NAVPLAN 2022: Laying the Groundwork for the Future Force
The MOC
Photo From U.S. Navy.
By
Admiral James G. Foggo, U.S. Navy (Ret.), Dr. Steven Wills
July 26, 2022
The U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations has published his new Navigation Plan, laying the cornerstone for the future fleet of 2045, and delivers integrated, all-domain naval power. It is a comprehensive plan that tackles the challenges of readiness, capacity, capabilities, and sailor issues, consistent with FRAGO 2019 and NAVPLAN 2021. While the Navy has achieved initial success, the long-term plan requires time and more money to execute as the service plans a combat capable fleet out through 2045.
Readiness
The Navy has made some strides to get out of the readiness debt that the service has suffered from being the primary firepower support for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001. Since 2019, the Navy has:
Maintained over the threshold Mission Capable Rates for most of its fixed and rotary wing aircraft, including the F/A-18E/F, E/A-18G, E-2D, P-8A, MH-60R, and MH-60S.
Improved repair turnaround time and parts reliability in the Navy supply chain, with millions of dollars in savings to reinvest in the process.
More effort is needed to drive delays in maintenance to zero. Just as delaying bringing one’s car in for maintenance at a dealer can result in unexpected costs, delays in shipboard maintenance can reduce the life expectancy of ships and aircraft, making them much less useful to the fleet. CNO’s number one priority to get maintenance done on time must continue.
These new weapon and network capabilities, combined with the manned and unmanned units of Force Design 2045 will enable greater lethality in the fleet needed to combat adversary attempts to restrict access. Additional capabilities that still need effort include the terminal defense of the fleet against ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missiles, how to conduct logistics support to the fleet in a contested environment, more long-range weapon systems, and the artificial intelligence systems needed to get inside the opponent’s OODA loop. That’s “Decision Advantage!”
Capacity
The Navy is continuing to invest in areas of known superiority such as submarines while experimenting with future unmanned platforms that will add warfighting capacity in future years. Since 2019, the Navy has:
Nonetheless, capacity is not easy to build on a flatline or reduced budget. The Navy still needs to divest of aging platforms to help speed the development of new weapons systems, like the Columbia class ballistic missile submarine, the Constellation class frigate, the future destroyer DDX, and the next generation attack submarine as well as maintaining a minimum of twelve aircraft carriers.
Personnel
Finally in terms of training and support to Navy sailors, since 2019 the service has:
Conducted Large Scale Exercise-21 and other fleet exercises that virtually connected multiple Maritime Operations Centers, Marine Force Operations Centers, Carrier, and Expeditionary Strike Groups, and 30 ships into a single Live Virtual Constructive (LVC) training environment. LVC is economical, efficient, and more secure. It is the wave of the future so let’s invest.
Updated eleven enlisted ratings from legacy instructional methods – and are updating another 26 – to incorporate immersive and interactive technology, improving leaner experience and skill attainment.
Completed a top-down review of the education needs of the future force, establishing key warfighting competencies that will guide future education development.
Building tomorrow’s sailors with classroom, virtual, and live training is an unending process and will require additional support into the future.
Conclusion
The real takeaway from Admiral Gilday’s successive Navigation plans is that building the Navy that the Nation needs for peacetime competition and, if necessary, combat operations is a continuum and beyond the tenure of the one CNO.
Our credible conventional deterrence of China continues to erode given Chinese technological advances in the maritime domain as well as in cyber and space. Recent events have driven China, Russia, and even Iran closer as they collaborate to overturn the norms, standards, and institutions of the current international order. The unprovoked attack on Ukraine and blockade of seaborne ports of departure in the Black Sea is only the beginning. The next CNO’s NAVPLAN will need to continue to build on Admiral Gilday’s framework for the fleet to meet these challenges.
Restoring fleet readiness, introducing new capabilities, rebuilding capacity for deployment and operations as well as training current and future sailors is a decade-long process. The Navy needs greater financial support in terms of 3 to 5 percent budget growth above inflation per year to being to achieve these goals. Congress and the Department of Defense need to support these initiatives over the next decades and respect the Navy’s need to develop Force Design 2045 as embodied in NAVPLAN 2022. CNO Gilday has set the Navy on course for success but maintaining that direction and speed over time will be a challenge.
