Anchoring NATO’s Northern Flank: Why and How Poland Should Lead in the Baltic
The MOC
By
Cade Acker
August 26, 2025
For nearly all its history, Poland’s security story has been told in terms of its land forces, from their winged hussars of old to the armored brigades now along NATO’s the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) eastern flank. That focus is understandable: Poland sits squarely between Russia and the heart of Europe, and history has not been kind to Poland in that space. Poland has gone to great lengths to become NATO’s “Defense Colossus”. Yet, in 2025 and beyond, the most overlooked dimension of Poland’s strategic potential may lie not on land, but in the Baltic Sea.
Poland’s only maritime access is in the Baltic Sea, whose undersea domain is a quiet but critical theater; it is vulnerable to Russian surface and subsurface threats, which would be keen to take advantage of its acoustic complexity and multitude of abnormal conditions. The Baltic is ringed by NATO and European Union members, all reliant on the Sea for commercial and logistical use, but also by Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave and the approaches to St. Petersburg, which poses an incredible threat.
Russia fields incredibly advanced submarines and undersea surveillance systems that give Moscow the ability to threaten sea lines of communication. On top of that, the Soviet Union had previously established a major presence in the Baltic Sea, providing Russian submarines access to mapping and acoustic information: a massive potential advantage. In a crisis, even the perception of contested sea control could disrupt supply to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania — nations that depend on maritime logistics and communication in the Baltic Sea to sustain combat operations along NATO’s northern flank.
For years, the United States Navy (USN) has been the backbone of NATO’s deterrence against Russian naval aggression. As Washington pivots naval resources toward the Indo-Pacific, NATO’s maritime security in northern Europe will increasingly rely on regional allies. While Ukraine has been able to sustain a fight against Russia in the Black Sea and conceivably win, without actually having a navy, Ukraine hasn’t had to face the Russian submarine fleet. The introduction of such a change would dramatically alter the calculus in favor of Russian naval superiority in Europe.
Europe, as a whole, “[does] possess significant maritime assets”. Yet, the German surface fleet is capable but limited, and the Royal Navy will be tied down with anti-submarine operations in the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap. France and Italy will doubtlessly have assets to help in the East; however, the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) have minimal anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and defense capacity compared to Russia, and Denmark and Sweden’s niche capabilities cannot cover the whole theater. Under current and potentially future circumstances, this could result in significant implications for states that rely on the Baltic Sea.
Filling the Gap: Poland as the Baltic’s Keystone
In this context, Poland emerges as the state most capable of addressing the Baltic’s most critical security gaps. With other nations constrained by geography or competing priorities, Poland is uniquely positioned to step into this central maritime role.
Poland’s geographic limitations, by contrast to other Baltic NATO states, could be its greatest strength—with both the motivation and the trajectory to fill the gap needed to cover the theater. It does not have to worry about defending a lengthy coast from Russian aggression like Sweden, Denmark, or Finland; Poland enjoys a concentrated corridor in the southern Baltic, right in the face of the enclave of Kaliningrad. In other words, Poland’s compact maritime geography gives it the ability to defend the Baltic decisively, where others must spread their forces thin, while still allowing Polish support in other sub-sectors of the theater.
Poland has demonstrated three qualities that make it an ideal candidate for more Baltic maritime responsibility and has signaled itself as ready for such a role. The first quality is strategic clarity. Warsaw has consistently warned against the illusion that economic interdependence will tame Russian ambitions. When Germany championed the Nord Stream II pipeline after Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, Poland was one of the loudest voices against it — and one of the first to fully divest from Russian energy. This realism extends to defense planning, as Warsaw has committed to an astonishing 4.7% defense spending for 2025
The second quality is political will. Where others have hesitated, Poland has acted. It was one of the earliest and most vocal supporters of Ukraine’s defense, and it has invested heavily in its deterrent posture. Unlike many NATO members, Poland has not been banking on “buck-passing” security responsibilities to others. It has been building a force meant to fight and win on its own, if necessary.
