Blue-water Navies: South Korea Becoming a Responsible Stakeholder
The MOC
By
Nazia Kazi
May 8, 2026
South Korea’s geography places it in the heart of the geopolitical issues in Northeast Asia and the political relationships between its neighbors. Given the nature of the division of the Korean peninsula, the Republic of Korea (ROK) has a unique position as an emerging global leader in an increasingly destabilizing security environment. Prior to the 21st century, the ROK’s strategic interests and national security priorities focused on maintaining a strong ground force in the event of invasion from the north. Now in the shadow of China’s rise, the ROK’s needs have expanded past its geography. For the first time since its foundation, the ROK is making strides towards achieving a blue-water navy capable of managing its geopolitical security constraints in the maritime environment. Plans such as the 2022 Global Pivotal Strategy and the 2026 Maritime Action Plan with the United States aim to enhance the US-ROK alliance while protecting interests abroad.
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is the ROK’s greatest and most immediate security concern in the case of invasion; however in the 21st century, the DPRK has been classified as “standing threat” that is persistent but also growing, indicating South Korea’s need to deter the DPRK by becoming a key player on the global stage and to address a more pressing security threat: U.S.-China great power competition. Ian Bowers cites the DPRK’s development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles as great motivation for the ROK to pursue a whole-of-peninsula defense and achieve blue-water capabilities. Additionally, the ROK Navy’s growing amphibious capabilities will be important for offensive and counter-offensive operations. According to Scott Snyder’s The US–South Korea Alliance, the ROK functions like an island nation as all of its borders have been cut from direct contact with the outside world for the past 75 years. As a result, the ROK heavily relies on its exports for boosting domestic production and economic growth and imports for critical resources such as oil for energy and raw materials for manufacturing. Thus, securing the shipments and sea lanes for these resources while deterring others such as China, Japan, and the DPRK are a critical priority for South Korea.
Herein lies the U.S. entrapment paradox: the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is South Korea’s largest trading partner and yet, by extension of U.S. competition, a potentially dangerous adversary. In Victor Cha’s powerplay model, great powers can leverage bilateral agreements with allies to maximize their power projection and constrain adversarial hard-power capabilities. By offering military commitments and molding potentially rogue governments such as Japan into strongholds, the United States was able to set up an alliance system that could maintain U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific region while preventing unilateral aggression and keeping other great powers from Europe out. South Korea and Taiwan followed suit.
In the current alliance system set up, the United States exerts control through its alliance-bargaining. However, the powerplay model is problematic in that the United States is just as susceptible to entrapment as its allies and increased regional military tensions pose a threat to the great power. In Graham Allison’s analysis of great power competitions, 12 out of 16 case studies of great power rivalries in the last 500 years eventually resulted in all-out war. In a short-term scenario, Sino-American relations have either the option of returning to a time of stability or increasing competition, whereas the long-term outcomes include competitive coexistence or a hegemonic war. For the past decade, the United States and China have observed considerable increase in technological competition and military advancements that reflect a short-term scenario with the possibility of escalation for a Taiwan Strait crisis or other altercation. Unfortunately, both Beijing and Washington are geared towards short-term rewards over long-term stability for the international system.
As with the case of alliances, the United States and South Korea both need to jointly prepare for the possibility of mutual entrapment. Should the United States engage in a war with the PRC, South Korea would inevitably be called to action by way of the U.S.-ROK military alliance, irrespective of the ROK’s relationship with the PRC. Even more alarming for the ROK is the potential for the collapse of the Kim regime; if North Korea were to fall, China would most likely intervene, with the potential for political conflict with the ROK over sovereignty rights and economic disaster. Additionally, the humanitarian crisis would lead to an influx of refugees to neighboring countries by sea, which would need to be managed. To protect South Korea’s major trade routes and prepare for the possibility of conflict between the PRC and the United States, the ROKN has taken on more responsibilities and naval modernization initiatives to transform from a green-water to a blue-water navy.
It is safe to assume that the ROK has graduated past older security perceptions of Korea as “shrimp among whales,” but it is important to understand that the ROK Navy (ROKN) only truly began to heavily modernize in the 1990s as Russia, China, and Japan all raced to modernize their navies. Thus the 21st century marks a major change in the ROK’s approach to naval modernization. In 2001, former ROK President Kim Dae Jung announced that the ROKN would establish a “strategic mobile fleet that protects state interests in the five big oceans and plays a role of keeping peace in the world.” This statement implies the ROKN’s evolution was meant for security concerns that go beyond self-defense in regional waters. In 2005, the South Korean Ministry of National Defense published “Defense Reform 2050” which reduced emphasis on ground forces build-up and brought attention to establishing an open-ocean navy by 2020.
