Damn the Cruise Missiles and Full Speed Ahead in Hormuz
The MOC
By
Dr. Steven Wills
May 19, 2026
The U.S. Navy is again demonstrating the power of well-equipped, well-crewed warships in the close confines of the Strait of Hormuz. With perhaps a nod to Admiral David Farragut—who rammed his fleet past multiple Confederate forts during the American Civil War—U.S. Navy destroyers supporting Operation Epic Fury have now steamed through the strait under fire from cruise missiles, drones, and Iranian fast-attack craft. This operation, and a previous one covering the exit of U.S.-flagged commercial ships from the Persian Gulf, saw U.S. destroyers weather multiple attacks from cruise missiles, drones, and the ubiquitous Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) attack boats. These are dangerous operations; even one hit from a cruise missile could disable a destroyer and leave it at the mercy of small craft and drone attacks. While these passages do not necessarily mean “victory,” they do make clear that,despite forty-plus years of preparation for just such operations,the IRGCN has failed in its mission to control the Strait of Hormuz by preventing U.S. Navy access. While it may take time to restore full and safe passage, recent events do not suggest the United States is “losing” a conflict with Iran.
Running the Strait of Hormuz at night with only a handful of warships calls to mind Admiral David Farragut’s and Admiral David Dixon Porter’s operations against Confederate shore batteries and gunboats during the American Civil War. At New Orleans in 1862, Port Hudson in 1863, and Mobile Bay in 1864, Farragut led his fleets past heavily armed shore batteries—and sometimes Rebel gunboats as well—in missions that helped neutralize the power of key Confederate cities. Although successful, Farragut lost a major warship in each battle: USS Varuna, USS Mississippi, and USS Tecumseh, respectively. Porter likewise ran his river fleet past the guns of Vicksburg in April 1863 and lost the transport Henry Clay in the endeavor. Ships/sailors are indeed perhaps “fools to fight forts,” as either Admiral Lord Nelson or Admiral Sir John Fisher suggested; nevertheless, they can run the gauntlet of land-based firepower for brief periods when the objective demands it. Initial reports suggested that—like Farragut’s and Porter’s battles—the transit of the Strait of Hormuz under Iranian missile and drone fire, as well as small-boat attacks, was hard-fought, with multiple instances in which U.S. warships were nearly hit or damaged. Like the Confederates, however, the IRGC appears to have paid a high price for attacking U.S. Navy warships: some estimates suggest dozens of small gunboats sunk and numerous shore facilities damaged in follow-on U.S. air and missile strikes.
The U.S. Navy also appears to have found mine-free passages for transiting Hormuz, suggesting that Iran’s mine-laying campaign has failed to block passage except by forcing ships into Iranian territorial waters. Mines will remain a threat. Although Farragut could perhaps famously cry, “Damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead,” at the Battle of Mobile Bay, he did so with intelligence suggesting that many of the Confederate mines (“torpedoes”) were likely inoperable after long immersion in salt water. Today’s U.S. Navy leaders may have a harder time taking such calculated risks with modern undersea weapons. Cruise missiles, drones, and small gunboats can be seen and engaged; mines disguised as underwater wreckage or debris are harder to find and can still destroy without warning.
Overall, however, the U.S. Navy’s successful run through IRGCN defenses in the Strait of Hormuz, coupled with the continuing blockade of Iranian shipping and oil exports, suggests the United States retains a firm upper hand in the conflict. Iran has been unable to contest the blockade effectively, and recent events indicate that U.S. warships can threaten Iran from within roughly a dozen miles of Iranian territory. These conditions do not suggest a winning hand for hardline IRGCN leaders. Nor is this the Black Sea, where Ukrainian land-based missiles and drones have driven the Russian Black Sea Fleet into remote corners of the theater. The U.S. Navy remains too small for its many global missions, but when deployed in appropriate numbers, its carrier-based aircraft, destroyers, and nuclear submarines retain decisive advantages—especially against authoritarian regimes whose centralized control discourages the innovative mission-command practices that often underpin U.S. success.
The United States has not won its conflict with the Islamist Iranian regime, but it certainly has not lost it. The U.S. Joint Force continues to inflict heavy losses on Iran’s conventional forces and the IRGC, with comparatively few casualties in return. The United States must not allow an IRGC-led regime to control Hormuz in any way; abandoning a global chokepoint is tantamount to surrendering the system of free trade to pirates and thugs. While war should never be a first choice, the Iranian Islamist regime has arguably been at war with the United States and Israel—as well as much of Western Europe—since 1979, and current operations are now returning that conflict to Iran with disastrous results for a regime that has conducted terrorism operations from its beginning. Parts of the Navy may have forgotten how to fight during the long post–Cold War peace, but experience in the Red Sea and now the Strait of Hormuz—supported by revived training and warfighting initiatives such as the surface warfare tactics instructor suggests the surface Navy, in particular, is fighting hard and well. Damn the cruise missiles, indeed.
