It has become quite fashionable lately to criticize European navies in general and the German Navy in particular. This publication is no exception. In October, Ewa Andryjalowicz argued that the German Navy faces severe “constraints” and is not doing enough to rectify this situation in the face of the threat posed by Russia. She raised questions about the current state of Germany’s fleet and its operational readiness, and asserted that it compared poorly with other Baltic navies. In December, Nicholas Weising—while arguing that European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are completely dependent on the United States for maritime security and for naval leadership within the Alliance—dismissed the German Navy a “green water navy”.
There is merit to these criticisms: the past decades have generally not been favorable to the Bundeswehr, with the German Navy especially affected by the lack of prioritization in defense spending by the Bundestag. Other problems in Germany’s defense establishment seem to have an outsized impact on the Navy. In the 15 years since national conscription was abolished, Germany has failed to crack the code on recruitment and retention in a country where military service is still viewed with much suspicion. Germany’s cumbersome and costly procurement system has delayed the introduction of new capabilities across its armed forces. As with all Western navies, the German Navy has been worn down by long decades of low-intensity but nonetheless challenging deployments in support of counter-terrorism and counter-piracy, hard on ships and crews and causing high-end warfighting skills to atrophy. The Navy has also had its share of simple bad luck in some of its procurement projects, notably the reduction gear issues on the K130 corvettes and combat system integration in the F125 frigates. The concept of the F125s as a stabilization frigate—designed to carry out those low-intensity operations economically—certainly looks grossly out of place in today’s operating environment.
But valid criticism can be taken so far as to no longer represent reality. Totally missing in either article is any analysis of specific higher-level decision-making; the knock-on effects of those decisions; and the fact that in naval force planning, impacts are felt decades down the line. Andryjalowicz claims, “current capabilities of the German Navy are limited“. Limited to or by what she does not clarify. That the German Navy is smaller than it was 30 years ago, that it has manning and readiness issues, or that not enough missiles were have been procured, are taken to indicate that it has no capability whatsoever, with no recognition given to the very real and substantial capabilities that do exist. There is no reference to stated political aims, defense ministry mission statements, or NATO Defence Capability Targets, which form the objective standards by which a navy’s capability and performance should be judged.
These criticisms also fail to account for the fact that most NATO navies have had a similar history since the end of the Cold War—the United States Navy (USN) included. Have critics forgotten the procurement debacles that are Littoral Combat Ship, Zumwalt-class, Ford-class, Cruiser Life Extension program, and now the Constellation-class? The criticisms not only ring as inaccurate, but—by singling out Germany—as unfair. Similar criticisms can be leveled at every NATO navy. If nothing else, this does a gross disservice to the herculean and praiseworthy efforts of the uniformed men and women of the German Navy to meet national, NATO, and other obligations with those resources afforded to them.
As to the accuracy of the assertions, it is difficult to understand, for instance, how the German Navy can be labeled “green water” when the lead ship of its newest class of warship is about to complete an 18-month, round-the-world deployment that included six months in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), participation in RIMPAC, exercises with the Indian Navy, and—most notably—a Taiwan Straits transit.
Similarly, Andryjalowicz’s assertion that “Germany’s maritime limitations are even more apparent compared to the naval capabilities of NATO members on the eastern front, such as Poland” ignores many simple facts. The Polish Navy consists of just two nearly 50-year-old FFG-7 class frigates, a single home-built patrol vessel (the only survivor of a planned but canceled class of eight corvettes), and some coastal minesweepers of mainly Soviet vintage. Does this force truly contribute more to deterrence in the Baltic than Germany’s Baltic-based Einsatzflottille 1—consisting of modern corvettes, submarines, minehunters, and tenders—never mind the big frigates of Einsatzflottille 2 based on the North Sea? This is to say nothing of the German Naval Air Arm, which makes Germany the only NATO Baltic nation besides Sweden with a true maritime patrol aircraft component and which by 2028 will include P-8 aircraft.
By that same year, when Poland’s new frigate will just be starting sea-trials, Germany will have built five new corvettes, two new fleet tankers, started sea trials on the F126 frigate, and begun construction on the F127 air defense frigate and two new Type212CD submarines. Germany also possesses Alliance-leading competence in mine countermeasures and unmanned anti-submarine warfare systems with ongoing development of MEKO S-X.