Blue-water navies project power by being capable of operating all over the world through long-range missions. This highly expensive endeavor reflects South Korea’s long-term ambitions to become a responsible stakeholder in the region and the changing power dynamics in East Asia. As one of the Four Asian Tigers, one of South Korea’s key interests is maintaining the “Global Korea” policy that promotes South Korean foreign policy goals by leading in development and infrastructure projects worldwide. North Korea is the basis of South Korea’s naval expansion; since the DPRK’s nuclear and military provocations in 2010, the United States and South Korea have reimagined alliance cooperation to identify and manage challenges that impact the long-term relationship. South Korea’s naval ambitions not only strengthen its relationship with the United States, but also solidifies its political legitimacy to the world without losing to other great powers such as China and Japan.
U.S.-ROK joint cooperation in maritime security allows for powerplay to balance out without jeopardizing individual state interests. For the United States, increased ROKN presence in the maritime space eases burden-sharing while South Korea is able to maintain its own battle readiness through naval operations. Increased multilateral security cooperation also enhances general maritime domain awareness (MDA) while establishing common interests and practices for activity at sea. In 2022, former South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol announced his Global Pivotal Strategy that redefined South Korea’s scope of influence. The U.S.-ROK alliance is the central focus of South Korean foreign policy, and by association, South Korea is a responsible leader capable of pushing forward democratic principles and freedom to the global stage.
As a “Global Pivotal State,” President Yoon proclaimed that South Korea could guide other states towards a future of peace and prosperity, most effectively through the form of multilateral partnerships and joint security cooperation, especially in antipiracy and Humanitarian Assistance & Disaster Relief (HADR) operations. HADR joint operations with the United States and ASEAN member states provide especially beneficial practice for handling a possible North Korean regime collapse scenario. South Korea’s engagement in Southeast Asia and the QUAD Plus signifies a shift in perspective towards security cooperation as an avenue of diplomacy. South Korea’s participation in other frameworks such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and Enhancing Security Cooperation in and with Asia (ESIWA) help with keeping South Korea relevant, but still lack the initiative for leadership in maritime governance.
The first step to becoming a responsible maritime stakeholder is to increase advancements in naval technology and lead in maritime expertise such as “shipbuilding, maritime engineering, maritime surveillance, fisheries management, environmental management, and sustainable energy.” South Korea’s involvement with the United States’ new Maritime Action Plan will be a prime example for South Korean leadership and capabilities for large-scale maritime governance. Continued naval modernization will include the ROKN’s plans to “acquire a next-generation light aircraft carrier by 2033” and upgrade warships such as the KSS-III diesel-electric attack submarines and KDX-III guided missile destroyers through indigenous production. With the impending security risks of China’s naval modernization and role in global maritime governance, South Korea will need to take bolder measures to protect its assets from the Korean Strait to the East China Sea and remain a key player in global stakes.
Nazia Kazi is a graduate student at George Washington University studying Asian Studies.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Nazia Kazi
South Korea’s geography places it in the heart of the geopolitical issues in Northeast Asia and the political relationships between its neighbors. Given the nature of the division of the Korean peninsula, the Republic of Korea (ROK) has a unique position as an emerging global leader in an increasingly destabilizing security environment. Prior to the 21st century, the ROK’s strategic interests and national security priorities focused on maintaining a strong ground force in the event of invasion from the north. Now in the shadow of China’s rise, the ROK’s needs have expanded past its geography. For the first time since its foundation, the ROK is making strides towards achieving a blue-water navy capable of managing its geopolitical security constraints in the maritime environment. Plans such as the 2022 Global Pivotal Strategy and the 2026 Maritime Action Plan with the United States aim to enhance the US-ROK alliance while protecting interests abroad.
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is the ROK’s greatest and most immediate security concern in the case of invasion; however in the 21st century, the DPRK has been classified as “standing threat” that is persistent but also growing, indicating South Korea’s need to deter the DPRK by becoming a key player on the global stage and to address a more pressing security threat: U.S.-China great power competition. Ian Bowers cites the DPRK’s development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles as great motivation for the ROK to pursue a whole-of-peninsula defense and achieve blue-water capabilities. Additionally, the ROK Navy’s growing amphibious capabilities will be important for offensive and counter-offensive operations. According to Scott Snyder’s The US–South Korea Alliance, the ROK functions like an island nation as all of its borders have been cut from direct contact with the outside world for the past 75 years. As a result, the ROK heavily relies on its exports for boosting domestic production and economic growth and imports for critical resources such as oil for energy and raw materials for manufacturing. Thus, securing the shipments and sea lanes for these resources while deterring others such as China, Japan, and the DPRK are a critical priority for South Korea.
Herein lies the U.S. entrapment paradox: the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is South Korea’s largest trading partner and yet, by extension of U.S. competition, a potentially dangerous adversary. In Victor Cha’s powerplay model, great powers can leverage bilateral agreements with allies to maximize their power projection and constrain adversarial hard-power capabilities. By offering military commitments and molding potentially rogue governments such as Japan into strongholds, the United States was able to set up an alliance system that could maintain U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific region while preventing unilateral aggression and keeping other great powers from Europe out. South Korea and Taiwan followed suit.
