NAVPLAN 2022’s Budget Requirement: An Elusive Necessity?
The MOC
Image From U.S. Navy.
By
Benjamin E. Mainardi
July 28, 2022
In his recently released, updated Navigation Plan (NAVPLAN), Chief of Naval Operations Michael Gilday stated that “the Navy will require 3-5% sustained budget growth above actual inflation. Short of that, we will prioritize modernization over preserving force structure.” This assertion, bolded in the document as it is here, challenges Congress and the Administration to match their rhetoric with their funding priorities. For those members who have continually called on the Navy to be ready to meet a possible challenge from China or expressed the desire to maintain American forward presence abroad, now is the time for them to demonstrate their commitment.
Some members, such as Representatives Elaine Luria and Jared Golden, met the challenge even before NAVPLAN 2022 issued the call. Yet Congress’ overall, sustained support of the Navy, at least as seen through the budget, has been less than stellar in the past two decades. As seen below, the Navy’s budget has frequently experienced periods of brief growth followed by corresponding decline.
Accounting for inflation, the twenty-year average annual growth rate of the Department of the Navy’s budget stands at just 1.94 percent. Worth noting here as well, is that the Department’s budget includes that of the Marine Corps, which in a given year may account for as much as a fifth to a quarter of the total allocation. In this light, the CNO’s goal to receive sustained growth at rate above the twenty-year average seems less than likely – especially given the longstanding one-third, one-third, one-third paradigm that relatively equally divides the Department of Defense budget between the Army, Air Force, and Navy.
NAVPLAN 2022’s budget requirement, however, holds the corresponding clause that should funding remain insufficient, the Navy will “prioritize modernization over preserving force structure.” This caveat reflects the CNO’s previously articulated preference to prepare the force for the long term – as seen through the aspirational ramping scale of the 30-year Shipbuilding Plan and the “divest to invest” mantra. NAVPLAN’s challenge clearly expresses to those concerned about force readiness in the short term, particularly regarding China’s geopolitical ambitions and the massive growth of its naval forces, that they must provide the Navy with the resources to preserve the short-term capacity they demand on top of the CNO’s long term growth priorities. After all, the ability to respond to a China conflict scenario which dominates much of the criticism surrounding the Navy’s divest to invest plan fundamentally relies on the Navy and Marine Corps to take the lead in any American-led response. Thus, NAVPLAN 2022’s implication that the Department of the Navy, and by extension Marine Corps, requires more resources than their constituent services is well-grounded.
As we remain in the throes of the fiscal year 2023 budget reconciliation season, we shall see if the Department of the Navy’s 2023 budget request – which is indeed a 3.98 percent increase over the 2022 enacted budget – is able to come out maintaining the NAVPLAN’s required greater than 3 percent budget growth rate. Whether Congress will remain committed to doing so in future fiscal years as well, however, is elusive.
Benjamin E. Mainardi is an analyst at the Center for Maritime Strategy. He holds a master’s in War Studies from King’s College London. His primary research interests are in strategic studies and military history.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Benjamin E. Mainardi
In his recently released, updated Navigation Plan (NAVPLAN), Chief of Naval Operations Michael Gilday stated that “the Navy will require 3-5% sustained budget growth above actual inflation. Short of that, we will prioritize modernization over preserving force structure.” This assertion, bolded in the document as it is here, challenges Congress and the Administration to match their rhetoric with their funding priorities. For those members who have continually called on the Navy to be ready to meet a possible challenge from China or expressed the desire to maintain American forward presence abroad, now is the time for them to demonstrate their commitment.
Some members, such as Representatives Elaine Luria and Jared Golden, met the challenge even before NAVPLAN 2022 issued the call. Yet Congress’ overall, sustained support of the Navy, at least as seen through the budget, has been less than stellar in the past two decades. As seen below, the Navy’s budget has frequently experienced periods of brief growth followed by corresponding decline.
Accounting for inflation, the twenty-year average annual growth rate of the Department of the Navy’s budget stands at just 1.94 percent. Worth noting here as well, is that the Department’s budget includes that of the Marine Corps, which in a given year may account for as much as a fifth to a quarter of the total allocation. In this light, the CNO’s goal to receive sustained growth at rate above the twenty-year average seems less than likely – especially given the longstanding one-third, one-third, one-third paradigm that relatively equally divides the Department of Defense budget between the Army, Air Force, and Navy.
NAVPLAN 2022’s budget requirement, however, holds the corresponding clause that should funding remain insufficient, the Navy will “prioritize modernization over preserving force structure.” This caveat reflects the CNO’s previously articulated preference to prepare the force for the long term – as seen through the aspirational ramping scale of the 30-year Shipbuilding Plan and the “divest to invest” mantra. NAVPLAN’s challenge clearly expresses to those concerned about force readiness in the short term, particularly regarding China’s geopolitical ambitions and the massive growth of its naval forces, that they must provide the Navy with the resources to preserve the short-term capacity they demand on top of the CNO’s long term growth priorities. After all, the ability to respond to a China conflict scenario which dominates much of the criticism surrounding the Navy’s divest to invest plan fundamentally relies on the Navy and Marine Corps to take the lead in any American-led response. Thus, NAVPLAN 2022’s implication that the Department of the Navy, and by extension Marine Corps, requires more resources than their constituent services is well-grounded.
As we remain in the throes of the fiscal year 2023 budget reconciliation season, we shall see if the Department of the Navy’s 2023 budget request – which is indeed a 3.98 percent increase over the 2022 enacted budget – is able to come out maintaining the NAVPLAN’s required greater than 3 percent budget growth rate. Whether Congress will remain committed to doing so in future fiscal years as well, however, is elusive.
Benjamin E. Mainardi is an analyst at the Center for Maritime Strategy. He holds a master’s in War Studies from King’s College London. His primary research interests are in strategic studies and military history.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.