Arsenalotti for America: Lessons from The Serene Republic for a U.S. Maritime Industrial Corps
The MOC
By
CDR Dan Justice, USN
January 27, 2026
The Battle of Chioggia
It was the longest night of the year, and two fleets were on the cusp of a major battle. For nearly a decade, two competing maritime powers were locked in strategic competition, which had culminated in full-scale hostilities a few years prior. Both nations had recently weathered the severe disruptions to their workforce and commerce of a major pandemic. One power had seen its battle fleet shrink in recent years while the other had grown. Yet, as it faced existential domination by the other, by mustering its populace and leveraging the formidable might of its maritime industrial base, this republic was able to rapidly expand its fleet. Through clever strategy and the introduction of novel maritime technology, they successfully pushed back their rival, ultimately securing dominance over the contested seas.
In December 1379, the Battle of Chioggia marked a decisive turning point in the Fourth Genoese–Venetian War. The Genoese fleet had captured the strategic chokepoint of Chioggia, threatening the entrance to the Venetian Lagoon. Despite suffering significant losses to the Venetian fleet earlier in the war at Pola, Venice was able to rapidly mobilize its maritime industrial base to not only replace its losses but to expand its fleet to 34 galleys, up from approximately 22 at the outbreak of hostilities. Venetian Admiral Vettor Pisani capitalized on Venice’s fleet’s reestablished strength. He blockaded the large, deep-water channels the Genoese fleet required, relying instead on smaller Venetian craft capable of navigating the shallow lagoon to eventually starve out the invaders. Venice leveraged its victory at Chioggia to negotiate the favorable Treaty of Turin, ensuring its immediate survival.
Victory at Chioggia set the foundation for Venice’s long-term maritime might, which led to five centuries of dominance in the Eastern Mediterranean, and was driven primarily by the Arsenale, the massive complex of state-owned shipyards and armories. If Venice rested on the Arsenale, the Arsenale rested on the Arsenalotti, a specialized class of professional shipbuilders and artisans. These individuals possessed critical skills, special statuses, privileges (and restrictions) recognizing their essential role as a state-supported industrial corps. The United States today finds itself a maritime nation in need of a growing fleet, confronting a strategic competition that demands increased industrial output and agility. The COVID-19 pandemic stressed an already inadequate industrial base, exposing chronic shortages in skilled labor, brittle supply chains, and insufficient production capacity for everything from submarines to munitions. We can and must emulate Venice’s historical lesson, developing a strong maritime industrial base supported by its workforce. By creating a professional corps of maritime industrial professionals, our own Arsenalotti for America, we can rebuild our naval production capacity and secure our long-term prosperity.
The Arsenalotti
The Venetian Republic’s mastery of the seas was rooted in the organization and ingenuity of the Arsenale. Shipyards existed in the area that became the Arsenale since the Byzantine era and were expanded over the centuries. This industrial expansion was a direct response to the economic boon of maritime commerce as well as strategic competition from the Ottoman Turks. By the 16th century, the Arsenale was “perhaps the largest industrial plant of that time,” renowned for its phenomenal production scale. Though the famous claim of producing a ship per day may have exaggerated or conflated total construction time with final fitting, a documented output of 40 to 60 warships annually was an unparalleled feat. The remarkable output of the Arsenale was driven by several factors; industrial innovation: the facility pioneered assembly-line-like features for standardized and modular production, intellectual capital: Venice trained its own master craftsman to the highest degree and sought consultation from the greatest minds of the day, including Leonardo da Vinci and Galileo Galilei, and finally skilled labor: the arsenalotti.
The labor force in the Arsenale, was divided into three main divisions: shipbuilding (the largest), rope and cable construction, and armaments. The true “arsenalotti” at the heart of Venice’s maritime power were the shipbuilders, the master shipwrights, caulkers, and oarmakers who physically built the fleet. The arsenalotti were a distinct class of citizen, granted specific privileges necessary to maintain the elite workforce that propelled Venetian maritime power.
