The passing of 2022 marks a number of milestones in human history. Never have western democracies been under siege by so many different authoritarian regimes. In fact, the number of challenges from the past year makes the bipolar world of the Cold War era look appealing.
In January 2022, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin celebrated a reforged friendship and common cause against the West during the Olympic games in Beijing. It is widely speculated that Putin disclosed his grandiose plans to invade Ukraine in an imminent “Special Military Operation.” The only stipulation for Xi was that he wait until the final ceremony of the games had concluded.
Until this time, the United States Navy and its NATO Allies had maintained a robust naval presence in the Black Sea region. The U.S. SIXTH Fleet operated two destroyers and the command ship, USS Mount Whitney, in the Black Sea. Their departure at the end of December was likely driven by a desire not to exacerbate Putin and precipitate an invasion of Ukraine. He did anyway and that lesson should not be lost in the archives of intended diplomacy. Appeasing Putin doesn’t work. He only understands one thing and that is brute force and power politics.
The invasion of Ukraine occurred on 24 February, and despite the massive Russian buildup on the border of over 100,000 troops and equipment, it still surprised many, including some in the government of Ukraine. Once the Special Military Operation began, it was brutal and bloody. Ukrainians surprised Russia and the world with their fighting spirit and tenacity.
Russia’s lackluster performance was not only demonstrated in its land campaign but also at sea. The Russian Federation Navy failed to execute amphibious landings in Mariupol, Mykolaiv, or Odesa. Even worse, the Russian Black Sea Fleet Flagship Moskva, was sunk by two air breathing cruise missiles. Taking the hits unalerted and broadside was one significant error. Failure to put out the fires and stop the flooding belowdecks was the second and indicative of a systemic problem, not just in the Russian Navy, but throughout the Russian Armed Forces. Corruption, lack of trained Non-Commissioned Officers, and poor leadership all contributed to numerous Russian failures on the battlefield that continue to this day.
With economic sanctions hampering the Russian economy during lackluster performance by Russian troops on the ground, Vladimir Putin looked for other avenues to extort concessions from the West. He initiated a “Hunger Blockade” of Ukrainian ports thereby preventing the maritime flow of foodstuffs, notably wheat, corn, and sunflower oil, from one the world’s largest agricultural exporters. Many developing nations including Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, India, and Sudan depend upon these grain shipments for basic subsistence. Although Putin’s actions to frustrate grain shipments severely agitated the international community, there was not much that western powers could do given that they abandoned the Black Sea in the previous December. In March 2022, Turkey, as the chosen administrator of the Montreux Treaty, which regulates all civilian and military traffic in and out of the Bosporus, declared the situation in Ukraine a conflict thereby restricting non-riparian states from moving warships in or out of the region.
Ultimately, the United Nations and Turkey brokered a deal with Russia and Ukraine allowing shipments of grain to resume from three Ukrainian ports. These vessels have been doing so ever since, but with no military escort and the under continuous threat of mines in the Black Sea. The fact that NATO warships have not regained normal entry into the Black Sea well before the start of the conflict is a mark of weakness and must be resolved. As a minimum, with the threat of mines in the Black Sea getting worse by the week, NATO should start with the deployment of the Standing NATO Mine-Countermeasures Group (SNMCMG) as soon as possible.
Throughout the conflict, the United States has taken a leadership role in support of Ukraine. With over $21.3 billion in American support since the start of the war to both Ukraine and our European Allies, the U.S. has emerged as the lead nation in this conflict. European nations have similarly rallied to contribute more than $10 billion in lethal and non-lethal aid. The United States has moved deliberately with its decisions on shipment of lethal aid and equipment, keeping in mind that overstepping could lead to the use of a tactical nuclear weapon by Putin. As time goes on, however, the Biden Administration has become bolder in the provision of longer-range weapons to include HIMARS and, most recently, the Patriot missile battery. American tanks and aircraft are still off limits, however, and the longer range ATACMS precision-guided artillery system is still a matter for debate. President Zelensky’s recent trip to address the U.S. Congress before Christmas has likely assured the continued delivery of lethal military aid despite a turnover of leadership in the House.
2022 was also a busy year in the Pacific, and the war in Ukraine has forced both the United States and its adversaries to re-evaluate their stance on Taiwan. Since the Olympic Games, Beijing has watched the situation Ukraine with significant interest. The parallels to an invasion of the island of Taiwan are obvious. Xi has acted in support of Putin since the war started, but Putin’s failure to deliver a decisive victory in the first weeks of the war have likely caused Beijing to rethink its position.
Putin’s failures demonstrate the pitfalls that China might fall prey to in a hasty invasion of Taiwan. Putin became an international pariah and economic sanctions have been universal and crippling. China, whose economy is far more enmeshed in the global economy than Russia’s was prior to February 2022, would be playing a much more dangerous game to bring similar retribution upon itself. Putin’s armed forces, long touted as combat ready and credible, have proven anything but. The same must be pondered of China’s own armed forces, who have not seen real combat since the war with Vietnam in 1979. No doubt the People’s Liberation Army suffer woes similar to the Russian Federation forces – despite Xi’s efforts, questions abound about the lack of a fully developed non-commissioned officer corps, inexperienced conscripts, and lingering corruption. China likely can overcome these shortcomings given time, but will the time required to do so remain in-line with Beijing’s wider ambitions?
