Reflections on Ukraine’s Place in the European Order​

By Dr. Lisa Aronsson

Russia’s war in Ukraine, now in its second year, has inflicted enormous suffering among Ukraine’s people and inspired heroic resilience. Ukraine’s efforts to resist Russia’s aggression, including heinous attacks on its civilians, demonstrate Ukraine’s will to fight for its national existence, independence, and, also, for Euro-Atlantic security and the values at the heart of NATO: democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. No one can predict how or when the Kremlin’s brutal war against Ukraine will end. Unfortunately, as Eugene Rumer writes, this year may be just “the end of the beginning” of a long war in Europe. Rumer argues that the U.S. and Ukraine’s other Western supporters have no good options other than to increase military support to Ukraine and “hope for the best.”

That does not mean, however, that they can postpone discussion of Ukraine’s place in the European security architecture until after the war ends. Ukrainians are more resolved than ever in their commitment to join the EU and NATO, and allies in central and eastern Europe argue the time is now to clarify Ukraine’s path to NATO membership. The EU already granted candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova, and potential candidate status to Georgia, marking a monumental shift in the assumptions driving European Neighborhood Policy, which had, until recently, effectively acquiesced to Russia’s imperial vision for its neighborhood. Recognizing Ukraine’s progress in consolidating democracy, EU leaders visited Kyiv in February to discuss closer integration into EU structures, and to launch new sanctions on Russia targeting the technologies Russia needs to field capabilities in the war.

Even if the EU accelerates Ukraine’s path to membership, the EU Treaty’s mutual defense clause cannot deliver what Ukraine needs the most, which is security. NATO also needs a similar, monumental shift in its approach to the region. Since the mid-1990s NATO developed a series of mechanisms, such as the Partnership for Peace, to assist newly independent countries, normalize inter-state relations, and provide mutual security through cooperation mechanisms that would extend, NATO hoped, to include Russia itself. Partnerships worked brilliantly so long as NATO held on to assumptions about cooperative security with Russia. For vulnerable states, however, partnership has proven inadequate. NATO’s 1997 and 2002 enlargements were driven by the demands of these states and, also, by a U.S.-led vision to expand the liberal security order eastward through “cooperative security.”

These assumptions proved untenable after Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its destabilization of the Donbas in 2014, raising questions about the purpose of NATO partnerships. And yet, the U.S. and other Western allies reinforced the distinction between allies and partners as fundamental to the way NATO operates. In 2014, President Obama reassured NATO allies of the U.S.’s iron-clad commitment to NATO’s mutual defense clause, Article 5, noting “Ukraine is not a member of NATO.” Obama explained this was in part “because of its close and complex history with Russia.” Other Western European allies, including France and Germany, have also been keen to uphold the distinction. Europeans do not have the forces, capabilities, plans, or the political will to deter Russia without the U.S., and they held onto hopes that, eventually, a cooperative security relationship with Russia would work.

After 2014, however, NATO cut off all cooperation with Russia, but allies, especially in Western Europe, hadn’t yet adapted their strategic mindset or their assumptions to reflect the new realities on the ground. As Jeff Mankoff has argued, there can be no security for Ukraine so long as Russia’s leadership denies its existence as a state, its national identity, and so long as Russia harbors grievances against the West. No stable European order can be built together with Putin’s Russia. Russia does not appear to have narrowed its original war aims despite major operational setbacks and high costs. Putin may believe that he can exhaust Ukraine and outlast its Western supporter’s willingness or capacity to provide adequate military support.

For the next decade or more, President Zelensky has said that security will be Ukraine’s “number one” issue. Last spring, Zelensky imagined future Ukraine to be like a “big Israel,” relying on its own defense, technology, innovation, intelligence, and partnerships, including, with the United States. Others have imagined other solutions for Ukraine’s security. Alexander Vershbow argued that a Secure Neighborhood Initiative should be part of NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept, committing the allies to do “everything possible short of extending an Article 5” to support Kyiv. Andriy Yermak and Anders Fogh Rasmussen put forward a Kyiv Security Treaty, to unite Ukraine with guarantor states and others. The Alphen Group proposed a Comprehensive Strategy that included security guarantees, and Henrik Larsen argues “NATO should offer Ukraine an arms supply pact.”

Unless or until Russia’s leadership and the Kremlin’s policies are soundly defeated or transformed from within, none of the above options can assure Ukraine that Russia will not bide its time, reconstitute its military capacity, and launch another war in the future. In these circumstances, the best – and perhaps only – solution for Ukraine remains NATO membership. Zelensky declared Ukraine a “de facto” ally; it has interoperability with NATO forces, mutual trust, and a will to defend NATO at the front lines against NATO’s “most significant and direct threat.” Ukraine has also advanced its domestic reform agenda at least as much as other states that did go on to achieve NATO membership, and it has continued to do so in wartime. Ukraine has also already made significant contributions to NATO’s past missions and operations, including in the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.

