By the Center for Maritime Strategy Editorial Board
Muchhas beenwritten about the atrophy of the U.S. Maritime Industrial Base since the end of the Cold War. The globalization narrative convinced multiple administrations that the United States could import whatever it required in terms of resources or manufacturing capability from foreign countries with cheaper labor and production costs. The recent decision to block the sale of U.S. Steel to Japan notwithstanding, it would appear that we have outsourced our national security needs. However, despite these challenges, a new paradigm may be in the offing.
Last week, Ambassador Bill Burns, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Richard Moore, the Director of British Intelligence (MI6) met in the United Kingdom for a public forum on global security threats. The conclusions drawn from this impromptu summit between the two intelligence leaders are sobering. In effect, the United States and its allies have not faced such a plethora of threats since the Cold War. While the United States was distracted by two decades of fighting the Global War on Terror with our boots in the sands of Iraq and Afghanistan, our enemies were slowly building up their arsenals. North Korea became a nuclear power. Russia occupied Crimea and initiated an unprovoked bloody war on Ukraine that continues today. Iran profited from the multi-billion-dollar payout from the JCPOA and invested in a terrorist organization known as the “Axis of Resistance” that threatens American allies and interests in the Middle East and Red Sea. China began a naval and nuclear arms race and currently outnumbers the United States Navy and regularly harasses our allies and partners in the Western Pacific.
At home, we struggle to keep pace with the threat and to reconstitute the “Arsenal of Democracy” that won World War Two. It doesn’t have to be this way. Arthur Herman’s book Freedoms Forge documents what the United States of America—theretofore an isolationist nation—did in response to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. America quickly ramped up its industrial base in order to fight and win a two-front war in Europe and the Pacific. By the end of World War Two, the United States had 55 shipyards bending metal and producing ships of all varieties. By the Presidency of Ronald Reagan, that number had dwindled to 19. Today we can claim only 7 shipyards. The government’s ship acquisition process is broken—as evidenced by the serials delays of programs as diverse as the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine and the Coast Guard’s Polar Security Cutter.
Last week, the Center for Maritime Strategy conducted a “staff ride” to Philadelphia Naval Shipyard to examine the constructions of the Maritime Administration’s (MARAD) National Security Multi-Mission Vessel (NSMV). These ships are intended as training platforms for the five state maritime academies Empire State has already been delivered to SUNY Maritime with four more vessels under construction. The second NSMV—Patriot State—was christened this week. These ships are built to American Bureau of Shipping standards and are therefore not hardened warships, but they are multi-mission capable for training purposes, disaster relief, or humanitarian assistance. There is no reason why the NSMV hull could not be adapted to provide the basis for a hospital ship, a submarine tender, or a command-and-control ship—each of which are types of vessels that the U.S. Navy needs to urgently replace. Furthermore, the shipyard is producing the current class of vessels very nearly on time and on budget—a rare feat for today’s government shipbuilding programs.
What is the secret to this success? First, MARAD did not start construction of the vessels without an approved and unwaivable design. Second, MARAD chose not to manage the day-to-day construction of the vessels. Instead, it chose to hire a Vessel Construction Manager (VCM) to provide oversight of the project and report progress back to the government. Finally, the budget was fixed and there is no appetite for ship alterations or configurations changes.
Among other things, Tote Services, the VCM is responsible for oversight, construction, outfitting, testing, and delivery of the vessels. The VCM identifies and mitigates risks to cost and schedule. Commercial best practices are shared with the yard to ensure a continuous learning curve throughout subsequent hull construction. The VCM develops ship’s logistics, standard operating procedures, and preventive maintenance plans as well as procuring, assembling, and installing government furnished equipment. In doing so, the VCM relieves the shipyard of the requirement to answer multiple requests for information from the purchaser—in this case MARAD—and instead allows the shipyard to do what the shipyard does best: building ships. The result is a ship built to design specifications that is delivered on time and on budget as well as streamlining the acquisition process.
