Littoral Warfare Requirements for Future Black Sea Operations
The MOC
By
Alasdair Murrie
November 9, 2023
Defense strategists and military leadership are keenly observing events in the Black Sea, particularly, covert domain awareness and operational superiority strategies in a contested littoral environment and Weapons Engagement Zone (“WEZ”); this being analogous to and perhaps a “test-case” for future geopolitical conflicts in other coastal regions of the world. The sinking of Russian flagship Moskva confirmed that large, conspicuous, high value assets operating outside blue-water radii of operations are vulnerable to comparatively low cost, low-tech, “disruptive” weapon systems. Therefore, smaller, more covert solutions able to operate on and below the surface are crucial for force projection in coastal zones, especially in the Black Sea.
The Rise of USV, UAV, and UUVs in the Black Sea
While NATO strains to formulate policy for policing aggression by Russia and lacks any meaningful Naval Order of Battle, Ukraine – with allied support – continues to innovate with ingenuity via development of ad-hoc, uncrewed surface, air, and underwater vehicles (“USV,” “UAV,” and “UUV”) engaged in Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (“ISR”) and so called “suicide” missions. Beyond providing a morale boost for Ukrainians and some short-term tactical gains, it is not a sustainable means for prosecuting a littoral warfare campaign, nor is it a path to victory. Three NATO countries have Black Sea coastlines: Romania, Bulgaria, and Türkiye. However, for any policing activity or future hostilities, greater numbers and types of naval assets are required. Conversely, an “Armada” of large, slow, combatant vessels is no solution either, especially given vulnerability within the cramped confines of the Black Sea and the 300 km (186 mi.) WEZ of Russian surface to surface coastal defenses plus fast-moving radius of air to surface weaponry (see Figure 1). Maritime success surely requires the ability to operate freely inside these zones.
Movement to and from the Black Sea by military vessels is subject to the United Nations Montreaux Convention of 1936requiring fifteen days advance notification of transit intent, that combined tonnage of all non-Black Sea navies present must not exceed 45,000 tonnes and that such vessels must leave after twenty-one days. Therefore, new, innovative expeditionary CONOPS are required. In response, many call for adjustments to the U.S. Navy’s fleet structure. The Congressional Research Service recently highlighted the need to acquire uncrewed vessels to “Shift the Navy to a more distributed fleet architecture, meaning a mix of ships that spreads the Navy’s capabilities over an increased number of platforms and avoids concentrating a large portion of the fleet’s overall capability into a relatively small number of high-value ships.” Further, General Robert Neller and Admiral John Richardson suggested the need for “Hard to find, hard to hit platforms, with an ability to conduct sea-based, inshore, maritime raids and amphibious advanced force operations.” Neller’s successor Berger recently commented, “Mobility inside the WEZ is a competitive advantage and an operational imperative.” However, one limitation of UUV/UAV design is the reliance on battery propulsion, often severely limiting range and duration, requiring recovery for re-charge and data extraction. What is missing is resilience and persistence, measured in days not hours.
Overcoming Limits to UUV/UAV Designs
One emerging technology fitting the above narratives and UUV/UAV persistence conundrum for extended ISR capability in littoral theatres is the Hyper-Sub Platform Technologies’ Fast Boat Submarine (“FBS”) (see Figure 2) a family of scalable and modular, dual modality, dual use craft. Combining the speed and agility of long range, Fast Patrol Boats on the surface with the extended duration of a diesel-electric submarine when submerged up to 500 ft. (152 m.), carried in an ultra-shallow draft hull capable of operating submerged in less than 15 ft. (4.5 m.) of water and able to carry out at least twenty identified mission sets including C4ISR, mine warfare and countermeasures, ASW, and ASuW.
Figure 2. Hyper-Sub Platform Technologies’ FBS. Photo from author.
A key feature of the unique FBS multi-module design is that it can be supplied as a dry cabin, crewed solution including lock-in / out chamber for special forces swimmer delivery. Alternatively, it can be supplied as a fully autonomous, heavy-lift weapon and sensor platform for uncrewed operations in coastal or fluvial zones. Modular design means that different but substantial mission payloads may be changed out in theatre to meet required CONOPS as they arise (see Figure 3).
Figure 3. Fast Boat Submarine (“FBS”) modularity. Photo from author.
Despite many capable UUV technologies being available, no other crewed or uncrewed, heavy payload, dual surface and subsea weapons platform exists that can act as a highly mobile, mothership or refuel and comms relay station for extended duration UUV/UAV operations. FBS has a submerged lifting capability of 15,000 lbs. (6,800 kg.) and cargo capacity of over 6,000 lbs. (2,700 kg.). For comparison, Mk 46 torpedoes weigh 512 lbs. (232 kg.). FBS carries 500 gallons of fuel that can re-charge batteries multiple times, using onboard invertors and snorkels to remain submerged. It has a large dry chamber/ cabin module, for housing sensors / electronics and external heavy duty central frame to which many different weapons or sensor payloads are attached.
