Bolstering Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific through Long Range Fires
The MOC
By
CDR Josh “Minkus” Portzer
October 24, 2023
The Department of Defense (“DoD”) and its allies view both the future of Taiwan and the stability of the Indo-Pacific theater with anxiety. This is not without merit. Whether by force or a strategically patientfait accompli, the Chinese annexation of Taiwan has become a recurring discussion topic inside the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”). To compound this tension, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (“PLAN”) – in conjunction with their maritime militia – and Air Force (“PLAAF”) both have increased their aggression over time in day-to-day interactions with military and civilian vessels as well. The U.S. military and its allies must think carefully about the way they deter China from the former risk, amidst the now routine escalatory behavior that comprises the latter.
The how in pursuing deterrence is complicated. Ultimately, there must exist a latent threat the PRC finds so unpalatable that Beijing modifies its behavior in the maritime domain. In recent years, America and its allies utilized strategic financial levers against Russia at the onset of its invasion of Ukraine. Russia, of course, is still waging its war. China has had the advantage of watching the deterrence (and arguably select economic and diplomatic weapons) fail and can annotate lessons learned accordingly. As such, perhaps the one deterrent lever left is the one most fundamental: the latent threat of violence sans proxy. This train of thought has challenges though. The current U.S. politico-economic environment on the Hill is not conducive to rapid defense cost growths. Given this, in what should the DoD and its allies invest to bolster deterrence?
The Navy has previously identified Long Range Fires (“LRF”) as one of its top force design imperatives. The most recent Chief of Naval Operations remarked that “to build the dynamic kill chains required for [distributed maritime operations, the U.S. Navy] must modernize and integrate current capabilities for long-range fires, aligning our analysis, prototyping, experimentation, requirements documentation, and capability development.” The DoD and America’s allies need to follow this train of thought. Long range fires could be one of the major keys to a viable deterrence strategy that rests on the latent threat of violence. To understand why, it is best to think about how the U.S. military determines credible threats through the lens of lethal force: in terms of capability, opportunity, and intent.
Capability (…and Capacity)
The United States military has long enjoyed technological and doctrinal supremacy in its materiel procurements and Joint employment of its forces. The new Ford-class aircraft carrier (~$13B per unit) can generate three times as much power as a Nimitz-class carrier and has an electromagnetic aircraft launch system. The DDG(X) (~$3.5B per unit) is planned to employ 21-cell RAM launchers and directed energy weapons. The P-8A aircraft (~$173M per unit) can employ weapons both beneath and above the sea and will field advanced weapons such as the Long Range Anti-Surface Missile (“LRASM”). The problem is that as these platforms (which are the focal points of U.S. naval deterrence) are exquisite — they are extremely expensive per unit. Because they are so expensive, the Navy for cannot purchase very many of them.
This underscores a fundamental asymmetry between China and the United States. These U.S. focal points of deterrence are limited in number, which naturally yields a certain conservative disposition as to their respective risk tolerances. A U.S. aircraft carrier likely will not linger willy-nilly in PRC territorial waters if the proverbial balloon goes up. Nor would P-8As fly within weapon engagements envelopes. Generally speaking, there are too few assets to accept such point blank risk. Beijing understands this fact, and that the skirmish that would invariably take place post invasion of Taiwan would be in the PRC’s “backyard.” Our lack of reach in the midst of hostilities due to limited inventory then limits the size of the stick Washington can carry whilst speaking softly. Capacity is its own capability in the long game.
From a budget programming perspective, going “all in” on LRF could change the paradigm. With LRF, the Navy does not necessarily need every launch platform itself to be exquisite in capability. What the platform launches becomes the immediate exquisite capability at hand (ideally of course, it is both). Per unit, they are also cheaper (orders of magnitude in some instances), which means the DoD could more easily choose to purchase more of them. Being that weapons are by their nature attritable, the threshold for mission success is naturally lower when entertaining the question of lobbing a missile into the fray. Now, in the maritime case, the Navy has more capable weapons, more of them, and less required restraint in engaging should conflict arise. This, by way of capacity, is more capability through the eyes of deterrence. If the PRC no longer thinks the saber rattling is a bluff (because America now has plenty of sabers to spare), it may take pause in considering escalatory scenarios where it may have not done so before.