The Venetian republic was aware of the role the arsenalotti played in their society and took specific steps to maintain and nurture the workforce. The work of the arsenalotti earned them public recognition and high esteem, although excluded from the nobility. They were regarded as an ‘aristocracy of labor.’ This status was codified in the republic’s registries: the Venetian patricians were inscribed in the Libro d’Oro (Golden Book), the shipbuilders were recorded in the analogous Libro delle Maestranze (Book of the Masteries). Their standing was reinforced through powerful ceremonial roles such as during the ducal inauguration. It was the arsenalotti who carried the Doge’s ceremonial chair, an unsubtle symbol that the Head of State was literally supported by the maritime workforce. The arsenalotti and their work were a visible presence to all Venetians, even in during their commute. Arsenalotti were required to carry their coats over their shoulders leaving the arsenale (to prevent the embezzlement of materials hidden under a jacket). This security protocol evolved into a badge of identity. A Venetian seeing a man walking through the street with his jacket draped over his arm recognized him immediately not just as any worker, but as a man essential to the survival of the State.
Proud that their arsenalotti formed the backbone of Venetian maritime power, the Republic ensured they were compensated as a strategic priority. Skilled shipwrights earned significantly higher wages at the state-owned Arsenale than in private yards. Furthermore, Venice ensured that pay was stable. Even during slack periods of work, the arsenalotti could still come to the yard, find some useful endeavor and be paid. This stability in employment enticed workers to the Arsenale instead of private yards where employment levels followed the ebb and flow of production. Beyond high pay, arsenalotti also received an early pension system where aging workers were retained and paid well past their physical prime, along with tax exemptions and special bonuses like wine rations. Even during periods of fiscal austerity, the Republic’s leadership consistently relented to the (sometimes violent) demands of this critical constituency to keep them materially comfortable. Beyond direct pay, the state also provided dedicated housing adjacent to the shipyard, fostering specialized neighborhoods that integrated the workers’ lives with their mission. In medieval Venice, the arsenalotti represented a significant expenditure of state resources, but the Republic viewed the cost as a necessary premium for the unmatched value of its maritime industrial capacity.
Maintaining their position as a maritime power over centuries required Venice to develop a system where they kept their yards and workers at the highest levels of technical leadership. For training and developing the arsenalotti, Venice relied on the medieval guild system. The training pipeline was aggressive but adaptable: young apprentices (fanti minuti) entered the trades as early as age ten, while older recruits (fanti grossi) could be surged into the workforce during periods of heightened demand. After joining the Arsenale the fanti faced demanding standards to advance in the guild. Apprentices trained under expert supervision, and prospective overseers faced a demanding prova (technical trial) to achieve the rank of master. When the state of the maritime art was not developed in Venice, it was perfectly willing to import expertise as well. The Republic engaged Leonardo da Vinci to evaluate concepts for naval defense, including floating gun batteries, and later retained Galileo Galilei as a technical consultant to optimize the placement and efficiency of galley oars. Venice’s maritime power and prestige rested upon the efforts of the arsenalotti and the assurance they would be well trained and have the latest in maritime technology to work with.
Finally, the arsenalotti were integrated into the larger Venetian maritime and security ecosystem beyond their role as an industrial workforce. This integration began at sea: most arsenalotti spent some portion of their careers aboard merchant vessels or war galleys, gaining first hand experience understanding how the ships they built actually operated at sea. By the 15th century, the Venetian Senate formalized this link, mandating that galleys deploy with several arsenalotti aboard to effect combat repairs. The builder’s utility extended to the shore as well, where they functioned as an expeditionary engineering corps, constructing barracks, bridges, and harbor infrastructure in Venice’s distant holdings. Closer to home, arsenalotti also served as a domestic militia, watchmen and fire brigade. These connections ensured the arsenalotti and their work were entrenched into the operational needs of the fleet and the Venetian larger security apparatus.
An American Maritime Industrial Corps (MIC)
The Venetian Republic did not become and remain the dominant maritime power in the Eastern Mediterranean for centuries merely through superior geography or luck. That mastery was built on the institution of the Arsenale and, more importantly, on the state’s support for its arsenalotti. Today, the United States faces a similar imperative. The need for a revitalized maritime industry and the associate workforce is clear. To reinvigorate our own maritime industrial base, the United States must adopt a twenty-first-century conception of the Venetian model, develop our own Maritime Industrial Corps (MIC): arsenalotti for America. We should focus on four decisive lines of effort: Elevate, Train, Compensate, and Integrate.
