Roadblock to Strategy and Fleet Design: Platform-Centric Thinking​

By Robert C. “Barney” Rubel

A recent New York Times article by Eric Lipton asserts that the Navy remains wedded to large combatant ships, failing to embrace the alternative of numerous unmanned craft. Interestingly, Lipton at one point refers to unmanned craft as “weapons,” which points to a problem endemic in the Navy since it procured its first six sailing frigates: platform-centric thinking. Platform-centric thinking focuses on ship characteristics first, before almost any other consideration. While certainly understandable, since ships are the thing that distinguishes a navy from the other armed services, the problem with it is that it deflects attention from what should be the pivot point of fleet design: weapons. Of course, weapons enter into fleet design logic, but generally in a dependent manner; ship characteristics are most often the starting point. What this does is embed conservatism in both strategic thinking and fleet design. While Lipton decries such conservatism, he is victim to the same error. He sees the alternative to current fleet design in terms of unmanned platforms. Instead, innovative thinking should begin with an assessment of what will be the decisive weapon in future battles, and then move on to what array of platforms would make that weapon most effective.

As a naval aviation strike leader, I began mission planning by weaponeering the assigned target, determining how many of what kinds of weapons would inflict the needed degree and kind of damage. That, in turn, governed how many strike aircraft would be needed, with a few more added to compensate for anticipated losses enroute to the target. From there, fighter escort requirements and defense suppression requirements could be calculated based on known enemy defenses. From there, aerial refueling requirements could be calculated and ultimately the deck spot on the aircraft carrier. This tactical logic train should be bumped up to the strategic level. The Navy should start by figuring out what will be the decisive future weapon, and the missile, in all its forms, is a promising candidate. Once this determination is made, the Navy can proceed to determine how many of what kind of missiles would be needed in the principal warfighting scenarios and from there the kind of command and control, number, and type of delivery platforms and ultimately the necessary logistic support can be calculated. What would likely emerge is a fleet design that looks very different from today. This all seems simple and straightforward, but unfortunately, a variety of cultural and bureaucratic obstacles get in the way, not the least of which is platform-centric thinking.

Platform-centric thinking is not an unreasonable approach from a certain point of view. Chief of Naval Operations in the late 1990s Admiral Jay Johnson once said that if the Navy only had one ship, it would be an aircraft carrier. This was more than aviator parochialism. It reflected the logic of constraint, as the Navy shed force structure in the wake of the Cold War, each ship remaining had to be as capable as possible. If the Navy’s central mission was to win wars at sea, then every ship had to contribute to that goal. Thus, the large aircraft carriers were escorted by cruisers and destroyers and frigates that could fight threats in the air, on the surface and below the surface. Even when planners tried to think outside the box, they started with ship characteristics. The Littoral Combat Ship (“LCS”) had to have a certain top speed and minimize crew requirements. Weapons suites were supposed to be in modules that could be changed out. The Zumwalt-class destroyer was given a tumblehome hull and stealth characteristics, and then was supposed to be fitted with a rail gun, which never materialized. The new Constellation-class frigate was designed to be affordable, possessing a limited weapons suite, but now the Navy is considering installing long range anti-ship missiles on it after production has started. The point is that it does make a certain amount of sense to start with ship characteristics, if funds are limited, and there are two centuries of fleet design practice contributing to inertia in thinking.

The problem is that platform-centric thinking blinds us to viable alternatives. Over the past few decades, several concepts have been floated that are radically different from current fleet design. One was the arsenal ship that was supposed to carry a large number of missiles, with targeting and command and control conducted offboard. The more recent idea of a “missile merchant,” a converted commercial ship used in the same way as an arsenal ship has been advanced. A first cousin is a missile barge that would be towed by a combatant. The opposite of an arsenal ship is a small craft carrying only a couple of missiles. The Chinese Hobei is an example. These would be numerous and fast, making a difficult target. Finally, the Soviets concocted a massive wing-in-ground effect craft that would skim just above the surface and launch several anti-ship missiles. The Marines are experimenting with small detachments that would fire land-based anti-ship missiles. Any or all of these ideas may or may not be viable, but unless fleet designers think first in terms of whether and how missiles will be the decisive weapon, there is no criterion available to judge.

To get back to Lipton’s article, without a determination of what will be the decisive weapon, it is impossible to render a rational judgment on unmanned systems. The war in the Ukraine has featured the use of armed drones used a bit like missiles, but whether or not they would constitute an alternative to missiles at the level of a fleet engagement is not evident from his article, nor is it likely the Navy has undertaken serious consideration of the matter. Unmanned systems will certainly play an increasingly important part in naval warfare, but exactly how will not be evident until the Navy adopts a weapons-centric form of corporate thinking. If, as it is now, the bulk of the Navy’s offensive firepower is concentrated in the carrier air wing, the role of unmanned systems will be very different than if that firepower was truly distributed among dispersed units of widely differing characteristics, from Air Force bombers to small missile craft to Marine and Army coastal missile detachments to submarines to converted merchant ships. Start with the weapon to target relationship and work back from there.

There is a larger strategic issue that platform-centric thinking affects. From the Japanese surrender in World War II until now, the United States has enjoyed unchallenged command of the sea. That command has been so complete for so long that the Navy abandoned the concept, substituting instead the more focused operational term sea control. So long as command of the sea could be relegated to a tacit assumption, sea control, as a supporting function for projection of power ashore, sufficed. But with the growth of the Peoples Liberation Army Navy and China’s intent to gain control of the global order, command of the sea becomes relevant, if not compelling, once again. Command of the sea, rightly understood, is a strength relationship between contending navies in which the weaker is either unable or unwilling to directly challenge the stronger.

There are many facets to command of the sea that are beyond the scope of this article, but a key one for this discussion is the inherent deterrence aspect. Since Navies are expensive and hard to replace, governments do not risk them unless they feel there is a good chance of success. Calculating those odds comes up against the matter of platform-centric thinking. Traditionally, naval power has been a function of the number of capital ships a nation possesses or perhaps overall naval tonnage. In such terms the U.S. retains an advantage over China, albeit narrowing. But what if missiles change the equation? China has developed long range ballistic missiles with anti-ship maneuvering warheads. Do these invalidate traditional command of the sea calculations? A dangerous situation emerges if the U.S., wedded to platform-centric thinking, fails to perceive how new weapons change the equation. The bottom line is that a simple shift to weapons-centric thinking would open new avenues in fleet design and better align it with emerging geopolitical conditions.

 

Robert C. “Barney” Rubel is a retired Navy captain and professor emeritus. Most recently served as a consultant to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral John Richardson. From 2006 – 2014 he served as Dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College. Prior to assuming this position, he was Chairman of the Wargaming Department. A thirty-year Navy veteran, he was a light attack naval aviator, flying the A-7 Corsair II and later the F/A-18 Hornet. He commanded Strike Fighter Squadron 131 and also served as the Inspector General at U.S. Southern Command. In 2006 he designed and led the research and gaming effort that supported the development of the 2007 U.S. maritime strategy. Captain Rubel received his commission from the NROTC Unit at the University of Illinois and has a master’s degree from Naval War College, and he is also a graduate of the Spanish Naval War College.

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The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.