Mastering The Waves: Learning to understand the maritime-industrial strategy behind Trumps’ foreign policy vision
The MOC
By
Grant Morgan
June 13, 2025
Many have labeled the Trump administration’s recent aggressive statements regarding the Panama Canal or the ongoing efforts by U.S. intelligence agencies to expand spying in Greenland as myopic and misinformed. Some, such as 726 international affairs experts who were recently polled by the TRIP Project, describe an administration which was actively antagonizing allies and making itself less capable of delivering its stated foreign policy objectives. Slews of leading economists have also concluded that America’s new emerging trade policy is rapidly deteriorating its growth prospects and regional competitiveness. Despite these varied criticisms, the Trump Administration’s unprecedented behavior toward regional countries, such as Panama, Canada, and Greenland, all share a common logic and singular objective: a quest for maritime-industrial security.
So far, the administration has largely defined its goals within trade and regional policies through promises of protective tariffs, reindustrialization, and claims over vital resources. But these various promises, despite seeming discombobulated, are actually quite connected to a long-term goal. Globalization has made untangling problems in trade and national security a more vexing enterprise, largely because bodies of water, and the ability to traverse them, are now more important than ever in shaping a country’s strength. Trump’s obsession with shipbuilding, port ownership, American control of Greenland and the Panama Canal, as well as his general trade policy, are not performative. Instead, they all point to an administration that is clearly stating how it views the future of global politics and trade. The aim is no longer just short-term trade deals or increased American exports but rather the fundamental reorientation of American industrial-maritime power in the Western Hemisphere, especially within the increasingly important Arctic. To accomplish this task, the administration has come to recognize how important maritime capacity will be for American national security in the coming decades.
Take the administration’s recent policy on port fees for Chinese vessels. By October, Chinese-owned and operated vessels will be subject to a $50 per ton service fee, with rates increasing to $140 per ton by 2028. Foreign operators of Chinese-built vessels, meanwhile, will be subject to a lesser fee of $18 per ton, or around $120 per container. The administration will also grant three-year exceptions to operators if they are able to provide a proof of an order for an American-made vessel. Altogether, these fees will be applied multiple times per year and could potentially raise the cost of shipping—all before possible tariffs are imposed. The intention here is obvious—to simultaneously raise the cost of using Chinese shipping while incentivizing domestic and foreign companies to switch to American or allied alternatives.
The logic underpinning this plan is that the raised costs will help sustain long-term demand for ships built by either American or allied shipyards. And if complemented by the bipartisan SHIPS Act, which aims to offer a slew of subsidies, regulatory changes, and other incentives to spur domestic ship production, these fees would indeed serve as a sturdy protectionist measure against China. In their entirety, the port fees and SHIPS Act are two different avenues for achieving the same goal of increasing American shipbuilding while also reducing reliance on China. The logic is partially economic, in the sense that both measures aim to create American jobs and support domestic and allied industries. But beyond achieving growth, they are also driven by a geopolitical worldview that requires a fundamental change to America’s industrial-maritime position.
The United States currently relies on China for various industrial inputs and logistical operations. Chinese-owned ports dominate our complex global supply chains, as does Chinese shipbuilding, which is projected to account for 53 percent of global orders this year. The United States, conversely, represents a mere 0.1 percent. China has also financed, bought, or built ports throughout the Western Hemisphere, including the critical Chancay Port located in Peru. Critical sectors, such as rare earths and minerals, have also become heavily dependent on China, with many commodities being sourced exclusively from Chinese companies and mines.
China’s shipbuilding capabilities also dwarf the U.S. maritime industry by gargantuan margins. Estimates from the U.S. Navy have indicated that China’s shipbuilding capacity is 232 times greater than America’s and this capacity is only growing larger as China continues to subsidize the industry. This dual purpose capacity has also allowed China to rapidly expand its navy and coast guard. Today, China has the largest navy by number of ships, with over 405 active vessels. Beijing has also continued to make its desires and goals within the maritime field rather clear. Beyond just defense, China has utilized its expanded capacity to perform drills in its near abroad and engage in gray zone operations meant to intimidate regional countries. It has also expanded its naval cooperation with Russia within several heavily trafficked areas, including the Russian Far East, the Mediterranean, and the Artic.