Opportunity
With more plentiful and more capable weapons, the next threat factor supervenes: opportunity (and equally if not more important, the perception of opportunity). Several prime defense contracting companies, such as Lockheed Martin, have advertised long range and (also counter) hypersonic weapons in development. If the Navy (and DoD writ large) go all in on LRF, the PRC will find themselves in a pickle when trying to calculate risk to their forces — a quintessential element of determining whether a latent threat is palatable.
If the PRC believes the U.S. military has many weapons with which to employ LRF, then it must also understand that these U.S. forces may operate at further distances from China, with greater reach. With an increase in distance and reach, there is a corresponding increase in both maneuverability and (likely,) maneuverability that is harder to surveille by the PRC. Accordingly, the axes along which the PRC would have to assume there were threats increases in both number and duration through time. This would invariably shape their risk calculus.
Intent
Given capability and opportunity, the advantage provided through intent then follows. When it becomes easier and less costly (both in monetary and political terms) for the DoD to engage with LRF against hostilities, the PRC may perceive the U.S. military has intent when the PLAN or PLAAF conduct actions that the PRC knows would necessitate a military response (i.e. that the acceptable or desired public response would include the use of military force). In that calculation, Beijing would now be considering their own actions based off how America and its allies might see an incident or escalation. The full scale adoption and proliferation of LRF across the DoD and its allies would make calling bluff a much riskier move for Beijing, at a much smaller cost to the U.S. military. For America, showing one’s hand when called simply costs less. If the PLAN and PLAAF know this, doubt inevitably follows, and ideally, discourages. That is the crux of deterrence.
This line of thinking admittedly is a Western one, and there has been expressed concern that a Western lens is at risk of misunderstanding China. This is both a deep and important concern to voice. However, it should not cast aside an important shared truth. For centuries, militaries have been in the business of killing people. A given military may not understand another’s language or culture, but all militaries understand threats. It is off this fundamental fact alone that there can be hope for successful deterrence…given the right stick.
CDR Josh “Minkus” Portzer is an active-duty P-8A weapons and tactics instructor in the U.S. Navy. The views expressed here are his own.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By CDR Josh “Minkus” Portzer
The Department of Defense (“DoD”) and its allies view both the future of Taiwan and the stability of the Indo-Pacific theater with anxiety. This is not without merit. Whether by force or a strategically patient fait accompli, the Chinese annexation of Taiwan has become a recurring discussion topic inside the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”). To compound this tension, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (“PLAN”) – in conjunction with their maritime militia – and Air Force (“PLAAF”) both have increased their aggression over time in day-to-day interactions with military and civilian vessels as well. The U.S. military and its allies must think carefully about the way they deter China from the former risk, amidst the now routine escalatory behavior that comprises the latter.
The how in pursuing deterrence is complicated. Ultimately, there must exist a latent threat the PRC finds so unpalatable that Beijing modifies its behavior in the maritime domain. In recent years, America and its allies utilized strategic financial levers against Russia at the onset of its invasion of Ukraine. Russia, of course, is still waging its war. China has had the advantage of watching the deterrence (and arguably select economic and diplomatic weapons) fail and can annotate lessons learned accordingly. As such, perhaps the one deterrent lever left is the one most fundamental: the latent threat of violence sans proxy. This train of thought has challenges though. The current U.S. politico-economic environment on the Hill is not conducive to rapid defense cost growths. Given this, in what should the DoD and its allies invest to bolster deterrence?
The Navy has previously identified Long Range Fires (“LRF”) as one of its top force design imperatives. The most recent Chief of Naval Operations remarked that “to build the dynamic kill chains required for [distributed maritime operations, the U.S. Navy] must modernize and integrate current capabilities for long-range fires, aligning our analysis, prototyping, experimentation, requirements documentation, and capability development.” The DoD and America’s allies need to follow this train of thought. Long range fires could be one of the major keys to a viable deterrence strategy that rests on the latent threat of violence. To understand why, it is best to think about how the U.S. military determines credible threats through the lens of lethal force: in terms of capability, opportunity, and intent.