And third, Poland possesses regional credibility. Poland already leads the Baltic States and other Eastern European nations in articulating security concerns within NATO and the EU. Promoting its maritime role would build on an existing leadership position rather than inventing one from scratch. While Sweden, for example, has a good navy, it is too new to NATO to have substantial credibility alongside allies against Russian naval threats.
Moving Forward
Poland’s navy has capable officers and a modest fleet, but it lacks the robust ASW platforms, sensors, and training cycles needed to counter Russia’s undersea threat. The war in Ukraine has underscored the importance of keeping supply lines open. For the Baltic states, who rely heavily on maritime trade, denying the adversary maritime dominance will always be critical. In the Baltic, that means tracking, deterring, and, if necessary, neutralizing Russian submarines before they can disrupt NATO logistics and ongoing operations.
Two initiatives could jump-start Poland’s ASW transformation. First, the MH-60R “Seahawk” is the USN’s primary ASW helicopter, equipped with advanced dipping sonars, sonobuoys, and anti-submarine torpedoes. Recently, the Seahawk also underwent a significant upgrade that could prove relevant in an environment such as the Baltic Sea. In comparison, Poland currently deploys the SH-2G “Seasprite”—a somewhat outdated platform. Brokering a deal between Lockheed Martin, Sikorsky, and Poland would give Warsaw an immediate and credible ASW platform. Integrated with existing frigates or shore-based operations, MH-60Rs could dramatically improve Poland’s ability to rapidly detect and prosecute submarines in its waters—a capability lacking in other Baltic countries.
Integrating ASW into Poland’s strategic portfolio will require more than hardware; it will also necessitate a shift in doctrine, training, and regional coordination. The Polish Navy should move from a primarily coastal defense focus toward a layered approach that integrates undersea surveillance, rapid-reaction ASW forces, and joint operations with NATO allies. This would complement Poland’s formidable land-based anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems, creating a multi-domain deterrent against Russian aggression in the Baltic.
Training is equally critical. ASW is a perishable skill set that requires constant practice in complex acoustic environments such as the Baltic Sea. The USN could support Poland in leading the expansion of participation in NATO exercises like BALTOPS and Dynamic Mongoose. Hosting bilateral training with the Royal Navy and other veteran naval powers and establishing a Baltic ASW central strategy to share best practices against the Russian navy would amplify Polish and Baltic deterrence. Interoperability is also a crucial aspect of coalition defense operations, especially when balancing against a bigger threat like Russia.
Poland should also lead efforts to build a common operating picture for Baltic maritime security. That means fusing data from national and NATO sensors, sharing intelligence rapidly, and ensuring that maritime domain awareness translates into actionable tasking for ASW forces across the collective territory.
Poland boasts one of the most capable militaries in Europe, with growing land and air forces that could stand up to Russian divisions. Yet Polish strength on the ground cannot fully compensate for vulnerabilities at sea. Maritime security and land defense are not mutually exclusive—they are interdependent in many cases, such as this one. In a Baltic crisis, the ability to move reinforcements, munitions, and humanitarian aid by sea could determine whether NATO’s frontline states hold or collapse.
Waiting until a maritime crisis emerges in the Baltic would create a reactive and sub-optimal response. Acting now would be in line with Poland’s broader defense modernization, allow time for integration and training, and strengthen NATO’s deterrent signal to Moscow.
Just as important, developing these initiatives would deepen the U.S.-Poland security partnership beyond the land-centric focus that has defined it since the 1990s. In doing so, it would anchor a more balanced NATO force posture in northern Europe. Poland could very well be the American protégé in Europe, and it would be in both the short- and long-term interests of the United States to see Poland at the helm of European security against the Russian Federation.
Poland has spent the last three decades proving that it is willing to lead where others hesitate. It has diversified away from Russian energy, invested in defense at levels unmatched in Europe, and championed the security concerns of NATO’s most vulnerable members. Now, with the Baltic’s undersea domain emerging as a critical theater, Poland has the chance to extend that leadership to the maritime arena.
