East and West of Suez: What if the Canal Closes?​

By Michael D. Purzycki

In 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. Fearing a loss of their power in the Middle East, Britain and France joined with Israel to invade the Sinai Peninsula. Much of the world, including the United States, condemned the invasion, and President Dwight D. Eisenhower pressured Britain and France to withdraw.

It was a humiliating result for two countries that still thought of themselves as great powers. For Britain, the Sinai War marked a turning point in its attitude toward overseas power projection. Although it did not completely withdraw militarily from the world, in the late 1960s Britain began to give up its major bases “East of Suez.” More and more, the United States would be the outside power providing stability in regions like the Persian Gulf.

Today, Egypt is an ally of the United States, and a major recipient of U.S. military aid. The Suez Canal is an important pathway for American vessels to reach the Gulf from the Mediterranean and, by extension, the Atlantic. Strong U.S.-Egyptian relations, therefore, are a key aspect of America’s ability to protect its interests in the Middle East.

But suppose Egypt should restrict access to the Suez Canal again. Suppose the U.S. Navy could no longer depend on the canal for sending its ships from the Mediterranean to the Gulf, and vice versa. What then?

Since taking power in a coup d’état in 2013, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has purchased more and more weapons from Russia. From 2015 to 2020, the U.S. share of Egyptian arms purchases fell from 47% to 14%. While this does not signal a full-fledged shift from pro-American to pro-Russian, it is a reason for the U.S. to be wary of relying on Cairo too much.

Sisi’s regime may look stable, but there are signs he may be in for a shock, especially if Egypt is deprived of Ukrainian grain thanks to Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine. Hosni Mubarak, Egypt’s president from 1981 to 2011, appeared to be secure until he was quickly ousted by a popular uprising. It is perfectly possible, if Egypt suffers from a major food shortage, that Sisi could be overthrown the way Mubarak was.

Such vulnerability could make Sisi susceptible to pressure from Putin. Russia could push Egypt to do with the Suez Canal what Turkey has done with the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits. Turkey’s decision to bar Russian naval vessels from moving into or out of the Black Sea – an authority it holds under the 1936 Montreux Convention – has prevented Russia from reinforcing its Black Sea fleet. That fleet has been significantly weakened by Ukraine’s sinking of its flagship, the cruiser Moskva. Russia may attempt to get its revenge by placing similar constraints on the U.S. Navy at Suez.

Suppose Putin were to say to Sisi, “I’ll give you grain, and I’ll give you weapons to fend off an uprising, but I want something in return.” Suppose that something is for Egypt to deny the U.S. Navy the ability to send its ships through the Suez Canal. In such a scenario, Sisi may well decide that his survival in power depended on denying the U.S. passage between the Mediterranean and the Gulf.

Imagine a resurgence of ISIS in Syria that induced the U.S. to increase its military presence there. It may want to move forces forward deployed in Central Command and the Fifth Fleet through the Suez Canal for this purpose, rather than use forces currently under European Command and the Sixth Fleet that are guarding against possible Russian attacks. A loss of access to the canal would slow down the speed at which forces could be exchanged between the Fifth Fleet on one side of the canal, and the Sixth Fleet on the other.

How to preempt such a dilemma? One possible way is to split U.S. Middle East policy into two portions: Gulf policy and Mediterranean policy. Instead of presuming the ability to move ships easily between the Med and the Gulf, plan for a world without the Suez Canal. And instead of thinking of the Middle East as a single region, view it in two parts: East of Suez and West of Suez.

With the Gulf and the Mediterranean divided between the Navy’s Fifth and Sixth Fleets, respectively, the maritime component of such a split is already in place. Creating the split on land (for example, considering the fight against ISIS in Syria separately from basing forces in a Gulf monarchy, even though both are under Central Command) could help the U.S. mentally shift away from an era of extended land deployment in the Middle East. The Navy could show U.S. policymakers how to break down the Middle East into components manageable within a context of great power competition.

East of Suez, the U.S. could attempt to tie China’s hands regarding energy. China already imports more oil from Saudi Arabia than the U.S. does, and its naval presence in the Gulf may well expand in coming years. Linking the Gulf to competition with China could give the U.S. ideas on ways to exploit Beijing’s dependence on the region’s oil.

West of Suez, Russia’s military presence in Syria could give the U.S. the chance to weaken Putin on a front other than Ukraine. Since 2015, Russian airstrikes have targeted Syrian civilians opposed to the regime of Russia’s ally, Bashar al-Assad. Should the U.S. provide anti-Assad Syrians with some of the same anti-aircraft weapons it has given Ukraine, it could open a second front in the battle against Putin’s aggression.

Even if the U.S. does not lose access to the Suez Canal, dividing the Middle East in this way could sharpen American minds. While the region will still be relevant to the U.S., it need not absorb the attention of policymakers as much as it has over the last two decades. Dividing East of Suez from West of Suez is a way to integrate Middle Eastern security into a new era of U.S. strategy.

Michael D. Purzycki is an analyst, writer, and editor based in Arlington, Virginia. The views expressed here are entirely his own.

The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.