Capability (…and Capacity)
The United States military has long enjoyed technological and doctrinal supremacy in its materiel procurements and Joint employment of its forces. The new Ford-class aircraft carrier (~$13B per unit) can generate three times as much power as a Nimitz-class carrier and has an electromagnetic aircraft launch system. The DDG(X) (~$3.5B per unit) is planned to employ 21-cell RAM launchers and directed energy weapons. The P-8A aircraft (~$173M per unit) can employ weapons both beneath and above the sea and will field advanced weapons such as the Long Range Anti-Surface Missile (“LRASM”). The problem is that as these platforms (which are the focal points of U.S. naval deterrence) are exquisite — they are extremely expensive per unit. Because they are so expensive, the Navy for cannot purchase very many of them.
This underscores a fundamental asymmetry between China and the United States. These U.S. focal points of deterrence are limited in number, which naturally yields a certain conservative disposition as to their respective risk tolerances. A U.S. aircraft carrier likely will not linger willy-nilly in PRC territorial waters if the proverbial balloon goes up. Nor would P-8As fly within weapon engagements envelopes. Generally speaking, there are too few assets to accept such point blank risk. Beijing understands this fact, and that the skirmish that would invariably take place post invasion of Taiwan would be in the PRC’s “backyard.” Our lack of reach in the midst of hostilities due to limited inventory then limits the size of the stick Washington can carry whilst speaking softly. Capacity is its own capability in the long game.
From a budget programming perspective, going “all in” on LRF could change the paradigm. With LRF, the Navy does not necessarily need every launch platform itself to be exquisite in capability. What the platform launches becomes the immediate exquisite capability at hand (ideally of course, it is both). Per unit, they are also cheaper (orders of magnitude in some instances), which means the DoD could more easily choose to purchase more of them. Being that weapons are by their nature attritable, the threshold for mission success is naturally lower when entertaining the question of lobbing a missile into the fray. Now, in the maritime case, the Navy has more capable weapons, more of them, and less required restraint in engaging should conflict arise. This, by way of capacity, is more capability through the eyes of deterrence. If the PRC no longer thinks the saber rattling is a bluff (because America now has plenty of sabers to spare), it may take pause in considering escalatory scenarios where it may have not done so before.
Opportunity
With more plentiful and more capable weapons, the next threat factor supervenes: opportunity (and equally if not more important, the perception of opportunity). Several prime defense contracting companies, such as Lockheed Martin, have advertised long range and (also counter) hypersonic weapons in development. If the Navy (and DoD writ large) go all in on LRF, the PRC will find themselves in a pickle when trying to calculate risk to their forces — a quintessential element of determining whether a latent threat is palatable.
If the PRC believes the U.S. military has many weapons with which to employ LRF, then it must also understand that these U.S. forces may operate at further distances from China, with greater reach. With an increase in distance and reach, there is a corresponding increase in both maneuverability and (likely,) maneuverability that is harder to surveille by the PRC. Accordingly, the axes along which the PRC would have to assume there were threats increases in both number and duration through time. This would invariably shape their risk calculus.
Intent
Given capability and opportunity, the advantage provided through intent then follows. When it becomes easier and less costly (both in monetary and political terms) for the DoD to engage with LRF against hostilities, the PRC may perceive the U.S. military has intent when the PLAN or PLAAF conduct actions that the PRC knows would necessitate a military response (i.e. that the acceptable or desired public response would include the use of military force). In that calculation, Beijing would now be considering their own actions based off how America and its allies might see an incident or escalation. The full scale adoption and proliferation of LRF across the DoD and its allies would make calling bluff a much riskier move for Beijing, at a much smaller cost to the U.S. military. For America, showing one’s hand when called simply costs less. If the PLAN and PLAAF know this, doubt inevitably follows, and ideally, discourages. That is the crux of deterrence.
This line of thinking admittedly is a Western one, and there has been expressed concern that a Western lens is at risk of misunderstanding China. This is both a deep and important concern to voice. However, it should not cast aside an important shared truth. For centuries, militaries have been in the business of killing people. A given military may not understand another’s language or culture, but all militaries understand threats. It is off this fundamental fact alone that there can be hope for successful deterrence…given the right stick.
CDR Josh “Minkus” Portzer is an active-duty P-8A weapons and tactics instructor in the U.S. Navy. The views expressed here are his own.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.