Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Lisa Franchetti released the latest in a series of naval policy white papers entitled “Navigation Plans” this week with a bold course to make the navy ready for potential conflict with China in 2027. Inside the 2024 Navigation Plan Admiral Franchetti has set her own Plan 33 (as she is the 33rd CNO) to recapture the continuity over time in naval strategy and policy documents last seen during the 1980’s in the period of the Maritime Strategy and 600 ship navy of the Reagan administration and Navy Secretary John Lehman. The new plan accurately targets readiness of navy platforms and sailors as its primary focus, with emphasis on the 3% to 5% budget growth needed to actually increase the size of the fleet over time. The plan advances the need for uncrewed systems to the priority it deserves as well, and sailor recruiting, training and retention gets needed attention.
Challenges
No document can satisfy all needs and some aspects of readiness, warfighting, contested logistics and the maritime industrial base deserve additional attention. The fact of having 1/3 of the fleet deployed at all times, with numerous circumstances where those deployments were extended means that the “precise choreography” of operation, maintenance and training of the fleet has been constantly upset since it abandoned its traditional 18 month readiness cycle in 2003. Getting to an 80% readiness level of all ships, submarines and aircraft may mean significant cutbacks in numbers of deployed ships and in locations where those ships deploy. The focus on warfighting is admirable, as is the need to accelerate the participation of uncrewed units. The new navigation plan, however, has few specifics on that process, and “mountain” represented by the 2027 goal is a tough one to quickly surmount. Naval aviation for example has decreed a goal of 60% of all carrier aircraft being uncrewed by the mid 2030’s- 2040. Road maps to greater numbers and quality of uncrewed systems are absent from the 2024 Navigation plan.
Contested logistics gets a shoutout as a “hard” process for a distributed fleet, but how many more commercial and combat logistics force vessels are needed to make that possible? Much is made of improving the Maritime Industrial base to improve overall navy readiness, but the navy is still engaged in building an all high end fleet of expensive and complex warships that tax the existing commercial maritime enterprise to its limits. The littoral combat ship was to be the low end component of the surface fleet, but failed to achieve operational or lower cost objectives, leaving the Navy was an expensive fleet of high-end warships whose maintenance costs also place a burden on Navy readiness. Getting a new High/Low mix such as that advocated by Admiral Zumwalt for the final decades of the Cold War might help improve the Navy’s ability to maintain readiness for “more players on the field,” as the CNO desires.
Finally, there is the question of a Maritime Operations Center (MOC)-based warfare concept for the fleets in wartime. Since the end of the Cold War, land-based command centers have been used in the absence of great power threats to provide command and control of navy assets, especially during Joint operations. NAVPLAN 2024 rightly points out the great value of centralized data fusion and command centers to provide direction from Fleet commanders to task force groups and elements. The Naval War College calls the MOC, “The connective tissue between Navy (fleet) commanders at the operational level and the Task Force Commanders (CTFs,) and their staffs at the tactical level. These command posts can also be resident at sea where they have less direct vulnerability to enemy action than ashore.
The Navigation plan says, “Our Maritime Operations Centers (MOC) are how we execute fleet-level warfare and how we facilitate mission command at lower echelons.” MOC’s can enable independent action by subordinates or stifle it through use of what is colloquially called the “thousand mile screwdriver.” If a fleet is dependent on a shore-based command center, will its commanders and units engage in the kind of independent action such as U.S. naval aviation units did at the 1942 Battle of Midway, when they could no longer communicate with their carriers for direction? Commanders at sea like Admiral Raymond Spruance executed commander’s intent, as provided by Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Chester Nimitz, and did not need to constantly reach back to him for direction and guidance. Wartime operations demand that junior leaders execute boldly and decisively in the absence of senior leader guidance. Too much reliance on shore-based MOC’s is akin to British Royal navy captains at the 1916 battle of Jutland missing key opportunities to destroy their German opposite numbers due to lack of direct approval to open fire. MOC’s are indeed vital to fighting the fleet at sea, but an equal weight should be devoted to equipping commanders to fight in the absence of a MOC with network assets they can contact but relying on commanders’ intent rather than direct contact with headquarters.
Recommendations
The latest Navigation plan is welcome as another step in building continuity across multiple CNO’s to prepare for future fights. It lays out some very solid goals that can and should be accomplished both prior to and after 2027. It should however expand on some of its precepts, perhaps in a follow-on version of the document. The CNO cannot control the demand signal placed on the fleet of less than 300 ships by the Unified Combatant Commanders, but she can highlight the strain such demand puts on achieving her desired readiness goals for 2027. The 3% to 5% goal for annual Navy budget increase is good, but that will means decades to grow the fleet. The Reagan administration doubled that figure, and that effort resulted in John Lehman’s navy of ships, submarines, and aircraft that has sustained the navy for the last 35 years. Such “once in a generation” investments are vital. Contested logistics needs a number goal, as the current “hub and spoke, just in time” U.S. navy logistics concept is wholly unsuited to sustaining distributed maritime operations. Finally, the question of MOC location and leadership should be clarified as seagoing MOC’s such as the Mount Whitney and Blue Ridge provide mobility and additional survivability for these command posts. America’s warfighting navy is indeed on a new march, with a successful combat record in the Red Sea, but it cannot depend on command from ashore, and if needed must fight with commander’s intent from the sea as was often the case in World War 2.
The new Navy Navigation Plan is another step ahead in the process for preparing for great power war, but more such steps are needed toward 2027 and into the following decades to reach CNO Franchetti’s goals of fleet readiness. Flank speed ahead indeed!
