The China-Japan Crisis Demonstrates China’s Growing Influence in Myanmar
The MOC
By
Matthew Reisener
January 15, 2026
Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi made waves with her recent comments about Japan’s willingness to potentially intervene on behalf of Taiwan if the island were attacked by China. Perhaps no response to this diplomatic spat was more surprising than the one issued by Myanmar, a country which has historically sought to cultivate strong relationships with both China and Japan. This statement, issued by a representative of Myanmar’s military government, expressed that Japan’s position on Taiwan reflected “neither remorse nor responsibility for the crimes committed by Japan across Asia,” condemned the “possible resurgence of fascist tendencies in Japan,” reaffirmed Myanmar’s commitment to the one-China policy, and declared that “Myanmar opposes any external interference,” over the issue of Taiwan, which Myanmar views as “purely China’s internal affair.”
While Myanmar’s continued adherence to the one-China policy is hardly newsworthy, its decisive rebuke of Japan, complete with erroneous and inflammatory warnings of resurgent fascism in the country, raised eyebrows among those familiar with the historically strong ties between Japan and Myanmar. In 1941, the Japanese army trained and supported the Thirty Comrades (the precursor to Myanmar’s modern armed forces) in their struggle against British colonialism in World War II, and their 1942 invasion was welcomed by many in Myanmar who assumed the Japanese would help them establish an independent state. While Japan’s subsequent occupation of Myanmar and establishment of a puppet regime in Yangon naturally engendered local resentment, the relationship took an important step towards healing with the signing of the 1954 peace treaty, in which Japan provided hundreds of millions of dollars in reparations and economic support to Myanmar, including funding the reconstruction of the Yangon Port.
In the coming years, Japan’s relationship with Myanmar was a remarkable testament to the power of reconciliation. Often referred to by both countries as the “special relationship” (evoking the enduring Anglo-American partnership), Myanmar became one of Japan’s closest partners in the region through sustained trade relations, military cooperation, and geopolitical collaboration. Public opinion polling in Myanmar has consistently shown Japan to be the most trusted and valued partner of the Burmese people. Japan’s ties with Myanmar were strained after Myanmar’s military ousted its democratically elected government in 2021, just as they were in the wake of Myanmar’s 1988 military coup before Myanmar’s gradual embrace of greater liberalization and economic reforms helped rejuvenate them. However, Japan has taken care to sustain its ties with Myanmar’s junta over the past few years, maintaining diplomatic relations, providing humanitarian assistance, and helping broker a ceasefire between warring parties in Myanmar’s ongoing domestic conflict, even as it reduced its economic development assistance to Naypyidaw.
Japan’s efforts to avoid alienating Myanmar’s military government have apparently been insufficient to prevent its erstwhile ally from firmly aligning itself with its other major regional backer: China. However, the deepening of the Sino-Burmese partnership was far from certain in the wake of Myanmar’s 2021 military coup. While China has been one of Myanmar’s largest sources of trade and aid for several decades, Myanmar’s military leaders have long distrusted Beijing due to its support for armed ethnic militias in Myanmar, as well as its backing of the Communist Party of Burma. While China used its veto power to shield the junta from condemnation from the UN Security Council following the coup, the early years of the State Administration Council’s rule over Myanmar elicited significant concerns in Beijing about the military government’s capacity to protect Chinese investments in the country and prevent the violence and crime in Myanmar from spilling across its border with China. As recently as 2023, the Chinese government was greenlighting rebel-launched campaigns against government-controlled cities and military camps while also being protested by competing factions in Myanmar on the grounds that Beijing was either too supportive of the junta or not supportive enough. China’s efforts to play both sides of Myanmar’s internal conflict, it seemed, were backfiring.