Elevate: First, we must both legally and culturally elevate the status of the maritime defense worker. Just as Venice understood the shipwright was as vital as the admiral, the United States must recognize that the “workforce is part of the industrial base—it’s inseparable from national security.” We should establish a formal Maritime Industrial Corps (MIC), placed under the authority and administration of the Maritime Security Advisor proposed in the SHIPS Act. To establish this new corps, draw lessons from historical and contemporary initiatives. Specifically, learn from the potential success of the “U.S. Tech Force” and, for mobilizing a dedicated and infrastructure force, study the model and lessons of the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC).
Membership in the MIC would not be automatic upon hiring for anyone tangentially related to ship construction. Just as Venetian masters were inscribed in the Libro delle Maestranze only after years of apprenticeship and after proving their skill, enrollment in the MIC should be reserved for those who reach an appropriate journeyman level of proficiency. This distinction ensures that the corps remains an elite cadre of proven professionals. Once admitted, these members should be afforded tangible recognition. Show that the American people appreciate their efforts. Let them board airplanes early alongside military members and families. Encourage sports teams to have “MIC day at the ballpark.” Pass out bumper stickers that say “My child is a shipbuilder” at graduation from the Additive Manufacturing Center of Excellence. Give the MIC brand recognition. Design a logo. Make lapel pins and ball caps with it. Weave the logo into a nationwide recruitment campaign. Just like a Venetian recognized an arsenalotto carrying their coat through the streets, when a MIC member walks down the street wearing their MIC logo hat, people should think, “Oh, they’re a shipbuilder, good for them, we need those people.”
Educate: The Venetian guild system prioritized the retention and transfer of state-of-the-art shipbuilding knowledge and actively imported advanced technical innovation. It is insufficient to simply hire more bodies; the MIC workforce must be highly trained and capable of exploiting advanced manufacturing technologies as true force multipliers. While there is a renewed national focus on skilled trades, this shift must be aggressively accelerated within the maritime sector. We must expand public-private partnerships to subsidize technical education, using initiatives like the U.S. Navy’s Additive Manufacturing Center of Excellence as a baseline model. Registered apprenticeships must serve as the primary vehicle to bridge the widening gap between academic theory and the applied, “learn-by-doing” skills required for critical trades. We must dramatically expand support for On-the-Job Training (OJT); these programs offer the flexibility to develop skills concurrently with production, bypassing the delays of rigid, linear academic pipelines. Furthermore, utilizing intermediaries such as the National Institute for Industry and Career Advancement (NIICA) is essential to harmonize certification standards and recognition across state lines, ensuring workforce mobility from the Northeast to the Gulf Coast and potentially revitalized West Coast yards.
Finally, Venice is an island, but not isolated. We cannot allow insularity to stymie advancements in industrial efficiency. Just as the Venetian state consulted foreign (Florentine) intellectuals like Galileo and Da Vinci to refine their craft, we must aggressively leverage expertise from allied shipbuilding powerhouses such as South Korea and Japan. By integrating allied best practices in automation, robotics, and digital design with a proficient, well-trained domestic workforce, we can optimize our shipyards to meet the demands of a new era of great power competition
Compensate: It paid to be an arsenalotto; it must pay to build American ships. While our economic system differs from the Venetian state monopoly that directly controlled wages, the principle remains. Today, the “U.S. DIB is not competitive with the commercial sector in the areas of compensation and fringe benefits.” The government, as the sole customer of naval shipbuilding, needs to provide the ability for industry to pay high wages. We must provide “stable, transparent demand signals” to allow industry to predictably hire and compensate talent. However, compensation extends beyond the paycheck. We should expand the concept of “Maritime Prosperity Zones,” using tax incentives to encourage the ecosystem around our shipyards. MIC workers will go home at night, if on the way they can’t stop to get milk and their kids can’t go to a good school near the shipyard, we risk losing trained talent to the private sector that affords these benefits. We must invest in the community infrastructure around the MIC such as childcare, housing, and transportation that makes a career in the shipyard not just a job, but a pathway to a rich life.