Dr. Steve Wills,is the Navalist at The Center for Maritime Strategy.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Dr. Steven Wills
The U.S. Navy is again demonstrating the power of well-equipped, well-crewed warships in the close confines of the Strait of Hormuz. With perhaps a nod to Admiral David Farragut—who rammed his fleet past multiple Confederate forts during the American Civil War—U.S. Navy destroyers supporting Operation Epic Fury have now steamed through the strait under fire from cruise missiles, drones, and Iranian fast-attack craft. This operation, and a previous one covering the exit of U.S.-flagged commercial ships from the Persian Gulf, saw U.S. destroyers weather multiple attacks from cruise missiles, drones, and the ubiquitous Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) attack boats. These are dangerous operations; even one hit from a cruise missile could disable a destroyer and leave it at the mercy of small craft and drone attacks. While these passages do not necessarily mean “victory,” they do make clear that,despite forty-plus years of preparation for just such operations,the IRGCN has failed in its mission to control the Strait of Hormuz by preventing U.S. Navy access. While it may take time to restore full and safe passage, recent events do not suggest the United States is “losing” a conflict with Iran.
Running the Strait of Hormuz at night with only a handful of warships calls to mind Admiral David Farragut’s and Admiral David Dixon Porter’s operations against Confederate shore batteries and gunboats during the American Civil War. At New Orleans in 1862, Port Hudson in 1863, and Mobile Bay in 1864, Farragut led his fleets past heavily armed shore batteries—and sometimes Rebel gunboats as well—in missions that helped neutralize the power of key Confederate cities. Although successful, Farragut lost a major warship in each battle: USS Varuna, USS Mississippi, and USS Tecumseh, respectively. Porter likewise ran his river fleet past the guns of Vicksburg in April 1863 and lost the transport Henry Clay in the endeavor. Ships/sailors are indeed perhaps “fools to fight forts,” as either Admiral Lord Nelson or Admiral Sir John Fisher suggested; nevertheless, they can run the gauntlet of land-based firepower for brief periods when the objective demands it. Initial reports suggested that—like Farragut’s and Porter’s battles—the transit of the Strait of Hormuz under Iranian missile and drone fire, as well as small-boat attacks, was hard-fought, with multiple instances in which U.S. warships were nearly hit or damaged. Like the Confederates, however, the IRGC appears to have paid a high price for attacking U.S. Navy warships: some estimates suggest dozens of small gunboats sunk and numerous shore facilities damaged in follow-on U.S. air and missile strikes.
The U.S. Navy also appears to have found mine-free passages for transiting Hormuz, suggesting that Iran’s mine-laying campaign has failed to block passage except by forcing ships into Iranian territorial waters. Mines will remain a threat. Although Farragut could perhaps famously cry, “Damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead,” at the Battle of Mobile Bay, he did so with intelligence suggesting that many of the Confederate mines (“torpedoes”) were likely inoperable after long immersion in salt water. Today’s U.S. Navy leaders may have a harder time taking such calculated risks with modern undersea weapons. Cruise missiles, drones, and small gunboats can be seen and engaged; mines disguised as underwater wreckage or debris are harder to find and can still destroy without warning.
Overall, however, the U.S. Navy’s successful run through IRGCN defenses in the Strait of Hormuz, coupled with the continuing blockade of Iranian shipping and oil exports, suggests the United States retains a firm upper hand in the conflict. Iran has been unable to contest the blockade effectively, and recent events indicate that U.S. warships can threaten Iran from within roughly a dozen miles of Iranian territory. These conditions do not suggest a winning hand for hardline IRGCN leaders. Nor is this the Black Sea, where Ukrainian land-based missiles and drones have driven the Russian Black Sea Fleet into remote corners of the theater. The U.S. Navy remains too small for its many global missions, but when deployed in appropriate numbers, its carrier-based aircraft, destroyers, and nuclear submarines retain decisive advantages—especially against authoritarian regimes whose centralized control discourages the innovative mission-command practices that often underpin U.S. success.
The United States has not won its conflict with the Islamist Iranian regime, but it certainly has not lost it. The U.S. Joint Force continues to inflict heavy losses on Iran’s conventional forces and the IRGC, with comparatively few casualties in return. The United States must not allow an IRGC-led regime to control Hormuz in any way; abandoning a global chokepoint is tantamount to surrendering the system of free trade to pirates and thugs. While war should never be a first choice, the Iranian Islamist regime has arguably been at war with the United States and Israel—as well as much of Western Europe—since 1979, and current operations are now returning that conflict to Iran with disastrous results for a regime that has conducted terrorism operations from its beginning. Parts of the Navy may have forgotten how to fight during the long post–Cold War peace, but experience in the Red Sea and now the Strait of Hormuz—supported by revived training and warfighting initiatives such as the surface warfare tactics instructor suggests the surface Navy, in particular, is fighting hard and well. Damn the cruise missiles, indeed.
Dr. Steve Wills, is the Navalist at The Center for Maritime Strategy.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.