SAMs to Syria: Can the Marines Weaken Putin on Another Front?
The MOC
Photo by Andrii Marienko/Associated Press.
By
Michael D. Purzycki
October 5, 2022
U.S. support to Ukraine in its battle against the Russian invasion has paid dividends. The world has been impressed by recent Ukrainian battlefield gains, made possible by a wide array of U.S. equipment. By all means, the U.S. and its allies should continue aiding Ukrainian forces.
However, Ukraine is not the only country to be pummeled by Vladimir Putin’s military. Since 2015, Russia has maintained a military presence in Syria – part of Putin’s effort to keep fellow dictator Bashar al-Assad in power. While it no longer garners headlines in the West, the Syrian Civil War that began in 2011 is not over. With Russian assistance, Assad continues brutally striking at Syrians demanding a more just and accountable government. Russian aircraft have deliberately struck civilian targets in opposition-held areas, including hospitals. When Russia invaded Ukraine, Syrians recognized immediately what Ukrainians could suffer.
This opens the possibility of creating a new front in efforts to blunt Putin’s aggression. If U.S. aid to Ukraine leaves enough weapons available to send elsewhere without depleting U.S. stocks, sending weapons to anti-Assad Syrians could put added pressure on Putin, further weakening his ability to bring Ukraine under his thumb. It is a possibility to strongly consider, and the Marine Corps could have a role in it.
The Marines have taken part in aiding Ukraine, including providing surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). They have sent approximately 1,000 FIM-92 Stinger missile weapon systems to Ukrainian troops. While the Army has sent considerable weaponry as well, the Marines have proven their value in arming Putin’s enemies. This could be extended to Syria.
The Corps has operated in Syria before. In 2017, for example, Marines fired at ISIS targets with M777-A2 howitzers. While fighting insurgents with artillery is different from helping resistance fighters with SAMs, this precedent of Marines operating in Syria is something to build on. The Stinger has a range of approximately 11,000 feet. While this is below the altitude at which Russian jets normally fly – between 15,000 to 20,000 feet – Russia and Syria have also used helicopters to target anti-regime forces in Idlib province in northwest Syria, forces that have managed to shootdown some of these same helicopters.
Why should the Marines specifically aid the Syrian opposition? Why not the Army? The reason is the relative frequency of Russian air strikes in northwest Syria, close to the Syrian coast. Anti-terrorist operations, by contrast, are mainly in the east of the country. U.S. forces fighting ISIS are based at al-Tanf garrison, near the border with Iraq and Jordan. A division of labor in this regard, with the Army’s presence in Syria dedicated to fighting ISIS further inland, could help the Marine Corps transition away from its recent history of inland fighting in the region while still remaining active in the Middle East.
Marine Corps Commandant General David Berger has sought to orient the Corps toward littoral operations in the Indo-Pacific, intending to leave behind two decades of deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq. This is a sound approach – if competition with China and Russia is the driving force in U.S. planning, it makes sense for the Marines to focus on confronting China, rather than being sent to places like Fallujah and Marja. There is, however, still a role the Corps can play in the Middle East, if it limits itself to coastal areas like the Mediterranean.
A 2021 paper from the Center for a New American Security explored ways for the U.S. to beat back a Russian invasion of the Baltic states and a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The authors called for a division of labor between military branches, “asking the U.S. Army to concentrate on Europe while the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Marine Corps focus on the Indo-Pacific.” But while this is a sensible division, it does not preclude Marines being active outside the Pacific. The II Marine Expeditionary Force will still be based on the East Coast of the Continental United States, and its Marines can take part countering in Russia.
To be sure, aiding anti-Assad Syrians with SAMs would be fraught with difficulties. Firstly, which Syrians to aid? The strongest anti-Assad faction around Idlib is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an Islamist group designated a terrorist organization by the U.S., one that has been accused of extensive human rights violations. While the Syrian National Army has tens of thousands of fighters in northern Syria, it is closely allied with Turkey, and may not be amenable to aligning with U.S. interests. The groups to arm and train with SAMs would have to be carefully vetted.
