Arguably, at the tactical or combat level of war it is the engage function, i.e., delivery of effects to the enemy, that defines the essence of what one expects our Navy to be able to do. So, what are those effects and how are they achieved? Here we find the letter “D” repeatedly.
Degrade (interfere with the enemy’s tracking and targeting capability);
Destroy/Defeat (eliminating the enemy’s warfighting capability is the ultimate objective with the other “D’s” contributing);
Defend (AAW, ASW, ASUW) (preventing/limiting the enemy’s ability to degrade/destroy own force capability).
At the operational level of war (as opposed to the tactical level), one might add another couple of “D’s”: Deter and Deny. Denial is so important that former DASD Elbridge Colby has recommendedDenial as the principal strategy for the U. S. in Asia.
And, before addressing the “effects” one must “Decide or Determine” whether the objective is sea control or sea Denial.
Ah, but there is a temporal dimension to the combat D effects. Namely, some of the effects may be temporary while others may be permanent. The “destroy” effect would be permanent in most cases. On the other hand, the “distract, deceive, and degrade” actions could be temporary.
So here we are in 2022, and the letter D is has once again clamored for our attention. Just look again at CNO Admiral Mike Gilday’s Navigation Plan 2022’s “Force Design Imperatives” in which he prioritizes the future capabilities needed to maintain credible deterrence…he groups these capabilities into six overarching Force Design Imperatives that include:
– Expand Distance, i.e., long-range precision fires across all domains and platforms with greater reach.
– Harden Defense: Integrating directed energy with hard-kill and soft-kill defensive systems disrupts attacks and keeps naval forces survivable when targeted by adversaries.
– Increase Distribution: Distributing forces geographically and in all domains enables them to threaten an adversary from multiple attack axes. Smaller, lethal, and less costly platforms— including manned, unmanned, and optionally-manned—further complicate threat targeting, generate confusion, and impose dilemmas for our adversaries.
– Ensure Delivery: Resilient logistics connecting the foundry to the fleet—enabled by secure communications and information technology—refuel, rearm, resupply, repair, and revive distributed naval forces down to the last tactical mile.
– Generate Decision Advantage Connecting sensors, weapons, decision across all domains enables naval forces to mass firepower and influence without massing forces.
The CNO summarizes, “Together, these six force design imperatives enable DMO, the Navy’s foundational operating concept. Our priority investments are delivering on these imperatives.
– Building a resilient joint force and Defense Ecosystem
Returning to the entering argument, the ability to deliver combat effects to the enemy is central to Navy’s enduring roles and missions, and hopefully this discussion of the Combat “D’s” is a useful reminder. As the Navy moves forward, it should pull together the guidance from the National Defense Strategy and the CNO’s Navigation Plan to further define and explain how distributed maritime operations will be executed, both with the present fleet and with the 2045 goal the CNO lists in the Navigation Plan. In doing this, the service can better explain to Congress and to the public why smaller and perhaps more vulnerable ships are needed to execute DMO and can have enhanced survivability though their physical distribution. It would also explain why more combat logistics force ships are needed to refuel, resupply and re-arm the more distributed fleet of smaller ships. All of this supports the most important “D” of all which is the destruction of opponent forces.
Captain (ret.) R. Robinson Harris retired from the U. S. Navy after 30 years of commissioned service. His first command was of one of the first TOMAHAWK Strike Destroyers, USS CONOLLY. His major command was DESTROYER SQUADRON 32. His shore assignments include Executive Assistant to the Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Director of Programs, SECNAV Office of Legislative Affairs; and, lastly, Executive Director, Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel. He was a key contributor to the development of the Maritime Strategy in the 1980s.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Captain (ret.) R. Robinson Harris
The Navy has a penchant for trying to express complex thoughts in simple acronyms or even single letters. In the case of the recent, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO’s) NAVPLAN 2022, it is that pesky letter “D” (delta for military types) again! Three years ago, I authored a post for Proceedings that argued that at the end of the day the Navy exists to deliver effects. Here’s how I explained it. It relates the work of two famous defense theorists, one Air Force and one Navy. It begins with Colonel John Boyd’s OODA loop as parsed by naval tactics expert Captain Wayne Hughes into the following four functions:
“Scouting:” finding and identifying targets (ISR);
“Deciding:” prioritizing targets, pairing, and scheduling weapons and platforms to targets (C2);
“Engaging” delivering effects to the targets; and
“Assessing” conducting battle damage assessment.
