While it sounds good on paper to increase the armament of any vessel, making such changes at this stage in the program is hazardous as it will delay the scheduled builds of FFG 63 and follow-on ships, and open the class to a potential flood of other upgrades that would increase the overall cost of the program. The Tomahawk and SM-6 missiles are also outside the role of the FFG-62 class as a lower-end surface combatant. The FFG-62 class ship can conduct air defense and surface attack without those weapons. Adding these capabilities to a ship that some observers have said is already too large and capable further imbalances the U.S. surface fleet toward all high-end ships that are more costly to maintain over time.
The U.S. needs more frigates and ought to be building more FFG-62 class ships than DDG-51 Flight III ships. Any future fight with the Chinese or Russian navies will require large numbers of capable ships, not just a handful of high payload-producing platforms, and more frigates are needed to swell U.S. fleet numbers at reasonable cost.
The reason given by the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) for the change was that it was concerned that the Navy was rushing to arm unmanned ships with Tomahawk before ensuring it was available to all manned ships. The SASC NDAA language initially stated,
“The committee notes the Navy is developing and fielding ‘virtualized’ weapons control system technology, including systems to support its vision for Tomahawk-capable unmanned surface vessels. The committee believes the FFG–62 class should include optimized Tomahawk Weapons System hardware and software, which would both provide a necessary lethality increase for the FFG–62 class and serve as a key technical risk reduction advance in realizing Tomahawk-capable USVs. The committee believes that jumping directly to Tomahawk-capable USVs without first having ensured that the FFG–62 class is Tomahawk-capable presents excessive technical risk in such USV programs.”
The question of whether arming an unmanned vessel with Tomahawk before a manned one causes program risk is open for discussion, but the engineering and costs associated with adding it to FFG-63 and forward are more concrete. Up-arming the frigates with these weapons involves adding the SM-6 Combat System and radar integration required to add the SM-6 missile into the FFG AW combat system, as well as additional integration to add Tomahawk weapon control consoles (TTWCS) into the FFG combat system. These weapons add capability, but they set a precedent to keep adding on other systems.
The Constellation class is not supposed to be a light destroyer but rather a frigate with responsibilities for antisubmarine warfare escort, and medium to low-level combat operations. The frigate needs to be built in large numbers as was the previous FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry class ships. The Navy can do that, and in the process lower costs on individual ships but it won’t get there if Congress keeps adding additional systems and costs. Let the Navy build the first, planned twenty frigates and then consider a second “batch” as has been used in the past in U.S. and Commonwealth navies.
The Navy built the first 21 Perry class as “short hull” ships the SH-2 antisubmarine helicopter but constructed the remainder as 8-ft longer versions capable of supporting the Light Airborne Multi-Purpose (LAMPS) helicopter program with the SH-60B helicopter. Commonwealth navies have routinely constructed surface combatants in “batches” with incremental capabilities such as the Type 42 destroyer and the new Type 26 frigate. The batch system allows needed ships to get into service early and when needed, but includes more capable, follow-on ships and a plan to modernize the earlier vessels once other ships are in service.
Endless upgrades to a program already underway delay service entry and raise costs. In the wake of problems with the Zumwalt class destroyers and Littoral Combat Ship, it is imperative that the Navy restore confidence in surface combatant construction by getting the frigates into service on time, on budget, and with the capabilities initially approved for the class.
The Constellation class frigates were supposed to provide additional air defense and antisubmarine warfare capability not provided by the preceding Littoral Combat Ships, but they were not supposed to grow to a cost of 2/3 that of the Arleigh Burke class destroyer but with only 1/3 that ship’s vertical launch missile capacity. Let the Constellation be the lower-end, smaller surface combatant it was designed to be and don’t make it a light destroyer.
Dr. Steven Wills is the Navalist at the Center for Maritime Strategy. His research and analysis centers on U.S. Navy strategy and policy, surface warfare programs and platforms, and military history.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
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Center for Maritime Strategy
By Dr. Steven Wills
The 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) contains a number of naval provisions, one of which (Sec. 131), is a demand to up-arm the Constellation class frigates after the initial unit (FFG 62 USS Constellation), with Standard Missile 6 surface to air missiles and Tomahawk cruise missiles.