The U.S. would have to take Turkish interests into account. Though a NATO member – one whose denial of access to the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits for Russian warships has helped Ukraine – Turkey seeks a healthy relationship with Russia in Syria. It worries about the heavily Kurdish, U.S.-supported Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeast Syria, believing them to be too closely linked to the militant Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). As such, Turkey has conducted incursions into Syria in recent years. The U.S. would have to carefully balance aid to anti-Assad Syrians in the northwest with its relations with the SDF in the northeast.
Additionally, throughout the Syrian Civil War, Iran has aided Assad, both directly and through proxies. This has prompted frequent Israeli airstrikes in Syria to prevent Iran and its allies from building up large arsenals which can be used against Israel. Israel has taken care not to clash with Russia in the process. The U.S. would have to make a great effort not to allow actions in northwest Syria to undermine Israel’s security interests.
Despite these factors, Marines arming and training Syrians resisting Assad and, by extension, Putin is a possibility to strongly consider. American SAMs can inflict significant damage on Russia’s military presence in the region whilst protecting at least some Syrians from further devastation. While Ukrainians have suffered at Putin’s hands, Syrians have suffered for far longer. Indeed, the brutality Putin unleashed on Assad’s behalf in 2015 was a driving factor in that year’s vast refugee crisis, when millions of people, many of them Syrian, arrived in Europe to escape war and persecution.
If Marines are assigned to give SAMs to Syrian resistance groups, not only would they expand the effort to blunt Putin’s brutality. They would also demonstrate that they remain relevant outside of the Pacific. While an action like this may be minor in the grand scheme of anti-Putin efforts, it would produce gains both for America and for human decency, if successful.
Michael D. Purzycki is an analyst, writer, and editor based in Arlington, Virginia. He has worked for the United States Navy, Marine Corps, and Army. The views expressed here are entirely his own.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
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Center for Maritime Strategy
By Michael D. Purzycki
U.S. support to Ukraine in its battle against the Russian invasion has paid dividends. The world has been impressed by recent Ukrainian battlefield gains, made possible by a wide array of U.S. equipment. By all means, the U.S. and its allies should continue aiding Ukrainian forces.
However, Ukraine is not the only country to be pummeled by Vladimir Putin’s military. Since 2015, Russia has maintained a military presence in Syria – part of Putin’s effort to keep fellow dictator Bashar al-Assad in power. While it no longer garners headlines in the West, the Syrian Civil War that began in 2011 is not over. With Russian assistance, Assad continues brutally striking at Syrians demanding a more just and accountable government. Russian aircraft have deliberately struck civilian targets in opposition-held areas, including hospitals. When Russia invaded Ukraine, Syrians recognized immediately what Ukrainians could suffer.
This opens the possibility of creating a new front in efforts to blunt Putin’s aggression. If U.S. aid to Ukraine leaves enough weapons available to send elsewhere without depleting U.S. stocks, sending weapons to anti-Assad Syrians could put added pressure on Putin, further weakening his ability to bring Ukraine under his thumb. It is a possibility to strongly consider, and the Marine Corps could have a role in it.
The Marines have taken part in aiding Ukraine, including providing surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). They have sent approximately 1,000 FIM-92 Stinger missile weapon systems to Ukrainian troops. While the Army has sent considerable weaponry as well, the Marines have proven their value in arming Putin’s enemies. This could be extended to Syria.
The Corps has operated in Syria before. In 2017, for example, Marines fired at ISIS targets with M777-A2 howitzers. While fighting insurgents with artillery is different from helping resistance fighters with SAMs, this precedent of Marines operating in Syria is something to build on. The Stinger has a range of approximately 11,000 feet. While this is below the altitude at which Russian jets normally fly – between 15,000 to 20,000 feet – Russia and Syria have also used helicopters to target anti-regime forces in Idlib province in northwest Syria, forces that have managed to shoot down some of these same helicopters.