Then the cycle repeats itself.
Of course, Captain Hughes would have added his famous dictum about the criticality of “attacking effectively first.” Agreeing with Colonel Boyd Captain Hughes said that one way to shoot effectively first is to interfere with and encumber the enemy’s OODA loop. That brings us to an explanation of the combat D’s.
Arguably, at the tactical or combat level of war it is the engage function, i.e., delivery of effects to the enemy, that defines the essence of what one expects our Navy to be able to do. So, what are those effects and how are they achieved? Here we find the letter “D” repeatedly.
Distract/Deceive (TACSIT Management, i.e., denying the enemy targeting information on own forces);
Degrade (interfere with the enemy’s tracking and targeting capability);
Destroy/Defeat (eliminating the enemy’s warfighting capability is the ultimate objective with the other “D’s” contributing);
Defend (AAW, ASW, ASUW) (preventing/limiting the enemy’s ability to degrade/destroy own force capability).
At the operational level of war (as opposed to the tactical level), one might add another couple of “D’s”: Deter and Deny. Denial is so important that former DASD Elbridge Colby has recommended Denial as the principal strategy for the U. S. in Asia.
And, before addressing the “effects” one must “Decide or Determine” whether the objective is sea control or sea Denial.
Ah, but there is a temporal dimension to the combat D effects. Namely, some of the effects may be temporary while others may be permanent. The “destroy” effect would be permanent in most cases. On the other hand, the “distract, deceive, and degrade” actions could be temporary.
So here we are in 2022, and the letter D is has once again clamored for our attention. Just look again at CNO Admiral Mike Gilday’s Navigation Plan 2022’s “Force Design Imperatives” in which he prioritizes the future capabilities needed to maintain credible deterrence…he groups these capabilities into six overarching Force Design Imperatives that include:
– Expand Distance, i.e., long-range precision fires across all domains and platforms with greater reach.
– Leverage Deception: Deceptive measures degrade enemy surveillance and increase adversary uncertainty.
– Harden Defense: Integrating directed energy with hard-kill and soft-kill defensive systems disrupts attacks and keeps naval forces survivable when targeted by adversaries.
– Increase Distribution: Distributing forces geographically and in all domains enables them to threaten an adversary from multiple attack axes. Smaller, lethal, and less costly platforms— including manned, unmanned, and optionally-manned—further complicate threat targeting, generate confusion, and impose dilemmas for our adversaries.
– Ensure Delivery: Resilient logistics connecting the foundry to the fleet—enabled by secure communications and information technology—refuel, rearm, resupply, repair, and revive distributed naval forces down to the last tactical mile.
– Generate Decision Advantage Connecting sensors, weapons, decision across all domains enables naval forces to mass firepower and influence without massing forces.
The CNO summarizes, “Together, these six force design imperatives enable DMO, the Navy’s foundational operating concept. Our priority investments are delivering on these imperatives.
But wait—there is more! The unclassified 2022 National Defense Strategy spells out four top level priorities:
– Defending the homeland.
– Deterring strategic attacks.
– Deterring aggressors.
– Building a resilient joint force and Defense Ecosystem
Returning to the entering argument, the ability to deliver combat effects to the enemy is central to Navy’s enduring roles and missions, and hopefully this discussion of the Combat “D’s” is a useful reminder. As the Navy moves forward, it should pull together the guidance from the National Defense Strategy and the CNO’s Navigation Plan to further define and explain how distributed maritime operations will be executed, both with the present fleet and with the 2045 goal the CNO lists in the Navigation Plan. In doing this, the service can better explain to Congress and to the public why smaller and perhaps more vulnerable ships are needed to execute DMO and can have enhanced survivability though their physical distribution. It would also explain why more combat logistics force ships are needed to refuel, resupply and re-arm the more distributed fleet of smaller ships. All of this supports the most important “D” of all which is the destruction of opponent forces.
Captain (ret.) R. Robinson Harris retired from the U. S. Navy after 30 years of commissioned service. His first command was of one of the first TOMAHAWK Strike Destroyers, USS CONOLLY. His major command was DESTROYER SQUADRON 32. His shore assignments include Executive Assistant to the Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Director of Programs, SECNAV Office of Legislative Affairs; and, lastly, Executive Director, Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel. He was a key contributor to the development of the Maritime Strategy in the 1980s.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.