The People’s Liberation Army Navy and the China Dream
The MOC
By
Alexandru Filip
April 14, 2026
Introduction
Since the formation of the People’s Republic, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) role has undergone a number of transformational changes which run parallel to the political ambitions of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Today’s PLAN intends to project power further from China’s shores as a political aim, and to wage decisive battles through distributed tactics as a military aim. Yet, in the contrast which marks these ambitions we can observe the risk of dissonance between the PLAN’s operational commanders and China’s political leadership which can come to define the conduct of military operations.
Overview of China’s Naval and Political Development
During Mao Zedong’s rule, the first Commander of the People’s Liberation Army Navy, Xiao Jinguang, developed a doctrine of “sabotage warfare at sea”. An army officer with no real experience at sea, Xiao’s astute dictum was that the PLAN should strive for a type of guerilla defense in which it would maximize the use of shoals and small vessels with the intent of preventing an amphibious invasion. Beginning in 1982, with the succession of Liu Huaqing as the Commander of the People’s Liberation Army Navy, the PLAN underwent a period of great modernization and an important reorientation in regard to its outlook as a naval force and as a subordinate entity within the greater political structure. It is under Liu that the navy came to understand its position in the context of Deng Xiaoping’s call for the defense of near-seas. Instead of an established two-hundred nautical mile limit to the Navy’s defensive duty, Liu defined the objective geographically as incorporating much of the Nine-Dash Line claims. Thus, the PLAN’s area of responsibility came to be expanded, with the intention of keeping hostile forces at arm’s length from the coastline and incapable of defining Chinese domestic affairs. After the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, Jiang Zemin extolled at the 8th CCP Congress of the People’s Liberation Army Navy on the need for a navy that could be tasked with “protecting the motherland’s territorial integrity, safeguarding the motherland’s unification and maritime rights and interests, and ensuring the stability of the peripheral environment”. In 2004, Hu Jintao went further and called for the PLAN to take on “Historic Missions”:
Consolidate the ruling status of the Communist Party
Help ensure China’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and domestic security in order to continue national development
Safeguard China’s expanding national interests
Help maintain world peace
While safeguarding the rule of the CCP and China’s sovereignty has always been a traditional part of the mandate, the inclusion of provisions to guarantee continued national development, the expansion of national interests, and the maintenance of world peace represented a more confident notion of what could be asked of a rapidly modernizing force.
The People’s Liberation Army Navy and Power Projection
The evolution of the PLAN’s role now suggests that it is no longer simply a defensive bulwark. Instead, it serves a political purpose by forcefully promoting Chinese foreign policy. This is made clear by continued calls from the Commanders of the PLAN– to include Wu Shengli,, Shen Jinlong, now Minister of Defense Dong Jun, and Hu Zhongming – which have all contended that China must demonstrate exemplary conduct at sea, with the intent of establishing itself as a status-quo enforcing maritime power, while also forcefully demonstrating its intention to protect the interests defined by the civilian political leadership.
As has been the case historically, this evolution of the PLAN’s political aims has occurred in parallel with the development of relatively novel naval warfare thought amongst its officer cadre. Chinese naval warfare theory has come to purposefully regard literature on sea control and decisive battles by naval theorists such as Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Stafford Corbett. Thus, much academic debate on the subject can be observed, but the emphasis of these efforts suggests that China’s war planners are taking seriously the idea of a navy which is primarily offensive in nature, and meant to acquire some form of sea control through battle.
This may be the first mark of dissonance between political and military leadership. In keeping with the tradition of his predecessors, Xi Jinping has also stated that the development of a powerful navy is the key to national rejuvenation and that this will allow China to accede to the dream of becoming a “Great Maritime Power”, recognizing the Navy as a source of great pride for the CCP. For PLAN commanders, their focus will rest primarily in planning for operations and looking to understand the reality of conducting them under the strain of high-intensity combat. As such, a significant aspect of the PLAN’s status is derived from its preeminent political effect of power projection.
The Role of The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Forces
In support of the PLAN’s expanded political aims and a more offensive role, the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Forces (PLARF) has grown in importance. The extensive range of its conventional missiles and the large stockpile it yields has allowed it to become China’s main defensive force, threatening any offensive attempts towards its shores and the approaches. This seeks to extend the benefits of the coastline farther out to support force projection operations by the PLAN. Within the First Island Chain, mainland assets networked through the PLA’s doctrine of Joint-Fires leverages naval and air assets to generate targeting solutions and aims to impose the steepest cost on allied forces. Further out, reaching towards the Second Island Chain and beyond, Chinese missiles will require a targeting solution along a more complex kill-chain which is likely to involve satellites, air, and naval forces.
