A New York Times article on recent Chinese military exercises asked what the U.S. response would be if the People’s Republic of China (PRC) blockaded Taiwan by air and sea for an extended period. The U.S. has several options from the more hard-edge in a counter-blockade of vulnerable Chinese seaborne commodities to a Cold War favorite of airlifting supplies into a beleaguered city. Chinese imports of protein and hydrocarbons are vital to both peacetime civilian existence as well as the maintenance of Beijing’s war machine. On the softer side, the 1949 Berlin Airlift offers a peaceful solution to an authoritarian nation’s blockade of a peaceful neighbor and puts the onus back on the aggressor for initiating hostile action. The United States military, especially the United States Navy, would be essential to both operations.
Worse yet for China, a distant blockade of these assets can be conducted far from points where Beijing’s vaunted land-based missile systems have the accuracy to reach. To lift such a blockade, the Chinese Navy would need to sortie from the shelter of land-based missiles and come to blue water locations where it has a decided disadvantage verses the U.S. Navy. The Chinese military has not been in battle since 1979, and would be hard-pressed to deliver a perfect victory in a short time.
There is also a peaceful precedent for airlifting crucial supplies to a threatened friend. The 1948-1949 Berlin airlift moved over 2.3 million tons of supplies to West Berlin, much of coal, and via air over a 15-month period. It was, at best, a survival level operation and, at its start, U.S. General Lucius Clay, the commander of the U.S. Berlin sector called in the mayor of West Berlin, telling him: “Look, I am ready to try an airlift. I can’t guarantee it will work. I am sure that even at its best, people are going to be cold, and people are going to be hungry. And if the people of Berlin won’t stand that, it will fail. And I don’t want to go into this unless I have your assurance that the people will be heavily in approval.” A “Taipei Airlift” in 2022 would be equally daunting, as more people would need to be supplied over a longer ocean route. Long-range aircraft would have to take on much of the effort, but U.S. Navy aircraft-carrier based aircraft would be needed to make targeted re-supply missions and provide escorts for cargo-carrying aircraft on the terminal phase of their flights into Taiwan.
Both efforts, the blockade and the airlift, would be costly, dangerous evolutions but so would be a direct attack on PRC armed forces in the Chinese homeland. Both actions also place the burden of initiating hostilities in response on the PRC government. The upshot of the Berlin blockade by the Soviets was that it drove West Berlin politically closer to the West. A blockade of Taiwan by the PRC would similarly drive Taiwan closer to the West and not back to the PRC.
The United States and other democratic nations need not play into the PRC’s game if the Communist state launches a blockade of Taiwan. Resolution in the face of tyranny through humanitarian aid, or distant blockade of key PRC commodities which puts the onus for escalation back on China is the best course to deter Chinese aggression while preserving peace in the Western Pacific.
Dr. Steven Wills is the Navalist at the Center for Maritime Strategy. His research and analysis centers on U.S. Navy strategy and policy, surface warfare programs and platforms, and military history.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Dr. Steven Wills
A New York Times article on recent Chinese military exercises asked what the U.S. response would be if the People’s Republic of China (PRC) blockaded Taiwan by air and sea for an extended period. The U.S. has several options from the more hard-edge in a counter-blockade of vulnerable Chinese seaborne commodities to a Cold War favorite of airlifting supplies into a beleaguered city. Chinese imports of protein and hydrocarbons are vital to both peacetime civilian existence as well as the maintenance of Beijing’s war machine. On the softer side, the 1949 Berlin Airlift offers a peaceful solution to an authoritarian nation’s blockade of a peaceful neighbor and puts the onus back on the aggressor for initiating hostile action. The United States military, especially the United States Navy, would be essential to both operations.
On the hard edge, the PRC is very vulnerable to a counter-blockade of its own food and hydrocarbon imports. China’s imports 85% of the soybeans it consumes. China’s vast fishing fleets, already known global bad actors in overfishing, supply 21% of the animal protein consumed by Chinese citizens. By 2030, internal Chinese demand for fish will outstrip what its fishing fleets provide. China also imports over 70% of the oil it uses. Cut off the return of PRC fishing fleets, and soybean imports and the Chinese nation won’t starve, but quality of life could rapidly plummet in Chinese urban areas in the absence of greater protein availability. Likewise, China can import hydrocarbons overland via pipeline, road, or rail, but these methods pale in comparison to the cost benefits of moving hydrocarbons by sea. One large oil tanker carrying 55 million gallons carries the equivalent of 1,830 rail cars (30,000-gallon capacity each) worth of oil and can offloaded faster and with greater efficiency then via land-based transportation. China has coal it can burn for power and heat, but the exhaust from increased use of coal would make the already rampant Chinese air pollution issues even worse.
Worse yet for China, a distant blockade of these assets can be conducted far from points where Beijing’s vaunted land-based missile systems have the accuracy to reach. To lift such a blockade, the Chinese Navy would need to sortie from the shelter of land-based missiles and come to blue water locations where it has a decided disadvantage verses the U.S. Navy. The Chinese military has not been in battle since 1979, and would be hard-pressed to deliver a perfect victory in a short time.
There is also a peaceful precedent for airlifting crucial supplies to a threatened friend. The 1948-1949 Berlin airlift moved over 2.3 million tons of supplies to West Berlin, much of coal, and via air over a 15-month period. It was, at best, a survival level operation and, at its start, U.S. General Lucius Clay, the commander of the U.S. Berlin sector called in the mayor of West Berlin, telling him: “Look, I am ready to try an airlift. I can’t guarantee it will work. I am sure that even at its best, people are going to be cold, and people are going to be hungry. And if the people of Berlin won’t stand that, it will fail. And I don’t want to go into this unless I have your assurance that the people will be heavily in approval.” A “Taipei Airlift” in 2022 would be equally daunting, as more people would need to be supplied over a longer ocean route. Long-range aircraft would have to take on much of the effort, but U.S. Navy aircraft-carrier based aircraft would be needed to make targeted re-supply missions and provide escorts for cargo-carrying aircraft on the terminal phase of their flights into Taiwan.
Both efforts, the blockade and the airlift, would be costly, dangerous evolutions but so would be a direct attack on PRC armed forces in the Chinese homeland. Both actions also place the burden of initiating hostilities in response on the PRC government. The upshot of the Berlin blockade by the Soviets was that it drove West Berlin politically closer to the West. A blockade of Taiwan by the PRC would similarly drive Taiwan closer to the West and not back to the PRC.
The United States and other democratic nations need not play into the PRC’s game if the Communist state launches a blockade of Taiwan. Resolution in the face of tyranny through humanitarian aid, or distant blockade of key PRC commodities which puts the onus for escalation back on China is the best course to deter Chinese aggression while preserving peace in the Western Pacific.
Dr. Steven Wills is the Navalist at the Center for Maritime Strategy. His research and analysis centers on U.S. Navy strategy and policy, surface warfare programs and platforms, and military history.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.