However, by Autumn of 2024, China had shifted its strategy to one more clearly supportive of the junta, a decision driven in part by Beijing’s growing fear that its Burmese proxies were operating independently and against China’s economic interests in Myanmar. China has since publicly embraced the junta, increasing its delivery of military aid and supporting the country’s ongoing sham elections which have been condemned by the UN and which include neither the National League for Democracy (the party whose control of the government was ended by the coup) nor prominent opposition leaders. This support has served as a lifeline for the junta, which many analysts previously assessed to be at risk of collapse, and has enabled them to turn the tide in the conflict. China has helped curb the flow of aid and supplies for anti-government rebel groups (including desperately-needed UAVs), used its influence to pressure local militants into ceasefire agreements, and materially supported a brutal air campaign designed to reclaim territory lost during the Chinese-backed Operation 1027 a few years prior. Recent reporting has also uncovered China’s efforts to help Myanmar create a digital payments system which could help them circumvent US sanctions. Given the junta’s growing dependence on China for survival, it is little wonder Myanmar opted to so publicly side with China in its diplomatic dispute with Japan over Taiwan, regardless of the military’s historic feelings towards those two countries.
The deepening ties between China and Myanmar carry significant strategic ramifications for the region’s security. Aside from helping secure another public voice in support of China’ regional priorities such as reunification with Taiwan and peeling away a potential ally of Japan’s, fostering Naypyidaw’s dependency on Beijing furthers several of China’s major economic and security goals—chief among them the strengthening of China’s naval and commercial presence in the Bay of Bengal. China has invested heavily in developing the “China-Myanmar Economic Corridor” (CMEC), a $15 billion series of infrastructure programs in furtherance of China’s Belt and Road Initiative designed to connect Kyaukphyu on Myanmar’s western coast to the city of Muse on its eastern border with China.
CMEC is designed to provide China with an alternative corridor to facilitate trade with the Indian Ocean while bypassing the Strait of Malacca, a narrow waterway through which nearly two-thirds of Chinese maritime trade and 80% of China’s crude oil imports pass. Establishing such alternative trade routes could make China less economically vulnerable to both piracy and the threat of a naval conflict with a country capable of targeting Chinese ships in the strait, helping insulate the PRC from the potential ramifications of its naval saber-rattling in the Pacific.
After years of delay, Myanmar’s junta approved the construction a deep-sea port at Kyaukphyu last year, a key component of China’s CMEC strategy. Whether this decision came because of Chinese pressure or instead encouraged China to side with the junta to protect this investment is open for interpretation. Regardless, this project was not only an economic win for China, but also carries security implications due to the potential for the Chinese military to dock ships at this port.
China’s growing influence in Myanmar threatens to give Beijing an edge in its geopolitical rivalry with India in the Bay of Bengal due to the proximity of Kyaukphyu to the naval base being constructed by India to house its nuclear submarines. Additionally, China has allegedly established military installations on Great Coco, a Myanmar-controlled island less than 40 miles from the Indian naval and air bases located on Andaman and Nicobar Islands, prompting concern from India that China could use this island to conduct espionage operations against the Indian military. If China is able to use its growing influence and debt leverage over Myanmar to gain access to more ports and establish greater military presence in Myanmar, it could favorably alter the balance of power in the Bay of Bengal. Some Indian analysts are already warning that Myanmar’s recently passed law regulating the operations of private security firms in the country is being used to covertly strengthen China’s military foothold in Myanmar under the guise of Chinese security firms protecting the country’s economic investments. India’s recent announcement of a new naval base at Haldia on the north end of the Bay illustrates India’s acknowledgment of the rising Chinese threat in this region and the growing need to counterbalance it.
While the Burmese junta’s comments on Taiwan were largely overshadowed by the threat of a Sino-Japanese conflict, they provided an insightful window into Myanmar’s current relations with both countries and underscore the effectiveness of China’s efforts to expand its influence in Southeast Asia. China’s desire for a stable but weak junior partner in Myanmar has informed its strategy in navigating Myanmar’s ongoing civil strife, and Myanmar’s vocal rebuke of its historic friend in Japan speaks to the extent to which China’s strategic priorities now influence Myanmar’s foreign policy. Beijing’s ability to leverage the junta’s increasing dependence on Chinese support for its continued survival could allow China to increase its maritime presence in the Bay of Bengal and strengthen its claim to regional hegemony. Regardless of the outcome of the Sino-Japanese diplomatic crisis, the clear demonstration of Myanmar’s growing alignment towards China should be considered a clear win for Beijing and a loss for countries seeking to contain its rise.
