In 2012, the United States and the United Kingdom signed a Statement of Intent (SOI) regarding aircraft carrier cooperation. It committed the U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy to pursuing, “effective cooperation on the generation, training, operation, and sustainability of their respective aircraft carrier forces.” With this document, the two most powerful carrier forces in NATO agreed to pool resources for the sake of greater interoperability.
This SOI has produced valuable results. In 2021, a combined force of U.S. Marine Corps, Royal Navy, and Royal Air Force F-35s deployed aboard HMS Queen Elizabeth, as she carried out a six-month deployment in the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and Western Pacific. These American and British planes flew combat missions as part of the multilateral fight against the Islamic State. Queen Elizabeth and her task force then took part in Maritime Partnership Exercise 2021 in the Indian Ocean, alongside U.S., Japanese, and Australian forces. In 2023, an American Mojave drone took off from and landed on HMS Prince of Wales, the first time an unmanned aircraft operated from a British carrier.
The U.S. and U.K. both face security challenges across the globe, from Vladimir Putin’s Russia to Iran-backed Houthis to Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific. Carrier cooperation gives reason to believe neither will have to protect its interests alone. Can this practice be extended to other NATO members? If so, it would give the alliance more confidence in its ability to meet challenges in multiple regions at once.
In the Mediterranean, four additional NATO members operate carriers (though some are officially classified as amphibious assault ships): France, Italy, Spain, and Turkey. Between Russia’s war in Ukraine, Iran’s proxies in the Levant, and the ever-present threat of a resurgent Islamic State, America needs a naval presence in the Mediterranean for the foreseeable future, including carriers. But what if, for example, America’s leaders do not invest enough in the Navy to enable a continuous presence in the Med? What if simultaneous crises in the Persian Gulf and the Indo-Pacific draw America’s naval resources, and its leaders’ attention, away from the Med for long periods of time? It would help if other NATO allies were able to pick up some of the slack.
In some ways, carrier cooperation is already happening. Italy and the U.K. are among the nations acquiring F-35s—both are obtaining the U.S. Marine Corps’ F-35B variant for their navies. Spain is also considering placing F-35Bs on ESPS Juan Carlos I, to replace its aging AV-8B Harriers. Spain’s carrier, in turn, is the basis for the design of TCG Anadolu, whose commissioning in 2023 made Turkey the newest member of the carrier club. While the French Navy uses its own fighters for carrier aviation, FS Charles de Gaulle carries the American-made E-2 Hawkeye airborne early warning plane, just like U.S. carriers do. These facts combined could form a foundation on which multilateral carrier cooperation can be built.
Unmanned aerial vehicles are one area in which carrier cooperation might have great potential. In 2019-2020, Turkey’s drones prevented Khalifa Haftar’s rebel army from overthrowing the United Nations-recognized government of Libya. Both Ukraine and Azerbaijan have used Turkish-made Bayraktar UAVs to devastating effect within the last four years. At sea, Anadolu’s air wing includes both manned and unmanned aircraft. France, meanwhile, used American-made MQ-9 Reaper drones alongside its Mirage 2000 fighters during its counterterrorist campaign in Mali. Last year, France signed a contract for drones that can inspect Charles de Gaulle’s fighters while at sea. What lessons can NATO members learn and share with each other from these experiences?
Another possible benefit for America is further development of Lightning Carriers. Tests in 2019 and 2022 showcased the viability of flying up to 20 F-35Bs from an America class amphibious assault ship (effectively turning a ship that mainly transports Marines into a small carrier).This gives the U.S. Navy more ways to project airpower at sea besides Nimitz and Gerald R. Ford class supercarriers. The carriers of NATO’s Mediterranean navies range in length from 757 feet (Juan Carlos I) to 857 feet (Charles de Gaulle), compared to 844 feet for the America class. Expanding the Lightning Carrier concept to allied ships could improve interoperability.