Because of this emerging geopolitical reality, the administration’s worldview has expanded beyond economic security and has recognized America’s reindustrialization as a crucial tool for expanding maritime security in Washington’s spheres of influence. Since January 20th, an outline of this strategy has begun to emerge. The administration has planned dual-use ship acquisitions with allies, which could produce would serve both military and commercial missions. These plans also include fleets of icebreakers, which could help to establish control over emerging Arctic trade routes and newly thawed resources. The National Security Council has also repeatedly highlighted the importance of increased naval capacity, particularly as a means to ensure American maritime competitiveness and deter foreign navies.
Put simply, Trump’s shipbuilding and naval reindustrialization scheme is not merely an afterthought of economic populism; rather, it is an intentional political tool meant to rapidly expand America’s ability to survive the emerging resource-drive multipolar arena of the mid-twenty-first century. At the heart of Trump’s America First agenda lies a new orientation for America’s maritime power and industrial capacity. It is a proactive strategy, predicated on a belief in an impending tumultuous future that will pit America against different regional powers and spheres of influence. Washington will have to contest resource rights and territorial ownership, as well as shipping lanes and supply chains. Most significantly, America’s economic role will have to shift from being a global consumer to being a regional industrial powerhouse that can swiftly build the tools and weapons of the twenty-first century, many of which will be deployed on ships and aircraft.
This worldview, however, is not without contradictions. Purchasing ships abroad will be necessary to meet initial American demand for non-Chinese vessels. However, recent tariff threats against Japan and South Korea may jeopardize this plan. Tariffs on steel, aluminum, and various other inputs necessary for domestic ship production will also likely delay attempts to expand domestic production. Thus, industrial cooperation with allies and regional partners will be essential to meet short to medium-term demand.
Domestic reindustrialization will additionally require government support and policy changes. Congress will need to do more than discuss legislation such as the SHIPS Act; it must also be passed and implemented. America will need a competent administrative bureaucracy. Numerous studies of past industrialization attempts have shown that government policy toward shipbuilding requires various combinations of carrots and sticks, alongside transparency and oversight. Subsidies must be targeted and tied to specific outcomes. Vital inputs and financing options must also be readily cheap and accessible. The free market will not just naturally cause orders flow to pricey and back-logged American shipbuilders. The government must approach the problem of regulatory reform and incentives carefully in order to grow the industry’s capacity over time.
The administration’s territorial claims and plans for resource extraction will also face hurdles. Greenland and Panama are unlikely to submit to American threats, nor will countries take kindly to American coercion against regional partners and supposed allies. Thus, the administration would be wise to work out economic arrangements that allow for greater access to rare earths and other resources in a mutually beneficial fashion.
Overall, American shipbuilding has become a largely bipartisan issue. Coalitions of lobbyists, unions, politicians, and businesspeople have all coalesced behind an attempt to revitalize an industry that has rapidly fallen behind our chief competitor. Within the Trump administration, the cabinet has elevated this aim to the forefront of U.S. foreign policy. America requires cruisers, frigates, icebreakers, liquid natural gas tankers, and many other classes of vessel to ensure its economic and political security. But beyond just serving as a populist talking point, American shipbuilding has emerged as a salient rallying cry and tool in American foreign policy. Its ultimate impact and effectiveness, however, will be determined through effective policymaking and implementation, not rhetoric. Hopefully, the industry’s growing salience will be able to surmount past failed attempts at rebuilding such an increasingly crucial part of how many Americans view the world.