Matthew Reisener is the Senior National Security Advisor at the Center for Maritime Strategy.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Matthew Reisener
Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi made waves with her recent comments about Japan’s willingness to potentially intervene on behalf of Taiwan if the island were attacked by China. Perhaps no response to this diplomatic spat was more surprising than the one issued by Myanmar, a country which has historically sought to cultivate strong relationships with both China and Japan. This statement, issued by a representative of Myanmar’s military government, expressed that Japan’s position on Taiwan reflected “neither remorse nor responsibility for the crimes committed by Japan across Asia,” condemned the “possible resurgence of fascist tendencies in Japan,” reaffirmed Myanmar’s commitment to the one-China policy, and declared that “Myanmar opposes any external interference,” over the issue of Taiwan, which Myanmar views as “purely China’s internal affair.”
While Myanmar’s continued adherence to the one-China policy is hardly newsworthy, its decisive rebuke of Japan, complete with erroneous and inflammatory warnings of resurgent fascism in the country, raised eyebrows among those familiar with the historically strong ties between Japan and Myanmar. In 1941, the Japanese army trained and supported the Thirty Comrades (the precursor to Myanmar’s modern armed forces) in their struggle against British colonialism in World War II, and their 1942 invasion was welcomed by many in Myanmar who assumed the Japanese would help them establish an independent state. While Japan’s subsequent occupation of Myanmar and establishment of a puppet regime in Yangon naturally engendered local resentment, the relationship took an important step towards healing with the signing of the 1954 peace treaty, in which Japan provided hundreds of millions of dollars in reparations and economic support to Myanmar, including funding the reconstruction of the Yangon Port.
In the coming years, Japan’s relationship with Myanmar was a remarkable testament to the power of reconciliation. Often referred to by both countries as the “special relationship” (evoking the enduring Anglo-American partnership), Myanmar became one of Japan’s closest partners in the region through sustained trade relations, military cooperation, and geopolitical collaboration. Public opinion polling in Myanmar has consistently shown Japan to be the most trusted and valued partner of the Burmese people. Japan’s ties with Myanmar were strained after Myanmar’s military ousted its democratically elected government in 2021, just as they were in the wake of Myanmar’s 1988 military coup before Myanmar’s gradual embrace of greater liberalization and economic reforms helped rejuvenate them. However, Japan has taken care to sustain its ties with Myanmar’s junta over the past few years, maintaining diplomatic relations, providing humanitarian assistance, and helping broker a ceasefire between warring parties in Myanmar’s ongoing domestic conflict, even as it reduced its economic development assistance to Naypyidaw.
Japan’s efforts to avoid alienating Myanmar’s military government have apparently been insufficient to prevent its erstwhile ally from firmly aligning itself with its other major regional backer: China. However, the deepening of the Sino-Burmese partnership was far from certain in the wake of Myanmar’s 2021 military coup. While China has been one of Myanmar’s largest sources of trade and aid for several decades, Myanmar’s military leaders have long distrusted Beijing due to its support for armed ethnic militias in Myanmar, as well as its backing of the Communist Party of Burma. While China used its veto power to shield the junta from condemnation from the UN Security Council following the coup, the early years of the State Administration Council’s rule over Myanmar elicited significant concerns in Beijing about the military government’s capacity to protect Chinese investments in the country and prevent the violence and crime in Myanmar from spilling across its border with China. As recently as 2023, the Chinese government was greenlighting rebel-launched campaigns against government-controlled cities and military camps while also being protested by competing factions in Myanmar on the grounds that Beijing was either too supportive of the junta or not supportive enough. China’s efforts to play both sides of Myanmar’s internal conflict, it seemed, were backfiring.
