VADM Mustin testifies before the SASC on 17 March 1987. From CSPAN.
By
Dr. Steven Wills
September 27, 2022
Back in March, 1987, as the Senate contemplated the last two-carrier “block buy” that later became the USS George Washington and USS Abraham Lincoln, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policies and Operations Vice Admiral Hank Mustin confronted a phalanx of arguably one of the more august Senate Armed Services Committee groups – Ted Kennedy, John Warner, Carl Levin, John McCain, Bill Cohen and many others – with a startling claim that “since 1947 11 Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs have validated carrier requirements in excess of 20” for wartime requirements (CSPAN 2:37). He also stated that air superiority in the maritime environment was “non-negotiable.” Secretary of the Navy John Lehman goes on to explain the many versatile uses for the carrier around the world in both peace and war. Lehman and Mustin’s remarks were later confirmed by declassified Joint Strategic Planning Documents that indicate that the Joint Chiefs wanted 22 carriers as a “minimum risk” force.
1982 Joint Strategy Planning Document. U.S. Department of Defense.
That was 1987, but Admiral Mustin’s remarks still ring true in the third decade of the 21st century. The United States remains the lynchpin of the “Rimland” maritime powers that confront Eurasian opponents like China and Russia seeking access to the wider world oceans through belts and roads, and through strategic passages like the Norwegian Sea. The math that governs the rotational deployment position by which the U.S. Navy deploys its forces has long said that it takes at least fifteen carriers to provide a constant deployed force of one carrier in three deployed geographic locations or “hubs.” That math was included in the 1993 Bottom Up Review (BUR) of the Clinton administration which was effectively the first Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) document.
1993 Bottom-Up Review. U.S. Department of Defense.
Since 1993 no Department of Defense or Navy authority has ever refuted the BUR carrier figures for peacetime carrier deployment requirements. If fifteen carriers remain the peacetime deployment requirement, then what might current wartime requirements demand? Many current defense sources have suggested that the carrier is susceptible to attack and vulnerable to damage or loss from Chinese air land-based ballistic and cruise missiles. Some have suggested reducing the number of carriers to build more submarines and unmanned surface ships capable of launching high volume cruise missile attacks in place of manned and unmanned aircraft launched from carriers. The operational range of current carrier aircraft is reduced since the Cold War and that factor has also been a source of well-supported criticism of carrier aviation.
Regardless of issues of vulnerability and lack of striking range, the carrier and its airwing remain essential to the overall U.S. Navy contribution to the Joint Force, and especially in terms of potential combat in the Indo-Pacific, Arctic, and other geographic locations without immediate, land-based air support. Sea Control is a team effort with air, surface ad subsurface components. Sea control is not possible in the absence of air superiority over the water space where control is sought. Unlike current surface and subsurface platforms that must return to port to rearm, the carrier as a weapon system can be reloaded at sea while still engaged in combat operations. Unlike past capital ships, such as the battleship, the carrier can be upgraded over time in terms of air wing composition. Indeed, a carrier at the end of its service life often boasts a vastly different aircraft complement than when first commissioned decades earlier.
USS Enterprise in 1962 left and in 2012 right with noticeably different air wings. Photo From U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command.
As carriers are unlikely to soon disappear from the U.S. Navy order of battle anytime soon, it is important to again consider how many are needed for combat operations in the event of great power war. If peacetime presence requirements to keep at least one carrier deployed in three geographic locations require fifteen carriers in a rotational cycle, what would an Indo-Pacific war, with probable action on a global scale against multiple opponents demand? It probably would be a larger number than the current 11 flattops. The large deck amphibious warfare ships of the Wasp and America classes (LHD/LHA), provide some additional sea-based aviation capabilities, but those vessels are much slower, have far smaller fuel and weapon storage, and are built to a lower survivability standard than are purpose-built carriers (CVN/CV’s). A new class of conventional (CTOL) medium carriers, with conventional or nuclear propulsion that carry at least three strike fighter squadrons may be the right choice to supplement the existing fleet of large deck, nuclear-powered carriers of the Nimitz and Ford class.
In 2013, former Naval Sea Systems Command leader Vice Admiral Thomas Moore said, “We are an 11 carrier Navy in a 15 carrier world.” The current U.S. strategic situation with two great power competitors – China and Russia – two regional adversaries – Iran and North Korea – as well as continuing instability across many areas of the globe demands at least fifteen carriers and more than twenty for potential combat operations.