A potential political benefit of expanding carrier cooperation within NATO is luring Turkey away from Russia. While Turkey is a valuable contributor to Western support for Ukraine—in addition to material support, its closure of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles prevents Russia from reinforcing its Black Sea Fleet—Ankara seeks good relations with Moscow whenever possible. They seek to deconflict in Syria, for example, where they back different sides (and have different enemies) in the ongoing civil war. Carrier cooperation might be an avenue to remind Turkish policy makers who their true friends are.
There would be many political hurdles to expanded carrier cooperation. Greece would likely object to closer U.S.-Turkish cooperation, given the countries’ longstanding rivalry despite their shared NATO membership. Outside of NATO, Israel would object, due to Turkey’s sympathy for Hamas. Both countries—especially Israel, as it fights Hamas in Gaza and Iran’s other proxies on multiple fronts—would have to be reassured that carrier cooperation will not come at their expense.
Then there is the matter of French pride. For generations, French leaders have worked to ensure their country is not subservient to Washington in security matters. In 1966, President Charles de Gaulle’s dissatisfaction with America was such that he withdrew France from NATO’s unified military command structure (though it remained an alliance member). France did not rejoin until 2009. Last year, President Emmanuel Macron raised eyebrows when he suggested Europe should not take sides in any conflict between America and China over Taiwan.
Fortunately, there are signs Turkey and France might be open to carrier cooperation. This year, during NATO’s annual Peacetime Vigilance Activity, France transferred authority for the operations of Charles de Gaulle to NATO for the first time. Anadolu also took part in the exercise, showing alliance members the value of Turkey’s naval power. This exercise, coming during NATO’s 75th year in existence, could prove an early step toward expanding carrier cooperation across the alliance.
Between Russia, China, Iran, and unforeseen challenges that may emerge, American carriers will be busy confronting threats for quite some time. The more America can depend on allies to complement its carrier power, the better placed it will be to handle these threats. Expanding carrier cooperation to more NATO members is one way to take fuller advantage of NATO’s strength at sea.
Michael D. Purzycki is an analyst, writer, and editor based in Arlington, Virginia. He has worked for the United States Navy, Marine Corps, and Army. The views expressed here are entirely his own.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Michael Purzycki
Figure 1: USMC F-35B with HMS Prince of Wales
In 2012, the United States and the United Kingdom signed a Statement of Intent (SOI) regarding aircraft carrier cooperation. It committed the U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy to pursuing, “effective cooperation on the generation, training, operation, and sustainability of their respective aircraft carrier forces.” With this document, the two most powerful carrier forces in NATO agreed to pool resources for the sake of greater interoperability.
This SOI has produced valuable results. In 2021, a combined force of U.S. Marine Corps, Royal Navy, and Royal Air Force F-35s deployed aboard HMS Queen Elizabeth, as she carried out a six-month deployment in the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and Western Pacific. These American and British planes flew combat missions as part of the multilateral fight against the Islamic State. Queen Elizabeth and her task force then took part in Maritime Partnership Exercise 2021 in the Indian Ocean, alongside U.S., Japanese, and Australian forces. In 2023, an American Mojave drone took off from and landed on HMS Prince of Wales, the first time an unmanned aircraft operated from a British carrier.
The U.S. and U.K. both face security challenges across the globe, from Vladimir Putin’s Russia to Iran-backed Houthis to Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific. Carrier cooperation gives reason to believe neither will have to protect its interests alone. Can this practice be extended to other NATO members? If so, it would give the alliance more confidence in its ability to meet challenges in multiple regions at once.
In the Mediterranean, four additional NATO members operate carriers (though some are officially classified as amphibious assault ships): France, Italy, Spain, and Turkey. Between Russia’s war in Ukraine, Iran’s proxies in the Levant, and the ever-present threat of a resurgent Islamic State, America needs a naval presence in the Mediterranean for the foreseeable future, including carriers. But what if, for example, America’s leaders do not invest enough in the Navy to enable a continuous presence in the Med? What if simultaneous crises in the Persian Gulf and the Indo-Pacific draw America’s naval resources, and its leaders’ attention, away from the Med for long periods of time? It would help if other NATO allies were able to pick up some of the slack.