However, by Autumn of 2024, China had shifted its strategy to one more clearly supportive of the junta, a decision driven in part by Beijing’s growing fear that its Burmese proxies were operating independently and against China’s economic interests in Myanmar. China has since publicly embraced the junta, increasing its delivery of military aid and supporting the country’s ongoing sham elections which have been condemned by the UN and which include neither the National League for Democracy (the party whose control of the government was ended by the coup) nor prominent opposition leaders. This support has served as a lifeline for the junta, which many analysts previously assessed to be at risk of collapse, and has enabled them to turn the tide in the conflict. China has helped curb the flow of aid and supplies for anti-government rebel groups (including desperately-needed UAVs), used its influence to pressure local militants into ceasefire agreements, and materially supported a brutal air campaign designed to reclaim territory lost during the Chinese-backed Operation 1027 a few years prior. Recent reporting has also uncovered China’s efforts to help Myanmar create a digital payments system which could help them circumvent US sanctions. Given the junta’s growing dependence on China for survival, it is little wonder Myanmar opted to so publicly side with China in its diplomatic dispute with Japan over Taiwan, regardless of the military’s historic feelings towards those two countries.
The deepening ties between China and Myanmar carry significant strategic ramifications for the region’s security. Aside from helping secure another public voice in support of China’ regional priorities such as reunification with Taiwan and peeling away a potential ally of Japan’s, fostering Naypyidaw’s dependency on Beijing furthers several of China’s major economic and security goals—chief among them the strengthening of China’s naval and commercial presence in the Bay of Bengal. China has invested heavily in developing the “China-Myanmar Economic Corridor” (CMEC), a $15 billion series of infrastructure programs in furtherance of China’s Belt and Road Initiative designed to connect Kyaukphyu on Myanmar’s western coast to the city of Muse on its eastern border with China.
CMEC is designed to provide China with an alternative corridor to facilitate trade with the Indian Ocean while bypassing the Strait of Malacca, a narrow waterway through which nearly two-thirds of Chinese maritime trade and 80% of China’s crude oil imports pass. Establishing such alternative trade routes could make China less economically vulnerable to both piracy and the threat of a naval conflict with a country capable of targeting Chinese ships in the strait, helping insulate the PRC from the potential ramifications of its naval saber-rattling in the Pacific.
After years of delay, Myanmar’s junta approved the construction a deep-sea port at Kyaukphyu last year, a key component of China’s CMEC strategy. Whether this decision came because of Chinese pressure or instead encouraged China to side with the junta to protect this investment is open for interpretation. Regardless, this project was not only an economic win for China, but also carries security implications due to the potential for the Chinese military to dock ships at this port.
China’s growing influence in Myanmar threatens to give Beijing an edge in its geopolitical rivalry with India in the Bay of Bengal due to the proximity of Kyaukphyu to the naval base being constructed by India to house its nuclear submarines. Additionally, China has allegedly established military installations on Great Coco, a Myanmar-controlled island less than 40 miles from the Indian naval and air bases located on Andaman and Nicobar Islands, prompting concern from India that China could use this island to conduct espionage operations against the Indian military. If China is able to use its growing influence and debt leverage over Myanmar to gain access to more ports and establish greater military presence in Myanmar, it could favorably alter the balance of power in the Bay of Bengal. Some Indian analysts are already warning that Myanmar’s recently passed law regulating the operations of private security firms in the country is being used to covertly strengthen China’s military foothold in Myanmar under the guise of Chinese security firms protecting the country’s economic investments. India’s recent announcement of a new naval base at Haldia on the north end of the Bay illustrates India’s acknowledgment of the rising Chinese threat in this region and the growing need to counterbalance it.
While the Burmese junta’s comments on Taiwan were largely overshadowed by the threat of a Sino-Japanese conflict, they provided an insightful window into Myanmar’s current relations with both countries and underscore the effectiveness of China’s efforts to expand its influence in Southeast Asia. China’s desire for a stable but weak junior partner in Myanmar has informed its strategy in navigating Myanmar’s ongoing civil strife, and Myanmar’s vocal rebuke of its historic friend in Japan speaks to the extent to which China’s strategic priorities now influence Myanmar’s foreign policy. Beijing’s ability to leverage the junta’s increasing dependence on Chinese support for its continued survival could allow China to increase its maritime presence in the Bay of Bengal and strengthen its claim to regional hegemony. Regardless of the outcome of the Sino-Japanese diplomatic crisis, the clear demonstration of Myanmar’s growing alignment towards China should be considered a clear win for Beijing and a loss for countries seeking to contain its rise.
Matthew Reisener is the Senior National Security Advisor at the Center for Maritime Strategy.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.