capabilities of its Navy.
Just like Norway, Sweden’s naval capabilities stand out as a key component of the Nordic nation’s efforts to ensure the waters of the Baltic Sea and Europe’s northern flank remain free and open. The report’s release highlights an increased awareness of the growing threat that Moscow in general and the Russian Navy in particular pose to European security—and the crucial role that NATO’s naval forces will be called to play in upholding freedom of navigation and the rules-based order at sea. Most importantly, it sets a valuable example for other NATO nations to follow suit, especially those who have neglected and under-resourced their naval capabilities in spite of their natural inclination to the sea.
The Future of the Royal Swedish Navy
The Defense Parliamentary Committee’s report sheds light on three different modernization efforts that the Swedish Navy is currently undertaking, providing additional details on the future of Swedish surface, submarine, and amphibious forces.
The report indicates that the Visby corvettes will be equipped “with anti-aircraft missile systems and improved sensors for air, surface and underwater reconnaissance” in their mid-life upgrade (MLU). It also recommends extending the service of the two Gavle-class corvettes and the two Stockholm-class patrol vessels until the delivery of the future Lulea-class vessels, which is expected to take place in the early 2030s. The report also stresses is the need to further develop sea mine clearance capabilities, for which “the procurement of new torpedo mine for submarines will be initiated.” Lastly, Sweden’s coastal missile capabilities are in need of an expansion and subsequent organization into two units “to increase both availability and endurance.”
The submarine force was widely considered to be one of Sweden’s strongest military assets coming to NATO. The report stresses “the unique operational environment in the Baltic Sea region poses special requirements.” The submarine division is expected to remain at five units: three of the currently active Gotland-class (of which the Halland will be the last to undergo its MLU) and the two units of the Blekinge-class to be delivered in the 2030s as a replacement of the two Södermanland-class also in service. Furthermore, it is also noted that “the Armed Forces intends to implement a program to create conditions for long-term supply of submarines” beyond 2035, a goal for which they strongly recommend “that preliminary design of a new generation of submarines should be initiated” to replace the three units of the Gotland-class around the late 2030s and early 2040s.
Lastly, the committee “believes that the development of the two maritime amphibious battalions should continue” to enhance Sweden’s amphibious forces and that the addition of a third should be considered over the following decade. To strengthen the Navy’s capabilities to conduct amphibious warfare, new boats with direct fire capability will be delivered to the battalions and older boats for transportation will be replaced.
Overall, the report suggests a renewed emphasis on strengthening Sweden’s naval and maritime assets following its accession to NATO. Just like its neighbor in Oslo, Stockholm will seek to solidify its geostrategic position to better cope with the increased threats from Russia and other foes.
The Royal Swedish Navy in NATO
Last month, Sweden took part in NATO’s annual North Atlantic-based ASW exercise Dynamic Mongoose in the Norwegian Sea, deploying one of its Gotland-class submarines. As highlighted by U.S. Navy Rear Admiral Thomas Wall, the Commander Submarines NATO, “[t]hey bring the experience of a submarine crew well versed in shallow water operations so to have them in our Allied maritime force composition firmly enhances our collective defense in the region.”
With Sweden’s accession to NATO, its naval forces will make an important contribution to the alliance’s maritime posture and naval capabilities—particularly in the Baltic region. As professor Sebastian Bruns discussed back in 2022:
“The Swedish Navy brings to the table a wide experience in national and territorial defense at sea and in the protection of commercial shipping, two core naval missions spanning a wide spectrum. Moreover, the Swedish Navy has some experience in multilateral maritime operations such as the EU’s counterpiracy mission ATALANTA (2010) and the UNIFIL maritime task force (2006-2007).”
Undoubtedly, Sweden’s accession to NATO offers an important opportunity for the alliance to continue strengthening its maritime posture and sea control efforts in the Baltic Sea. Both Finland and Sweden bring to the table important capabilities and great expertise in the shallow waters of this “flooded meadow”.
Still, as the recently announced efforts of both Sweden and Norway indicate, much work remains to be done until the Atlantic alliance completely recovers the maritime mentality that effectively deterred Soviet aggression decades ago. To achieve this, members must adequately resource their naval forces to properly meet the emerging challenges from Russia, particularly those which have neglected their naval capabilities and overall maritime mentality in spite of their natural inclination to sea.
Gonzalo Vázquez is a junior analyst with the Spanish Naval War College’s Center for Naval Thought. He has previously worked as an intern at the NATO Crisis Management and Disaster Response Center of Excellence (CMDR COE) in Sofia, Bulgaria.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.