America’s Fleet of Ship-to-Shore Connectors: A Looming Crisis​

In October 2024, Mike Daum published an essay entitled “Infantry Wins Battles, Logistics Wins Wars: The Role of the Army’s Little Navy in the Pacific”. His analysis identifies a timeless axiom of warfare: logistics, as well as secure lines of communication, are the foundation for sustained combat operations.

The current state of the U.S. merchant fleet clearly demonstrates that America is incapable of supporting global sealift operations. Simply put, America’s commercial maritime industry is obsolete, and the military sea lift fleet has not fared much better. Since the end of World War II, the number of amphibious warships and Military Sealift Command vessels has slowly decreased, leaving the U.S. military reliant on a small, aging assortment of government-subsidized ships.

Another capability the U.S. military has steadily lost is bulk ship-to-shore movement. During World War II, American industry produced thousands of shallow-hulled vessels, including Liberty Ships, Landing Ship Tanks (LSTs), Army DUKWs, and Higgins boats. The Army, not the Navy, was primarily responsible for ship-to-shore operations. And with the service’s combined fleet of 127,000 ship-to-shore connectors, Army logistics forces ferried millions of tons of equipment from ocean-going ships to the beach.

Most of America’s successful island-hopping operations in the Pacific and amphibious landings in Europe were the result of efficient ship-to-shore logistics. For instance, the Allies initiated Operation Red Ball Express shortly after the D-Day landings on France’s Normandy coast.

This resupply operation combined efficient ship-to-shore connectors, prefabricated Mulberry Harbors, and sustained truck convoys to rapidly push supplies and ammunition to the front. Without such an effort, the Allied advance would have likely foundered in the French countryside.

During the Cold War, the Navy introduced new ship-to-shore connectors, including the Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC). This fast, maneuverable hovercraft allowed America’s Naval Service to rapidly transport tons of equipment from large amphibious warships, such as Landing Platform Docks (LPDs) and Landing Helicopter Docks (LHDs). But America’s fleet of LCACs is rapidly aging. Introduced in the late 1980s, the U.S. Navy currently maintains seventy-two in its inventory; however, many of these connectors are tied up in prolonged maintenance periods, leaving the Navy’s available fleet severely depleted.

Fortunately, the U.S. Army maintains an inventory of 900 ship-to-shore connectors maintains an inventory of 900 ship-to-shore connectors, including Logistic Support Vessels (LSVs) and Lighter Amphibious Resupply Cargo Vessels (LARC-Vs). Furthermore, this fleet has proven capability. The Army has routinely evaluated its ship-to-shore operational models in multiple exercises, including Talisman Sabre. Nevertheless, there are growing concerns about the Army’s “little navy.”

First, sixty percent of the current LSVs are in the reserves, raising serious concerns about operational readiness. Reserve training only provides for weekend drills and a two-week annual exercise, an amount insufficient to the rigors of operating large watercraft. Additionally, the Army has retired sixty-four units from its LSV fleet, and only forty percent of the remaining ships are “fully mission capable”.

The Army, moreover, has no dedicated acquisition plans to produce and field a new generation of ship-to-shore connectors. Instead, current military leadership favors leasing roll-on-roll-off (Ro-Ro) vessels to fill emergency capability gaps. This solution is simply unfeasible. The current state of the U.S. Merchant Fleet could not muster enough shipping capacity to meet wartime demands. These vessels are also not suited to the ship-to-shore role, which requires shallow drafts, cranes, and unloading ramps.

The U.S. military has already suffered from this capability gap. During the invasion and occupation of Iraq, Military Sealift Command (MSC) attempted to supply ground forces through deep-water ports, including the Kuwait Naval Base. This installation, however, could only accommodate two Ro-Ro vessels at a time, resulting in a prolonged logistics bottleneck. As a result, MSC could not support the massive retrograde, leaving tons of military equipment sitting in Kuwaiti holding yards.

This dilemma became even more severe during America’s withdrawal from Iraq in 2011. The lack of intermodal shipping forced the U.S. Army to abandon millions of dollars of equipment. The clear solution was additional ship-to-shore connectors. During Operation Desert Storm, the military had pre-selected and screened miles of pristine Kuwaiti beaches for amphibious operations. The Army could have used these same beaches to withdraw its forces and equipment twenty years later. Instead, only the Navy and Marine Corps executed limited ship-to-shore operations.

There are no easy solutions to this problem. It will likely take the government a decade to identify the shipyards, skilled labor, and “fenced” appropriations to rebuild America’s fleet of ship-to-shore connectors. Nevertheless, this capability is worth the investment. As stated at the beginning of this article, logistics wins wars. America will not be able to sustain prolonged combat operations without a robust inventory of ship-to-shore connectors. Moreover, large, fixed seaports of debarkation are likely not survivable in an era of precision strike. Consequently, urgent action is needed to preserve America’s ship-to-shore lift capability.

LTC (ret.) Richard Vargus, PhD served in the United States Marine Corps and United States Army for almost forty years. In 2002, he assumed duties at the US Merchant Marine Academy, Global Maritime Transportation School (GMATS). Serving as the lead instructor and development of maritime security and maritime counter-terrorism/piracy courses. In his role as the theater customs program oversight, he was engaged with port security, and planning retrograde sealift movements with MSC, CBP and USDA. Col. Vargus holds a doctorate in Public Administration. He is a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff and Air War College, and was awarded the Bronze Star. Active in the Navy League, he continues to serve as an adjunct instructor at the Maritime Institute of Technology and Graduate Studies.