Sustaining the Distributed Joint Force in the Indo-Pacific
The MOC
By
Nolan Vihlen
November 14, 2024
In a conflict with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), U.S. forces will likely have to assume a distributed, low-signature posture throughout the Indo-Pacific theater. The PRC’s large arsenal of precision weapons—and industrial capacity to produce more at scale—renders concentrated American forces vulnerable. This revelation presents two troubling challenges for the United States.
First, the anticipated expenditure rates of offensive and defensive weapons necessary to prevent the isolation of distributed forces will rapidly outpace current weapons production capacity. Second, traditional means of sustaining U.S. forces are too limited in numbers or simply incapable to support widely distributed forces across the maritime domain.
As defense startups work to field new, low-cost systems at scale, the means of transporting these weapons systems to end users remains less clear. Logistics in the new distributed reality must recognize the U.S. Navy’s numerical disadvantage in the Pacific, appreciate the unsustainable infrastructure requirements for strategic airlift, and leverage an existing technology that is ready to support warfighters today. In short, the joint force must rely on one of the few quantitative advantages at its disposal: the United States’ large fleet of tiltrotor aircraft.
Tiltrotor aircraft provide long-range aerial logistics at speeds unmatched by any vertical-lift platform worldwide. Leveraging the lessons of almost two decades in service, the Marine Corps’ MV-22 squadrons provide persistent presence throughout the Pacific and enable continuous aerial support in inherently demanding environments.
This capability is not limited to the Marine Corps. The Navy must expand the CMV-22’s role beyond carrier onboard delivery. The ability to transport 6,000 pounds of cargo up to 1,150 nautical miles is a windfall for sustaining increasingly distributed maritime and naval air forces. The increased flexibility afforded by the platform’s aerial refueling capability will also be foundational to sustaining a successful logistics network in a dynamic peer-conflict.
Furthermore, joint logistical capabilities will be tangibly enhanced by the fielding of the U.S. Army’s V-280 by the end of the decade. While individual aircraft carry significantly smaller payloads than the legacy strategic airlift fleet, the steadily increasing tiltrotor inventory provides much-needed mass-through-scale to meet the demands of future conflicts. The proven capabilities of the V-22 fleet demonstrate the superiority of tiltrotor logistics for sustaining future distributed maritime forces compared to the available alternatives.
The most straightforward way to sustain distributed forces in a maritime environment might appear to be through naval surface connectors. However, in reality, this method of sustainment is actually the most vulnerable. The PRC possesses the world’s largest surface fleet, and the quantitative gap between the Chinese and U.S. navies shows no signs of narrowing. Further complicating this quantitative disparity is the fact that a preponderance of the U.S. Navy’s fleet is focused not on logistics, but on the defense and support of aircraft carriers.
The United States Marine Corps seeks to mitigate this fact through the acquisition of a future medium landing ship (LSM) for supplying its stand-in force dispersed across expeditionary advanced bases. Certainly, a future surface connector tailor-made for this purpose will have utility. However, until they can be introduced at a pace greater than the current output of American shipyards, a numerically superior Chinese fleet can repeat tactics that effectively stall Philippine resupply efforts in the South China Sea.
During a war in the Western Pacific, logistical sustainment efforts will not be able to count on the ability to mass supplies in uncontested rear areas as the United States has been safely able to do during the counterinsurgency operations of the past two decades. Substantial logistics depots built up through strategic airlift will be quickly identified and targeted due to their large footprints. No amount of air defense can hope to effectively defend these inherently static “iron mountains” in the face of multilayered attacks by long-range drones and cruise and ballistic missiles. Yet, even if airfields compatible with America’s largest airlift platforms were hardened against attack and possessed rapid repair capabilities, the final leg of logistical delivery from forward depots to end users has yet to be addressed.
Some commentators have suggested unconventional approaches, such as seaplanes, in response to these unprecedented challenges to logistical sustainment for distributed operations. However, they only hold if one embraces invalid assumptions about their successful utilization. For instance, seaplanes would require adequate docks or piers at each forward site to offload cargo. DARPA’s Liberty Lifter initiative has attempted to obviate this constraint through a tail ramp to offload onto beaches directly. However, this fails to consider the restraints of incompatible beach gradients, tides, or natural obstacles. Moreover, no support infrastructure exists to maintain these nonexistent aircraft. While over 30 seaplane tenders were fielded by the U.S. Navy during World War II, the likelihood of an already strained industrial base resurrecting an extinct class of ship is unlikely.
Sustaining a highly dispersed maneuver force requires logistical support unhindered by these limitations. The requirement for vast expenditures of long-range artillery and air defense weapons will increase under a distributed posture—even as the means to logistically support distributed forces becomes challenging to sustain. Traditional logistics platforms will continue to play an important, but more limited, role at the operational level. Initiatives such as the Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030 also reduce the need for many of these more cumbersome methods of transportation by deliberately creating a nimbler force, with correspondingly lighter loads.
In this environment, tiltrotor aircraft have the flexibility, range, and sufficient lift capacity to support distributed operations. Tiltrotors can land at exponentially more locations with only a fraction of the infrastructure required by traditional strategic airlift. Ultimately, the means to mitigate isolation of distributed forces exists, but only if the joint force continues to field existing tiltrotor aircraft and accelerates efforts to develop this innovative technology.
Nolan Vihlen is a doctrine analyst with Marine Forces Reserve and an MBA candidate at Georgetown University McDonough School of Business. He previously served as a CH-53E pilot and weapons and tactics instructor at Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One.