While it sounds good on paper to increase the armament of any vessel, making such changes at this stage in the program is hazardous as it will delay the scheduled builds of FFG 63 and follow-on ships, and open the class to a potential flood of other upgrades that would increase the overall cost of the program. The Tomahawk and SM-6 missiles are also outside the role of the FFG-62 class as a lower-end surface combatant. The FFG-62 class ship can conduct air defense and surface attack without those weapons. Adding these capabilities to a ship that some observers have said is already too large and capable further imbalances the U.S. surface fleet toward all high-end ships that are more costly to maintain over time.
The U.S. needs more frigates and ought to be building more FFG-62 class ships than DDG-51 Flight III ships. Any future fight with the Chinese or Russian navies will require large numbers of capable ships, not just a handful of high payload-producing platforms, and more frigates are needed to swell U.S. fleet numbers at reasonable cost.
The reason given by the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) for the change was that it was concerned that the Navy was rushing to arm unmanned ships with Tomahawk before ensuring it was available to all manned ships. The SASC NDAA language initially stated,
“The committee notes the Navy is developing and fielding ‘virtualized’ weapons control system technology, including systems to support its vision for Tomahawk-capable unmanned surface vessels. The committee believes the FFG–62 class should include optimized Tomahawk Weapons System hardware and software, which would both provide a necessary lethality increase for the FFG–62 class and serve as a key technical risk reduction advance in realizing Tomahawk-capable USVs. The committee believes that jumping directly to Tomahawk-capable USVs without first having ensured that the FFG–62 class is Tomahawk-capable presents excessive technical risk in such USV programs.”
The question of whether arming an unmanned vessel with Tomahawk before a manned one causes program risk is open for discussion, but the engineering and costs associated with adding it to FFG-63 and forward are more concrete. Up-arming the frigates with these weapons involves adding the SM-6 Combat System and radar integration required to add the SM-6 missile into the FFG AW combat system, as well as additional integration to add Tomahawk weapon control consoles (TTWCS) into the FFG combat system. These weapons add capability, but they set a precedent to keep adding on other systems.
The last time a major FFG-62 upgrade was discussed involved increasing the number of VLS tubes on the ship from 32 to 48. The Congressional Research Service reported such a change would add 200 tons to the ship’s displacement and an increase in the ship’s beam (width.) The cost for this change was estimated between $16m and $24m per ship. Adding SM-6 and Tomahawk is not as costly, but FFG-62 already cost one billion or more per unit.
The Constellation class is not supposed to be a light destroyer but rather a frigate with responsibilities for antisubmarine warfare escort, and medium to low-level combat operations. The frigate needs to be built in large numbers as was the previous FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry class ships. The Navy can do that, and in the process lower costs on individual ships but it won’t get there if Congress keeps adding additional systems and costs. Let the Navy build the first, planned twenty frigates and then consider a second “batch” as has been used in the past in U.S. and Commonwealth navies.
The Navy built the first 21 Perry class as “short hull” ships the SH-2 antisubmarine helicopter but constructed the remainder as 8-ft longer versions capable of supporting the Light Airborne Multi-Purpose (LAMPS) helicopter program with the SH-60B helicopter. Commonwealth navies have routinely constructed surface combatants in “batches” with incremental capabilities such as the Type 42 destroyer and the new Type 26 frigate. The batch system allows needed ships to get into service early and when needed, but includes more capable, follow-on ships and a plan to modernize the earlier vessels once other ships are in service.
Endless upgrades to a program already underway delay service entry and raise costs. In the wake of problems with the Zumwalt class destroyers and Littoral Combat Ship, it is imperative that the Navy restore confidence in surface combatant construction by getting the frigates into service on time, on budget, and with the capabilities initially approved for the class.
The Constellation class frigates were supposed to provide additional air defense and antisubmarine warfare capability not provided by the preceding Littoral Combat Ships, but they were not supposed to grow to a cost of 2/3 that of the Arleigh Burke class destroyer but with only 1/3 that ship’s vertical launch missile capacity. Let the Constellation be the lower-end, smaller surface combatant it was designed to be and don’t make it a light destroyer.
Dr. Steven Wills is the Navalist at the Center for Maritime Strategy. His research and analysis centers on U.S. Navy strategy and policy, surface warfare programs and platforms, and military history.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.