Recent reports on Russia’s research fleet and its underwater surveillance network, Harmony, highlights a trend that deserves closer strategic attention: Moscow is attempting to integrate these unmanned systems into a broader concept for maritime dominance, combining offensive, defensive, and dual-use functions.
In recent years, Russia has deployed an expanding portfolio of unmanned and remotely operated maritime systems: surface drones, seabed platforms, deep-diving autonomous and remotely underwater vehicles capable of reconnaissance, seabed mapping, sabotage, and infrastructure protection. These systems vary widely in capability, some highly sophisticated, others constrained by technical limits, sanctions, and bottlenecks in Russia’s defense-industrial base. They are used for both military and economic projects.
Russia’s Sea Robots: Civilian Origins, Military Applications
In recent years, the combined needs of Russia’s oil industry, research institutes, and military have driven a rapid expansion in unmanned and remotely operated sea systems. Moscow now fields a growing mix of surface and deep-sea platforms designed for reconnaissance, seabed work, and militaryoperations.. While these platforms can be used worldwide, their primary operating environments remain the Arctic, the North Atlantic, and the Baltic Sea.
Russia’s sea robotics span core missions such as underwater positioning, security operations, search and exploration, detection and tracking of underwater objects, operational hydrography, and communication.
Unmanned Surface Vehicles for the invasion of Ukraine but not only
Russia has made some progress in light unmanned surface vehicles, producing several small Unmanned Surface Vehicles now entering service, but it still lacks heavy-class platforms. . Most new Russian unmanned combat boats fall into a small, lightweight class of 1.5–2 tons and are built on modified commercial hulls to keep costs and production timelines down. The Skanda mine-hunting USV, based on a modified motorboat, is already deployed on Project 12700 Alexandrite vessels. Newer systems, such as the Vizir-700 and the Orkan, have begun small-batch production, with some units delivered to the Ministry of Defense for testing and initial fielding.
Several Russian firms, from major defense producers to small engineering teams, are now developing unmanned surface vehicles intended for military use, often working from similar concepts but with different technical solutions
Russian unmanned surface vehicles can carry modular payloads, from optics and compact radars for surface and air reconnaissance to hydroacoustic sensors for tracking underwater targets. Several designs are also configured as one-way attack boats, capable of delivering a 500–600 kg explosive charge against high-value targets. Russia’s unmanned surface vehicles sector has expanded mostly to meet wartime needs in Ukraine, but several designs Are also intended for civilian use. Sitronics KT is developing unmanned cargo boats, 550 kg to 1.5 tons payload, intended for river and coastal logistics, including in Arctic waters. Yet the sector faces major barriers: Russian maritime law does not recognize unmanned vessels, slowing integration with traditional shipping, and businesses remain wary due to the lack of clear standards or operating rules.
Autonomous Underwater Vehicles and Remotely Operated Underwater Vehicles’ Dual-Use Capabilities: “Linking” Industry and Defense
They are overwhelmingly dual-use. Many platforms designed for civilian tasks – surveying, environmental monitoring, offshore energy work can be quickly repurposed for military missions. Amphibious autonomous underwater vehicles, for example, can conduct year-round water monitoring and search operations, but the same capabilities allow them to perform covert reconnaissance, target designation, and sabotage.
Russia highlights several official uses by navy and civilian purposes for its Autonomous Underwater Vehicles: surveying routes for pipelines and offshore fields, clearing hazardous debris, inspecting underwater infrastructure, securing port and coastal facilities, monitoring the environment, and supporting emergency response.
Many of Russia’s autonomous underwater vehicles can also support military missions, including sabotage and intelligence work. Only a handful, however, have reached serial production: the heavy Klavesin-1P3 and the medium Galtel. Most medium and heavy autonomous underwater vehicle programs are still in the testing phase. Among Remotely Operated Underwater Vehicles, only the Aleksandrit-ISPUM and the Marlin-350 are produced at scale. Slow transition from prototypes to serial production has left Russia with limited presence in the global autonomous underwater vehicles market. However, Russia plans to export domestically produced AUVs in three formats for the near future. First, as finished products supplied to countries such as Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Nigeria, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Myanmar, and Indonesia. Second, through licensed production arrangements with Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Vietnam, and Thailand. Third, via joint design and construction projects with Brazil, South Africa, China, India, and Malaysia. At the same time, Russia is primarily targeting potential markets for its light-class AUVs, where entry barriers are lower and demand is growing.