During a visit to Washington D.C. earlier this year, parliamentarians from allied Lithuania, Poland, and from Ukraine argued that the time is now, while there is still political unity across the alliance, to consolidate Ukraine’s place inside NATO and the EU. Political unity could fracture within the U.S. or across Europe. They called on the U.S. to expand security assistance to Ukraine, impose sanctions on countries buying Russian energy at a discount, and finally admit Ukraine to NATO. NATO’s Open-Door policy is enshrined in its highest-level strategy documents, including in the 2022 Strategic Concept, and senior U.S. and NATO officials continue to repeat their 2008 Bucharest Summit promise that Ukraine (and Georgia) will “one day” become members. The promise rang hollow and preserved a certain ambiguity in Ukraine’s status, an opportunity that Putin has seized.

Some allies may not see the defense of Ukraine as in their vital interests, but it is also true that some allies continued to quietly accept or defer to Russia’s ideas about “privileged interests” in its near abroad. These allies may worry about escalation to conflict with Russia, but they also still hold on to hopes or feel it’s a necessity to maintain a cooperative security relationship with Russia. As a result, Putin tried not only to destroy the Ukrainian state, but it has also tried to break Ukraine’s cooperative security relationships with the EU and with NATO. When Russia asserted its demands of the U.S. and NATO in its proposed draft treaties in December 2021, the U.S. administration told reporters, “We will not compromise on key principles on which European security is built.” After receiving unsatisfactory replies, Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The war that followed strengthened Ukraine’s resolve and brought unprecedented unity across allies and partners. Sweden and Finland applied for NATO membership, and Georgia, still committed to NATO and the EU, has had to hedge given uncertainties about how much support it can expect receive. Moldova, too, may soon reexamine its constitutional neutrality given the threat environment. In these circumstances, European security depends on integrating Ukraine into NATO, Jonathan Eyal argues, “at in substance if not in form.” Even former U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, who opposed NATO membership for Ukraine before this war, for fear of escalation, now sees it as an “appropriate outcome.”

Unfortunately, senior U.S. and NATO officials still “won’t touch the topic.” A handful of allies are leading the way by providing meaningful military assistance bilaterally and through the Ramstein Group, but NATO, meanwhile, on the anniversary of the full-scale invasion, released a statement affirming its defensive nature, increasing practical and political support, and its solidarity with Ukraine. Admitting Ukraine to NATO isn’t possible now, not necessarily because of the war or because or Russian occupied territory, as Daniel Fried argues, but because consensus among the allies will still prove elusive. There is more work to be done internally across NATO to build consensus around a clear path for Ukraine into NATO. NATO should do more to offer more visible support for Ukraine’s war effort. NATO already extended the European order – if not deterrence or guarantees – to close European partners.

Rebecca Moore argues that the allies are already committed to using armed force in defense not only of their territory but of their shared values. As NATO’s Vilnius Summit approaches, some allies are ramping up their military support to Ukraine. NATO should find ways to meaningfully integrate Ukraine into its structures and processes, and it should take a more visible role in organizing and increasing military assistance to Ukraine. Dan Fata argues that it may be possible to achieve a “security blanket” for Ukraine through a series of interlocking commitments. He argues, among other things, that the U.S. could give Ukraine the status of Major Non-NATO Ally. NATO could set up a Training Mission for Ukraine, and other allies might provide security assistance while ensuring Ukraine develops the industries, partnerships, and supply lines to deter Russia and strengthen relations with the West.

While the center of gravity may be shifting eastward in the alliance to states like Poland and the Baltic states, nothing in NATO can be achieved without the economic heavyweights and unparalleled military capabilities of the U.S., France, Germany and other major Western European allies. Nothing can be achieved without political cohesion among the alliance’s thirty or soon to be thirty-one or thirty-two members. NATO has already jettisoned its outdated assumptions about a cooperative security relationship with Russia in its 2022 Strategic Concept, but some allies have yet to do so fully in practice. Proposed negotiations with Putin’s Russia or “peace deals” at Ukraine’s expense are still prevalent in debates, including among Western democracies. Much work remains to be done internally to build a foundation for consensus around Ukraine’s membership in NATO.

Military experts believe the Kremlin is unlikely to achieve its original war aims, which means that an independent, sovereign, democratic Ukraine will emerge from this conflict. It may also have one of the most capable and battle-hardened militaries in Europe, and it will continue to defend the European security order on its eastern borders. So long as Putin leads Russia and “Putinism” drives the Kremlin’s policy, cooperative security cannot work with Russia, and neither can any NATO policy that relies on those outdated assumptions. Russia has made this clear time and again since 2008. One day, it may be possible to build a stable European security order with Russia. Unless or until that happens, Ukraine’s place in the European security order is inside the EU and inside NATO.

The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.