Admiral James G. Foggo, U.S. Navy, retired, is the Dean of the Center for Maritime Strategy. Admiral Foggo is the former commander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Africa, and Allied Joint Force Command, Naples. He Commanded BALTOPS in 2015 and 2016 as well as Exercise Trident Juncture in 2018.
Dr. Steven Wills is the Navalist at the Center for Maritime Strategy. His research and analysis centers on U.S. Navy strategy and policy, surface warfare programs and platforms, and military history.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Admiral James G. Foggo, U.S. Navy (Ret.), Dr. Steven Wills
The U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations has published his new Navigation Plan, laying the cornerstone for the future fleet of 2045, and delivers integrated, all-domain naval power. It is a comprehensive plan that tackles the challenges of readiness, capacity, capabilities, and sailor issues, consistent with FRAGO 2019 and NAVPLAN 2021. While the Navy has achieved initial success, the long-term plan requires time and more money to execute as the service plans a combat capable fleet out through 2045.
Readiness
The Navy has made some strides to get out of the readiness debt that the service has suffered from being the primary firepower support for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001. Since 2019, the Navy has:
More effort is needed to drive delays in maintenance to zero. Just as delaying bringing one’s car in for maintenance at a dealer can result in unexpected costs, delays in shipboard maintenance can reduce the life expectancy of ships and aircraft, making them much less useful to the fleet. CNO’s number one priority to get maintenance done on time must continue.
Capabilities
Since 2019, the Navy has added:
These new weapon and network capabilities, combined with the manned and unmanned units of Force Design 2045 will enable greater lethality in the fleet needed to combat adversary attempts to restrict access. Additional capabilities that still need effort include the terminal defense of the fleet against ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missiles, how to conduct logistics support to the fleet in a contested environment, more long-range weapon systems, and the artificial intelligence systems needed to get inside the opponent’s OODA loop. That’s “Decision Advantage!”
Capacity
The Navy is continuing to invest in areas of known superiority such as submarines while experimenting with future unmanned platforms that will add warfighting capacity in future years. Since 2019, the Navy has:
Nonetheless, capacity is not easy to build on a flatline or reduced budget. The Navy still needs to divest of aging platforms to help speed the development of new weapons systems, like the Columbia class ballistic missile submarine, the Constellation class frigate, the future destroyer DDX, and the next generation attack submarine as well as maintaining a minimum of twelve aircraft carriers.
Personnel
Finally in terms of training and support to Navy sailors, since 2019 the service has:
Building tomorrow’s sailors with classroom, virtual, and live training is an unending process and will require additional support into the future.
Conclusion
The real takeaway from Admiral Gilday’s successive Navigation plans is that building the Navy that the Nation needs for peacetime competition and, if necessary, combat operations is a continuum and beyond the tenure of the one CNO.
Our credible conventional deterrence of China continues to erode given Chinese technological advances in the maritime domain as well as in cyber and space. Recent events have driven China, Russia, and even Iran closer as they collaborate to overturn the norms, standards, and institutions of the current international order. The unprovoked attack on Ukraine and blockade of seaborne ports of departure in the Black Sea is only the beginning. The next CNO’s NAVPLAN will need to continue to build on Admiral Gilday’s framework for the fleet to meet these challenges.
Restoring fleet readiness, introducing new capabilities, rebuilding capacity for deployment and operations as well as training current and future sailors is a decade-long process. The Navy needs greater financial support in terms of 3 to 5 percent budget growth above inflation per year to being to achieve these goals. Congress and the Department of Defense need to support these initiatives over the next decades and respect the Navy’s need to develop Force Design 2045 as embodied in NAVPLAN 2022. CNO Gilday has set the Navy on course for success but maintaining that direction and speed over time will be a challenge.
Admiral James G. Foggo, U.S. Navy, retired, is the Dean of the Center for Maritime Strategy. Admiral Foggo is the former commander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Africa, and Allied Joint Force Command, Naples. He Commanded BALTOPS in 2015 and 2016 as well as Exercise Trident Juncture in 2018.
Dr. Steven Wills is the Navalist at the Center for Maritime Strategy. His research and analysis centers on U.S. Navy strategy and policy, surface warfare programs and platforms, and military history.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.