Russia’s most common Remotely Operated Underwater Vehicle, the Marlin-350, illustrates this dual role: it supports rescue operations and offshore energy projects, yet can also be deployed for naval inspection, infrastructure monitoring, and security missions. Modern amphibious AUVs expand this flexibility even further. Equipped with modular sensors and portable analytic instruments, they can map coastlines, survey riverbeds, or analyze water quality. But they can also track enemy systems in littoral zones, support counter-sabotage missions along the Northern Sea Route, search for undersea cables and pipelines, plant listening devices or explosives, and deliver small cargo – such as ammunition, medical supplies, or reconnaissance equipment – to remote areas.
In practice, almost every new Russian underwater platform is engineered for intended duality, enabling rapid transition from civilian tasks to military use as strategic needs evolve. Roughly 70 percent of Russia’s autonomous underwater vehicles s are used for military purposes, with about 14 percent employed in the offshore oil and gas sector and 10 percent in scientific research. Most of these systems are inherently dual-use, allowing technologies developed for industry or science to be quickly adapted for defense.
Harmony and Poseidon
One key initiative is the secret project “Harmony,” an underwater sensor network deployed in the Barents Sea. The system consists of sonar arrays deployed in an arc stretching from Murmansk to Novaya Zemlya and onward to Alexandra Land in the Franz Josef Land archipelago. Project Harmony improves Russia’s ability to detect Western submarines, enabling its own nuclear-armed submarines to move to and from port with minimal risk of detection or interference. Investigative findings also suggest that some components may serve not only for submarine tracking, but also for guiding Russian underwater vehicles, platforms that could be employed for seabed surveillance and potential sabotage operations. The system relies on specialized underwater robotic platforms launched from submarines that place high-power sonar stations on the seabed. These robots then relay collected data to command centers via satellite.
As early as 2016, Russian government-affiliated media announced the deployment of a global maritime surveillance system known as “Harmony,” an underwater hydroacoustic tracking network reportedly capable of detecting ships, submarines, and even low-flying aircraft and helicopters across the world’s oceans.
Sea-bed communication projects
Developing the Northern Sea Route as a strategic national transport corridor is one of the key Moscow’s interests and goal and contributes to the route’s technological advancement. The integration of robotics in the Arctic presents a number of challenges, including the need to develop specialized technologies resilient to low temperatures, along with the creation of appropriate digital infrastructure and the retraining of personnel. The development of shipping along the Northern Sea Route, coupled with the rapid introduction of modern information and communication systems, big data technologies, and artificial intelligence, is leading to the rapid accumulation of relevant digital information.
In this respect, there are several projects conducted by the Central Research Institute of the Navy over the past few years aimed at developing a unified information system for ensuring the safe operation of vessels in ice conditions. In September 2024, the Institute received a patent for the invention of the “Onboard Automated Information and Measuring Complex for the Rapid Collection and Processing of Local Information on the Situation in a Vessel’s Area.” The device automatically collects comprehensive information on hydrometeorological, ice, and navigational conditions in the vessel’s area, as well as enables more accurate measurements of ice and snow thickness. Until the end of 2025, BIK LO is installed on five nuclear-powered icebreakers of Project 10521 and Project 22220. Data from these systems is automatically transmitted to the shore center of the Russian Atom fleet and then to the Unified Platform for Digital Services of the Northern Sea Route.
Along with satellite data and operational information from unmanned aerial vehicles deployed on nuclear-powered icebreakers, data from the Northern Sea Route’s the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) forms the basis of a comprehensive information system to support decision-making by both specialists from the Marine Operations Headquarters of the Federal State Budgetary Institution the Chief Directorate of the Northern Sea Route and ship captains in NSR waters.
