In Our Neighborhood: The United States’ Need to Address China’s Port Dominance in West Africa
The MOC
By
Michael Howard
April 24, 2025
A report published this March by the African Center for Strategic Studies revealed China’s large and growing influence in Africa’s port industry. According to the report, state-backed Chinese firms have ownership stakes in a third of African ports, with the largest portion of those ports being in West Africa. Even more alarmingly for the United States, many of these ports have already been used to house People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ships, conduct military exercises, and, in one case, host a Chinese naval base. A large Chinese presence in West African ports poses a security threat to the United States because it increases the PLAN’s presence in the Atlantic, which is in the United States’ direct security periphery and is less defensible than the Pacific.
As a part of China’s Belt and Road initiative, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has worked through Chinese firms to acquire ownership stakes in many African ports. Ownership of international ports is a focus of China’s Belt and Road initiative because of their importance for both trade and security. While China has an ownership stake in ports all over Africa, 45 percent of these ports are located in West Africa. The CCP is present in some of West Africa’s most important ports, like Nigeria’s Lekki Sea Port, in which Chinese firms hold a seventy-five percent ownership stake. The CCP makes these gains in African ports by working through state-backed firms, which construct and manage them. The actions of Chinese firms in West Africa align with the official CCP policy of developing China’s maritime power through foreign ports. Some of the ports China in which is involved are above or around the Tropic of Cancer. This is significant because it puts them directly into NATO’s area of responsibility and the United States’ security periphery. The Chinese presence in West African ports would be less frightening if those ports were only used for economic purposes; however, this is not the case.
The military capabilities of Chinese ownership in African ports have been demonstrated by the CCP’s use of African ports for military exercises, port calls of PLAN vessels, and the construction of military bases. Since 2000, China has conducted 55 port calls of PLAN vessels in Africa, including in Morocco and Mauritania, two countries both in West Africa and above the Tropic of Cancer. Not only can commercial ports in West Africa be used to host PLAN vessels, but China has shown an ability and willingness to use these African ports to construct military bases. This capacity was shown in Djibouti in 2018, when the state-owned Chinese Merchants Group worked with the Djiboutian government to construct a PLAN-exclusive military port next to a recently constructed commercial port. While the CCP has not constructed a naval base in West Africa yet, it has searched for potential locations, including Gabon, which would give the PLAN direct access to the Atlantic. In its efforts to control ports globally, China has also made significant investments in the European port industry. China now has a larger presence in European ports than the United States, making it challenging for the United States to match China’s port dominance in the East Atlantic through European ports.
While the coasts of West Africa may seem far from the United States, at its nearest point Africa is only 3000 miles away from the United States’ East Coast—about the same distance from New York to California. China’s presence in the West African port industry should be a major concern for U.S. naval strategists because of the proximity to the United States’ security periphery. Ports are key to projecting naval power and dominance over a region’s ports can often mean military dominance in that region. If the Chinese continue to expand their influence over ports in Africa, combined with their significant advantage in shipbuilding capacity over the United States, they will likely be able to project significant military power across the Atlantic Ocean. This would mean that for the first time since World War Two, a rival great power’s navy would have a significant presence in the Atlantic Ocean, which could pose a threat to the United States’ national security.
While the Atlantic Ocean is a large body of water and therefore serves as a powerful barrier for halting military aggression, China’s port dominance is still a threat to U.S. strategic interests in and around the Atlantic, including the continental United States. The Atlantic Ocean does not provide as much protection as one would expect because the United States maintains a relatively small military presence in the Atlantic. This lack of military presence in the Atlantic is in stark contrast with that of the Pacific Ocean, where there are U.S. military bases from California to Japan and plenty in between. The Pacific has more military installations than the Atlantic primarily because it has seen more pressing military threats throughout recent American history. Since World War Two, the United States has engaged in several instances of security competition that required it to have forward-deployed military bases in the Pacific Ocean. The conflict with Imperial Japan, the Vietnam War, and the struggle for influence in the South China Sea have all necessitated that the U.S. Navy maintain a series of forward naval bases in the Pacific. The Atlantic Ocean has seen so many fewer security threats than the Pacific that the United States even disbanded the Second Fleet, which was responsible for the Atlantic, for seven years. While some Atlantic-based naval forces could be bolstered in the face of a rising Chinese threat, those forces would of course have to come from somewhere: namely the Pacific.
