It makes perfect sense that the North Atlantic is one of the main geopolitical flashpoints to which American policymakers pay constant attention. As Vladimir Putin continues to threaten European and North American security with his attempts undo the collapse of the Soviet Union, transatlantic maritime security should indeed be a major concern for governments on both sides of the Atlantic. As European nations continue to increase their defense spending in response to Russia’s war on Ukraine, naval strength should be a component of their buildups, one the United States can assist in developing.
At the same time, however, it behooves American strategists to also look to the South Atlantic. While not always obvious, this region also has the potential to be a flashpoint. Several nations—Argentina, Brazil, China, Russia, South Africa, and the United Kingdom—could one day find themselves in conflicts in those waters. If the United States pays attention, it may be able to help avert conflict.
The last major military engagement in the South Atlantic was the Falklands War of 1982. On April 2 of that year, the Argentinian military junta invaded the Falkland Islands, a British territory since 1833 over which Argentina has always claimed sovereignty despite never exercising actual control. In addition to territorial ambitions, the junta sought to distract its population’s attention away from problems at home, including a troubled economy and a controversial “dirty war” against left-wing insurgents within the country.
Though the invasion caught the United Kingdom off guard, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s reaction was decisive. She dispatched a task force of 127 vessels (including two aircraft carriers) and more than 25,000 servicemen to retake the islands. While taking significant casualties (British losses included two destroyers, two frigates, 10 fighters, 24 helicopters, 255 men killed, and 777 men wounded), Britain prevailed after a ten week campaign.
While defeat in the Falklands helped precipitate the fall of the junta and the return of democracy to Argentina in 1983, the possibility of another Argentinian invasion of the islands can never be completely dismissed. President Javier Milei, though he has used conciliatory language on the issue, hopes the Falklands will one day become part of Argentina, as have all of his predecessors, elected and unelected. If Argentina’s economy falls into deep trouble, the government of the day—regardless of ideology, political party, or relative commitment to democracy—may see a war to reclaim the Falklands as the answer to domestic political problems.
There is no guarantee that Britain would prevail in another Falklands War, or that London would even choose to fight to retake the islands. In 1981, Thatcher’s government strongly considered cutting the Royal Navy’s budget. Until the war the following year was actually over, many in Britain were unsure their country would win.
Similarly, the British armed forces today have been pared back since the end of the Cold War. Historian Mark Felton wryly noted earlier this year that the Royal Navy has more admirals than warships. Prime Minister Keir Starmer has pledged to increase defense spending to 2.5 percent of British GDP and his government’s 2025 Strategic Defense Review calls for expanding the Royal Navy’s nuclear submarine force. However, it will take a long time for these investments come to full fruition.
Furthermore, if Britain did respond to an Argentinian invasion of the Falklands with military force, NATO may be worse off for it. While many NATO allies have increased defense spending in the three years since Putin sent his army marching toward Kyiv, there are still reasons to worry about the condition and readiness of the alliance. Losing Britain’s contribution to security in European waters—even temporarily—could weaken European resolve and embolden Russia.
As well as the U.K., Argentina sometimes has a troubled relationship with its larger neighbor, Brazil. The U.K. and Brazil, on the other hand, have a positive defense relationship. The flagship of the Brazilian Navy, the helicopter carrier NAM Atlântico, is the former HMS Ocean, and Brazil plans to acquire the Royal Navy’s two Albion-class amphibious warfare ships. This creates the possibility of Brazil quietly assisting Britain during a future Falklands War, as Chile did in 1982.
China is also a player in the South Atlantic. While both Argentina and Brazil are Major Non-NATO Allies of the United States, both have also sought good economic relations with the People’s Republic. Beijing has invested in both countries’ maritimeinfrastructure. In 2021, this closeness helped produce a surprising event: Argentina denied a U.S. Coast Guard cutter, USCGC Stone, permission to dock.