Another area of economic significance for Russia’s undersea projects concerns the development of fiber-optic communication lines. In 2025, Russian Arctic Telecom announced plans to implement the Arctic Synergy project, aimed at laying fiber-optic communication lines across Arctic regions. Another project, the Polar Express, seeks to support the development of port infrastructure along the Northern Sea Route and create a regional digital ecosystem. The pipeline-laying process involves a fleet of specialized vessels, including research ships. These vessels will carry out marine surveys, hydrographic and hydrological research, as well as underwater technical operations such as route preparation and the installation of a seabed fiber-optic communication line. They use autonomous underwater vehicles and remotely operated underwater vehicles.
However, there are delays on completion of both projects. Delays stem primarily from the extreme conditions of Arctic navigation and seabed operations, as well as the need to substitute imported equipment. Cable-laying in the Arctic is uniquely challenging due to harsh weather, high logistical costs, and limited infrastructure, making such projects difficult to scale.
Problems
Despite decades of technical experience, Russia’s unmanned sea sector faces structural obstacles. Even before the Ukraine war and the sanctions, Russian experts and producers pointed to major gaps: no unified regulatory framework, weak Artificial Intelligence development, technological difficulties in producing systems for harsh marine conditions, and limited demand from buyers uncertain about the practicality of robotic platforms. Furthermore, across the entire shipbuilding industry there is a significant shortage of administrative and technical personnel, qualified engineers, and skilled workers These issues still slow progress today.
Existing and prospective autonomous maritime projects face significant barriers to accessing satellite data and communications, largely due to the high cost of these services, which makes their use economically unattractive for many companies. Another challenge is competition with established conventional shipbuilding enterprises that maintain strong connections to Russian decision-making circles, limiting opportunities for newer unmanned-systems developers.
A further constraint concerns the integrated use of unmanned platforms. Russia has not yet developed an effective system for coordinating unmanned surface vehicles, autonomous underwater vehicles, remotely operated underwater vehicles and unmanned aerial vehicles in combined operations. Although efforts are underway, the primary difficulties lie in creating the necessary communication and coordination architectures required for fully integrated sea-robotic operations.
Finally, Russia faces demand for unmanned vessels across military, economic, and civilian sectors, but government support overwhelmingly favors naval projects, giving the Navy a dominant role in the field. Civilian applications, such as Arctic/Northen rivers logistics and ferry operations, remain underdeveloped, in part due to shortages of high-tech talent since 2022. Unlike other producer countries, where industry and research institutes are major users of sea robotics, in Russia the Navy is still the primary customer and driving force.
Conclusion
Taken together, these factors show that Russia is advancing its unmanned sea systems for both military and civilian use, yet progress remains constrained by the country’s foreign and security policies, deteriorating relations with Western states, and the impact of sanctions. Despite these obstacles, demand for unmanned systems, particularly for military operations and for economic activity in harsh Arctic and northern maritime environments, will continue to drive development. However, this progress will likely be uneven, delayed, and primarily focused on meeting the needs of the Navy. Moscow can attempt to integrate these unmanned systems into a broader concept for maritime dominance, combining offensive, defensive, and dual-use functions.
Nurlan Aliyev holds a Ph.D. in philosophy and security studies. His research area is primarily focused on Russia’s foreign and security policy, the Arctic, post-Soviet countries, strategic studies, geopolitics and geoeconomics of Eurasia. He is Senior Research Fellow in the European Neighbourhood Chair at the College of Europe in Natolin. Nurlan Aliyev is the author of “Reassessing Russia’s Security Policy”. Since 2005 he has been providing consultancy for various government, non-government and international institutions, including UN organizations, government institutions of the region countries, the EU and U.S. institutions.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Please note that the views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author and do not reflect the official stance of the College of Europe.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Dr. Nurlan Aliyev
Russia’s Expanding Robotic Sea Capabilities
Recent reports on Russia’s research fleet and its underwater surveillance network, Harmony, highlights a trend that deserves closer strategic attention: Moscow is attempting to integrate these unmanned systems into a broader concept for maritime dominance, combining offensive, defensive, and dual-use functions.