The teething problems of Germany’s recent ship classes have been worked out and the platforms are now reliable, capable ships that contribute to security and deterrence on NATO’s eastern flank. The corvettes do yeoman’s work in the Baltic and Mediterranean. Despite being under-armed, the F125s are large, roomy, stable ships equipped with a superb combat management system and plenty of space and flexibility to install new capabilities, including medium-range air defense. Just like the Spruance-class in the 1970s against which very similar criticisms were once leveled, these ships have a lot of untapped potential that could make them useful in high-end conflict.
Thus the critique that Germany has not built “aircraft carriers, cruisers or destroyers” is even more odd. Why should it? Germany has only ever built one carrier, its fate far from glorious. Has there ever been any consideration of doing so in the modern era? The last cruiser built by any nation was USS Port Royal, commissioned 30 years ago. And at 7000 tons, both the F124s and F125s are twice the displacement of the last class of destroyers operated by Germany (the Type 103s)—or about the same as a World War II-era light cruiser. It is disingenuous to say Germany has no destroyers or other “large surface combatants” when these ships are called “Frigates” largely for political reasons despite their greater size and capability. As Mahan once put it: “it is a nomenclature which probably facilitated the appropriations.”
Germany’s ships operate globally, participating in NATO’s Standing Naval Forces and Operation Sea Guardian, UNIFIL, EUNAVFOR Operations, and innumerable major exercises. This author can attest to the professional seamanship and tactical proficiency of German crews and that they take excellent care of their vessels. The 2024 German Navy Indo-Pacific deployment, with its Taiwan Straits transit, was called “fantastic” by U.S. Indo-Pacific Commander, Admiral Sam Paparo. That Germany possesses a capable blue-water, warfighting navy is nowhere more evident than in the superb performance of FGS Hessen in escorting merchant ships while engaging Houthi missiles and drones during EU Operation Aspides.
The German Navy not only contributes meaningfully to freedom of the seas and upholding the rules-based international order, it boasts a cadre of experienced and worldly sailors and naval officers who have extensive global, multinational, at-sea experience. Thanks to Aspides, some have now seen true high-end anti-air warfare. Senior Navy leaders with extensive global, at-sea command experience are the intellectual equals in maritime strategic thought of any nation’s admirals, routinely contributing to global discussions on maritime affairs.
Whatever problems the German Navy has stem largely from insufficient resources provided by the Bundestag and lack of political will on the part of the Federal Government. The USN has, with its comparatively massive budget, no comparable excuse. Its current shortcomings in hulls and readiness are very much the result of shortsightedness, mismanagement, overuse, and waste within the Pentagon and defense industry. At least the German Navy is in a position to beg taxpayers not for forgiveness, but rather to recognize the importance of sea power.
One should also not forget that the degree to which a democracy exercises its military muscle is a product of the political resolve of its elected leaders and thus of the nation’s voters. The decision to send the Indo-Pacific task force around Africa instead of through the Red Sea was made not by an admiral but by the defense minister, an elected politician. Is it really surprising in light of the country’s history that Germany is hesitant—even 80 years on—to use its military in ways which can be seen as aggressive, nationalist, or, even worse, neo-imperialist?
Quite simply, Germans have a navy of which they can be proud, despite the financial and political handcuffs placed upon it. Those who seek to criticize it, or any NATO navy, would do well to remember this and then to identify exactly what their criticisms are, at whom specifically they are aimed, and by what standard they should be judged. Should parliament carry the blame for failing to provide the correct legal framework or sufficient funding? Government for failing to establish the correct policies or being too timid—or bold—in employment of the force? The procurement process for failing to deliver? The defense ministry for not using resources wisely? Or does responsibility lie with military leadership for not maintaining assets or training personnel?
Failing to provide this level of analysis and nuance risks alienating potential allies in solving these problems, especially among that navy’s leaders. With every NATO navy seemingly living in a glass house, critics should be sure of their aim before throwing stones.