This offers advantages crucial in the Black Sea. It can transit to an area of interest on the surface at speeds of 30 + Kts. and a range in excess of 400 nm. (740 km.) prior to extended, submerged operations. Scalability means larger FBS variants could serve as covert, resupply trucks for amphibious beach landing, support & logistical resupply, incorporating additional C4ISR sensors and defense/offense systems. Alternatively, multiple platforms on the seafloor, off an adversary’s coastline, activated when required, leveraging dual modality, for surface and subsea missions. FBS in crewed format is currently Technical Readiness Level 6 but should be in production during 2024, fills a gap in littoral warfare capability previously unavailable and answers the call from military leadership for dual modality, covert ingress, loitering, and mission persistence within a contested WEZ environment. It also solves the conundrum of crewed versus uncrewed, there being modules for both.
The Future of Black Sea Fleets?
While Ukraine continues to prosecute the land war with limited air support, a lack of amphibious capability hinders any opportunity to fight Russia on multiple fronts and certainly FBS provides some of that crucial capability. This conflict provides a fascinating template for future littoral campaigns and the capability requirements described by Berger in this scenario: “Forces that can continue to operate inside an adversary’s long-range precision fire WEZ are more operationally relevant than forces which must rapidly maneuver to positions outside the WEZ in order to remain survivable. These “stand-in” forces attrite adversary forces, enable joint force access requirements, complicate targeting and consume adversary ISR resources, and prevent fait accompli scenarios.”
FBS can be delivered by air, road and rail or launched from a small port, mooring, riverbank or canal system, configured with a substantial payload due to its modular format. Covertly recharging battery and air systems enables sustained operations measured in days not hours and in “Mothership” mode, exponentially extends the mission scope of swarms of smaller UUV or UAV systems. Furthermore, it provides sea to shore connector capability for logistical resupply, special operations, or key personnel evacuation. It also provides peace-time border security and anti-terrorism patrol functionality.
The logistical challenges of Montreaux combined with the tactical imprudence of deploying greater numbers of large, conspicuous combatants into the Black Sea, while considering the current UUV CONOPS and associated short comings in range, persistence and mission flexibility, present challenges that are not yet sufficiently overcome. An alternative to enable covert force projection into littoral zones is required.
Alasdair Murrie is Vice President of Business Development at Hyper-Sub Technologies Inc. A Desert Storm veteran and former Royal Air Force Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Officer, Murrie has spent almost 20 years in the commercial subsea sector in various business development and consultancy roles, delivering marine and subsea robotic vehicle, acoustic and optical sensor, smart tooling and control software solutions for defense & security, first responder, offshore energy and marine science organizations.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
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Center for Maritime Strategy
By Alasdair Murrie
Defense strategists and military leadership are keenly observing events in the Black Sea, particularly, covert domain awareness and operational superiority strategies in a contested littoral environment and Weapons Engagement Zone (“WEZ”); this being analogous to and perhaps a “test-case” for future geopolitical conflicts in other coastal regions of the world. The sinking of Russian flagship Moskva confirmed that large, conspicuous, high value assets operating outside blue-water radii of operations are vulnerable to comparatively low cost, low-tech, “disruptive” weapon systems. Therefore, smaller, more covert solutions able to operate on and below the surface are crucial for force projection in coastal zones, especially in the Black Sea.
The Rise of USV, UAV, and UUVs in the Black Sea
While NATO strains to formulate policy for policing aggression by Russia and lacks any meaningful Naval Order of Battle, Ukraine – with allied support – continues to innovate with ingenuity via development of ad-hoc, uncrewed surface, air, and underwater vehicles (“USV,” “UAV,” and “UUV”) engaged in Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (“ISR”) and so called “suicide” missions. Beyond providing a morale boost for Ukrainians and some short-term tactical gains, it is not a sustainable means for prosecuting a littoral warfare campaign, nor is it a path to victory. Three NATO countries have Black Sea coastlines: Romania, Bulgaria, and Türkiye. However, for any policing activity or future hostilities, greater numbers and types of naval assets are required. Conversely, an “Armada” of large, slow, combatant vessels is no solution either, especially given vulnerability within the cramped confines of the Black Sea and the 300 km (186 mi.) WEZ of Russian surface to surface coastal defenses plus fast-moving radius of air to surface weaponry (see Figure 1). Maritime success surely requires the ability to operate freely inside these zones.
Figure 1. Range of Russian coastal defenses. Image from the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Movement to and from the Black Sea by military vessels is subject to the United Nations Montreaux Convention of 1936 requiring fifteen days advance notification of transit intent, that combined tonnage of all non-Black Sea navies present must not exceed 45,000 tonnes and that such vessels must leave after twenty-one days. Therefore, new, innovative expeditionary CONOPS are required. In response, many call for adjustments to the U.S. Navy’s fleet structure. The Congressional Research Service recently highlighted the need to acquire uncrewed vessels to “Shift the Navy to a more distributed fleet architecture, meaning a mix of ships that spreads the Navy’s capabilities over an increased number of platforms and avoids concentrating a large portion of the fleet’s overall capability into a relatively small number of high-value ships.” Further, General Robert Neller and Admiral John Richardson suggested the need for “Hard to find, hard to hit platforms, with an ability to conduct sea-based, inshore, maritime raids and amphibious advanced force operations.” Neller’s successor Berger recently commented, “Mobility inside the WEZ is a competitive advantage and an operational imperative.” However, one limitation of UUV/UAV design is the reliance on battery propulsion, often severely limiting range and duration, requiring recovery for re-charge and data extraction. What is missing is resilience and persistence, measured in days not hours.