The views expressed above are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of any current or former employer, nor do they express an official view of the U.S. government.The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Nolan Vihlen
In a conflict with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), U.S. forces will likely have to assume a distributed, low-signature posture throughout the Indo-Pacific theater. The PRC’s large arsenal of precision weapons—and industrial capacity to produce more at scale—renders concentrated American forces vulnerable. This revelation presents two troubling challenges for the United States.
First, the anticipated expenditure rates of offensive and defensive weapons necessary to prevent the isolation of distributed forces will rapidly outpace current weapons production capacity. Second, traditional means of sustaining U.S. forces are too limited in numbers or simply incapable to support widely distributed forces across the maritime domain.
As defense startups work to field new, low-cost systems at scale, the means of transporting these weapons systems to end users remains less clear. Logistics in the new distributed reality must recognize the U.S. Navy’s numerical disadvantage in the Pacific, appreciate the unsustainable infrastructure requirements for strategic airlift, and leverage an existing technology that is ready to support warfighters today. In short, the joint force must rely on one of the few quantitative advantages at its disposal: the United States’ large fleet of tiltrotor aircraft.
Tiltrotor aircraft provide long-range aerial logistics at speeds unmatched by any vertical-lift platform worldwide. Leveraging the lessons of almost two decades in service, the Marine Corps’ MV-22 squadrons provide persistent presence throughout the Pacific and enable continuous aerial support in inherently demanding environments.
This capability is not limited to the Marine Corps. The Navy must expand the CMV-22’s role beyond carrier onboard delivery. The ability to transport 6,000 pounds of cargo up to 1,150 nautical miles is a windfall for sustaining increasingly distributed maritime and naval air forces. The increased flexibility afforded by the platform’s aerial refueling capability will also be foundational to sustaining a successful logistics network in a dynamic peer-conflict.
Furthermore, joint logistical capabilities will be tangibly enhanced by the fielding of the U.S. Army’s V-280 by the end of the decade. While individual aircraft carry significantly smaller payloads than the legacy strategic airlift fleet, the steadily increasing tiltrotor inventory provides much-needed mass-through-scale to meet the demands of future conflicts. The proven capabilities of the V-22 fleet demonstrate the superiority of tiltrotor logistics for sustaining future distributed maritime forces compared to the available alternatives.
The most straightforward way to sustain distributed forces in a maritime environment might appear to be through naval surface connectors. However, in reality, this method of sustainment is actually the most vulnerable. The PRC possesses the world’s largest surface fleet, and the quantitative gap between the Chinese and U.S. navies shows no signs of narrowing. Further complicating this quantitative disparity is the fact that a preponderance of the U.S. Navy’s fleet is focused not on logistics, but on the defense and support of aircraft carriers.
The United States Marine Corps seeks to mitigate this fact through the acquisition of a future medium landing ship (LSM) for supplying its stand-in force dispersed across expeditionary advanced bases. Certainly, a future surface connector tailor-made for this purpose will have utility. However, until they can be introduced at a pace greater than the current output of American shipyards, a numerically superior Chinese fleet can repeat tactics that effectively stall Philippine resupply efforts in the South China Sea.
During a war in the Western Pacific, logistical sustainment efforts will not be able to count on the ability to mass supplies in uncontested rear areas as the United States has been safely able to do during the counterinsurgency operations of the past two decades. Substantial logistics depots built up through strategic airlift will be quickly identified and targeted due to their large footprints. No amount of air defense can hope to effectively defend these inherently static “iron mountains” in the face of multilayered attacks by long-range drones and cruise and ballistic missiles. Yet, even if airfields compatible with America’s largest airlift platforms were hardened against attack and possessed rapid repair capabilities, the final leg of logistical delivery from forward depots to end users has yet to be addressed.
Some commentators have suggested unconventional approaches, such as seaplanes, in response to these unprecedented challenges to logistical sustainment for distributed operations. However, they only hold if one embraces invalid assumptions about their successful utilization. For instance, seaplanes would require adequate docks or piers at each forward site to offload cargo. DARPA’s Liberty Lifter initiative has attempted to obviate this constraint through a tail ramp to offload onto beaches directly. However, this fails to consider the restraints of incompatible beach gradients, tides, or natural obstacles. Moreover, no support infrastructure exists to maintain these nonexistent aircraft. While over 30 seaplane tenders were fielded by the U.S. Navy during World War II, the likelihood of an already strained industrial base resurrecting an extinct class of ship is unlikely.
Sustaining a highly dispersed maneuver force requires logistical support unhindered by these limitations. The requirement for vast expenditures of long-range artillery and air defense weapons will increase under a distributed posture—even as the means to logistically support distributed forces becomes challenging to sustain. Traditional logistics platforms will continue to play an important, but more limited, role at the operational level. Initiatives such as the Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030 also reduce the need for many of these more cumbersome methods of transportation by deliberately creating a nimbler force, with correspondingly lighter loads.
In this environment, tiltrotor aircraft have the flexibility, range, and sufficient lift capacity to support distributed operations. Tiltrotors can land at exponentially more locations with only a fraction of the infrastructure required by traditional strategic airlift. Ultimately, the means to mitigate isolation of distributed forces exists, but only if the joint force continues to field existing tiltrotor aircraft and accelerates efforts to develop this innovative technology.
Nolan Vihlen is a doctrine analyst with Marine Forces Reserve and an MBA candidate at Georgetown University McDonough School of Business. He previously served as a CH-53E pilot and weapons and tactics instructor at Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One.
The views expressed above are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of any current or former employer, nor do they express an official view of the U.S. government. The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.