One Tool Among Many: Uncrewed Systems in the Black Sea
The MOC
By
Kayvan Amyot-Ariya
July 23, 2026
Although Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and Uncrewed Surface Vehicles (USV) are often associated with the success of Ukrainian sea denial in the Black Sea, these platforms are tools within a wider denial system, and not a panacea of coastal defence.
To integrate the lessons learned from the Ukrainian model of denial, it is essential to understand what uncrewed vehicles can and cannot do.
For this reason, Russian losses in the Black Sea were compiled and categorized according to the strike method used and the full displacement tonnage of the targets. This data was assembled by expanding the existing Black Sea Institute’s tracker with open-source reporting.
This enlarged data covers the start of the conflict till May 2026 and distinguishes between destroyed and damaged targets, although it must be admitted that there are several cases where there is a degree of uncertainty as to the effect of strikes.
Figure 1. Lethality of Various Ukrainian Striking Platforms in the Black Sea 2022-May 2026
The strikes were codified in seven categories: Missiles, Mines, Special Operations, UAVs, USVs, Undersea Uncrewed Vehicles (UUV), and Uncrewed. Strikes by special operations units which were not physically aboard the ship were counted as having used the striking platform that they used. For example, the corvette Ivanovets which was struck by USVs operated by special operators was counted as USV. Strikes marked as Uncrewed could not be attributed to any specific uncrewed platform with the information available at the time of writing.
Aerial Drones
In the early stages of the war, UAVs were able to destroy a high number of low-tonnage vessels, primarily patrol boats, that were operating near the coasts and Snake Island. That is the situation in which UAVs were most lethal, tallying a total of 9 ships under 100 tonnes destroyed until May 2026. Moreover, UAVs have proven to be effective at distracting the air defences of ships that are jointly being targeted by more lethal means, such as with anti-ship missiles. Notably, this was the method used in the famous sinking of the cruiser Moskva, where a UAV distraction paved the way for a Neptune missile strike.
The relative lack of lethality of UAVs in naval contexts, including the long-range strike platforms, is evident in their conspicuous lack of destruction against ships over 100 tonnes. However, that is not to say they are not effective. It is quite the opposite: the fact that UAVs have been able to strike moving warships and damage them is in itself very significant.
Although the figure does not consider the early July 2026 Ukrainian coordinated strikes on the Russian Shadow Fleet, the drawn conclusions remain unchanged. The strikes, which were largely conducted against oil tankers and other non-warships, highlight the effectiveness of high endurance UAVs at hitting moving targets at sea.
Furthermore, the large number of strikes by UAVs, but the absence of sinkings against these large vessels supports the claim that UAVs are primarily effective at destroying small boats, distracting the defences of larger warships, and imposing a cost on other ships operating in the denied space by forcing them to accept a certain risk of damage.
Surface Drones
USVs only began to be used in October 2022 but rapidly expanded to the point where they were the platform responsible for the highest number of strikes until May 2026. Unlike UAVs, they have successfully struck many higher tonnage ships, even managing to sink some, such as the landing ship Caesar Kunikov.
As USVs continue to improve and grow their effective range, their strengths have become more apparent. USVs seem to be most effective when targeting ships at port or near coastlines, where a target’s location can be determined before the strike is launched. This information allows USVs to hit targets at the outer limits of their range such as the port of Novorossiysk and the Ivan Khurs intelligence ship, which was stationary for an extended period of time.
USVs, like UAVs, are not ship killers. They are strike platforms that have been quite successful at hitting costlier warships that have been operating within a denied area, even in the relative safety of defended ports. That, for the investment made, is a significant enough return, so long as the expectations made of it remain bounded within these historical confines.
Anti-Ship Missiles
Where uncrewed platforms disrupt and hinder enemy operations, anti-ship missiles are the only tool with the staying power to degrade their fighting capabilities at sea. When facing large combatants over 1,000 tonnes, anti-ship missiles were the most effective at both hitting and sinking warships.
Although the figure illustrates this reality, it nonetheless somewhat understates it given that strikes since 2024 have primarily targeted ships at port, in no small part due to the reticence of the Russian Navy to enter missile range. The effectiveness of land-based missiles was most visible in the opening stages of the war, when the frigate Admiral Essen was damaged and the cruiser Moskva was sunk, both by missile fire within a ten-day period.
Conclusion
Uncrewed systems are an essential component of a modern sea denial system. In combination with naval mines and the more lethal anti-ship missiles, these systems successfully hindered the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s operations. However, they are not miracle weapons, but rather tools which make it costlier for an enemy to operate in an area by destroying small vessels, harassing their warships with UAVs, damaging commercial vessels, and potentially damaging their ships at port with USVs. It remains unclear whether the long-range strike success of USVs would be replicated in an alternative setting without the same enclosed sea conditions, targeting information, or time needed to succeed.
Policymakers would do well to remember that these platforms are a component in a broader denial system, not a solution to all problems. If enemy warships are escorting smaller vessels in a littoral environment, it is an anti-ship missile that would be needed for rapid lethality, perhaps allowing for subsequent action by uncrewed systems against more favourable targets.
Kayvan Amyot-Ariya is a Strategic Studies student at Concordia University, focusing on maritime security and naval warfare. His current primary interest is the tracking and analysis of open-source data on the Russo-Ukrainian War, with a focus on Black Sea naval losses and strike patterns.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Kayvan Amyot-Ariya
Although Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and Uncrewed Surface Vehicles (USV) are often associated with the success of Ukrainian sea denial in the Black Sea, these platforms are tools within a wider denial system, and not a panacea of coastal defence.
