The advent and continued development of missile weapons over the last sixty plus years has called into question many traditional assumptions regarding the development of U.S. Navy force design, especially since the end of the Cold War. The increasing range, accuracy and lethality of missile weapons have been used to suggest that U.S. naval strategy and force design be based on the fielding of large numbers of missiles based on smaller warships. This fleet has been assessed in wargames to be more survivable in terms of retaining its cumulative firepower longer in combat despite losses than traditional U.S. force design which divides combat power among aircraft carriers, submarines, and larger surface warships. All of this sounds like complete validation of a distributive naval force structure that optimizes missiles delivered from a large number of smaller, more expendable missile ships rather than the present heterogeneous fleet of aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, destroyers, and amphibious warfare vessels.
The Limits of a Purely Distributed Missile Fleet
The problem with this solution is that it likely cannot exist outside the laboratory of military wargaming. The numbers of small missile ships required to go and be sustained at sea in place of a carrier or nuclear submarine is enormous, likely in the dozens, as is their logistical sustainment and force protection requirements; both at sea and in the forward bases from which they would need to operate. Similar past, mass fleets, and current ideas for the defense of Ukraine and Taiwan using small ships were defensive, and deployed in defense of nations’ littoral spaces, not as offensive arms in remote waters. Such missile flotillas, manned and unmanned do have a place in U.S. navy force structure, but they are not a replacement for larger vessels with deeper and more persistent magazines like the aircraft carrier. Both elements (larger manned warships such as aircraft carriers, and more numerous missile ships,) have a place in modern naval combat and neither is a “replacement” for the other.
Carrier versus Missile Combatants
The aircraft carrier has long been seen as susceptible to attack and vulnerable to damage due to its mission as an airbase at sea. Despite that challenge, and the additional escort warships needed to screen the big flattop, the carrier has deep magazines for its airwing that no other vessel, even battleships ever possessed. Depending on the intensity of its strike mission, a carrier and its embarked airwing can remain on station conducting continuous combat operations for over a week or more. The carrier’s airwing can be refueled and re-armed through the process of replenishment at sea, a process used by the navy for almost 80 years to resupply carriers. Its escort vessels also need fuel and might rapidly expend their own missiles in offensive or defensive missions, but those ships can rotate out of the strike group for re-arming in secure locations, while fully armed ships might take their place.
A mass of small missile vessels, by contrast, would need to number in the dozens constantly at sea to equal the firepower weight of the carrier. Such vessels might expend all of their missiles in a single large salvo, leaving their ships largely defenseless and impotent until re-armed. Replenishment transfers of vertical launch system (VLS) tubes attempted while underway at sea on larger vessels have been slow due to physics and weather; they would likely be impossible with smaller ships absent significant improvements in weapon resupply. Refueling could prove equally difficult absent an entirely new and costly ecosystem of likely unmanned resupply vessels—again, in large numbers—in order to refuel the missile fleet at sea. Smaller vessels usually have inferior sea keeping characteristics and are more severely impacted by poor weather, which can damage them while at sea or confine them immobile in port. The shorter operational range of these small missile ships also means they must have forward bases from which to operate, close to the location of their projected employment. Such bases need defenses, repair facilities, fueling piers, and above all lots of sailors and Marines to garrison. Those bases can be attacked and cut off from outside supply. This mass force’s deep shore-based support is a significant cost and operational liability not possessed by more mobile, expeditionary forces like the aircraft carriers the Navy currently employs.
Historical Evidence
Historically such large fleets of small vessels have been deployed for defensive rather than deployed missions. The famous French Jeune Ecole concept of massed torpedo boats designed to defeat attacking British battleships was premised on being supported from interior lines of communication ashore in the French homeland. Such forces, however, have not done well in the face of aggressive, preemptive action. The U.S. deployed its own numerous “hedge force” in the Philippines before World War Two, comprised of motor torpedo boats, submarines, and B-17 bombers. These cheap and numerous platforms (compared to a forward deployed fleet,) were supposed to help deter against Imperial Japanese threats to the archipelago. The Japanese however struck without warning, and either eliminated outright, or drove away these supposed deterrent forces.
Modern missile craft operating as a hedge force have performed poorly as well when confronted with U.S. forces. The U.S. struck hard at Iranian distributed small naval craft and shore-based missiles during Operation Epic Fury, destroying many before they could be employed. Long-range detection and engagement systems can be used against expeditionary forces, but they have to work as designed and can be limited or blinded by action against opponents’ satellites and data networks. These land-based networks and the missiles they control are indeed a threat, but they also have weaknesses not often reported by outlets more inclined to talk about missile range rings as if they represent a new Missile Maginot line.
Conclusion
In summary, a mass of missile-armed craft as a substitute for a carrier airwing, and associated destroyer and submarine-based missiles is a wargame experiment that cannot be replicated in the real world with an affordable price tag except under World War 2-like budgetary conditions. A vast fleet of distributed missile craft may be more survivable than a few larger ships, but such a force has historically only been mounted as a defense and not as a deployable offensive capacity under any conditions except that of total war such as seen in World War 2. The U.S. solution today lies in longer-ranged and more agile missiles employed by current platforms, as well as longer-ranged aviation platforms, both manned and unmanned for operation from aircraft carriers. Missiles are indeed the weapon of choice in naval warfare, but current platforms can better employ them rather than trust in mythical missile ships that cannot be sustained in needed numbers. Unmanned missile ships likely have a role as offensive platforms deep in the enemy weapon engagement zone, or as a praetorian guard for manned vessels, but it is not a binary choice between them.