Integrate: Finally, the arsenalotti were not isolated from the broader maritime and security apparatus of Venice; they were integrated into it. Our Maritime Industrial Corps must be similarly woven into the fabric of national defense. We must simplify the process for MIC members to affiliate with the Navy Reserve, creating a reservoir of technical talent that can be activated for forward-deployed repairs. Simultaneously, we must better integrate those leaving uniform into the industrial base (beyond just those with medical disqualification from service). Veterans bring valuable operational knowledge from their service, yet companies often struggle to recognize and value those skills. We must aggressively expand programs like SkillBridge, which allows service members to gain civilian work experience during their final period of service. This program should be scaled to facilitate longer and more robust transition opportunities specifically for service members entering the maritime trades. A machinist’s mate who has spent years operating the pumps of a destroyer should face zero friction in transitioning to the workforce that builds the next class of ships. Likewise we should tailor the Career Intermission Program (CIP) to foster cross-pollination between the fleet and the foundry. CIP allows service members to take a sabbatical from active duty to pursue personal or professional growth; we should specifically incentivize Engineering Duty Officers (EDOs), Naval Shipyard leadership, and naval officers assigned to Program Acquisition Executives (PAEs) to spend this time working within the MIC. This “permeability” would give service members a profound understanding of industrial constraints and capabilities and inject recent operational experience directly into institutions responsible for designing and building the future fleet.
The United States cannot admire the problem any longer; the risks of inaction are too high. Looking to the example of “The most serene Republic,” we can learn lessons of a centuries long maritime power. Focusing on the maritime industrial workforce will produce downstream effects for our security and prosperity. Formally institutionalize a maritime industrial corps. Elevate, educate, compensate and integrate. We need a high status, well trained and compensated MIC that is aligned with and synchronized with the larger maritime industry and security sector. We must treat our shipyards and their people as the national assets they are. It is time to make the American Arsenalotti the master of our seas.
Commander Dan Justice is a U.S. Navy Foreign Area Officer currently serving as the Federal Executive Fellow with RAND. Previously he has held roles in Policy Analysis and International Armaments Cooperation in addition to operational assignments.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the views or policy of the U.S. Defense Department, the Department of the Navy nor the U.S. government. No federal endorsement is implied or intended.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By CDR Dan Justice, USN
The Battle of Chioggia
It was the longest night of the year, and two fleets were on the cusp of a major battle. For nearly a decade, two competing maritime powers were locked in strategic competition, which had culminated in full-scale hostilities a few years prior. Both nations had recently weathered the severe disruptions to their workforce and commerce of a major pandemic. One power had seen its battle fleet shrink in recent years while the other had grown. Yet, as it faced existential domination by the other, by mustering its populace and leveraging the formidable might of its maritime industrial base, this republic was able to rapidly expand its fleet. Through clever strategy and the introduction of novel maritime technology, they successfully pushed back their rival, ultimately securing dominance over the contested seas.
In December 1379, the Battle of Chioggia marked a decisive turning point in the Fourth Genoese–Venetian War. The Genoese fleet had captured the strategic chokepoint of Chioggia, threatening the entrance to the Venetian Lagoon. Despite suffering significant losses to the Venetian fleet earlier in the war at Pola, Venice was able to rapidly mobilize its maritime industrial base to not only replace its losses but to expand its fleet to 34 galleys, up from approximately 22 at the outbreak of hostilities. Venetian Admiral Vettor Pisani capitalized on Venice’s fleet’s reestablished strength. He blockaded the large, deep-water channels the Genoese fleet required, relying instead on smaller Venetian craft capable of navigating the shallow lagoon to eventually starve out the invaders. Venice leveraged its victory at Chioggia to negotiate the favorable Treaty of Turin, ensuring its immediate survival.
Victory at Chioggia set the foundation for Venice’s long-term maritime might, which led to five centuries of dominance in the Eastern Mediterranean, and was driven primarily by the Arsenale, the massive complex of state-owned shipyards and armories. If Venice rested on the Arsenale, the Arsenale rested on the Arsenalotti, a specialized class of professional shipbuilders and artisans. These individuals possessed critical skills, special statuses, privileges (and restrictions) recognizing their essential role as a state-supported industrial corps. The United States today finds itself a maritime nation in need of a growing fleet, confronting a strategic competition that demands increased industrial output and agility. The COVID-19 pandemic stressed an already inadequate industrial base, exposing chronic shortages in skilled labor, brittle supply chains, and insufficient production capacity for everything from submarines to munitions. We can and must emulate Venice’s historical lesson, developing a strong maritime industrial base supported by its workforce. By creating a professional corps of maritime industrial professionals, our own Arsenalotti for America, we can rebuild our naval production capacity and secure our long-term prosperity.