Chuck Ridgwayis a retired US Navy surface warfare and reserve Africa Foreign Area Officer. After leaving active duty, he spent a decade as a NATO International Civilian at the NATO Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre in Lisbon, Portugal, and has since consulted as a maritime security subject matter expert with a number of NGOs, IOs, and, currently, the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s Institute for Security Governance. In his spare time he substitute teaches in Denver Public Schools. He is the winner of the CNO’s 2024 Naval History Essay Contest, Rising Historian category. From 2000 to 2003, in his final assignment on active duty, he was a Personnel Exchange Program officer aboard the German Frigate FGS Lübeck F-214.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Chuck Ridgway
It has become quite fashionable lately to criticize European navies in general and the German Navy in particular. This publication is no exception. In October, Ewa Andryjalowicz argued that the German Navy faces severe “constraints” and is not doing enough to rectify this situation in the face of the threat posed by Russia. She raised questions about the current state of Germany’s fleet and its operational readiness, and asserted that it compared poorly with other Baltic navies. In December, Nicholas Weising—while arguing that European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are completely dependent on the United States for maritime security and for naval leadership within the Alliance—dismissed the German Navy a “green water navy”.
There is merit to these criticisms: the past decades have generally not been favorable to the Bundeswehr, with the German Navy especially affected by the lack of prioritization in defense spending by the Bundestag. Other problems in Germany’s defense establishment seem to have an outsized impact on the Navy. In the 15 years since national conscription was abolished, Germany has failed to crack the code on recruitment and retention in a country where military service is still viewed with much suspicion. Germany’s cumbersome and costly procurement system has delayed the introduction of new capabilities across its armed forces. As with all Western navies, the German Navy has been worn down by long decades of low-intensity but nonetheless challenging deployments in support of counter-terrorism and counter-piracy, hard on ships and crews and causing high-end warfighting skills to atrophy. The Navy has also had its share of simple bad luck in some of its procurement projects, notably the reduction gear issues on the K130 corvettes and combat system integration in the F125 frigates. The concept of the F125s as a stabilization frigate—designed to carry out those low-intensity operations economically—certainly looks grossly out of place in today’s operating environment.
But valid criticism can be taken so far as to no longer represent reality. Totally missing in either article is any analysis of specific higher-level decision-making; the knock-on effects of those decisions; and the fact that in naval force planning, impacts are felt decades down the line. Andryjalowicz claims, “current capabilities of the German Navy are limited“. Limited to or by what she does not clarify. That the German Navy is smaller than it was 30 years ago, that it has manning and readiness issues, or that not enough missiles were have been procured, are taken to indicate that it has no capability whatsoever, with no recognition given to the very real and substantial capabilities that do exist. There is no reference to stated political aims, defense ministry mission statements, or NATO Defence Capability Targets, which form the objective standards by which a navy’s capability and performance should be judged.
These criticisms also fail to account for the fact that most NATO navies have had a similar history since the end of the Cold War—the United States Navy (USN) included. Have critics forgotten the procurement debacles that are Littoral Combat Ship, Zumwalt-class, Ford-class, Cruiser Life Extension program, and now the Constellation-class? The criticisms not only ring as inaccurate, but—by singling out Germany—as unfair. Similar criticisms can be leveled at every NATO navy. If nothing else, this does a gross disservice to the herculean and praiseworthy efforts of the uniformed men and women of the German Navy to meet national, NATO, and other obligations with those resources afforded to them.
As to the accuracy of the assertions, it is difficult to understand, for instance, how the German Navy can be labeled “green water” when the lead ship of its newest class of warship is about to complete an 18-month, round-the-world deployment that included six months in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), participation in RIMPAC, exercises with the Indian Navy, and—most notably—a Taiwan Straits transit.
Similarly, Andryjalowicz’s assertion that “Germany’s maritime limitations are even more apparent compared to the naval capabilities of NATO members on the eastern front, such as Poland” ignores many simple facts. The Polish Navy consists of just two nearly 50-year-old FFG-7 class frigates, a single home-built patrol vessel (the only survivor of a planned but canceled class of eight corvettes), and some coastal minesweepers of mainly Soviet vintage. Does this force truly contribute more to deterrence in the Baltic than Germany’s Baltic-based Einsatzflottille 1—consisting of modern corvettes, submarines, minehunters, and tenders—never mind the big frigates of Einsatzflottille 2 based on the North Sea? This is to say nothing of the German Naval Air Arm, which makes Germany the only NATO Baltic nation besides Sweden with a true maritime patrol aircraft component and which by 2028 will include P-8 aircraft.