In light of the ongoing crisis in Ukraine, America can ill afford to perform yet another pivot to the Pacific. As one of my general officer friends recently opined, “When does the pivot become a pirouette?” Accordingly, the U.S. must be prepared to deter or defend in more than one theater. This is not unachievable.
Let’s examine RIMPAC 2022 as an example. For two years, the bi-annual Pacific Rim (RIMPAC) Exercise coordinated by the Commander of the Pacific Fleet was forestalled by the COVID Pandemic. 2022, however, saw a return of the biggest and most sophisticated RIMPAC yet with participants from 26 nations with over 25,000 personnel embarked on 38 surface ships, three submarines, 170 aircraft, and 30 unmanned systems. There were several “firsts” in RIMPAC 2022 including the nine nations that participated in the RIMPAC Amphibious Assault Exercises (Australia, Chile, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka, Tonga and U.S.).
Closely coinciding with the RIMPAC exercises, Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s controversial trip to Taipei reminded the international community of the profound issues at stake surrounding the continued independence of Taiwan. China’s vehement protests and retaliatory military exercises demonstrated little more than its likeness to Russia as a dangerous authoritarian state.
Accordingly, the United States must continue to invest in its ability to protect our interests and those of our allies. Our ability to do so is predicated on a strong U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. The recent boost in the defense budget, including the funding of 11 battle force ships, is a good start. But the challenges facing the United States and its sea services are many and varied — resources must be put to good use in building the capabilities and capacity the nation needs for 2023 and beyond.
Admiral James G. Foggo, U.S. Navy (ret.), is the Dean of the Center for Maritime Strategy. Admiral Foggo is the former commander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Africa, and Allied Joint Force Command, Naples. He Commanded BALTOPS in 2015 and 2016 as well as Exercise Trident Juncture in 2018.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Admiral James G. Foggo, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
The passing of 2022 marks a number of milestones in human history. Never have western democracies been under siege by so many different authoritarian regimes. In fact, the number of challenges from the past year makes the bipolar world of the Cold War era look appealing.
In January 2022, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin celebrated a reforged friendship and common cause against the West during the Olympic games in Beijing. It is widely speculated that Putin disclosed his grandiose plans to invade Ukraine in an imminent “Special Military Operation.” The only stipulation for Xi was that he wait until the final ceremony of the games had concluded.
Until this time, the United States Navy and its NATO Allies had maintained a robust naval presence in the Black Sea region. The U.S. SIXTH Fleet operated two destroyers and the command ship, USS Mount Whitney, in the Black Sea. Their departure at the end of December was likely driven by a desire not to exacerbate Putin and precipitate an invasion of Ukraine. He did anyway and that lesson should not be lost in the archives of intended diplomacy. Appeasing Putin doesn’t work. He only understands one thing and that is brute force and power politics.
The invasion of Ukraine occurred on 24 February, and despite the massive Russian buildup on the border of over 100,000 troops and equipment, it still surprised many, including some in the government of Ukraine. Once the Special Military Operation began, it was brutal and bloody. Ukrainians surprised Russia and the world with their fighting spirit and tenacity.
As a result of the Russia’s unilateral but generally non-kinetic annexation of Crimea in 2014, many in the West viewed Russian Federation Forces as being “ten feet tall.” They proved to be anything but during the first few weeks and months of the special military operation. Russia’s Army appeared hollow — under-resourced, poorly equipped, and poorly led. Logistics proved to be the Army’s Achilles heel and as food, ammunition, and fuel supplies bogged down on the critical axes of approach to Kyiv and other major cities, Russian Forces stalled and were slaughtered in place. Russian losses in the war to date have, by some estimates, reached levels of 100,000 troops killed or wounded in battle.
Russia’s lackluster performance was not only demonstrated in its land campaign but also at sea. The Russian Federation Navy failed to execute amphibious landings in Mariupol, Mykolaiv, or Odesa. Even worse, the Russian Black Sea Fleet Flagship Moskva, was sunk by two air breathing cruise missiles. Taking the hits unalerted and broadside was one significant error. Failure to put out the fires and stop the flooding belowdecks was the second and indicative of a systemic problem, not just in the Russian Navy, but throughout the Russian Armed Forces. Corruption, lack of trained Non-Commissioned Officers, and poor leadership all contributed to numerous Russian failures on the battlefield that continue to this day.