On the other side of the South Atlantic, South Africa has the potential to cause problems for American and allied interests. It conducted joint naval exercises with China and Russia in 2023. While this falls well short of a formal military alliance between South Africa and either of America’s two greatest geopolitical rivals, an increased Chinese or Russian presence in the waters off South Africa could give either country a backdoor to the South Atlantic.
How can the United States maintain good relations with the various players in the South Atlantic, and reduce the likelihood of conflict? One way is by providing military equipment to both Argentina and Brazil. In 2024, Washington facilitated the sale of P-3 maritime surveillance planes from Norway to Argentina. Brazil, meanwhile, has expressed interest in buying the P-3’s successor, the P-8. Keeping such links to both countries can increase Washington’s leverage over Brasilia and Buenos Aires. If necessary to avoid ruffling feathers, the United States could coordinate sales with the Britain, rather than the two countries’ businesses competing with each other.
The United States might even consider asking Britain’s permission to base naval vessels in the Falklands. The presence of U.S. Navy warships in a once and potentially future warzone could act as a deterrent against aggression by Argentina against the U.K. However great Argentinians’ desire to annex the Falklands, they are unlikely to willingly risk conflict with the United States.
Meanwhile, having guided missile destroyers based in the South Atlantic could cut down on the time it would take to get DDGs to such maritime hotspots as the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. It can take nearly three weeks for ships based on the U.S. West Coast to reach the Middle East, and if the Suez Canal experiences another blockage like that in 2021, it may take an intolerably long time for U.S. ships from the East Coast to pass through. Having ships in the Falklands can hedge against such drawbacks and obstructions.
While the South Atlantic may not have as great a potential to be a conflict zone as the North Atlantic, it is not a complete sideshow. Local and outside powers, with competing claims and interests, could one day find themselves in conflict there. It is an eventuality for which the United States should be prepared.
Michael D. Purzycki is an analyst, writer, and editor based in Arlington, Virginia. He has worked for the United States Navy, Marine Corps, and Army.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Michael D. Purzycki
It makes perfect sense that the North Atlantic is one of the main geopolitical flashpoints to which American policymakers pay constant attention. As Vladimir Putin continues to threaten European and North American security with his attempts undo the collapse of the Soviet Union, transatlantic maritime security should indeed be a major concern for governments on both sides of the Atlantic. As European nations continue to increase their defense spending in response to Russia’s war on Ukraine, naval strength should be a component of their buildups, one the United States can assist in developing.
At the same time, however, it behooves American strategists to also look to the South Atlantic. While not always obvious, this region also has the potential to be a flashpoint. Several nations—Argentina, Brazil, China, Russia, South Africa, and the United Kingdom—could one day find themselves in conflicts in those waters. If the United States pays attention, it may be able to help avert conflict.
The last major military engagement in the South Atlantic was the Falklands War of 1982. On April 2 of that year, the Argentinian military junta invaded the Falkland Islands, a British territory since 1833 over which Argentina has always claimed sovereignty despite never exercising actual control. In addition to territorial ambitions, the junta sought to distract its population’s attention away from problems at home, including a troubled economy and a controversial “dirty war” against left-wing insurgents within the country.
Though the invasion caught the United Kingdom off guard, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s reaction was decisive. She dispatched a task force of 127 vessels (including two aircraft carriers) and more than 25,000 servicemen to retake the islands. While taking significant casualties (British losses included two destroyers, two frigates, 10 fighters, 24 helicopters, 255 men killed, and 777 men wounded), Britain prevailed after a ten week campaign.
While defeat in the Falklands helped precipitate the fall of the junta and the return of democracy to Argentina in 1983, the possibility of another Argentinian invasion of the islands can never be completely dismissed. President Javier Milei, though he has used conciliatory language on the issue, hopes the Falklands will one day become part of Argentina, as have all of his predecessors, elected and unelected. If Argentina’s economy falls into deep trouble, the government of the day—regardless of ideology, political party, or relative commitment to democracy—may see a war to reclaim the Falklands as the answer to domestic political problems.