In the current alliance system set up, the United States exerts control through its alliance-bargaining. However, the powerplay model is problematic in that the United States is just as susceptible to entrapment as its allies and increased regional military tensions pose a threat to the great power. In Graham Allison’s analysis of great power competitions, 12 out of 16 case studies of great power rivalries in the last 500 years eventually resulted in all-out war. In a short-term scenario, Sino-American relations have either the option of returning to a time of stability or increasing competition, whereas the long-term outcomes include competitive coexistence or a hegemonic war. For the past decade, the United States and China have observed considerable increase in technological competition and military advancements that reflect a short-term scenario with the possibility of escalation for a Taiwan Strait crisis or other altercation. Unfortunately, both Beijing and Washington are geared towards short-term rewards over long-term stability for the international system.
As with the case of alliances, the United States and South Korea both need to jointly prepare for the possibility of mutual entrapment. Should the United States engage in a war with the PRC, South Korea would inevitably be called to action by way of the U.S.-ROK military alliance, irrespective of the ROK’s relationship with the PRC. Even more alarming for the ROK is the potential for the collapse of the Kim regime; if North Korea were to fall, China would most likely intervene, with the potential for political conflict with the ROK over sovereignty rights and economic disaster. Additionally, the humanitarian crisis would lead to an influx of refugees to neighboring countries by sea, which would need to be managed. To protect South Korea’s major trade routes and prepare for the possibility of conflict between the PRC and the United States, the ROKN has taken on more responsibilities and naval modernization initiatives to transform from a green-water to a blue-water navy.
It is safe to assume that the ROK has graduated past older security perceptions of Korea as “shrimp among whales,” but it is important to understand that the ROK Navy (ROKN) only truly began to heavily modernize in the 1990s as Russia, China, and Japan all raced to modernize their navies. Thus the 21st century marks a major change in the ROK’s approach to naval modernization. In 2001, former ROK President Kim Dae Jung announced that the ROKN would establish a “strategic mobile fleet that protects state interests in the five big oceans and plays a role of keeping peace in the world.” This statement implies the ROKN’s evolution was meant for security concerns that go beyond self-defense in regional waters. In 2005, the South Korean Ministry of National Defense published “Defense Reform 2050” which reduced emphasis on ground forces build-up and brought attention to establishing an open-ocean navy by 2020.
Blue-water navies project power by being capable of operating all over the world through long-range missions. This highly expensive endeavor reflects South Korea’s long-term ambitions to become a responsible stakeholder in the region and the changing power dynamics in East Asia. As one of the Four Asian Tigers, one of South Korea’s key interests is maintaining the “Global Korea” policy that promotes South Korean foreign policy goals by leading in development and infrastructure projects worldwide. North Korea is the basis of South Korea’s naval expansion; since the DPRK’s nuclear and military provocations in 2010, the United States and South Korea have reimagined alliance cooperation to identify and manage challenges that impact the long-term relationship. South Korea’s naval ambitions not only strengthen its relationship with the United States, but also solidifies its political legitimacy to the world without losing to other great powers such as China and Japan.
U.S.-ROK joint cooperation in maritime security allows for powerplay to balance out without jeopardizing individual state interests. For the United States, increased ROKN presence in the maritime space eases burden-sharing while South Korea is able to maintain its own battle readiness through naval operations. Increased multilateral security cooperation also enhances general maritime domain awareness (MDA) while establishing common interests and practices for activity at sea. In 2022, former South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol announced his Global Pivotal Strategy that redefined South Korea’s scope of influence. The U.S.-ROK alliance is the central focus of South Korean foreign policy, and by association, South Korea is a responsible leader capable of pushing forward democratic principles and freedom to the global stage.
As a “Global Pivotal State,” President Yoon proclaimed that South Korea could guide other states towards a future of peace and prosperity, most effectively through the form of multilateral partnerships and joint security cooperation, especially in antipiracy and Humanitarian Assistance & Disaster Relief (HADR) operations. HADR joint operations with the United States and ASEAN member states provide especially beneficial practice for handling a possible North Korean regime collapse scenario. South Korea’s engagement in Southeast Asia and the QUAD Plus signifies a shift in perspective towards security cooperation as an avenue of diplomacy. South Korea’s participation in other frameworks such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and Enhancing Security Cooperation in and with Asia (ESIWA) help with keeping South Korea relevant, but still lack the initiative for leadership in maritime governance.
The first step to becoming a responsible maritime stakeholder is to increase advancements in naval technology and lead in maritime expertise such as “shipbuilding, maritime engineering, maritime surveillance, fisheries management, environmental management, and sustainable energy.” South Korea’s involvement with the United States’ new Maritime Action Plan will be a prime example for South Korean leadership and capabilities for large-scale maritime governance. Continued naval modernization will include the ROKN’s plans to “acquire a next-generation light aircraft carrier by 2033” and upgrade warships such as the KSS-III diesel-electric attack submarines and KDX-III guided missile destroyers through indigenous production. With the impending security risks of China’s naval modernization and role in global maritime governance, South Korea will need to take bolder measures to protect its assets from the Korean Strait to the East China Sea and remain a key player in global stakes.
Nazia Kazi is a graduate student at George Washington University studying Asian Studies.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.