The Arsenalotti
The Venetian Republic’s mastery of the seas was rooted in the organization and ingenuity of the Arsenale. Shipyards existed in the area that became the Arsenale since the Byzantine era and were expanded over the centuries. This industrial expansion was a direct response to the economic boon of maritime commerce as well as strategic competition from the Ottoman Turks. By the 16th century, the Arsenale was “perhaps the largest industrial plant of that time,” renowned for its phenomenal production scale. Though the famous claim of producing a ship per day may have exaggerated or conflated total construction time with final fitting, a documented output of 40 to 60 warships annually was an unparalleled feat. The remarkable output of the Arsenale was driven by several factors; industrial innovation: the facility pioneered assembly-line-like features for standardized and modular production, intellectual capital: Venice trained its own master craftsman to the highest degree and sought consultation from the greatest minds of the day, including Leonardo da Vinci and Galileo Galilei, and finally skilled labor: the arsenalotti.
The labor force in the Arsenale, was divided into three main divisions: shipbuilding (the largest), rope and cable construction, and armaments. The true “arsenalotti” at the heart of Venice’s maritime power were the shipbuilders, the master shipwrights, caulkers, and oarmakers who physically built the fleet. The arsenalotti were a distinct class of citizen, granted specific privileges necessary to maintain the elite workforce that propelled Venetian maritime power.
The Venetian republic was aware of the role the arsenalotti played in their society and took specific steps to maintain and nurture the workforce. The work of the arsenalotti earned them public recognition and high esteem, although excluded from the nobility. They were regarded as an ‘aristocracy of labor.’ This status was codified in the republic’s registries: the Venetian patricians were inscribed in the Libro d’Oro (Golden Book), the shipbuilders were recorded in the analogous Libro delle Maestranze (Book of the Masteries). Their standing was reinforced through powerful ceremonial roles such as during the ducal inauguration. It was the arsenalotti who carried the Doge’s ceremonial chair, an unsubtle symbol that the Head of State was literally supported by the maritime workforce. The arsenalotti and their work were a visible presence to all Venetians, even in during their commute. Arsenalotti were required to carry their coats over their shoulders leaving the arsenale (to prevent the embezzlement of materials hidden under a jacket). This security protocol evolved into a badge of identity. A Venetian seeing a man walking through the street with his jacket draped over his arm recognized him immediately not just as any worker, but as a man essential to the survival of the State.
Proud that their arsenalotti formed the backbone of Venetian maritime power, the Republic ensured they were compensated as a strategic priority. Skilled shipwrights earned significantly higher wages at the state-owned Arsenale than in private yards. Furthermore, Venice ensured that pay was stable. Even during slack periods of work, the arsenalotti could still come to the yard, find some useful endeavor and be paid. This stability in employment enticed workers to the Arsenale instead of private yards where employment levels followed the ebb and flow of production. Beyond high pay, arsenalotti also received an early pension system where aging workers were retained and paid well past their physical prime, along with tax exemptions and special bonuses like wine rations. Even during periods of fiscal austerity, the Republic’s leadership consistently relented to the (sometimes violent) demands of this critical constituency to keep them materially comfortable. Beyond direct pay, the state also provided dedicated housing adjacent to the shipyard, fostering specialized neighborhoods that integrated the workers’ lives with their mission. In medieval Venice, the arsenalotti represented a significant expenditure of state resources, but the Republic viewed the cost as a necessary premium for the unmatched value of its maritime industrial capacity.