Cade Acker is a Sophomore at Wheaton College (IL) studying International Relations, French, and Economics.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Cade Acker
For nearly all its history, Poland’s security story has been told in terms of its land forces, from their winged hussars of old to the armored brigades now along NATO’s the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) eastern flank. That focus is understandable: Poland sits squarely between Russia and the heart of Europe, and history has not been kind to Poland in that space. Poland has gone to great lengths to become NATO’s “Defense Colossus”. Yet, in 2025 and beyond, the most overlooked dimension of Poland’s strategic potential may lie not on land, but in the Baltic Sea.
Poland’s only maritime access is in the Baltic Sea, whose undersea domain is a quiet but critical theater; it is vulnerable to Russian surface and subsurface threats, which would be keen to take advantage of its acoustic complexity and multitude of abnormal conditions. The Baltic is ringed by NATO and European Union members, all reliant on the Sea for commercial and logistical use, but also by Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave and the approaches to St. Petersburg, which poses an incredible threat.
Russia fields incredibly advanced submarines and undersea surveillance systems that give Moscow the ability to threaten sea lines of communication. On top of that, the Soviet Union had previously established a major presence in the Baltic Sea, providing Russian submarines access to mapping and acoustic information: a massive potential advantage. In a crisis, even the perception of contested sea control could disrupt supply to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania — nations that depend on maritime logistics and communication in the Baltic Sea to sustain combat operations along NATO’s northern flank.
For years, the United States Navy (USN) has been the backbone of NATO’s deterrence against Russian naval aggression. As Washington pivots naval resources toward the Indo-Pacific, NATO’s maritime security in northern Europe will increasingly rely on regional allies. While Ukraine has been able to sustain a fight against Russia in the Black Sea and conceivably win, without actually having a navy, Ukraine hasn’t had to face the Russian submarine fleet. The introduction of such a change would dramatically alter the calculus in favor of Russian naval superiority in Europe.
Europe, as a whole, “[does] possess significant maritime assets”. Yet, the German surface fleet is capable but limited, and the Royal Navy will be tied down with anti-submarine operations in the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap. France and Italy will doubtlessly have assets to help in the East; however, the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) have minimal anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and defense capacity compared to Russia, and Denmark and Sweden’s niche capabilities cannot cover the whole theater. Under current and potentially future circumstances, this could result in significant implications for states that rely on the Baltic Sea.
Filling the Gap: Poland as the Baltic’s Keystone
In this context, Poland emerges as the state most capable of addressing the Baltic’s most critical security gaps. With other nations constrained by geography or competing priorities, Poland is uniquely positioned to step into this central maritime role.
Poland’s geographic limitations, by contrast to other Baltic NATO states, could be its greatest strength—with both the motivation and the trajectory to fill the gap needed to cover the theater. It does not have to worry about defending a lengthy coast from Russian aggression like Sweden, Denmark, or Finland; Poland enjoys a concentrated corridor in the southern Baltic, right in the face of the enclave of Kaliningrad. In other words, Poland’s compact maritime geography gives it the ability to defend the Baltic decisively, where others must spread their forces thin, while still allowing Polish support in other sub-sectors of the theater.
Poland has demonstrated three qualities that make it an ideal candidate for more Baltic maritime responsibility and has signaled itself as ready for such a role. The first quality is strategic clarity. Warsaw has consistently warned against the illusion that economic interdependence will tame Russian ambitions. When Germany championed the Nord Stream II pipeline after Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, Poland was one of the loudest voices against it — and one of the first to fully divest from Russian energy. This realism extends to defense planning, as Warsaw has committed to an astonishing 4.7% defense spending for 2025
The second quality is political will. Where others have hesitated, Poland has acted. It was one of the earliest and most vocal supporters of Ukraine’s defense, and it has invested heavily in its deterrent posture. Unlike many NATO members, Poland has not been banking on “buck-passing” security responsibilities to others. It has been building a force meant to fight and win on its own, if necessary.