Overcoming Limits to UUV/UAV Designs
One emerging technology fitting the above narratives and UUV/UAV persistence conundrum for extended ISR capability in littoral theatres is the Hyper-Sub Platform Technologies’ Fast Boat Submarine (“FBS”) (see Figure 2) a family of scalable and modular, dual modality, dual use craft. Combining the speed and agility of long range, Fast Patrol Boats on the surface with the extended duration of a diesel-electric submarine when submerged up to 500 ft. (152 m.), carried in an ultra-shallow draft hull capable of operating submerged in less than 15 ft. (4.5 m.) of water and able to carry out at least twenty identified mission sets including C4ISR, mine warfare and countermeasures, ASW, and ASuW.
Figure 2. Hyper-Sub Platform Technologies’ FBS. Photo from author.
A key feature of the unique FBS multi-module design is that it can be supplied as a dry cabin, crewed solution including lock-in / out chamber for special forces swimmer delivery. Alternatively, it can be supplied as a fully autonomous, heavy-lift weapon and sensor platform for uncrewed operations in coastal or fluvial zones. Modular design means that different but substantial mission payloads may be changed out in theatre to meet required CONOPS as they arise (see Figure 3).
Figure 3. Fast Boat Submarine (“FBS”) modularity. Photo from author.
Despite many capable UUV technologies being available, no other crewed or uncrewed, heavy payload, dual surface and subsea weapons platform exists that can act as a highly mobile, mothership or refuel and comms relay station for extended duration UUV/UAV operations. FBS has a submerged lifting capability of 15,000 lbs. (6,800 kg.) and cargo capacity of over 6,000 lbs. (2,700 kg.). For comparison, Mk 46 torpedoes weigh 512 lbs. (232 kg.). FBS carries 500 gallons of fuel that can re-charge batteries multiple times, using onboard invertors and snorkels to remain submerged. It has a large dry chamber/ cabin module, for housing sensors / electronics and external heavy duty central frame to which many different weapons or sensor payloads are attached.
This offers advantages crucial in the Black Sea. It can transit to an area of interest on the surface at speeds of 30 + Kts. and a range in excess of 400 nm. (740 km.) prior to extended, submerged operations. Scalability means larger FBS variants could serve as covert, resupply trucks for amphibious beach landing, support & logistical resupply, incorporating additional C4ISR sensors and defense/offense systems. Alternatively, multiple platforms on the seafloor, off an adversary’s coastline, activated when required, leveraging dual modality, for surface and subsea missions. FBS in crewed format is currently Technical Readiness Level 6 but should be in production during 2024, fills a gap in littoral warfare capability previously unavailable and answers the call from military leadership for dual modality, covert ingress, loitering, and mission persistence within a contested WEZ environment. It also solves the conundrum of crewed versus uncrewed, there being modules for both.
The Future of Black Sea Fleets?
While Ukraine continues to prosecute the land war with limited air support, a lack of amphibious capability hinders any opportunity to fight Russia on multiple fronts and certainly FBS provides some of that crucial capability. This conflict provides a fascinating template for future littoral campaigns and the capability requirements described by Berger in this scenario: “Forces that can continue to operate inside an adversary’s long-range precision fire WEZ are more operationally relevant than forces which must rapidly maneuver to positions outside the WEZ in order to remain survivable. These “stand-in” forces attrite adversary forces, enable joint force access requirements, complicate targeting and consume adversary ISR resources, and prevent fait accompli scenarios.”
FBS can be delivered by air, road and rail or launched from a small port, mooring, riverbank or canal system, configured with a substantial payload due to its modular format. Covertly recharging battery and air systems enables sustained operations measured in days not hours and in “Mothership” mode, exponentially extends the mission scope of swarms of smaller UUV or UAV systems. Furthermore, it provides sea to shore connector capability for logistical resupply, special operations, or key personnel evacuation. It also provides peace-time border security and anti-terrorism patrol functionality.
The logistical challenges of Montreaux combined with the tactical imprudence of deploying greater numbers of large, conspicuous combatants into the Black Sea, while considering the current UUV CONOPS and associated short comings in range, persistence and mission flexibility, present challenges that are not yet sufficiently overcome. An alternative to enable covert force projection into littoral zones is required.
Alasdair Murrie is Vice President of Business Development at Hyper-Sub Technologies Inc. A Desert Storm veteran and former Royal Air Force Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Officer, Murrie has spent almost 20 years in the commercial subsea sector in various business development and consultancy roles, delivering marine and subsea robotic vehicle, acoustic and optical sensor, smart tooling and control software solutions for defense & security, first responder, offshore energy and marine science organizations.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.