America Does Not Sail Alone: Pacific Allied and Partner Fleets Are Part of the Equation​

By Benjamin E. Mainardi

Two years ago, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) definitively surpassed the size of the United States Navy in terms of total platforms. Today, this has remained the case with the PLAN fielding some 355 “major combatants” and at least 85 patrol combatants equipped with anti-ship cruise missiles – to say nothing of the several hundred vessels of the China Coast Guard and People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia.

For its part, the U.S. Navy has remained relatively stagnant, standing at just 292 vessels – four shy of its 296 from 2020. Of course, this is in-line with Chief of Naval Operations Gilday’s dictum that, should fiscal resources remain below the necessary budget growth above inflation then readiness will be prioritized over capacity.

This prioritization of resources has sparked fierce criticism from across the political and national security communities, arguing that allowing the force to reduce in size poses a dangerous risk in being capable of meeting the threats posed by the PLAN and the other arms of China’s military.

Whichever side one falls on this debate there remains a conspicuously under-appreciated factor to consider: America’s allies and partners. Of course, the Biden Administration has reiterated ad nauseum throughout its tenure that America’s greatest strength lies in its network of allies and partners. Its recently released National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy is replete with references to developing “warfighting capabilities together with those of our Allies and partners” and that “we will leverage security cooperation and capacity building with partners.”

But, in the context of the concerns over the ability of the U.S. Navy to meet the challenges posed by the PLAN, just what is it that America’s allies and partners can bring to the table? As previously argued, the Indo-Pacific allies of the United States – principally, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand – maintain robust naval forces of varying sizes that can augment the size of the U.S. Navy. Regional partners, like Indonesia, Singapore, Taiwan, and Vietnam, similarly employ significant naval forces and coast guards. Not to mention the contributions of other allies, perhaps none more important than the United Kingdom who has committed to maintaining continuous naval presence in the Pacific and France whose island territories span the region housing a substantial military presence.

While China remains the single largest operator in the Pacific, the United States and its Pacific allies more than match its numerical capacity, as shown in the chart below. Yet the additions of allied naval forces seldom surface in the debates over the U.S. Navy’s ability to meet the challenges of the PLAN. True, the PLAN is projected to grow to approximately 400 platforms in the next three years and perhaps 440 by 2030, but this again does not overwhelm alliance-wide capacity should it retain existing levels.

To be sure, there are special considerations to be aware of when factoring in the potential contributions of allies. Most notably, that one cannot necessarily be certain they will join in a conflict, nor is there full authority over allies’ command and control. The U.S. Navy can certainly coordinate effectively with allies and other partners at sea, the 2022 Rim of the Pacific exercise demonstrated as much tactically, but is the Navy capable of maintaining a multilateral coalition at the operational and strategic levels? The generally sparse discussion of coalition management in Washington’s naval discourse does not necessarily elicit confidence.

Playing the numbers game is, of course, an imperfect method of evaluating naval forces. Considerations of the operational tempo of ships which determine their actual deployability at a given time, the distance between ships’ homeports and a given theater of operations, the composition of the force, among a myriad of other factors, all undermine the efficacy of comparing total fleet sizes. Fixating solely on the American fleet as the only meaningful factor in the equation, however, is even more egregious.

The value added by America’s Pacific allies and partners is substantial – Japan alone operates one of the largest navies and coast guards in the world. While the ambiguities of whether certain partner states would align with the United States in the event of conflict persist, addressing issues short of war like conducting freedom of navigation operations, enforcing the Law of the Sea Convention, and countering Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated fishing are exceptional opportunities to leverage the maritime capacity of America’s network of allies and partners.

In considering the capacity of and opportunities for coordination with allies and partners, critiques of the U.S. Navy’s emphasis on readiness over expanded capacity are perhaps unduly dismissive of the otherwise much-vaunted network of allies and partners. Indeed, investing finite Department of the Navy resources in prioritizing “readiness to keep combat-credible forces forward” preserves the commitment of the United States to its alliance network and allows for day-to-day working relationships to continue to strengthen. Yet to wield the network, made up of states often at odds with one another as it is, effectively in countering China’s maritime aggression in peace and war, requires the Navy to not only maintain presence but invest greater resources in coalition building abroad.

The key question in ensuring the success of leveraging allies and partners in such efforts is the ability of Untied States and its Navy to lead. Periodically, the Navy has attempted to take the initiative in doing so, notably in Admiral Mike Mullen’s “1000-Ship Navy” concept but has ultimately yielded mixed results with other Navy priorities often taking up more of the spotlight. Stagnant capacity-building efforts at home and renewed interest in the Indo-Pacific in Washington, however, are providing the Navy with an opportune moment to seize the momentum to build more active navy-to-navy relationships with allies whilst easing anxieties over the size of U.S. naval forces. Whether through the Quad-Plus or AUKUS “Plus,” in the form of the recently founded Partners in the Blue Pacific initiative, now is the time to reforge a maritime coalition in the Indo-Pacific.

Benjamin E. Mainardi is an analyst at the Center for Maritime Strategy. He holds a master’s in War Studies from King’s College London. His primary research interests are in strategic studies and military history.

The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.