Maintaining their position as a maritime power over centuries required Venice to develop a system where they kept their yards and workers at the highest levels of technical leadership. For training and developing the arsenalotti, Venice relied on the medieval guild system. The training pipeline was aggressive but adaptable: young apprentices (fanti minuti) entered the trades as early as age ten, while older recruits (fanti grossi) could be surged into the workforce during periods of heightened demand. After joining the Arsenale the fanti faced demanding standards to advance in the guild. Apprentices trained under expert supervision, and prospective overseers faced a demanding prova (technical trial) to achieve the rank of master. When the state of the maritime art was not developed in Venice, it was perfectly willing to import expertise as well. The Republic engaged Leonardo da Vinci to evaluate concepts for naval defense, including floating gun batteries, and later retained Galileo Galilei as a technical consultant to optimize the placement and efficiency of galley oars. Venice’s maritime power and prestige rested upon the efforts of the arsenalotti and the assurance they would be well trained and have the latest in maritime technology to work with.
Finally, the arsenalotti were integrated into the larger Venetian maritime and security ecosystem beyond their role as an industrial workforce. This integration began at sea: most arsenalotti spent some portion of their careers aboard merchant vessels or war galleys, gaining first hand experience understanding how the ships they built actually operated at sea. By the 15th century, the Venetian Senate formalized this link, mandating that galleys deploy with several arsenalotti aboard to effect combat repairs. The builder’s utility extended to the shore as well, where they functioned as an expeditionary engineering corps, constructing barracks, bridges, and harbor infrastructure in Venice’s distant holdings. Closer to home, arsenalotti also served as a domestic militia, watchmen and fire brigade. These connections ensured the arsenalotti and their work were entrenched into the operational needs of the fleet and the Venetian larger security apparatus.
An American Maritime Industrial Corps (MIC)
The Venetian Republic did not become and remain the dominant maritime power in the Eastern Mediterranean for centuries merely through superior geography or luck. That mastery was built on the institution of the Arsenale and, more importantly, on the state’s support for its arsenalotti. Today, the United States faces a similar imperative. The need for a revitalized maritime industry and the associate workforce is clear. To reinvigorate our own maritime industrial base, the United States must adopt a twenty-first-century conception of the Venetian model, develop our own Maritime Industrial Corps (MIC): arsenalotti for America. We should focus on four decisive lines of effort: Elevate, Train, Compensate, and Integrate.
Elevate: First, we must both legally and culturally elevate the status of the maritime defense worker. Just as Venice understood the shipwright was as vital as the admiral, the United States must recognize that the “workforce is part of the industrial base—it’s inseparable from national security.” We should establish a formal Maritime Industrial Corps (MIC), placed under the authority and administration of the Maritime Security Advisor proposed in the SHIPS Act. To establish this new corps, draw lessons from historical and contemporary initiatives. Specifically, learn from the potential success of the “U.S. Tech Force” and, for mobilizing a dedicated and infrastructure force, study the model and lessons of the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC).
Membership in the MIC would not be automatic upon hiring for anyone tangentially related to ship construction. Just as Venetian masters were inscribed in the Libro delle Maestranze only after years of apprenticeship and after proving their skill, enrollment in the MIC should be reserved for those who reach an appropriate journeyman level of proficiency. This distinction ensures that the corps remains an elite cadre of proven professionals. Once admitted, these members should be afforded tangible recognition. Show that the American people appreciate their efforts. Let them board airplanes early alongside military members and families. Encourage sports teams to have “MIC day at the ballpark.” Pass out bumper stickers that say “My child is a shipbuilder” at graduation from the Additive Manufacturing Center of Excellence. Give the MIC brand recognition. Design a logo. Make lapel pins and ball caps with it. Weave the logo into a nationwide recruitment campaign. Just like a Venetian recognized an arsenalotto carrying their coat through the streets, when a MIC member walks down the street wearing their MIC logo hat, people should think, “Oh, they’re a shipbuilder, good for them, we need those people.”