It should also be noted that the Atlantic has fewer islands, so there are fewer viable options for naval bases when compared to the Pacific. The islands that are in the Atlantic and could also serve as naval bases either don’t project power much further than naval bases on the coast of the United States or are controlled by other nations. This has left the United States with only two significant military bases in the Atlantic, compared to six in the Pacific. Because of the United States’ lack of military buildup in the Atlantic, China’s increasingly large naval presence in West Africa will be more effective at projecting power over the eastern half of the Atlantic and possibly even the western half, adjacent to the United States.
A powerful Chinese military presence in the Atlantic would likely allow the CCP to influence trade, stymie the transportation of U.S. troops across the Atlantic during a crisis in Europe or the Middle East, and do a myriad of other things that would be detrimental to the United States’ geostrategic objectives. The most frightening possibility that a strong Chinese naval presence in the Atlantic poses is the CCP’s ability to apply military pressure to the United States. In recent years the United States has attempted to wield its military position in the Indo-Pacific to stop China from advancing its geopolitical goals near its borders. The United States could face a similar situation if it continues to allow China to build up its naval presence in the Atlantic Ocean, which would be detrimental to its security posture. China’s ability to project power across the Atlantic—and therefore threaten the United States in its own backyard—could also allow the CCP to advance its own geostrategic goals (like conquering Taiwan) by deterring the United States from intervening. A powerful China in the Atlantic would almost certainly be a problem for the United States.
China’s increasing influence in the West African port industry could lead to the United States having to vie for power in what has been traditionally considered “America’s Ocean” for the first time in a hundred years. Unfortunately, the United States is far behind China in terms of developing infrastructure projects, including ports, in West Africa and will likely struggle to make significant gains. If the United States cannot easily slow down or roll back China’s influence in West Africa’s port industry, U.S. leaders need to start thinking about the Atlantic region in the same way that they think about the Pacific, as a zone where proactive measures have to be taken in order to promote American security interests. This could potentially include the creation of an Atlantic-based security cooperation group, involving nations from Latin America, Europe, and Africa. Or perhaps the United States could take a page out of China’s playbook by building artificial islands in the Atlantic to help stifle potential Chinese military pressure from Africa’s West Coast. Whatever approach the United States chooses to address China’s growing presence in the Atlantic with, it needs to get serious about ensuring its national security interests in the region.
Michael Howard is a sophomore at the University of Michigan, pursuing a degree in public policy from the Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy. His primary research interest is defense and security with a regional focus on Africa.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Michael Howard
A report published this March by the African Center for Strategic Studies revealed China’s large and growing influence in Africa’s port industry. According to the report, state-backed Chinese firms have ownership stakes in a third of African ports, with the largest portion of those ports being in West Africa. Even more alarmingly for the United States, many of these ports have already been used to house People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ships, conduct military exercises, and, in one case, host a Chinese naval base. A large Chinese presence in West African ports poses a security threat to the United States because it increases the PLAN’s presence in the Atlantic, which is in the United States’ direct security periphery and is less defensible than the Pacific.
As a part of China’s Belt and Road initiative, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has worked through Chinese firms to acquire ownership stakes in many African ports. Ownership of international ports is a focus of China’s Belt and Road initiative because of their importance for both trade and security. While China has an ownership stake in ports all over Africa, 45 percent of these ports are located in West Africa. The CCP is present in some of West Africa’s most important ports, like Nigeria’s Lekki Sea Port, in which Chinese firms hold a seventy-five percent ownership stake. The CCP makes these gains in African ports by working through state-backed firms, which construct and manage them. The actions of Chinese firms in West Africa align with the official CCP policy of developing China’s maritime power through foreign ports. Some of the ports China in which is involved are above or around the Tropic of Cancer. This is significant because it puts them directly into NATO’s area of responsibility and the United States’ security periphery. The Chinese presence in West African ports would be less frightening if those ports were only used for economic purposes; however, this is not the case.
The military capabilities of Chinese ownership in African ports have been demonstrated by the CCP’s use of African ports for military exercises, port calls of PLAN vessels, and the construction of military bases. Since 2000, China has conducted 55 port calls of PLAN vessels in Africa, including in Morocco and Mauritania, two countries both in West Africa and above the Tropic of Cancer. Not only can commercial ports in West Africa be used to host PLAN vessels, but China has shown an ability and willingness to use these African ports to construct military bases. This capacity was shown in Djibouti in 2018, when the state-owned Chinese Merchants Group worked with the Djiboutian government to construct a PLAN-exclusive military port next to a recently constructed commercial port. While the CCP has not constructed a naval base in West Africa yet, it has searched for potential locations, including Gabon, which would give the PLAN direct access to the Atlantic. In its efforts to control ports globally, China has also made significant investments in the European port industry. China now has a larger presence in European ports than the United States, making it challenging for the United States to match China’s port dominance in the East Atlantic through European ports.