With economic sanctions hampering the Russian economy during lackluster performance by Russian troops on the ground, Vladimir Putin looked for other avenues to extort concessions from the West. He initiated a “Hunger Blockade” of Ukrainian ports thereby preventing the maritime flow of foodstuffs, notably wheat, corn, and sunflower oil, from one the world’s largest agricultural exporters. Many developing nations including Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, India, and Sudan depend upon these grain shipments for basic subsistence. Although Putin’s actions to frustrate grain shipments severely agitated the international community, there was not much that western powers could do given that they abandoned the Black Sea in the previous December. In March 2022, Turkey, as the chosen administrator of the Montreux Treaty, which regulates all civilian and military traffic in and out of the Bosporus, declared the situation in Ukraine a conflict thereby restricting non-riparian states from moving warships in or out of the region.
Ultimately, the United Nations and Turkey brokered a deal with Russia and Ukraine allowing shipments of grain to resume from three Ukrainian ports. These vessels have been doing so ever since, but with no military escort and the under continuous threat of mines in the Black Sea. The fact that NATO warships have not regained normal entry into the Black Sea well before the start of the conflict is a mark of weakness and must be resolved. As a minimum, with the threat of mines in the Black Sea getting worse by the week, NATO should start with the deployment of the Standing NATO Mine-Countermeasures Group (SNMCMG) as soon as possible.
Throughout the conflict, the United States has taken a leadership role in support of Ukraine. With over $21.3 billion in American support since the start of the war to both Ukraine and our European Allies, the U.S. has emerged as the lead nation in this conflict. European nations have similarly rallied to contribute more than $10 billion in lethal and non-lethal aid. The United States has moved deliberately with its decisions on shipment of lethal aid and equipment, keeping in mind that overstepping could lead to the use of a tactical nuclear weapon by Putin. As time goes on, however, the Biden Administration has become bolder in the provision of longer-range weapons to include HIMARS and, most recently, the Patriot missile battery. American tanks and aircraft are still off limits, however, and the longer range ATACMS precision-guided artillery system is still a matter for debate. President Zelensky’s recent trip to address the U.S. Congress before Christmas has likely assured the continued delivery of lethal military aid despite a turnover of leadership in the House.
2022 was also a busy year in the Pacific, and the war in Ukraine has forced both the United States and its adversaries to re-evaluate their stance on Taiwan. Since the Olympic Games, Beijing has watched the situation Ukraine with significant interest. The parallels to an invasion of the island of Taiwan are obvious. Xi has acted in support of Putin since the war started, but Putin’s failure to deliver a decisive victory in the first weeks of the war have likely caused Beijing to rethink its position.
Putin’s failures demonstrate the pitfalls that China might fall prey to in a hasty invasion of Taiwan. Putin became an international pariah and economic sanctions have been universal and crippling. China, whose economy is far more enmeshed in the global economy than Russia’s was prior to February 2022, would be playing a much more dangerous game to bring similar retribution upon itself. Putin’s armed forces, long touted as combat ready and credible, have proven anything but. The same must be pondered of China’s own armed forces, who have not seen real combat since the war with Vietnam in 1979. No doubt the People’s Liberation Army suffer woes similar to the Russian Federation forces – despite Xi’s efforts, questions abound about the lack of a fully developed non-commissioned officer corps, inexperienced conscripts, and lingering corruption. China likely can overcome these shortcomings given time, but will the time required to do so remain in-line with Beijing’s wider ambitions?
In light of the ongoing crisis in Ukraine, America can ill afford to perform yet another pivot to the Pacific. As one of my general officer friends recently opined, “When does the pivot become a pirouette?” Accordingly, the U.S. must be prepared to deter or defend in more than one theater. This is not unachievable.
Let’s examine RIMPAC 2022 as an example. For two years, the bi-annual Pacific Rim (RIMPAC) Exercise coordinated by the Commander of the Pacific Fleet was forestalled by the COVID Pandemic. 2022, however, saw a return of the biggest and most sophisticated RIMPAC yet with participants from 26 nations with over 25,000 personnel embarked on 38 surface ships, three submarines, 170 aircraft, and 30 unmanned systems. There were several “firsts” in RIMPAC 2022 including the nine nations that participated in the RIMPAC Amphibious Assault Exercises (Australia, Chile, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka, Tonga and U.S.).
Closely coinciding with the RIMPAC exercises, Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s controversial trip to Taipei reminded the international community of the profound issues at stake surrounding the continued independence of Taiwan. China’s vehement protests and retaliatory military exercises demonstrated little more than its likeness to Russia as a dangerous authoritarian state.
Accordingly, the United States must continue to invest in its ability to protect our interests and those of our allies. Our ability to do so is predicated on a strong U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. The recent boost in the defense budget, including the funding of 11 battle force ships, is a good start. But the challenges facing the United States and its sea services are many and varied — resources must be put to good use in building the capabilities and capacity the nation needs for 2023 and beyond.
Admiral James G. Foggo, U.S. Navy (ret.), is the Dean of the Center for Maritime Strategy. Admiral Foggo is the former commander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Africa, and Allied Joint Force Command, Naples. He Commanded BALTOPS in 2015 and 2016 as well as Exercise Trident Juncture in 2018.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.