Educate: The Venetian guild system prioritized the retention and transfer of state-of-the-art shipbuilding knowledge and actively imported advanced technical innovation. It is insufficient to simply hire more bodies; the MIC workforce must be highly trained and capable of exploiting advanced manufacturing technologies as true force multipliers. While there is a renewed national focus on skilled trades, this shift must be aggressively accelerated within the maritime sector. We must expand public-private partnerships to subsidize technical education, using initiatives like the U.S. Navy’s Additive Manufacturing Center of Excellence as a baseline model. Registered apprenticeships must serve as the primary vehicle to bridge the widening gap between academic theory and the applied, “learn-by-doing” skills required for critical trades. We must dramatically expand support for On-the-Job Training (OJT); these programs offer the flexibility to develop skills concurrently with production, bypassing the delays of rigid, linear academic pipelines. Furthermore, utilizing intermediaries such as the National Institute for Industry and Career Advancement (NIICA) is essential to harmonize certification standards and recognition across state lines, ensuring workforce mobility from the Northeast to the Gulf Coast and potentially revitalized West Coast yards.
Finally, Venice is an island, but not isolated. We cannot allow insularity to stymie advancements in industrial efficiency. Just as the Venetian state consulted foreign (Florentine) intellectuals like Galileo and Da Vinci to refine their craft, we must aggressively leverage expertise from allied shipbuilding powerhouses such as South Korea and Japan. By integrating allied best practices in automation, robotics, and digital design with a proficient, well-trained domestic workforce, we can optimize our shipyards to meet the demands of a new era of great power competition
Compensate: It paid to be an arsenalotto; it must pay to build American ships. While our economic system differs from the Venetian state monopoly that directly controlled wages, the principle remains. Today, the “U.S. DIB is not competitive with the commercial sector in the areas of compensation and fringe benefits.” The government, as the sole customer of naval shipbuilding, needs to provide the ability for industry to pay high wages. We must provide “stable, transparent demand signals” to allow industry to predictably hire and compensate talent. However, compensation extends beyond the paycheck. We should expand the concept of “Maritime Prosperity Zones,” using tax incentives to encourage the ecosystem around our shipyards. MIC workers will go home at night, if on the way they can’t stop to get milk and their kids can’t go to a good school near the shipyard, we risk losing trained talent to the private sector that affords these benefits. We must invest in the community infrastructure around the MIC such as childcare, housing, and transportation that makes a career in the shipyard not just a job, but a pathway to a rich life.
Integrate: Finally, the arsenalotti were not isolated from the broader maritime and security apparatus of Venice; they were integrated into it. Our Maritime Industrial Corps must be similarly woven into the fabric of national defense. We must simplify the process for MIC members to affiliate with the Navy Reserve, creating a reservoir of technical talent that can be activated for forward-deployed repairs. Simultaneously, we must better integrate those leaving uniform into the industrial base (beyond just those with medical disqualification from service). Veterans bring valuable operational knowledge from their service, yet companies often struggle to recognize and value those skills. We must aggressively expand programs like SkillBridge, which allows service members to gain civilian work experience during their final period of service. This program should be scaled to facilitate longer and more robust transition opportunities specifically for service members entering the maritime trades. A machinist’s mate who has spent years operating the pumps of a destroyer should face zero friction in transitioning to the workforce that builds the next class of ships. Likewise we should tailor the Career Intermission Program (CIP) to foster cross-pollination between the fleet and the foundry. CIP allows service members to take a sabbatical from active duty to pursue personal or professional growth; we should specifically incentivize Engineering Duty Officers (EDOs), Naval Shipyard leadership, and naval officers assigned to Program Acquisition Executives (PAEs) to spend this time working within the MIC. This “permeability” would give service members a profound understanding of industrial constraints and capabilities and inject recent operational experience directly into institutions responsible for designing and building the future fleet.
The United States cannot admire the problem any longer; the risks of inaction are too high. Looking to the example of “The most serene Republic,” we can learn lessons of a centuries long maritime power. Focusing on the maritime industrial workforce will produce downstream effects for our security and prosperity. Formally institutionalize a maritime industrial corps. Elevate, educate, compensate and integrate. We need a high status, well trained and compensated MIC that is aligned with and synchronized with the larger maritime industry and security sector. We must treat our shipyards and their people as the national assets they are. It is time to make the American Arsenalotti the master of our seas.
Commander Dan Justice is a U.S. Navy Foreign Area Officer currently serving as the Federal Executive Fellow with RAND. Previously he has held roles in Policy Analysis and International Armaments Cooperation in addition to operational assignments.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the views or policy of the U.S. Defense Department, the Department of the Navy nor the U.S. government. No federal endorsement is implied or intended.