A Brief History of U.S. Naval Mine Warfare in the Persian Gulf, 1979–Present
The MOC
April 16, 2026
Dr. Steven Wills
Iran’s claim to have laid mines across a broad area astride the Strait of Hormuz has again raised the prospect of a USS Samuel B. Roberts mine strike-incident and prompted renewed scrutiny of U.S. Navy mine-warfare capabilities. Observers have questioned the decision to retire and repatriate the Avenger-class mine countermeasures ships that for decades formed the core of 5th Fleet mine-warfare forces. Similar concerns have been raised regarding the absence of littoral combat ships (LCS) equipped with mine-warfare mission packages from the Persian Gulf and, more broadly, the performance of LCS mine-countermeasure systems. Historically, such criticisms have recurred during periods of tension and conflict in the region, including during the 1987–1988 “Tanker Wars.” Mine countermeasures ships are often characterized as dated and insufficient in number, and the U.S. Navy is frequently accused of discounting mine threats until they materialize and, at times, of neglecting mine warfare altogether. Although the LCS program—particularly its mine-warfare mission package—experienced setbacks, the U.S. Navy has increasingly shifted from legacy mine-countermeasure ships to helicopter- and unmanned-systems-based capabilities deployable from multiple platforms.
These critiques of U.S. mine countermeasures in the Persian Gulf are longstanding. As with the Avenger-class, the preceding generation of mine countermeasures ships (MSOs) remained in service well beyond planned lifespans and were not consistently maintained to a high standard. In prior conflicts, new systems have been introduced into theater with limited operational experience at the onset of hostilities.
The 1987–1988 “Tanker War” (Operation Earnest Will) constituted the first major U.S. mine-warfare effort in the Persian Gulf. Prior to that period, the perceived threat to Iranian oil infrastructure from the neighboring Soviet Union was addressed through the Carter Administration’s Rapid Deployment Force, a precursor to today’s U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). The naval component of this posture remained limited, with only episodic reinforcement during crises. The outbreak of the Iran–Iraq War in 1980—between Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and the new Islamist regime in Iran—expanded conflict into the Persian Gulf and led to an increase in attacks on neutral tanker shipping, with Iran posing the principal threat. In May 1987, the United States proceeded with plans to reflag Kuwaiti tankers and escort them through the Strait of Hormuz. A U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee report concluded that the U.S. Navy was “ill-prepared to execute its new role in the Persian Gulf.” The mining of the Strait of Hormuz was also raised in other congressional hearings. In one such hearing, Senator Dan Quayle asked Under Secretary of Defense Michael Armacost, “Do we have any minesweepers that will go up in there?” Armacost responded in the negative and stated that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Bill Crowe, did not assess mines as a significant threat. The Joint Chiefs instead assessed Iranian, Chinese-made Silkworm cruise missiles as the greater danger. In July 1987, however, the reflagged tanker Bridgeton—the first such vessel escorted by the U.S. Navy—struck an Iranian-laid mine. Although the damage was limited, the U.S. naval presence in the Persian Gulf expanded from six ships to thirteen, and then to thirty by year’s end, to include minesweepers and minesweeping helicopters. USS Samuel B. Roberts subsequently struck a mine and was nearly lost. Ultimately, the operation contributed to deterring further Iranian attacks on merchant shipping.
Mines again emerged as a significant operational challenge in the Persian Gulf when Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi forces extensively mined Kuwaiti ports following the occupation of Kuwait, seeking to deter U.S. and Allied liberation efforts. U.S. minesweepers that had supported Operation Earnest Will had already departed the region and were redeployed via heavy-lift ships as the most rapid means of delivering the small, slow vessels to the theater. Despite sweeping and hunting operations, two U.S. ships—the cruiser Princeton and the amphibious ship Tripoli—were damaged by mine strikes. This episode renewed criticism regarding the adequacy of U.S. mine-clearance capacity. Secretary of the Navy H. Lawrence Garrett testified before Congress on 21 February 1991, stating, “The U.S. spent twenty-five years not developing or buying new minesweepers or minehunters.” Other observers noted that the United States remained dependent on Allied mine-warfare capabilities, particularly those of the British Royal Navy during Desert Storm. U.S. mine clearance efforts however were very successful and Avenger became the first mine countermeasure ship to neutralize an Italian Manta-type bottom mine, on 27 February 1991.
In 2003, the U.S. Navy again deployed mine countermeasures forces to the Persian Gulf in support of the opening combat operations of Operation Iraqi Freedom. In contrast to 1991, the Iraqi mining effort was more limited and largely confined to coastal and riverine areas. Four U.S. mine countermeasures ships—the Avenger-class ships Ardent and Dextrous, and the coastal minehunters Cardinal and Raven (smaller coastal mine hunting ships without towed sweep gear)—participated alongside six British mine countermeasures ships, primarily conducting mine hunting and destruction in muddy littoral waters near the port of Umm Qasr.