The Effects on Command
In 2025, the PLAN began undertaking expanded force projection through the Philippine Sea, and even reaching past the Second Island Chain. These efforts expose politically prized naval assets to the realities of naval warfare. The further that the PLAN ventures from the coastline, the more vulnerable it will become to long-range fires as well as reducing its own capacity to leverage mainland assets. Further, with less support during combat operations, PLAN commanders will be forced to obtain a decision through their own initiative.
The natural corollary is that combat operations will not be consistently defined by orders from the mainland and networked fire solutions, but by the commanding officer’s initiative and his understanding of the commander’s intent. Thus, any joint-fires operation from the mainland will need to be exceptionally responsive to the initiative of the forces at sea if it is to have an effect on the operational outcome.
Conclusion
This lends itself to two conclusions on China’s civil-military dynamic and the subsequent behavior of the PLAN in an armed conflict. First, in deploying forward towards the greatest threat axis, political leaders may intend to present their position within the balance of interests but military leaders in charge of operations will aim for victory. Xi Jinping’s emphasis on having the current Minister of Defense be the former Commander of the PLAN signals that the Navy likely has a strong advocate within the political establishment. Owing to the disposition of Chinese naval officers towards a decisive battle and the political leadership’s understanding of the PLAN as a preeminent representation of its interests abroad, the management of these interests will be marked by a complex interplay of power projection and offensive capability.
Second; the Politburo in Beijing must be comfortable with suffering some level of losses without becoming politically overbearing, just as the United Kingdom and its Royal Navy came to observe in the Falkland’s War. In promoting the Navy to such high importance within its foreign policy ambitions, Beijing will inevitably be forced to reflect on the importance of preserving its fleet. While it is likely that the political leadership has some idea of the losses it is willing to suffer, Robert Jervis’ “Perception and Misperceptions in International Relations” tells us that leaders are constantly assessing the value of their assets, and do not operate on rigidly established cognitive frameworks. A lack of high trust levels within these institutions, as exemplified by continued purges, signals that China’s political leadership still does not accord high levels of trust to its operational commanders, which could make it prone to risk averse behavior during high-intensity combat operations.
Alexandru Filip is a Research Fellow with the Dupuy Institute, based out of Tyson’s Corner, Virginia. His research focus is strategic and security studies, with a current emphasis on China’s military development. He has published pieces on capability analysis and policy recommendations in venues such as The Centre for International Maritime Security, The National Interest, Real Clear Defense, and Merion West.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Alexandru Filip
Introduction
Since the formation of the People’s Republic, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) role has undergone a number of transformational changes which run parallel to the political ambitions of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Today’s PLAN intends to project power further from China’s shores as a political aim, and to wage decisive battles through distributed tactics as a military aim. Yet, in the contrast which marks these ambitions we can observe the risk of dissonance between the PLAN’s operational commanders and China’s political leadership which can come to define the conduct of military operations.
Overview of China’s Naval and Political Development
During Mao Zedong’s rule, the first Commander of the People’s Liberation Army Navy, Xiao Jinguang, developed a doctrine of “sabotage warfare at sea”. An army officer with no real experience at sea, Xiao’s astute dictum was that the PLAN should strive for a type of guerilla defense in which it would maximize the use of shoals and small vessels with the intent of preventing an amphibious invasion. Beginning in 1982, with the succession of Liu Huaqing as the Commander of the People’s Liberation Army Navy, the PLAN underwent a period of great modernization and an important reorientation in regard to its outlook as a naval force and as a subordinate entity within the greater political structure. It is under Liu that the navy came to understand its position in the context of Deng Xiaoping’s call for the defense of near-seas. Instead of an established two-hundred nautical mile limit to the Navy’s defensive duty, Liu defined the objective geographically as incorporating much of the Nine-Dash Line claims. Thus, the PLAN’s area of responsibility came to be expanded, with the intention of keeping hostile forces at arm’s length from the coastline and incapable of defining Chinese domestic affairs. After the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, Jiang Zemin extolled at the 8th CCP Congress of the People’s Liberation Army Navy on the need for a navy that could be tasked with “protecting the motherland’s territorial integrity, safeguarding the motherland’s unification and maritime rights and interests, and ensuring the stability of the peripheral environment”. In 2004, Hu Jintao went further and called for the PLAN to take on “Historic Missions”:
While safeguarding the rule of the CCP and China’s sovereignty has always been a traditional part of the mandate, the inclusion of provisions to guarantee continued national development, the expansion of national interests, and the maintenance of world peace represented a more confident notion of what could be asked of a rapidly modernizing force.