And third, Poland possesses regional credibility. Poland already leads the Baltic States and other Eastern European nations in articulating security concerns within NATO and the EU. Promoting its maritime role would build on an existing leadership position rather than inventing one from scratch. While Sweden, for example, has a good navy, it is too new to NATO to have substantial credibility alongside allies against Russian naval threats.
Moving Forward
Poland’s navy has capable officers and a modest fleet, but it lacks the robust ASW platforms, sensors, and training cycles needed to counter Russia’s undersea threat. The war in Ukraine has underscored the importance of keeping supply lines open. For the Baltic states, who rely heavily on maritime trade, denying the adversary maritime dominance will always be critical. In the Baltic, that means tracking, deterring, and, if necessary, neutralizing Russian submarines before they can disrupt NATO logistics and ongoing operations.
Two initiatives could jump-start Poland’s ASW transformation. First, the MH-60R “Seahawk” is the USN’s primary ASW helicopter, equipped with advanced dipping sonars, sonobuoys, and anti-submarine torpedoes. Recently, the Seahawk also underwent a significant upgrade that could prove relevant in an environment such as the Baltic Sea. In comparison, Poland currently deploys the SH-2G “Seasprite”—a somewhat outdated platform. Brokering a deal between Lockheed Martin, Sikorsky, and Poland would give Warsaw an immediate and credible ASW platform. Integrated with existing frigates or shore-based operations, MH-60Rs could dramatically improve Poland’s ability to rapidly detect and prosecute submarines in its waters—a capability lacking in other Baltic countries.
Integrating ASW into Poland’s strategic portfolio will require more than hardware; it will also necessitate a shift in doctrine, training, and regional coordination. The Polish Navy should move from a primarily coastal defense focus toward a layered approach that integrates undersea surveillance, rapid-reaction ASW forces, and joint operations with NATO allies. This would complement Poland’s formidable land-based anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems, creating a multi-domain deterrent against Russian aggression in the Baltic.
Training is equally critical. ASW is a perishable skill set that requires constant practice in complex acoustic environments such as the Baltic Sea. The USN could support Poland in leading the expansion of participation in NATO exercises like BALTOPS and Dynamic Mongoose. Hosting bilateral training with the Royal Navy and other veteran naval powers and establishing a Baltic ASW central strategy to share best practices against the Russian navy would amplify Polish and Baltic deterrence. Interoperability is also a crucial aspect of coalition defense operations, especially when balancing against a bigger threat like Russia.
Poland should also lead efforts to build a common operating picture for Baltic maritime security. That means fusing data from national and NATO sensors, sharing intelligence rapidly, and ensuring that maritime domain awareness translates into actionable tasking for ASW forces across the collective territory.
Poland boasts one of the most capable militaries in Europe, with growing land and air forces that could stand up to Russian divisions. Yet Polish strength on the ground cannot fully compensate for vulnerabilities at sea. Maritime security and land defense are not mutually exclusive—they are interdependent in many cases, such as this one. In a Baltic crisis, the ability to move reinforcements, munitions, and humanitarian aid by sea could determine whether NATO’s frontline states hold or collapse.
Waiting until a maritime crisis emerges in the Baltic would create a reactive and sub-optimal response. Acting now would be in line with Poland’s broader defense modernization, allow time for integration and training, and strengthen NATO’s deterrent signal to Moscow.
Just as important, developing these initiatives would deepen the U.S.-Poland security partnership beyond the land-centric focus that has defined it since the 1990s. In doing so, it would anchor a more balanced NATO force posture in northern Europe. Poland could very well be the American protégé in Europe, and it would be in both the short- and long-term interests of the United States to see Poland at the helm of European security against the Russian Federation.
Poland has spent the last three decades proving that it is willing to lead where others hesitate. It has diversified away from Russian energy, invested in defense at levels unmatched in Europe, and championed the security concerns of NATO’s most vulnerable members. Now, with the Baltic’s undersea domain emerging as a critical theater, Poland has the chance to extend that leadership to the maritime arena.
Cade Acker is a Sophomore at Wheaton College (IL) studying International Relations, French, and Economics.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.