Since the October 2022 attack on the port of Sevastopol, USVs and other uncrewed vehicles have been a reality that the Russian Black Sea Fleet has had to contend with.
Building upon their initial success, Ukraine’s various USV variants have successfully damaged and sunk warships, targeted Russia’s Shadow Fleet, and reduced the Black Sea Fleet’s ability to maintain a presence in port, to the extent that some have discussed an eventual withdrawal from the Black Sea altogether.
How Lethal are Uncrewed Systems?
To integrate the lessons learned from the Ukrainian model of denial, it is essential to understand what uncrewed vehicles can and cannot do.
For this reason, Russian losses in the Black Sea were compiled and categorized according to the strike method used and the full displacement tonnage of the targets. This data was assembled by expanding the existing Black Sea Institute’s tracker with open-source reporting.
This enlarged data covers the start of the conflict till May 2026 and distinguishes between destroyed and damaged targets, although it must be admitted that there are several cases where there is a degree of uncertainty as to the effect of strikes.
The strikes were codified in seven categories: Missiles, Mines, Special Operations, UAVs, USVs, Undersea Uncrewed Vehicles (UUV), and Uncrewed. Strikes by special operations units which were not physically aboard the ship were counted as having used the striking platform that they used. For example, the corvette Ivanovets which was struck by USVs operated by special operators was counted as USV. Strikes marked as Uncrewed could not be attributed to any specific uncrewed platform with the information available at the time of writing.
Aerial Drones
In the early stages of the war, UAVs were able to destroy a high number of low-tonnage vessels, primarily patrol boats, that were operating near the coasts and Snake Island. That is the situation in which UAVs were most lethal, tallying a total of 9 ships under 100 tonnes destroyed until May 2026. Moreover, UAVs have proven to be effective at distracting the air defences of ships that are jointly being targeted by more lethal means, such as with anti-ship missiles. Notably, this was the method used in the famous sinking of the cruiser Moskva, where a UAV distraction paved the way for a Neptune missile strike.
The relative lack of lethality of UAVs in naval contexts, including the long-range strike platforms, is evident in their conspicuous lack of destruction against ships over 100 tonnes. However, that is not to say they are not effective. It is quite the opposite: the fact that UAVs have been able to strike moving warships and damage them is in itself very significant.
Although the figure does not consider the early July 2026 Ukrainian coordinated strikes on the Russian Shadow Fleet, the drawn conclusions remain unchanged. The strikes, which were largely conducted against oil tankers and other non-warships, highlight the effectiveness of high endurance UAVs at hitting moving targets at sea.
Furthermore, the large number of strikes by UAVs, but the absence of sinkings against these large vessels supports the claim that UAVs are primarily effective at destroying small boats, distracting the defences of larger warships, and imposing a cost on other ships operating in the denied space by forcing them to accept a certain risk of damage.
Surface Drones
USVs only began to be used in October 2022 but rapidly expanded to the point where they were the platform responsible for the highest number of strikes until May 2026. Unlike UAVs, they have successfully struck many higher tonnage ships, even managing to sink some, such as the landing ship Caesar Kunikov.
As USVs continue to improve and grow their effective range, their strengths have become more apparent. USVs seem to be most effective when targeting ships at port or near coastlines, where a target’s location can be determined before the strike is launched. This information allows USVs to hit targets at the outer limits of their range such as the port of Novorossiysk and the Ivan Khurs intelligence ship, which was stationary for an extended period of time.
USVs, like UAVs, are not ship killers. They are strike platforms that have been quite successful at hitting costlier warships that have been operating within a denied area, even in the relative safety of defended ports. That, for the investment made, is a significant enough return, so long as the expectations made of it remain bounded within these historical confines.
Anti-Ship Missiles
Where uncrewed platforms disrupt and hinder enemy operations, anti-ship missiles are the only tool with the staying power to degrade their fighting capabilities at sea. When facing large combatants over 1,000 tonnes, anti-ship missiles were the most effective at both hitting and sinking warships.
Although the figure illustrates this reality, it nonetheless somewhat understates it given that strikes since 2024 have primarily targeted ships at port, in no small part due to the reticence of the Russian Navy to enter missile range. The effectiveness of land-based missiles was most visible in the opening stages of the war, when the frigate Admiral Essen was damaged and the cruiser Moskva was sunk, both by missile fire within a ten-day period.
Conclusion
Uncrewed systems are an essential component of a modern sea denial system. In combination with naval mines and the more lethal anti-ship missiles, these systems successfully hindered the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s operations. However, they are not miracle weapons, but rather tools which make it costlier for an enemy to operate in an area by destroying small vessels, harassing their warships with UAVs, damaging commercial vessels, and potentially damaging their ships at port with USVs. It remains unclear whether the long-range strike success of USVs would be replicated in an alternative setting without the same enclosed sea conditions, targeting information, or time needed to succeed.
Policymakers would do well to remember that these platforms are a component in a broader denial system, not a solution to all problems. If enemy warships are escorting smaller vessels in a littoral environment, it is an anti-ship missile that would be needed for rapid lethality, perhaps allowing for subsequent action by uncrewed systems against more favourable targets.
Kayvan Amyot-Ariya is a Strategic Studies student at Concordia University, focusing on maritime security and naval warfare. His current primary interest is the tracking and analysis of open-source data on the Russo-Ukrainian War, with a focus on Black Sea naval losses and strike patterns.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.