By the late 2000s, however, the Avenger class was approaching the limits of its service life. The entire coastal mine hunting ship class (MHC, including Cardinal and Raven) was decommissioned by 2007 as a cost-saving measure. Three additional Avenger-class ships joined Dextrous in Bahrain (Devastator, Gladiator, and Sentry), and Ardent was decommissioned in 2020. In June 2025, the Secretary of the Navy approved the retirement of that remaining quartet of mine countermeasures vessels; from September 2025 to January 2026, they were replaced by three LCSs—Canberra, Santa Barbara, and Tulsa.
The United States initiated combat operations against Iran on 28 February 2026. At that time, LCS mine countermeasures units were not positioned in the Persian Gulf, and the decommissioned MCM ships were enroute to the United States for disposal—renewing criticism that mine countermeasures were not immediately available in theater. From an operational-risk perspective, withdrawing LCS MCM ships prior to commencing strikes against Iran reduced exposure of these relatively lightly defended vessels. Although larger and faster than the purpose-built Avenger-class ships, and offering greater capacity for mine-countermeasure equipment, LCS platforms lack the air and missile defenses required to withstand Iranian missile attacks. Had the Avengers remained in the Gulf, they would likely also have withdrawn prior to strikes given their limited self-defense capabilities. Of greater concern is the limited public discussion of, and the lack of a visible in-theater presence of, MH-53 minesweeping helicopters, which provide a rapid method for clearing mines. These aircraft are being retired, and it remains unclear when—and whether—they would be available for operations.
The outcome of the current U.S.–Iran conflict remains uncertain, and it is not yet clear whether the United States will attempt to reopen the Strait of Hormuz by force. Nevertheless, mine-warfare capabilities exist within the broader theater and could be employed should operations require them. At present, no NATO ally or partner state appears to have mine-warfare ships positioned nearby and prepared to provide immediate assistance. LCS-based mine-clearance capabilities have not been validated in combat; however, the original USS Avenger similarly deployed to the region for Operation Desert Shield/Storm without prior combat evaluation. The U.S. Navy has not “forgotten” mine warfare; rather, it has increasingly emphasized airborne and unmanned systems in lieu of relying on the traditional 20th-century minesweeper—platforms that, in many navies, have been associated with maintenance and readiness challenges. CENTCOM has experience addressing Iranian mine threats, and its exercises and war games have emphasized this mission for many years. As Admiral Paul Ryan, then the U.S. commander for mine warfare, observed in 2003, “Mine hunting and mine clearing is slow, tedious, and dangerous work, particularly in littoral areas with challenging environmental conditions.”
Dr. Steve Wills,is the Navalist at The Center for Maritime Strategy.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
Dr. Steven Wills
Iran’s claim to have laid mines across a broad area astride the Strait of Hormuz has again raised the prospect of a USS Samuel B. Roberts mine strike-incident and prompted renewed scrutiny of U.S. Navy mine-warfare capabilities. Observers have questioned the decision to retire and repatriate the Avenger-class mine countermeasures ships that for decades formed the core of 5th Fleet mine-warfare forces. Similar concerns have been raised regarding the absence of littoral combat ships (LCS) equipped with mine-warfare mission packages from the Persian Gulf and, more broadly, the performance of LCS mine-countermeasure systems. Historically, such criticisms have recurred during periods of tension and conflict in the region, including during the 1987–1988 “Tanker Wars.” Mine countermeasures ships are often characterized as dated and insufficient in number, and the U.S. Navy is frequently accused of discounting mine threats until they materialize and, at times, of neglecting mine warfare altogether. Although the LCS program—particularly its mine-warfare mission package—experienced setbacks, the U.S. Navy has increasingly shifted from legacy mine-countermeasure ships to helicopter- and unmanned-systems-based capabilities deployable from multiple platforms.
These critiques of U.S. mine countermeasures in the Persian Gulf are longstanding. As with the Avenger-class, the preceding generation of mine countermeasures ships (MSOs) remained in service well beyond planned lifespans and were not consistently maintained to a high standard. In prior conflicts, new systems have been introduced into theater with limited operational experience at the onset of hostilities.
The 1987–1988 “Tanker War” (Operation Earnest Will) constituted the first major U.S. mine-warfare effort in the Persian Gulf. Prior to that period, the perceived threat to Iranian oil infrastructure from the neighboring Soviet Union was addressed through the Carter Administration’s Rapid Deployment Force, a precursor to today’s U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). The naval component of this posture remained limited, with only episodic reinforcement during crises. The outbreak of the Iran–Iraq War in 1980—between Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and the new Islamist regime in Iran—expanded conflict into the Persian Gulf and led to an increase in attacks on neutral tanker shipping, with Iran posing the principal threat. In May 1987, the United States proceeded with plans to reflag Kuwaiti tankers and escort them through the Strait of Hormuz. A U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee report concluded that the U.S. Navy was “ill-prepared to execute its new role in the Persian Gulf.” The mining of the Strait of Hormuz was also raised in other congressional hearings. In one such hearing, Senator Dan Quayle asked Under Secretary of Defense Michael Armacost, “Do we have any minesweepers that will go up in there?” Armacost responded in the negative and stated that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Bill Crowe, did not assess mines as a significant threat. The Joint Chiefs instead assessed Iranian, Chinese-made Silkworm cruise missiles as the greater danger. In July 1987, however, the reflagged tanker Bridgeton—the first such vessel escorted by the U.S. Navy—struck an Iranian-laid mine. Although the damage was limited, the U.S. naval presence in the Persian Gulf expanded from six ships to thirteen, and then to thirty by year’s end, to include minesweepers and minesweeping helicopters. USS Samuel B. Roberts subsequently struck a mine and was nearly lost. Ultimately, the operation contributed to deterring further Iranian attacks on merchant shipping.