If the NSMV program remains close to on-budget and on-time throughout the remaining vessels of the five-ship class, it will prove to be a unique exception to the pattern of cost overruns and delays that have plagued American shipbuilding programs for decades. The VCM model has potential to facilitate the construction of other support vessel classes needed in the U.S. inventory, including:
Sealift Recapitalization
Hospital Ships
Navy Command and Control Ships
Submarine and Other Tenders
Missile Defense Agency (MDA) Replacement Vessels
Cable Laying Ships
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Vessels
NOAA Vessels
In an era when budgets are tight and our needs far exceed resources, we must adopt a new paradigm. In this case, the VCM model makes perfect sense.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Center for Maritime Strategy Editorial Board
By the Center for Maritime Strategy Editorial Board
Much has been written about the atrophy of the U.S. Maritime Industrial Base since the end of the Cold War. The globalization narrative convinced multiple administrations that the United States could import whatever it required in terms of resources or manufacturing capability from foreign countries with cheaper labor and production costs. The recent decision to block the sale of U.S. Steel to Japan notwithstanding, it would appear that we have outsourced our national security needs. However, despite these challenges, a new paradigm may be in the offing.
Last week, Ambassador Bill Burns, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Richard Moore, the Director of British Intelligence (MI6) met in the United Kingdom for a public forum on global security threats. The conclusions drawn from this impromptu summit between the two intelligence leaders are sobering. In effect, the United States and its allies have not faced such a plethora of threats since the Cold War. While the United States was distracted by two decades of fighting the Global War on Terror with our boots in the sands of Iraq and Afghanistan, our enemies were slowly building up their arsenals. North Korea became a nuclear power. Russia occupied Crimea and initiated an unprovoked bloody war on Ukraine that continues today. Iran profited from the multi-billion-dollar payout from the JCPOA and invested in a terrorist organization known as the “Axis of Resistance” that threatens American allies and interests in the Middle East and Red Sea. China began a naval and nuclear arms race and currently outnumbers the United States Navy and regularly harasses our allies and partners in the Western Pacific.
At home, we struggle to keep pace with the threat and to reconstitute the “Arsenal of Democracy” that won World War Two. It doesn’t have to be this way. Arthur Herman’s book Freedoms Forge documents what the United States of America—theretofore an isolationist nation—did in response to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. America quickly ramped up its industrial base in order to fight and win a two-front war in Europe and the Pacific. By the end of World War Two, the United States had 55 shipyards bending metal and producing ships of all varieties. By the Presidency of Ronald Reagan, that number had dwindled to 19. Today we can claim only 7 shipyards. The government’s ship acquisition process is broken—as evidenced by the serials delays of programs as diverse as the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine and the Coast Guard’s Polar Security Cutter.
Last week, the Center for Maritime Strategy conducted a “staff ride” to Philadelphia Naval Shipyard to examine the constructions of the Maritime Administration’s (MARAD) National Security Multi-Mission Vessel (NSMV). These ships are intended as training platforms for the five state maritime academies Empire State has already been delivered to SUNY Maritime with four more vessels under construction. The second NSMV—Patriot State—was christened this week. These ships are built to American Bureau of Shipping standards and are therefore not hardened warships, but they are multi-mission capable for training purposes, disaster relief, or humanitarian assistance. There is no reason why the NSMV hull could not be adapted to provide the basis for a hospital ship, a submarine tender, or a command-and-control ship—each of which are types of vessels that the U.S. Navy needs to urgently replace. Furthermore, the shipyard is producing the current class of vessels very nearly on time and on budget—a rare feat for today’s government shipbuilding programs.
What is the secret to this success? First, MARAD did not start construction of the vessels without an approved and unwaivable design. Second, MARAD chose not to manage the day-to-day construction of the vessels. Instead, it chose to hire a Vessel Construction Manager (VCM) to provide oversight of the project and report progress back to the government. Finally, the budget was fixed and there is no appetite for ship alterations or configurations changes.
Among other things, Tote Services, the VCM is responsible for oversight, construction, outfitting, testing, and delivery of the vessels. The VCM identifies and mitigates risks to cost and schedule. Commercial best practices are shared with the yard to ensure a continuous learning curve throughout subsequent hull construction. The VCM develops ship’s logistics, standard operating procedures, and preventive maintenance plans as well as procuring, assembling, and installing government furnished equipment. In doing so, the VCM relieves the shipyard of the requirement to answer multiple requests for information from the purchaser—in this case MARAD—and instead allows the shipyard to do what the shipyard does best: building ships. The result is a ship built to design specifications that is delivered on time and on budget as well as streamlining the acquisition process.
If the NSMV program remains close to on-budget and on-time throughout the remaining vessels of the five-ship class, it will prove to be a unique exception to the pattern of cost overruns and delays that have plagued American shipbuilding programs for decades. The VCM model has potential to facilitate the construction of other support vessel classes needed in the U.S. inventory, including:
In an era when budgets are tight and our needs far exceed resources, we must adopt a new paradigm. In this case, the VCM model makes perfect sense.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.