The People’s Liberation Army Navy and Power Projection
The evolution of the PLAN’s role now suggests that it is no longer simply a defensive bulwark. Instead, it serves a political purpose by forcefully promoting Chinese foreign policy. This is made clear by continued calls from the Commanders of the PLAN– to include Wu Shengli,, Shen Jinlong, now Minister of Defense Dong Jun, and Hu Zhongming – which have all contended that China must demonstrate exemplary conduct at sea, with the intent of establishing itself as a status-quo enforcing maritime power, while also forcefully demonstrating its intention to protect the interests defined by the civilian political leadership.
As has been the case historically, this evolution of the PLAN’s political aims has occurred in parallel with the development of relatively novel naval warfare thought amongst its officer cadre. Chinese naval warfare theory has come to purposefully regard literature on sea control and decisive battles by naval theorists such as Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Stafford Corbett. Thus, much academic debate on the subject can be observed, but the emphasis of these efforts suggests that China’s war planners are taking seriously the idea of a navy which is primarily offensive in nature, and meant to acquire some form of sea control through battle.
This may be the first mark of dissonance between political and military leadership. In keeping with the tradition of his predecessors, Xi Jinping has also stated that the development of a powerful navy is the key to national rejuvenation and that this will allow China to accede to the dream of becoming a “Great Maritime Power”, recognizing the Navy as a source of great pride for the CCP. For PLAN commanders, their focus will rest primarily in planning for operations and looking to understand the reality of conducting them under the strain of high-intensity combat. As such, a significant aspect of the PLAN’s status is derived from its preeminent political effect of power projection.
The Role of The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Forces
In support of the PLAN’s expanded political aims and a more offensive role, the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Forces (PLARF) has grown in importance. The extensive range of its conventional missiles and the large stockpile it yields has allowed it to become China’s main defensive force, threatening any offensive attempts towards its shores and the approaches. This seeks to extend the benefits of the coastline farther out to support force projection operations by the PLAN. Within the First Island Chain, mainland assets networked through the PLA’s doctrine of Joint-Fires leverages naval and air assets to generate targeting solutions and aims to impose the steepest cost on allied forces. Further out, reaching towards the Second Island Chain and beyond, Chinese missiles will require a targeting solution along a more complex kill-chain which is likely to involve satellites, air, and naval forces.
The Effects on Command
In 2025, the PLAN began undertaking expanded force projection through the Philippine Sea, and even reaching past the Second Island Chain. These efforts expose politically prized naval assets to the realities of naval warfare. The further that the PLAN ventures from the coastline, the more vulnerable it will become to long-range fires as well as reducing its own capacity to leverage mainland assets. Further, with less support during combat operations, PLAN commanders will be forced to obtain a decision through their own initiative.
The natural corollary is that combat operations will not be consistently defined by orders from the mainland and networked fire solutions, but by the commanding officer’s initiative and his understanding of the commander’s intent. Thus, any joint-fires operation from the mainland will need to be exceptionally responsive to the initiative of the forces at sea if it is to have an effect on the operational outcome.
Conclusion
This lends itself to two conclusions on China’s civil-military dynamic and the subsequent behavior of the PLAN in an armed conflict. First, in deploying forward towards the greatest threat axis, political leaders may intend to present their position within the balance of interests but military leaders in charge of operations will aim for victory. Xi Jinping’s emphasis on having the current Minister of Defense be the former Commander of the PLAN signals that the Navy likely has a strong advocate within the political establishment. Owing to the disposition of Chinese naval officers towards a decisive battle and the political leadership’s understanding of the PLAN as a preeminent representation of its interests abroad, the management of these interests will be marked by a complex interplay of power projection and offensive capability.
Second; the Politburo in Beijing must be comfortable with suffering some level of losses without becoming politically overbearing, just as the United Kingdom and its Royal Navy came to observe in the Falkland’s War. In promoting the Navy to such high importance within its foreign policy ambitions, Beijing will inevitably be forced to reflect on the importance of preserving its fleet. While it is likely that the political leadership has some idea of the losses it is willing to suffer, Robert Jervis’ “Perception and Misperceptions in International Relations” tells us that leaders are constantly assessing the value of their assets, and do not operate on rigidly established cognitive frameworks. A lack of high trust levels within these institutions, as exemplified by continued purges, signals that China’s political leadership still does not accord high levels of trust to its operational commanders, which could make it prone to risk averse behavior during high-intensity combat operations.
Alexandru Filip is a Research Fellow with the Dupuy Institute, based out of Tyson’s Corner, Virginia. His research focus is strategic and security studies, with a current emphasis on China’s military development. He has published pieces on capability analysis and policy recommendations in venues such as The Centre for International Maritime Security, The National Interest, Real Clear Defense, and Merion West.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.