Why should the Marines specifically aid the Syrian opposition? Why not the Army? The reason is the relative frequency of Russian air strikes in northwest Syria, close to the Syrian coast. Anti-terrorist operations, by contrast, are mainly in the east of the country. U.S. forces fighting ISIS are based at al-Tanf garrison, near the border with Iraq and Jordan. A division of labor in this regard, with the Army’s presence in Syria dedicated to fighting ISIS further inland, could help the Marine Corps transition away from its recent history of inland fighting in the region while still remaining active in the Middle East.
Marine Corps Commandant General David Berger has sought to orient the Corps toward littoral operations in the Indo-Pacific, intending to leave behind two decades of deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq. This is a sound approach – if competition with China and Russia is the driving force in U.S. planning, it makes sense for the Marines to focus on confronting China, rather than being sent to places like Fallujah and Marja. There is, however, still a role the Corps can play in the Middle East, if it limits itself to coastal areas like the Mediterranean.
A 2021 paper from the Center for a New American Security explored ways for the U.S. to beat back a Russian invasion of the Baltic states and a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The authors called for a division of labor between military branches, “asking the U.S. Army to concentrate on Europe while the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Marine Corps focus on the Indo-Pacific.” But while this is a sensible division, it does not preclude Marines being active outside the Pacific. The II Marine Expeditionary Force will still be based on the East Coast of the Continental United States, and its Marines can take part countering in Russia.
To be sure, aiding anti-Assad Syrians with SAMs would be fraught with difficulties. Firstly, which Syrians to aid? The strongest anti-Assad faction around Idlib is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an Islamist group designated a terrorist organization by the U.S., one that has been accused of extensive human rights violations. While the Syrian National Army has tens of thousands of fighters in northern Syria, it is closely allied with Turkey, and may not be amenable to aligning with U.S. interests. The groups to arm and train with SAMs would have to be carefully vetted.
The U.S. would have to take Turkish interests into account. Though a NATO member – one whose denial of access to the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits for Russian warships has helped Ukraine – Turkey seeks a healthy relationship with Russia in Syria. It worries about the heavily Kurdish, U.S.-supported Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeast Syria, believing them to be too closely linked to the militant Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). As such, Turkey has conducted incursions into Syria in recent years. The U.S. would have to carefully balance aid to anti-Assad Syrians in the northwest with its relations with the SDF in the northeast.
Additionally, throughout the Syrian Civil War, Iran has aided Assad, both directly and through proxies. This has prompted frequent Israeli airstrikes in Syria to prevent Iran and its allies from building up large arsenals which can be used against Israel. Israel has taken care not to clash with Russia in the process. The U.S. would have to make a great effort not to allow actions in northwest Syria to undermine Israel’s security interests.
Despite these factors, Marines arming and training Syrians resisting Assad and, by extension, Putin is a possibility to strongly consider. American SAMs can inflict significant damage on Russia’s military presence in the region whilst protecting at least some Syrians from further devastation. While Ukrainians have suffered at Putin’s hands, Syrians have suffered for far longer. Indeed, the brutality Putin unleashed on Assad’s behalf in 2015 was a driving factor in that year’s vast refugee crisis, when millions of people, many of them Syrian, arrived in Europe to escape war and persecution.
If Marines are assigned to give SAMs to Syrian resistance groups, not only would they expand the effort to blunt Putin’s brutality. They would also demonstrate that they remain relevant outside of the Pacific. While an action like this may be minor in the grand scheme of anti-Putin efforts, it would produce gains both for America and for human decency, if successful.
Michael D. Purzycki is an analyst, writer, and editor based in Arlington, Virginia. He has worked for the United States Navy, Marine Corps, and Army. The views expressed here are entirely his own.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.