Center for Maritime Strategy
By CMS Editorial Board
Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Lisa Franchetti released the latest in a series of naval policy white papers entitled “Navigation Plans” this week with a bold course to make the navy ready for potential conflict with China in 2027. Inside the 2024 Navigation Plan Admiral Franchetti has set her own Plan 33 (as she is the 33rd CNO) to recapture the continuity over time in naval strategy and policy documents last seen during the 1980’s in the period of the Maritime Strategy and 600 ship navy of the Reagan administration and Navy Secretary John Lehman. The new plan accurately targets readiness of navy platforms and sailors as its primary focus, with emphasis on the 3% to 5% budget growth needed to actually increase the size of the fleet over time. The plan advances the need for uncrewed systems to the priority it deserves as well, and sailor recruiting, training and retention gets needed attention.
Challenges
No document can satisfy all needs and some aspects of readiness, warfighting, contested logistics and the maritime industrial base deserve additional attention. The fact of having 1/3 of the fleet deployed at all times, with numerous circumstances where those deployments were extended means that the “precise choreography” of operation, maintenance and training of the fleet has been constantly upset since it abandoned its traditional 18 month readiness cycle in 2003. Getting to an 80% readiness level of all ships, submarines and aircraft may mean significant cutbacks in numbers of deployed ships and in locations where those ships deploy. The focus on warfighting is admirable, as is the need to accelerate the participation of uncrewed units. The new navigation plan, however, has few specifics on that process, and “mountain” represented by the 2027 goal is a tough one to quickly surmount. Naval aviation for example has decreed a goal of 60% of all carrier aircraft being uncrewed by the mid 2030’s- 2040. Road maps to greater numbers and quality of uncrewed systems are absent from the 2024 Navigation plan.
Contested logistics gets a shoutout as a “hard” process for a distributed fleet, but how many more commercial and combat logistics force vessels are needed to make that possible? Much is made of improving the Maritime Industrial base to improve overall navy readiness, but the navy is still engaged in building an all high end fleet of expensive and complex warships that tax the existing commercial maritime enterprise to its limits. The littoral combat ship was to be the low end component of the surface fleet, but failed to achieve operational or lower cost objectives, leaving the Navy was an expensive fleet of high-end warships whose maintenance costs also place a burden on Navy readiness. Getting a new High/Low mix such as that advocated by Admiral Zumwalt for the final decades of the Cold War might help improve the Navy’s ability to maintain readiness for “more players on the field,” as the CNO desires.
Finally, there is the question of a Maritime Operations Center (MOC)-based warfare concept for the fleets in wartime. Since the end of the Cold War, land-based command centers have been used in the absence of great power threats to provide command and control of navy assets, especially during Joint operations. NAVPLAN 2024 rightly points out the great value of centralized data fusion and command centers to provide direction from Fleet commanders to task force groups and elements. The Naval War College calls the MOC, “The connective tissue between Navy (fleet) commanders at the operational level and the Task Force Commanders (CTFs,) and their staffs at the tactical level. These command posts can also be resident at sea where they have less direct vulnerability to enemy action than ashore.
The Navigation plan says, “Our Maritime Operations Centers (MOC) are how we execute fleet-level warfare and how we facilitate mission command at lower echelons.” MOC’s can enable independent action by subordinates or stifle it through use of what is colloquially called the “thousand mile screwdriver.” If a fleet is dependent on a shore-based command center, will its commanders and units engage in the kind of independent action such as U.S. naval aviation units did at the 1942 Battle of Midway, when they could no longer communicate with their carriers for direction? Commanders at sea like Admiral Raymond Spruance executed commander’s intent, as provided by Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Chester Nimitz, and did not need to constantly reach back to him for direction and guidance. Wartime operations demand that junior leaders execute boldly and decisively in the absence of senior leader guidance. Too much reliance on shore-based MOC’s is akin to British Royal navy captains at the 1916 battle of Jutland missing key opportunities to destroy their German opposite numbers due to lack of direct approval to open fire. MOC’s are indeed vital to fighting the fleet at sea, but an equal weight should be devoted to equipping commanders to fight in the absence of a MOC with network assets they can contact but relying on commanders’ intent rather than direct contact with headquarters.
Recommendations
The latest Navigation plan is welcome as another step in building continuity across multiple CNO’s to prepare for future fights. It lays out some very solid goals that can and should be accomplished both prior to and after 2027. It should however expand on some of its precepts, perhaps in a follow-on version of the document. The CNO cannot control the demand signal placed on the fleet of less than 300 ships by the Unified Combatant Commanders, but she can highlight the strain such demand puts on achieving her desired readiness goals for 2027. The 3% to 5% goal for annual Navy budget increase is good, but that will means decades to grow the fleet. The Reagan administration doubled that figure, and that effort resulted in John Lehman’s navy of ships, submarines, and aircraft that has sustained the navy for the last 35 years. Such “once in a generation” investments are vital. Contested logistics needs a number goal, as the current “hub and spoke, just in time” U.S. navy logistics concept is wholly unsuited to sustaining distributed maritime operations. Finally, the question of MOC location and leadership should be clarified as seagoing MOC’s such as the Mount Whitney and Blue Ridge provide mobility and additional survivability for these command posts. America’s warfighting navy is indeed on a new march, with a successful combat record in the Red Sea, but it cannot depend on command from ashore, and if needed must fight with commander’s intent from the sea as was often the case in World War 2.
The new Navy Navigation Plan is another step ahead in the process for preparing for great power war, but more such steps are needed toward 2027 and into the following decades to reach CNO Franchetti’s goals of fleet readiness. Flank speed ahead indeed!