Fleet Readiness and the Eglin Gulf Testing and Training Range​

The MOC

By Rear Admiral (ret.) Philip Dur

America stands on the brink of a military readiness crisis. While the past century has seen tremendous growth in travel and commerce, one consequence of this progress has been the commercial encroachment on the air and sea space once reserved for military exercises. This trend, as well as the heightened concern for the environmental impact of such exercises, has limited opportunities for the military to conduct live-fire training of warships and tactical aircraft. A prime example of the trend was the 2003 closure of the Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Area (AFWTF). This area once supported live fire exercises by units of the Atlantic fleet in the Caribbean but was closed in 2003 in response to sustained protests by the community in Vieques, Puerto Rico regarding the environmental and community health impacts posed by the munitions being detonated there.

The impact of such closures on the combat readiness of the fleet is clear; absent opportunities to practice deploying weapons systems in realistic, high-pressure scenarios, America’s military personnel would struggle to develop the sufficient technical expertise, confidence, and unit cohesion necessary to adequately prepare themselves to use these tools in combat. The importance of ensuring combat readiness in the Western Hemisphere was on full display in Operations Pointed Spear and Absolute Resolve, which supported America’s War on Drugs and regime change efforts in Venezuela. These operations would not have been as successful as they were had it not been for the ability of the service men and women who executed them to conduct realistic training exercises to simulate similar missions.

The Eglin Gulf Testing and Training Range (EGTTR) in the Gulf of America is a vital maritime area that supports combat readiness by providing training critical to Air Force, Navy and Marine units. For the Navy, the range supports joint training and testing of air-to-air missilery such as the Tomahawk sub-sonic cruise missile, hypersonics, electronic warfare, bombing practice, and developing tactics for carrier strike groups. Atlantic fleet naval air forces use the range for realistic pre-deployment training, practicing complex missions like launching, flying to targets, and ordnance delivery. It is a critical hub for naval aviation and provides unique and varied environments for realistic combat scenarios for Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard aviators. The EGTTR also supports the role of naval aviation in joint operations by serving as a key location for joint exercises, which help integrate the training of the Air Force, Navy, Army, and Special forces to enable these branches to operate more effectively together. The area, including Santa Rosa Island and the EGTTR is also classified as a “designated landscape,” highlighting the government’s recognition of the need to balance military use with environmental concerns. Finally, Eglin hosts other Navy tenants such as the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) School, which uses the surrounding waters to teach technicians how to identify, locate, and dispose of sea mines and other hazardous weapons.

In sum, Eglin Air Force Base and the EGTTR which it controls are essential to force by providing the Air Force and the Navy with vital, controlled air space and an ocean area for training and testing that contributes to combat effectiveness in joint operations. While live-fire military exercises must be responsibly conducted in ways which minimize the risk to the environment and public safety at large, these exercises and the training areas that support play a critical role in preserving American military power and keeping its soldiers safe. Any commercial development which limits the value of the Gulf range in particular would degrade our ability to mount such successful operations in the future.

 

Rear Admiral (ret.) Philip Dur is a retired US Navy rear admiral. He served as the Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Plans, Policy and Operations before retiring in May 1995.


The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.