Grant Morgan is a freelance journalist who resides in Washington, DC. Grant’s work largely covers US foreign and industrial policy, often with focus on politics and interests driving changes in DC. He obtained his master’s in international affairs from Indiana University Bloomington in 2024.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Grant Morgan
Many have labeled the Trump administration’s recent aggressive statements regarding the Panama Canal or the ongoing efforts by U.S. intelligence agencies to expand spying in Greenland as myopic and misinformed. Some, such as 726 international affairs experts who were recently polled by the TRIP Project, describe an administration which was actively antagonizing allies and making itself less capable of delivering its stated foreign policy objectives. Slews of leading economists have also concluded that America’s new emerging trade policy is rapidly deteriorating its growth prospects and regional competitiveness. Despite these varied criticisms, the Trump Administration’s unprecedented behavior toward regional countries, such as Panama, Canada, and Greenland, all share a common logic and singular objective: a quest for maritime-industrial security.
So far, the administration has largely defined its goals within trade and regional policies through promises of protective tariffs, reindustrialization, and claims over vital resources. But these various promises, despite seeming discombobulated, are actually quite connected to a long-term goal. Globalization has made untangling problems in trade and national security a more vexing enterprise, largely because bodies of water, and the ability to traverse them, are now more important than ever in shaping a country’s strength. Trump’s obsession with shipbuilding, port ownership, American control of Greenland and the Panama Canal, as well as his general trade policy, are not performative. Instead, they all point to an administration that is clearly stating how it views the future of global politics and trade. The aim is no longer just short-term trade deals or increased American exports but rather the fundamental reorientation of American industrial-maritime power in the Western Hemisphere, especially within the increasingly important Arctic. To accomplish this task, the administration has come to recognize how important maritime capacity will be for American national security in the coming decades.
Take the administration’s recent policy on port fees for Chinese vessels. By October, Chinese-owned and operated vessels will be subject to a $50 per ton service fee, with rates increasing to $140 per ton by 2028. Foreign operators of Chinese-built vessels, meanwhile, will be subject to a lesser fee of $18 per ton, or around $120 per container. The administration will also grant three-year exceptions to operators if they are able to provide a proof of an order for an American-made vessel. Altogether, these fees will be applied multiple times per year and could potentially raise the cost of shipping—all before possible tariffs are imposed. The intention here is obvious—to simultaneously raise the cost of using Chinese shipping while incentivizing domestic and foreign companies to switch to American or allied alternatives.
The logic underpinning this plan is that the raised costs will help sustain long-term demand for ships built by either American or allied shipyards. And if complemented by the bipartisan SHIPS Act, which aims to offer a slew of subsidies, regulatory changes, and other incentives to spur domestic ship production, these fees would indeed serve as a sturdy protectionist measure against China. In their entirety, the port fees and SHIPS Act are two different avenues for achieving the same goal of increasing American shipbuilding while also reducing reliance on China. The logic is partially economic, in the sense that both measures aim to create American jobs and support domestic and allied industries. But beyond achieving growth, they are also driven by a geopolitical worldview that requires a fundamental change to America’s industrial-maritime position.
The United States currently relies on China for various industrial inputs and logistical operations. Chinese-owned ports dominate our complex global supply chains, as does Chinese shipbuilding, which is projected to account for 53 percent of global orders this year. The United States, conversely, represents a mere 0.1 percent. China has also financed, bought, or built ports throughout the Western Hemisphere, including the critical Chancay Port located in Peru. Critical sectors, such as rare earths and minerals, have also become heavily dependent on China, with many commodities being sourced exclusively from Chinese companies and mines.
China’s shipbuilding capabilities also dwarf the U.S. maritime industry by gargantuan margins. Estimates from the U.S. Navy have indicated that China’s shipbuilding capacity is 232 times greater than America’s and this capacity is only growing larger as China continues to subsidize the industry. This dual purpose capacity has also allowed China to rapidly expand its navy and coast guard. Today, China has the largest navy by number of ships, with over 405 active vessels. Beijing has also continued to make its desires and goals within the maritime field rather clear. Beyond just defense, China has utilized its expanded capacity to perform drills in its near abroad and engage in gray zone operations meant to intimidate regional countries. It has also expanded its naval cooperation with Russia within several heavily trafficked areas, including the Russian Far East, the Mediterranean, and the Artic.