By that same year, when Poland’s new frigate will just be starting sea-trials, Germany will have built five new corvettes, two new fleet tankers, started sea trials on the F126 frigate, and begun construction on the F127 air defense frigate and two new Type212CD submarines. Germany also possesses Alliance-leading competence in mine countermeasures and unmanned anti-submarine warfare systems with ongoing development of MEKO S-X.
The teething problems of Germany’s recent ship classes have been worked out and the platforms are now reliable, capable ships that contribute to security and deterrence on NATO’s eastern flank. The corvettes do yeoman’s work in the Baltic and Mediterranean. Despite being under-armed, the F125s are large, roomy, stable ships equipped with a superb combat management system and plenty of space and flexibility to install new capabilities, including medium-range air defense. Just like the Spruance-class in the 1970s against which very similar criticisms were once leveled, these ships have a lot of untapped potential that could make them useful in high-end conflict.
Thus the critique that Germany has not built “aircraft carriers, cruisers or destroyers” is even more odd. Why should it? Germany has only ever built one carrier, its fate far from glorious. Has there ever been any consideration of doing so in the modern era? The last cruiser built by any nation was USS Port Royal, commissioned 30 years ago. And at 7000 tons, both the F124s and F125s are twice the displacement of the last class of destroyers operated by Germany (the Type 103s)—or about the same as a World War II-era light cruiser. It is disingenuous to say Germany has no destroyers or other “large surface combatants” when these ships are called “Frigates” largely for political reasons despite their greater size and capability. As Mahan once put it: “it is a nomenclature which probably facilitated the appropriations.”
Germany’s ships operate globally, participating in NATO’s Standing Naval Forces and Operation Sea Guardian, UNIFIL, EUNAVFOR Operations, and innumerable major exercises. This author can attest to the professional seamanship and tactical proficiency of German crews and that they take excellent care of their vessels. The 2024 German Navy Indo-Pacific deployment, with its Taiwan Straits transit, was called “fantastic” by U.S. Indo-Pacific Commander, Admiral Sam Paparo. That Germany possesses a capable blue-water, warfighting navy is nowhere more evident than in the superb performance of FGS Hessen in escorting merchant ships while engaging Houthi missiles and drones during EU Operation Aspides.
The German Navy not only contributes meaningfully to freedom of the seas and upholding the rules-based international order, it boasts a cadre of experienced and worldly sailors and naval officers who have extensive global, multinational, at-sea experience. Thanks to Aspides, some have now seen true high-end anti-air warfare. Senior Navy leaders with extensive global, at-sea command experience are the intellectual equals in maritime strategic thought of any nation’s admirals, routinely contributing to global discussions on maritime affairs.
Whatever problems the German Navy has stem largely from insufficient resources provided by the Bundestag and lack of political will on the part of the Federal Government. The USN has, with its comparatively massive budget, no comparable excuse. Its current shortcomings in hulls and readiness are very much the result of shortsightedness, mismanagement, overuse, and waste within the Pentagon and defense industry. At least the German Navy is in a position to beg taxpayers not for forgiveness, but rather to recognize the importance of sea power.
One should also not forget that the degree to which a democracy exercises its military muscle is a product of the political resolve of its elected leaders and thus of the nation’s voters. The decision to send the Indo-Pacific task force around Africa instead of through the Red Sea was made not by an admiral but by the defense minister, an elected politician. Is it really surprising in light of the country’s history that Germany is hesitant—even 80 years on—to use its military in ways which can be seen as aggressive, nationalist, or, even worse, neo-imperialist?
Quite simply, Germans have a navy of which they can be proud, despite the financial and political handcuffs placed upon it. Those who seek to criticize it, or any NATO navy, would do well to remember this and then to identify exactly what their criticisms are, at whom specifically they are aimed, and by what standard they should be judged. Should parliament carry the blame for failing to provide the correct legal framework or sufficient funding? Government for failing to establish the correct policies or being too timid—or bold—in employment of the force? The procurement process for failing to deliver? The defense ministry for not using resources wisely? Or does responsibility lie with military leadership for not maintaining assets or training personnel?
Failing to provide this level of analysis and nuance risks alienating potential allies in solving these problems, especially among that navy’s leaders. With every NATO navy seemingly living in a glass house, critics should be sure of their aim before throwing stones.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.