Dr. Steve Wills,is the Navalist at The Center for Maritime Strategy.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Dr. Steven Wills
Introduction
The advent and continued development of missile weapons over the last sixty plus years has called into question many traditional assumptions regarding the development of U.S. Navy force design, especially since the end of the Cold War. The increasing range, accuracy and lethality of missile weapons have been used to suggest that U.S. naval strategy and force design be based on the fielding of large numbers of missiles based on smaller warships. This fleet has been assessed in wargames to be more survivable in terms of retaining its cumulative firepower longer in combat despite losses than traditional U.S. force design which divides combat power among aircraft carriers, submarines, and larger surface warships. All of this sounds like complete validation of a distributive naval force structure that optimizes missiles delivered from a large number of smaller, more expendable missile ships rather than the present heterogeneous fleet of aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, destroyers, and amphibious warfare vessels.
The Limits of a Purely Distributed Missile Fleet
The problem with this solution is that it likely cannot exist outside the laboratory of military wargaming. The numbers of small missile ships required to go and be sustained at sea in place of a carrier or nuclear submarine is enormous, likely in the dozens, as is their logistical sustainment and force protection requirements; both at sea and in the forward bases from which they would need to operate. Similar past, mass fleets, and current ideas for the defense of Ukraine and Taiwan using small ships were defensive, and deployed in defense of nations’ littoral spaces, not as offensive arms in remote waters. Such missile flotillas, manned and unmanned do have a place in U.S. navy force structure, but they are not a replacement for larger vessels with deeper and more persistent magazines like the aircraft carrier. Both elements (larger manned warships such as aircraft carriers, and more numerous missile ships,) have a place in modern naval combat and neither is a “replacement” for the other.
Carrier versus Missile Combatants
The aircraft carrier has long been seen as susceptible to attack and vulnerable to damage due to its mission as an airbase at sea. Despite that challenge, and the additional escort warships needed to screen the big flattop, the carrier has deep magazines for its airwing that no other vessel, even battleships ever possessed. Depending on the intensity of its strike mission, a carrier and its embarked airwing can remain on station conducting continuous combat operations for over a week or more. The carrier’s airwing can be refueled and re-armed through the process of replenishment at sea, a process used by the navy for almost 80 years to resupply carriers. Its escort vessels also need fuel and might rapidly expend their own missiles in offensive or defensive missions, but those ships can rotate out of the strike group for re-arming in secure locations, while fully armed ships might take their place.
A mass of small missile vessels, by contrast, would need to number in the dozens constantly at sea to equal the firepower weight of the carrier. Such vessels might expend all of their missiles in a single large salvo, leaving their ships largely defenseless and impotent until re-armed. Replenishment transfers of vertical launch system (VLS) tubes attempted while underway at sea on larger vessels have been slow due to physics and weather; they would likely be impossible with smaller ships absent significant improvements in weapon resupply. Refueling could prove equally difficult absent an entirely new and costly ecosystem of likely unmanned resupply vessels—again, in large numbers—in order to refuel the missile fleet at sea. Smaller vessels usually have inferior sea keeping characteristics and are more severely impacted by poor weather, which can damage them while at sea or confine them immobile in port. The shorter operational range of these small missile ships also means they must have forward bases from which to operate, close to the location of their projected employment. Such bases need defenses, repair facilities, fueling piers, and above all lots of sailors and Marines to garrison. Those bases can be attacked and cut off from outside supply. This mass force’s deep shore-based support is a significant cost and operational liability not possessed by more mobile, expeditionary forces like the aircraft carriers the Navy currently employs.
Historical Evidence
Historically such large fleets of small vessels have been deployed for defensive rather than deployed missions. The famous French Jeune Ecole concept of massed torpedo boats designed to defeat attacking British battleships was premised on being supported from interior lines of communication ashore in the French homeland. Such forces, however, have not done well in the face of aggressive, preemptive action. The U.S. deployed its own numerous “hedge force” in the Philippines before World War Two, comprised of motor torpedo boats, submarines, and B-17 bombers. These cheap and numerous platforms (compared to a forward deployed fleet,) were supposed to help deter against Imperial Japanese threats to the archipelago. The Japanese however struck without warning, and either eliminated outright, or drove away these supposed deterrent forces.
Modern missile craft operating as a hedge force have performed poorly as well when confronted with U.S. forces. The U.S. struck hard at Iranian distributed small naval craft and shore-based missiles during Operation Epic Fury, destroying many before they could be employed. Long-range detection and engagement systems can be used against expeditionary forces, but they have to work as designed and can be limited or blinded by action against opponents’ satellites and data networks. These land-based networks and the missiles they control are indeed a threat, but they also have weaknesses not often reported by outlets more inclined to talk about missile range rings as if they represent a new Missile Maginot line.
Conclusion
In summary, a mass of missile-armed craft as a substitute for a carrier airwing, and associated destroyer and submarine-based missiles is a wargame experiment that cannot be replicated in the real world with an affordable price tag except under World War 2-like budgetary conditions. A vast fleet of distributed missile craft may be more survivable than a few larger ships, but such a force has historically only been mounted as a defense and not as a deployable offensive capacity under any conditions except that of total war such as seen in World War 2. The U.S. solution today lies in longer-ranged and more agile missiles employed by current platforms, as well as longer-ranged aviation platforms, both manned and unmanned for operation from aircraft carriers. Missiles are indeed the weapon of choice in naval warfare, but current platforms can better employ them rather than trust in mythical missile ships that cannot be sustained in needed numbers. Unmanned missile ships likely have a role as offensive platforms deep in the enemy weapon engagement zone, or as a praetorian guard for manned vessels, but it is not a binary choice between them.
Dr. Steve Wills, is the Navalist at The Center for Maritime Strategy.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.