In some ways, carrier cooperation is already happening. Italy and the U.K. are among the nations acquiring F-35s—both are obtaining the U.S. Marine Corps’ F-35B variant for their navies. Spain is also considering placing F-35Bs on ESPS Juan Carlos I, to replace its aging AV-8B Harriers. Spain’s carrier, in turn, is the basis for the design of TCG Anadolu, whose commissioning in 2023 made Turkey the newest member of the carrier club. While the French Navy uses its own fighters for carrier aviation, FS Charles de Gaulle carries the American-made E-2 Hawkeye airborne early warning plane, just like U.S. carriers do. These facts combined could form a foundation on which multilateral carrier cooperation can be built.
Unmanned aerial vehicles are one area in which carrier cooperation might have great potential. In 2019-2020, Turkey’s drones prevented Khalifa Haftar’s rebel army from overthrowing the United Nations-recognized government of Libya. Both Ukraine and Azerbaijan have used Turkish-made Bayraktar UAVs to devastating effect within the last four years. At sea, Anadolu’s air wing includes both manned and unmanned aircraft. France, meanwhile, used American-made MQ-9 Reaper drones alongside its Mirage 2000 fighters during its counterterrorist campaign in Mali. Last year, France signed a contract for drones that can inspect Charles de Gaulle’s fighters while at sea. What lessons can NATO members learn and share with each other from these experiences?
Another possible benefit for America is further development of Lightning Carriers. Tests in 2019 and 2022 showcased the viability of flying up to 20 F-35Bs from an America class amphibious assault ship (effectively turning a ship that mainly transports Marines into a small carrier).This gives the U.S. Navy more ways to project airpower at sea besides Nimitz and Gerald R. Ford class supercarriers. The carriers of NATO’s Mediterranean navies range in length from 757 feet (Juan Carlos I) to 857 feet (Charles de Gaulle), compared to 844 feet for the America class. Expanding the Lightning Carrier concept to allied ships could improve interoperability.
A potential political benefit of expanding carrier cooperation within NATO is luring Turkey away from Russia. While Turkey is a valuable contributor to Western support for Ukraine—in addition to material support, its closure of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles prevents Russia from reinforcing its Black Sea Fleet—Ankara seeks good relations with Moscow whenever possible. They seek to deconflict in Syria, for example, where they back different sides (and have different enemies) in the ongoing civil war. Carrier cooperation might be an avenue to remind Turkish policy makers who their true friends are.
There would be many political hurdles to expanded carrier cooperation. Greece would likely object to closer U.S.-Turkish cooperation, given the countries’ longstanding rivalry despite their shared NATO membership. Outside of NATO, Israel would object, due to Turkey’s sympathy for Hamas. Both countries—especially Israel, as it fights Hamas in Gaza and Iran’s other proxies on multiple fronts—would have to be reassured that carrier cooperation will not come at their expense.
Then there is the matter of French pride. For generations, French leaders have worked to ensure their country is not subservient to Washington in security matters. In 1966, President Charles de Gaulle’s dissatisfaction with America was such that he withdrew France from NATO’s unified military command structure (though it remained an alliance member). France did not rejoin until 2009. Last year, President Emmanuel Macron raised eyebrows when he suggested Europe should not take sides in any conflict between America and China over Taiwan.
Fortunately, there are signs Turkey and France might be open to carrier cooperation. This year, during NATO’s annual Peacetime Vigilance Activity, France transferred authority for the operations of Charles de Gaulle to NATO for the first time. Anadolu also took part in the exercise, showing alliance members the value of Turkey’s naval power. This exercise, coming during NATO’s 75th year in existence, could prove an early step toward expanding carrier cooperation across the alliance.
Between Russia, China, Iran, and unforeseen challenges that may emerge, American carriers will be busy confronting threats for quite some time. The more America can depend on allies to complement its carrier power, the better placed it will be to handle these threats. Expanding carrier cooperation to more NATO members is one way to take fuller advantage of NATO’s strength at sea.
Michael D. Purzycki is an analyst, writer, and editor based in Arlington, Virginia. He has worked for the United States Navy, Marine Corps, and Army. The views expressed here are entirely his own.