While the coasts of West Africa may seem far from the United States, at its nearest point Africa is only 3000 miles away from the United States’ East Coast—about the same distance from New York to California. China’s presence in the West African port industry should be a major concern for U.S. naval strategists because of the proximity to the United States’ security periphery. Ports are key to projecting naval power and dominance over a region’s ports can often mean military dominance in that region. If the Chinese continue to expand their influence over ports in Africa, combined with their significant advantage in shipbuilding capacity over the United States, they will likely be able to project significant military power across the Atlantic Ocean. This would mean that for the first time since World War Two, a rival great power’s navy would have a significant presence in the Atlantic Ocean, which could pose a threat to the United States’ national security.
While the Atlantic Ocean is a large body of water and therefore serves as a powerful barrier for halting military aggression, China’s port dominance is still a threat to U.S. strategic interests in and around the Atlantic, including the continental United States. The Atlantic Ocean does not provide as much protection as one would expect because the United States maintains a relatively small military presence in the Atlantic. This lack of military presence in the Atlantic is in stark contrast with that of the Pacific Ocean, where there are U.S. military bases from California to Japan and plenty in between. The Pacific has more military installations than the Atlantic primarily because it has seen more pressing military threats throughout recent American history. Since World War Two, the United States has engaged in several instances of security competition that required it to have forward-deployed military bases in the Pacific Ocean. The conflict with Imperial Japan, the Vietnam War, and the struggle for influence in the South China Sea have all necessitated that the U.S. Navy maintain a series of forward naval bases in the Pacific. The Atlantic Ocean has seen so many fewer security threats than the Pacific that the United States even disbanded the Second Fleet, which was responsible for the Atlantic, for seven years. While some Atlantic-based naval forces could be bolstered in the face of a rising Chinese threat, those forces would of course have to come from somewhere: namely the Pacific.
It should also be noted that the Atlantic has fewer islands, so there are fewer viable options for naval bases when compared to the Pacific. The islands that are in the Atlantic and could also serve as naval bases either don’t project power much further than naval bases on the coast of the United States or are controlled by other nations. This has left the United States with only two significant military bases in the Atlantic, compared to six in the Pacific. Because of the United States’ lack of military buildup in the Atlantic, China’s increasingly large naval presence in West Africa will be more effective at projecting power over the eastern half of the Atlantic and possibly even the western half, adjacent to the United States.
A powerful Chinese military presence in the Atlantic would likely allow the CCP to influence trade, stymie the transportation of U.S. troops across the Atlantic during a crisis in Europe or the Middle East, and do a myriad of other things that would be detrimental to the United States’ geostrategic objectives. The most frightening possibility that a strong Chinese naval presence in the Atlantic poses is the CCP’s ability to apply military pressure to the United States. In recent years the United States has attempted to wield its military position in the Indo-Pacific to stop China from advancing its geopolitical goals near its borders. The United States could face a similar situation if it continues to allow China to build up its naval presence in the Atlantic Ocean, which would be detrimental to its security posture. China’s ability to project power across the Atlantic—and therefore threaten the United States in its own backyard—could also allow the CCP to advance its own geostrategic goals (like conquering Taiwan) by deterring the United States from intervening. A powerful China in the Atlantic would almost certainly be a problem for the United States.
China’s increasing influence in the West African port industry could lead to the United States having to vie for power in what has been traditionally considered “America’s Ocean” for the first time in a hundred years. Unfortunately, the United States is far behind China in terms of developing infrastructure projects, including ports, in West Africa and will likely struggle to make significant gains. If the United States cannot easily slow down or roll back China’s influence in West Africa’s port industry, U.S. leaders need to start thinking about the Atlantic region in the same way that they think about the Pacific, as a zone where proactive measures have to be taken in order to promote American security interests. This could potentially include the creation of an Atlantic-based security cooperation group, involving nations from Latin America, Europe, and Africa. Or perhaps the United States could take a page out of China’s playbook by building artificial islands in the Atlantic to help stifle potential Chinese military pressure from Africa’s West Coast. Whatever approach the United States chooses to address China’s growing presence in the Atlantic with, it needs to get serious about ensuring its national security interests in the region.
Michael Howard is a sophomore at the University of Michigan, pursuing a degree in public policy from the Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy. His primary research interest is defense and security with a regional focus on Africa.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.