Army Munitions Operations in Maritime Environments​

The MOC
Photo from War History Online. Left: The US flag is raised at Shuri. Right: Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm Avengers, Seafires and Fireflies on HMS Implacable warm up their engines before taking off.

By Michael Lima, D.B.A.

The Army’s operational concept of multidomain operations requires Army commanders and their staff to consider how to operate in maritime environments and move on maritime surface areas by balancing Army and Naval maritime forces. Tactical support areas providing munitions to maneuver forces may be separated by maritime surface areas that require watercraft or other joint capabilities. Commanders with land component vehicles must be supplemented with watercraft to support tactical level sustainment along the transition from sea to land lines of communications. The watercraft capabilities may be internal to the Army or the joint force.

Watercraft Capabilities

The Navy is synonymous with maritime operations using their Navy amphibious ships, which are part of the overall Ship Battle Force. The primary function of Navy amphibious ships is to transport Marines, their equipment, and supplies to expeditionary areas and conduct operations ashore. The Navy’s current amphibious-ship force is the large amphibious ships (designated LHA and LHD), and smaller amphibious ships, designated LPD or LSD. The Navy’s new Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) program has also been established to procure new amphibious ships to support the Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) operational concept. The concept entails reinforced-platoon-sized Marine Corps units maneuvering around the theater, moving from island to island, to fire anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and performing other missions. The Navy’s robust amphibious capabilities complement land forces.

Army watercraft operations are critical for the theater opening and an integral part in supporting the reception, staging, and onward movement of forces. Army watercraft maintain the capability to deploy to theaters worldwide and provide maneuvering in the littorals and support on inland waterways and rivers. Army watercraft has two categories: lighters and floating utility craft. Army lighters include modular causeway systems, Logistic Support Vessels (LSV), Landing Craft, Utility (LCU), and Landing Craft, Mechanized (LCM). Floating utility craft include tugs, floating cranes, causeways, and roll-on/roll-off discharge facilities (RRDF). Army watercraft and the joint force can provide joint-logistics-over-the-shore (JLOTS) operations for sustainment along beachheads.

Joint Logistics Over-The-Shore (JLOTS)

Logistics over-the-shore (LOTS) is the process of loading and unloading ships without the benefit of deep draft-capable, fixed port facilitiesor as a means of moving forces closer to tactical assembly areas. Joint logistics over-the-shore (JLOTS) operations occur when joint operations of Navy and Army LOTS forces conduct LOTS operations under a joint force commander (JFC). Navy LOTS include the use of United States Marine Corps forces, and the use of Air Force capabilities may take on a multirole in support of operations. Operation ICEBERG provides a historical example, where American forces in the Pacific Ocean Areas received a directive to seize positions in the Ryukyu Islands (Nansei Shoto), prioritizing Okinawa.

   Figure 1. Notional LOTS operation layout

The planning, organization, and execution of the supply line of Operation ICEBERG was a logistical problem far more significant than any previously encountered in the Pacific to that point. For the assault, about 183,000 troops and 747,000 measurement tons of cargo were loaded into over 430 assault transports and landing ships at 11 different ports, a distance of 6,250 nautical miles away. An increasing garrison force  numbered up to 270,000 troops. The distance was the main logistics factor. The West Coast furnished the bulk of resupply which required 26 days of sailing time. The culmination was assault troops landing on the beachheads, followed by tanks carried by LCMs which had been transported by dock landing ships and Landing Ship Mediums. After debarkation, the amphibian capabilities returned to transfer support troops, equipment, and supplies across the reef onto the beach. At the same time, amphibian vehicles preloaded with ammunition and supplies proceeded inland.

Figure 2. Landing operation on Okinawa, Ryukyus Islands, with USS LST-1000 at anchor, 16 April 1945.

National Archives photograph, 80-G-314292.

On order by the amphibious task force commander,  ship-to-shore movement begins and ends when the unloading is complete, divided into the assault and initial unloading period and the general unloading period. The first movement is tactical, while the second movement is logistical. Following tactical units, supplies land as directed by the appropriate troop commander or required by the landing force. Supplies, including munitions, are designated floating dumps or landing force supplies. Floating dumps are preloaded in watercraft capabilities to meet anticipated supply requirements. The watercraft remains near the line of departure and land when requested and moves onto designated Class V dumps. Amphibian vehicle landing sites should be located on one flank of the beach. Class V landing sites and dumps are located on the opposite beach flank.

Figure 3. Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore Operational Area

Ammunition from JLOTS Class V dumps is transported to theater ammunition supply points which is usually the theater’s main Class V storage activity, the mission being to receive, store, and ship munitions. Many receipts are containerized but may include break-bulk or a combination of both. Modular ammunition platoons of an ordnance company operate the theater ammunition supply points.

United States Army Pacific

Understanding the historical precedent seen in Operation ICEBERG can inform Army logisticians of armed conflict’s complexity in the Pacific today. The strategic environment of the Indo-Pacific contains Southeast Asia’s archipelagos with thousands of islands of the Blue Pacific nations, including the First, Second, and Third Island Chains. The U.S. Army is creating a new modernization team to develop contested logistics capability, focusing on developing watercraft, power-generation capabilities, and command-and-control networks to ease the movement of many commodities, including munitions, in the challenging maritime environment. The United States Army Pacific provides the Joint Force with decisive integrated landpower to consolidate gains during Campaigning, Crisis, and Conflict. Brigade General Samuel “Luke” Peterson, Program Executive Officer for Combat Support & Combat Service Support (PEO CS&CSS), stated “With renewed focus on the Indo and the Army’s responsibilities in terms of logistics resupply, it has led to a renewed emphasis on the Army watercraft fleet.” The United States Army Pacific, along with the sustainment personnel and units, must be able to support the joint force in large-scale combat in multidomain operations that may arise in the Indo-Pacific area of responsibility.

Conclusion

Multidomain operations employ combined arms of joint and Army capabilities to create and exploit advantages to achieve objectives, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains. This includes maritime capabilities that support the joint force commander in conducting armed conflict by providing the ability to move land forces and their munitions to the desired location to meet military objectives within maritime environments. Joint watercraft capabilities are key enablers in operating maritime environments requiring operations onto beachheads. Land component officers must understand joint watercraft capabilities and the maritime environment because joint logistics over-the-shore operations extend the operational reach and support freedom of action past the littoral.

 

Michael Lima, D.B.A., is an Ammunition Warrant Officer and has served 24 years in the United States military and over nine years as an adjunct instructor. He can be found on Twitter or LinkedIn and discusses munitions sustainment on Substack.


The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.