NATO Should Mind the Gap​

By Gonzalo Vázquez

During the days of the Cold War, allied navies played a cat-and-mouse game with the Soviet Navy´s Northern Fleet. The latter, having its headquarters at Murmansk, in the Kola Peninsula, had just one possible way to make it into the Atlantic – and thus, the world oceans. During those times, a particular region between the spheres of influence of both sides became critical for NATO allies to defend from Soviet submarines, who lacked sufficient missile capabilities and had to come closer to the Atlantic to better reach their targets. Such region has seen its strategic importance rise after years of low tensions, as a result of Russia´s Arctic military buildup and the prospects of busier commercial activity with the thawing of Arctic sea ice.

Drawn by connecting the Eastern coast of Greenland with Iceland and the North of the United Kingdom, the GIUK Gap is on track to become one of the main strategic maritime concerns for NATO over the following years. As in other places around the globe, the tyranny of geography makes of this imaginary line a gateway connecting the Arctic and the Atlantic; providing whoever can control it a major strategic advantage. This has been a major concern for the Northern Fleet of the Russian Navy, based at the Kola Peninsula, for many decades. Although the fleet´s size has shrunk considerably – going from 171 submarines and 70 surface vessels in 1989 to only 27 submarines and 10 surface vessels in 2022 – Russian efforts are still worth considering.

After a period of low activity, Russian military posture in the High North has been gradually returning to the levels of the Soviet era more three decades ago. Aside from remilitarizing and upgrading infrastructures from Soviet-era bases, Russia has developed very advanced systems to be deployed throughout the surroundings of the Kola Peninsula; including cruise missiles for their aerial and costal defenses, and developing special armored vehicles designed to operate in the harsh Arctic conditions.

In late 2014, the government decided to establish the Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command (JSC), and seven years later, in 2021, the Northern Fleet became its own military district by order of President Vladimir Putin. The juxtaposition of these last two decisions has been a major driving force for Russian Arctic military buildup ever since. The Northern Fleet´s conventional and nuclear submarines conduct regular patrols around the area, which according to Andrew Foxall, are not confined exclusively to the Arctic, but they often cross into the Atlantic through the GIUK Gap. The Bastion defense strategy used during the Cold War has now evolved into an A2/AD network of layered defenses, with most Russian civil and military bases pertaining to the Northern Fleet located closer to the Barents Sea, at the westernmost part of the country – thus, closer to the GIUK Gap. This precise region is strategically important for the Russian Navy, as it is among the only ones which remain free of ice all year round.

In the light of Russian efforts, NATO is now in dire need to strengthen its strategy for the Northern Flank, and doing so in a way that it includes the GIUK Gap as well. Although joint exercises such as Cold Response demonstrate strong willingness to do so, military capabilities still need to be further developed. Allied submarine forces and maritime patrol aircraft fleets, critical for such environment, were severely affected by the financial crisis of 2008, which hit hard national defense budgets of most allied nations. Aside for permanent military presence, the Alliance faces the task of rebuilding a strong defensive system around the Gap; a task for which Norway, Iceland, and Scotland will be key factors in the shaping of a strong military posture.

Norway, plainly aware of Russia´s Arctic military buildup as close neighbor of Moscow, has long been a strong advocate for increased naval and military presence in the High North. Oslo has been especially attentive to its patrols around the Barents Sea, a delicate region for their national interests. Military bases at Bergen and Stavanger, in the south, as well as those in Sortland and Olavsvern in the north, are strategically placed to be used for the prevention of any potential hostile incursion. As stated by members of the Norwegian Armed Forces, “Norway is responsible for vast sea areas in a strategically important part of the world, and we must therefore know and understand what is happening in these areas.”

Iceland does also provide an excellent base for maritime patrol aircraft and other operations in the region. Placed in the middle of the Gap, the United States is present in the island with the Naval Air Station of Keflavik. Abandoned in 2006 following more than five decades of permanent presence, they returned in 2017 to reform it and reequip it in the face of renewed Russian activity. As expressed by U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations Gilday in his last visit to the base, “we need a combat credible naval force that can protect our interests […] The Sailors here in Iceland are just that…” This way, Iceland has once again become a fundamental piece in the Gap´s geostrategy.

Lastly, the United Kingdom is also a firm contributor to NATO´s capabilities for the Gap, with the potential to use Scotland as an advanced base of operations for deployments to the High North. The Lossiemouth Base in Moray, received in early 2022 the last unit of its new P-8A Poseidon that conform the fleet of maritime patrol aircraft operating from the base; strengthening the assets held by NATO there. Furthermore, the naval base at Clyde, one of the three main bases of the Royal Navy, is home to the Vanguard-class of nuclear submarines, one of NATO´s nuclear deterrent pillars. Yet, the Royal Navy and its defensive role in the region also face a serious obstacle, with potential to hinder NATO´s nuclear deterrent in Scotland. Since 2014, Scottish independence has been in the table of discussions, with a huge potential of knocking down one of NATO´s nuclear deterrent assets: the Vanguard-class of SSBNs based in Faslane and the other bases of the Royal Navy in Scottish soil. Although it is not likely to happen in the short run, the potential costs associated with having to relocate the submarines away from their current homeport would be fatal to the Royal Navy – and for NATO.

At the end of the day, the GIUK Gap´s strategic importance is bound to remain high for the foreseeable future. Even with the development of long-range strike capabilities by both sides, the Gap is still the gateway that links the High North and the Northern Fleet with the Atlantic and European nations. Russian Arctic military activity must be closely watched in order to prevent any undesired hostilities from escalating into conflict in the region; and NATO must strengthen its naval capabilities by means of training and exercising like with Exercise Cold Response. Overall, having a united approach towards Russian military activities in the High North and strengthening its strategic awareness in the Gap will be essential to secure NATO´s Northern Flank.

Gonzalo Vázquez is a Spanish senior-year student of International Relations at the University of Navarre. He has contributed with the Australian Naval Review, the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies and other Spanish defense and security online publications.

The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.