Because of this emerging geopolitical reality, the administration’s worldview has expanded beyond economic security and has recognized America’s reindustrialization as a crucial tool for expanding maritime security in Washington’s spheres of influence. Since January 20th, an outline of this strategy has begun to emerge. The administration has planned dual-use ship acquisitions with allies, which could produce would serve both military and commercial missions. These plans also include fleets of icebreakers, which could help to establish control over emerging Arctic trade routes and newly thawed resources. The National Security Council has also repeatedly highlighted the importance of increased naval capacity, particularly as a means to ensure American maritime competitiveness and deter foreign navies.
Put simply, Trump’s shipbuilding and naval reindustrialization scheme is not merely an afterthought of economic populism; rather, it is an intentional political tool meant to rapidly expand America’s ability to survive the emerging resource-drive multipolar arena of the mid-twenty-first century. At the heart of Trump’s America First agenda lies a new orientation for America’s maritime power and industrial capacity. It is a proactive strategy, predicated on a belief in an impending tumultuous future that will pit America against different regional powers and spheres of influence. Washington will have to contest resource rights and territorial ownership, as well as shipping lanes and supply chains. Most significantly, America’s economic role will have to shift from being a global consumer to being a regional industrial powerhouse that can swiftly build the tools and weapons of the twenty-first century, many of which will be deployed on ships and aircraft.
This worldview, however, is not without contradictions. Purchasing ships abroad will be necessary to meet initial American demand for non-Chinese vessels. However, recent tariff threats against Japan and South Korea may jeopardize this plan. Tariffs on steel, aluminum, and various other inputs necessary for domestic ship production will also likely delay attempts to expand domestic production. Thus, industrial cooperation with allies and regional partners will be essential to meet short to medium-term demand.
Domestic reindustrialization will additionally require government support and policy changes. Congress will need to do more than discuss legislation such as the SHIPS Act; it must also be passed and implemented. America will need a competent administrative bureaucracy. Numerous studies of past industrialization attempts have shown that government policy toward shipbuilding requires various combinations of carrots and sticks, alongside transparency and oversight. Subsidies must be targeted and tied to specific outcomes. Vital inputs and financing options must also be readily cheap and accessible. The free market will not just naturally cause orders flow to pricey and back-logged American shipbuilders. The government must approach the problem of regulatory reform and incentives carefully in order to grow the industry’s capacity over time.
The administration’s territorial claims and plans for resource extraction will also face hurdles. Greenland and Panama are unlikely to submit to American threats, nor will countries take kindly to American coercion against regional partners and supposed allies. Thus, the administration would be wise to work out economic arrangements that allow for greater access to rare earths and other resources in a mutually beneficial fashion.
Overall, American shipbuilding has become a largely bipartisan issue. Coalitions of lobbyists, unions, politicians, and businesspeople have all coalesced behind an attempt to revitalize an industry that has rapidly fallen behind our chief competitor. Within the Trump administration, the cabinet has elevated this aim to the forefront of U.S. foreign policy. America requires cruisers, frigates, icebreakers, liquid natural gas tankers, and many other classes of vessel to ensure its economic and political security. But beyond just serving as a populist talking point, American shipbuilding has emerged as a salient rallying cry and tool in American foreign policy. Its ultimate impact and effectiveness, however, will be determined through effective policymaking and implementation, not rhetoric. Hopefully, the industry’s growing salience will be able to surmount past failed attempts at rebuilding such an increasingly crucial part of how many Americans view the world.
Grant Morgan is a freelance journalist who resides in Washington, DC. Grant’s work largely covers US foreign and industrial policy, often with focus on politics and interests driving changes in DC. He obtained his master’s in international affairs from Indiana University Bloomington in 2024.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.