Neptune Strike 26-1: A Good Start to Enhanced Vigilance Activity in the Europe
The MOC
By
Admiral James G. Foggo, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
March 31, 2026
I had the opportunity to participate in NATO’s Enhanced Vigilance Activity (EVA) “Neptune Strike (NEST) 26-1”. NEST has been ongoing for many years and allows NATO the opportunity to exercise multiple Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) or Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESG) at one time. Likewise when the ESG’s operate in theater, NATO can practice amphibious warfare with a multi-national force of Marines embarked from ship to shore in challenging scenarios. NEST is not wedded to on particular geographic area of the NATO area of responsibility. In fact, the mobility and flexibility of maritime forces allows NEST to move around the theater from sea to sea all over Europe. By doing so, NATO maritime forces can provide assurance, deterrence and collective defense across the theater.
By nature of the ongoing syllabus of NEST activities throughout the year, maritime forces are in a continuous state of training and readiness. NEST is not an exercise… it is more of a rehearsal of concept. In other words, if the needle moves from peacetime to crisis response, NATO maritime forces will be ready to respond momentarily. NEST also dovetails nicely with other component’s activities throughout the theater on the land, in the air, and in space and cyber domains. The ability to conduct simultaneous Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) will distinguish NATO from its adversaries.
Planning and coordination for NEST activities resides at the headquarters of Striking and Support Forces NATO (STRIKEFORNATO) in Lisbon, Portugal. The annual program of activity is planned over a year in advance but must be flexible based on real world situations and the availability of CSGs/ESGs to fulfill exercise objectives. All scheduled activities follow international law and rules of engagement. This is important because the level of interest in NEST activities often comes with the presence of curious Russian Federation forces nearby.
The first iteration of NEST 26 took place from 25 March to 1 April 2026, bringing together a group of CSGs and ESGs across the Western and Central Mediterranean theater. In coordination with the Commander, STRIKFORNATO, in Oeiras, Portugal, the Spanish Navy’s JUAN CARLOS I expeditionary strike group, the Italian Navy’s CAVOUR carrier strike group and supported by the French Navy’s CHARLES DE GAULLE carrier strike group conducted numerous exercises at sea enabling vigilance efforts at its Southern and South-Eastern flank.
Taking advantage of NATO’s unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) RQ-4D from the NATO Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Force (NISRF) in Sigonella, Italy, the strike groups’ air assets, including F-35B Lightning and AV-8 Harrier aircraft executed missions across the Mediterranean Sea, over land, and even into the contested Black Sea region. Based on the ISR provided by the UAVs, participating strike aircraft were able to engage targets on firing ranges in Poland and Romania. It is important that NATO maintain presence and visibility in international airspace in the Black Sea region, even while the conflict between Russia and Ukraine continues.
Other contributing nations in NEST 26-1 included Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Romania, Spain and the United States.
It is important to note that the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), GEN Alexus Grynkewich, USAF, visited STRIKEFORNATO Headquarters during the conduct of NEST 26-1 and observed firsthand exercise serials and scenarios in action. SACEUR also had the opportunity to visit the Spanish Navy’s JUAN CARLOS I expeditionary strike group and later conduct a Commander’s Daily Update Brief (DUB) with all participating CSG/ESG Commanders.
Visit of the Supreme Allied Commander, General Alexus Grynkewich, USAF, to STRIKEFORNATO, Lisbon, Portugal during NEST 26-1The author is photographed with STRIKFORNATO Staff during Distinguished Visitor Day when the Greek and Finnish Ambassadors visited the headquarters during the execution of NEST 26-1.
Admiral James Foggo (ret.) is the Dean of The Center for Maritime Strategy.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
By Admiral James G. Foggo, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
I had the opportunity to participate in NATO’s Enhanced Vigilance Activity (EVA) “Neptune Strike (NEST) 26-1”. NEST has been ongoing for many years and allows NATO the opportunity to exercise multiple Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) or Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESG) at one time. Likewise when the ESG’s operate in theater, NATO can practice amphibious warfare with a multi-national force of Marines embarked from ship to shore in challenging scenarios. NEST is not wedded to on particular geographic area of the NATO area of responsibility. In fact, the mobility and flexibility of maritime forces allows NEST to move around the theater from sea to sea all over Europe. By doing so, NATO maritime forces can provide assurance, deterrence and collective defense across the theater.
By nature of the ongoing syllabus of NEST activities throughout the year, maritime forces are in a continuous state of training and readiness. NEST is not an exercise… it is more of a rehearsal of concept. In other words, if the needle moves from peacetime to crisis response, NATO maritime forces will be ready to respond momentarily. NEST also dovetails nicely with other component’s activities throughout the theater on the land, in the air, and in space and cyber domains. The ability to conduct simultaneous Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) will distinguish NATO from its adversaries.
Planning and coordination for NEST activities resides at the headquarters of Striking and Support Forces NATO (STRIKEFORNATO) in Lisbon, Portugal. The annual program of activity is planned over a year in advance but must be flexible based on real world situations and the availability of CSGs/ESGs to fulfill exercise objectives. All scheduled activities follow international law and rules of engagement. This is important because the level of interest in NEST activities often comes with the presence of curious Russian Federation forces nearby.
The first iteration of NEST 26 took place from 25 March to 1 April 2026, bringing together a group of CSGs and ESGs across the Western and Central Mediterranean theater. In coordination with the Commander, STRIKFORNATO, in Oeiras, Portugal, the Spanish Navy’s JUAN CARLOS I expeditionary strike group, the Italian Navy’s CAVOUR carrier strike group and supported by the French Navy’s CHARLES DE GAULLE carrier strike group conducted numerous exercises at sea enabling vigilance efforts at its Southern and South-Eastern flank.
Taking advantage of NATO’s unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) RQ-4D from the NATO Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Force (NISRF) in Sigonella, Italy, the strike groups’ air assets, including F-35B Lightning and AV-8 Harrier aircraft executed missions across the Mediterranean Sea, over land, and even into the contested Black Sea region. Based on the ISR provided by the UAVs, participating strike aircraft were able to engage targets on firing ranges in Poland and Romania. It is important that NATO maintain presence and visibility in international airspace in the Black Sea region, even while the conflict between Russia and Ukraine continues.
Other contributing nations in NEST 26-1 included Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Romania, Spain and the United States.
It is important to note that the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), GEN Alexus Grynkewich, USAF, visited STRIKEFORNATO Headquarters during the conduct of NEST 26-1 and observed firsthand exercise serials and scenarios in action. SACEUR also had the opportunity to visit the Spanish Navy’s JUAN CARLOS I expeditionary strike group and later conduct a Commander’s Daily Update Brief (DUB) with all participating CSG/ESG Commanders.
Admiral James Foggo (ret.) is the Dean of The Center for Maritime Strategy.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.