Mines again emerged as a significant operational challenge in the Persian Gulf when Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi forces extensively mined Kuwaiti ports following the occupation of Kuwait, seeking to deter U.S. and Allied liberation efforts. U.S. minesweepers that had supported Operation Earnest Will had already departed the region and were redeployed via heavy-lift ships as the most rapid means of delivering the small, slow vessels to the theater. Despite sweeping and hunting operations, two U.S. ships—the cruiser Princeton and the amphibious ship Tripoli—were damaged by mine strikes. This episode renewed criticism regarding the adequacy of U.S. mine-clearance capacity. Secretary of the Navy H. Lawrence Garrett testified before Congress on 21 February 1991, stating, “The U.S. spent twenty-five years not developing or buying new minesweepers or minehunters.” Other observers noted that the United States remained dependent on Allied mine-warfare capabilities, particularly those of the British Royal Navy during Desert Storm. U.S. mine clearance efforts however were very successful and Avenger became the first mine countermeasure ship to neutralize an Italian Manta-type bottom mine, on 27 February 1991.
In 2003, the U.S. Navy again deployed mine countermeasures forces to the Persian Gulf in support of the opening combat operations of Operation Iraqi Freedom. In contrast to 1991, the Iraqi mining effort was more limited and largely confined to coastal and riverine areas. Four U.S. mine countermeasures ships—the Avenger-class ships Ardent and Dextrous, and the coastal minehunters Cardinal and Raven (smaller coastal mine hunting ships without towed sweep gear)—participated alongside six British mine countermeasures ships, primarily conducting mine hunting and destruction in muddy littoral waters near the port of Umm Qasr.
By the late 2000s, however, the Avenger class was approaching the limits of its service life. The entire coastal mine hunting ship class (MHC, including Cardinal and Raven) was decommissioned by 2007 as a cost-saving measure. Three additional Avenger-class ships joined Dextrous in Bahrain (Devastator, Gladiator, and Sentry), and Ardent was decommissioned in 2020. In June 2025, the Secretary of the Navy approved the retirement of that remaining quartet of mine countermeasures vessels; from September 2025 to January 2026, they were replaced by three LCSs—Canberra, Santa Barbara, and Tulsa.
The United States initiated combat operations against Iran on 28 February 2026. At that time, LCS mine countermeasures units were not positioned in the Persian Gulf, and the decommissioned MCM ships were enroute to the United States for disposal—renewing criticism that mine countermeasures were not immediately available in theater. From an operational-risk perspective, withdrawing LCS MCM ships prior to commencing strikes against Iran reduced exposure of these relatively lightly defended vessels. Although larger and faster than the purpose-built Avenger-class ships, and offering greater capacity for mine-countermeasure equipment, LCS platforms lack the air and missile defenses required to withstand Iranian missile attacks. Had the Avengers remained in the Gulf, they would likely also have withdrawn prior to strikes given their limited self-defense capabilities. Of greater concern is the limited public discussion of, and the lack of a visible in-theater presence of, MH-53 minesweeping helicopters, which provide a rapid method for clearing mines. These aircraft are being retired, and it remains unclear when—and whether—they would be available for operations.
The outcome of the current U.S.–Iran conflict remains uncertain, and it is not yet clear whether the United States will attempt to reopen the Strait of Hormuz by force. Nevertheless, mine-warfare capabilities exist within the broader theater and could be employed should operations require them. At present, no NATO ally or partner state appears to have mine-warfare ships positioned nearby and prepared to provide immediate assistance. LCS-based mine-clearance capabilities have not been validated in combat; however, the original USS Avenger similarly deployed to the region for Operation Desert Shield/Storm without prior combat evaluation. The U.S. Navy has not “forgotten” mine warfare; rather, it has increasingly emphasized airborne and unmanned systems in lieu of relying on the traditional 20th-century minesweeper—platforms that, in many navies, have been associated with maintenance and readiness challenges. CENTCOM has experience addressing Iranian mine threats, and its exercises and war games have emphasized this mission for many years. As Admiral Paul Ryan, then the U.S. commander for mine warfare, observed in 2003, “Mine hunting and mine clearing is slow, tedious, and dangerous work, particularly in littoral areas with challenging environmental conditions.”
Dr. Steve Wills, is the Navalist at The Center for Maritime Strategy.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Dr. Steven Wills, Navalist