Dr. Steven Wills is the Navalist at the Center for Maritime Strategy. His research and analysis centers on U.S. Navy strategy and policy, surface warfare programs and platforms, and military history.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
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Center for Maritime Strategy
By Dr. Steven Wills
Back in March, 1987, as the Senate contemplated the last two-carrier “block buy” that later became the USS George Washington and USS Abraham Lincoln, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policies and Operations Vice Admiral Hank Mustin confronted a phalanx of arguably one of the more august Senate Armed Services Committee groups – Ted Kennedy, John Warner, Carl Levin, John McCain, Bill Cohen and many others – with a startling claim that “since 1947 11 Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs have validated carrier requirements in excess of 20” for wartime requirements (CSPAN 2:37). He also stated that air superiority in the maritime environment was “non-negotiable.” Secretary of the Navy John Lehman goes on to explain the many versatile uses for the carrier around the world in both peace and war. Lehman and Mustin’s remarks were later confirmed by declassified Joint Strategic Planning Documents that indicate that the Joint Chiefs wanted 22 carriers as a “minimum risk” force.
1982 Joint Strategy Planning Document. U.S. Department of Defense.
That was 1987, but Admiral Mustin’s remarks still ring true in the third decade of the 21st century. The United States remains the lynchpin of the “Rimland” maritime powers that confront Eurasian opponents like China and Russia seeking access to the wider world oceans through belts and roads, and through strategic passages like the Norwegian Sea. The math that governs the rotational deployment position by which the U.S. Navy deploys its forces has long said that it takes at least fifteen carriers to provide a constant deployed force of one carrier in three deployed geographic locations or “hubs.” That math was included in the 1993 Bottom Up Review (BUR) of the Clinton administration which was effectively the first Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) document.
1993 Bottom-Up Review. U.S. Department of Defense.
Since 1993 no Department of Defense or Navy authority has ever refuted the BUR carrier figures for peacetime carrier deployment requirements. If fifteen carriers remain the peacetime deployment requirement, then what might current wartime requirements demand? Many current defense sources have suggested that the carrier is susceptible to attack and vulnerable to damage or loss from Chinese air land-based ballistic and cruise missiles. Some have suggested reducing the number of carriers to build more submarines and unmanned surface ships capable of launching high volume cruise missile attacks in place of manned and unmanned aircraft launched from carriers. The operational range of current carrier aircraft is reduced since the Cold War and that factor has also been a source of well-supported criticism of carrier aviation.
Regardless of issues of vulnerability and lack of striking range, the carrier and its airwing remain essential to the overall U.S. Navy contribution to the Joint Force, and especially in terms of potential combat in the Indo-Pacific, Arctic, and other geographic locations without immediate, land-based air support. Sea Control is a team effort with air, surface ad subsurface components. Sea control is not possible in the absence of air superiority over the water space where control is sought. Unlike current surface and subsurface platforms that must return to port to rearm, the carrier as a weapon system can be reloaded at sea while still engaged in combat operations. Unlike past capital ships, such as the battleship, the carrier can be upgraded over time in terms of air wing composition. Indeed, a carrier at the end of its service life often boasts a vastly different aircraft complement than when first commissioned decades earlier.
USS Enterprise in 1962 left and in 2012 right with noticeably different air wings. Photo From U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command.
As carriers are unlikely to soon disappear from the U.S. Navy order of battle anytime soon, it is important to again consider how many are needed for combat operations in the event of great power war. If peacetime presence requirements to keep at least one carrier deployed in three geographic locations require fifteen carriers in a rotational cycle, what would an Indo-Pacific war, with probable action on a global scale against multiple opponents demand? It probably would be a larger number than the current 11 flattops. The large deck amphibious warfare ships of the Wasp and America classes (LHD/LHA), provide some additional sea-based aviation capabilities, but those vessels are much slower, have far smaller fuel and weapon storage, and are built to a lower survivability standard than are purpose-built carriers (CVN/CV’s). A new class of conventional (CTOL) medium carriers, with conventional or nuclear propulsion that carry at least three strike fighter squadrons may be the right choice to supplement the existing fleet of large deck, nuclear-powered carriers of the Nimitz and Ford class.
In 2013, former Naval Sea Systems Command leader Vice Admiral Thomas Moore said, “We are an 11 carrier Navy in a 15 carrier world.” The current U.S. strategic situation with two great power competitors – China and Russia – two regional adversaries – Iran and North Korea – as well as continuing instability across many areas of the globe demands at least fifteen carriers and more than twenty for potential combat operations.
Dr. Steven Wills is the Navalist at the Center for Maritime Strategy. His research and analysis centers on U.S. Navy strategy and policy, surface warfare programs and platforms, and military history.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.