There is no guarantee that Britain would prevail in another Falklands War, or that London would even choose to fight to retake the islands. In 1981, Thatcher’s government strongly considered cutting the Royal Navy’s budget. Until the war the following year was actually over, many in Britain were unsure their country would win.
Similarly, the British armed forces today have been pared back since the end of the Cold War. Historian Mark Felton wryly noted earlier this year that the Royal Navy has more admirals than warships. Prime Minister Keir Starmer has pledged to increase defense spending to 2.5 percent of British GDP and his government’s 2025 Strategic Defense Review calls for expanding the Royal Navy’s nuclear submarine force. However, it will take a long time for these investments come to full fruition.
Furthermore, if Britain did respond to an Argentinian invasion of the Falklands with military force, NATO may be worse off for it. While many NATO allies have increased defense spending in the three years since Putin sent his army marching toward Kyiv, there are still reasons to worry about the condition and readiness of the alliance. Losing Britain’s contribution to security in European waters—even temporarily—could weaken European resolve and embolden Russia.
As well as the U.K., Argentina sometimes has a troubled relationship with its larger neighbor, Brazil. The U.K. and Brazil, on the other hand, have a positive defense relationship. The flagship of the Brazilian Navy, the helicopter carrier NAM Atlântico, is the former HMS Ocean, and Brazil plans to acquire the Royal Navy’s two Albion-class amphibious warfare ships. This creates the possibility of Brazil quietly assisting Britain during a future Falklands War, as Chile did in 1982.
China is also a player in the South Atlantic. While both Argentina and Brazil are Major Non-NATO Allies of the United States, both have also sought good economic relations with the People’s Republic. Beijing has invested in both countries’ maritime infrastructure. In 2021, this closeness helped produce a surprising event: Argentina denied a U.S. Coast Guard cutter, USCGC Stone, permission to dock.
On the other side of the South Atlantic, South Africa has the potential to cause problems for American and allied interests. It conducted joint naval exercises with China and Russia in 2023. While this falls well short of a formal military alliance between South Africa and either of America’s two greatest geopolitical rivals, an increased Chinese or Russian presence in the waters off South Africa could give either country a backdoor to the South Atlantic.
How can the United States maintain good relations with the various players in the South Atlantic, and reduce the likelihood of conflict? One way is by providing military equipment to both Argentina and Brazil. In 2024, Washington facilitated the sale of P-3 maritime surveillance planes from Norway to Argentina. Brazil, meanwhile, has expressed interest in buying the P-3’s successor, the P-8. Keeping such links to both countries can increase Washington’s leverage over Brasilia and Buenos Aires. If necessary to avoid ruffling feathers, the United States could coordinate sales with the Britain, rather than the two countries’ businesses competing with each other.
The United States might even consider asking Britain’s permission to base naval vessels in the Falklands. The presence of U.S. Navy warships in a once and potentially future warzone could act as a deterrent against aggression by Argentina against the U.K. However great Argentinians’ desire to annex the Falklands, they are unlikely to willingly risk conflict with the United States.
Meanwhile, having guided missile destroyers based in the South Atlantic could cut down on the time it would take to get DDGs to such maritime hotspots as the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. It can take nearly three weeks for ships based on the U.S. West Coast to reach the Middle East, and if the Suez Canal experiences another blockage like that in 2021, it may take an intolerably long time for U.S. ships from the East Coast to pass through. Having ships in the Falklands can hedge against such drawbacks and obstructions.
While the South Atlantic may not have as great a potential to be a conflict zone as the North Atlantic, it is not a complete sideshow. Local and outside powers, with competing claims and interests, could one day find themselves in conflict there. It is an eventuality for which the United States should be prepared.
Michael D. Purzycki is an analyst, writer, and editor based in Arlington, Virginia. He has worked for the United States Navy, Marine Corps, and Army.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.