In recent years, Russia has deployed an expanding portfolio of unmanned and remotely operated maritime systems: surface drones, seabed platforms, deep-diving autonomous and remotely underwater vehicles capable of reconnaissance, seabed mapping, sabotage, and infrastructure protection. These systems vary widely in capability, some highly sophisticated, others constrained by technical limits, sanctions, and bottlenecks in Russia’s defense-industrial base. They are used for both military and economic projects.
Russia’s Sea Robots: Civilian Origins, Military Applications
In recent years, the combined needs of Russia’s oil industry, research institutes, and military have driven a rapid expansion in unmanned and remotely operated sea systems. Moscow now fields a growing mix of surface and deep-sea platforms designed for reconnaissance, seabed work, and militaryoperations.. While these platforms can be used worldwide, their primary operating environments remain the Arctic, the North Atlantic, and the Baltic Sea.
Russia’s sea robotics span core missions such as underwater positioning, security operations, search and exploration, detection and tracking of underwater objects, operational hydrography, and communication.
Unmanned Surface Vehicles for the invasion of Ukraine but not only
Russia has made some progress in light unmanned surface vehicles, producing several small Unmanned Surface Vehicles now entering service, but it still lacks heavy-class platforms. . Most new Russian unmanned combat boats fall into a small, lightweight class of 1.5–2 tons and are built on modified commercial hulls to keep costs and production timelines down. The Skanda mine-hunting USV, based on a modified motorboat, is already deployed on Project 12700 Alexandrite vessels. Newer systems, such as the Vizir-700 and the Orkan, have begun small-batch production, with some units delivered to the Ministry of Defense for testing and initial fielding.
Several Russian firms, from major defense producers to small engineering teams, are now developing unmanned surface vehicles intended for military use, often working from similar concepts but with different technical solutions
Russian unmanned surface vehicles can carry modular payloads, from optics and compact radars for surface and air reconnaissance to hydroacoustic sensors for tracking underwater targets. Several designs are also configured as one-way attack boats, capable of delivering a 500–600 kg explosive charge against high-value targets. Russia’s unmanned surface vehicles sector has expanded mostly to meet wartime needs in Ukraine, but several designs Are also intended for civilian use. Sitronics KT is developing unmanned cargo boats, 550 kg to 1.5 tons payload, intended for river and coastal logistics, including in Arctic waters. Yet the sector faces major barriers: Russian maritime law does not recognize unmanned vessels, slowing integration with traditional shipping, and businesses remain wary due to the lack of clear standards or operating rules.
Autonomous Underwater Vehicles and Remotely Operated Underwater Vehicles’ Dual-Use Capabilities: “Linking” Industry and Defense
They are overwhelmingly dual-use. Many platforms designed for civilian tasks – surveying, environmental monitoring, offshore energy work can be quickly repurposed for military missions. Amphibious autonomous underwater vehicles, for example, can conduct year-round water monitoring and search operations, but the same capabilities allow them to perform covert reconnaissance, target designation, and sabotage.
Russia highlights several official uses by navy and civilian purposes for its Autonomous Underwater Vehicles: surveying routes for pipelines and offshore fields, clearing hazardous debris, inspecting underwater infrastructure, securing port and coastal facilities, monitoring the environment, and supporting emergency response.
Many of Russia’s autonomous underwater vehicles can also support military missions, including sabotage and intelligence work. Only a handful, however, have reached serial production: the heavy Klavesin-1P3 and the medium Galtel. Most medium and heavy autonomous underwater vehicle programs are still in the testing phase. Among Remotely Operated Underwater Vehicles, only the Aleksandrit-ISPUM and the Marlin-350 are produced at scale. Slow transition from prototypes to serial production has left Russia with limited presence in the global autonomous underwater vehicles market. However, Russia plans to export domestically produced AUVs in three formats for the near future. First, as finished products supplied to countries such as Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Nigeria, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Myanmar, and Indonesia. Second, through licensed production arrangements with Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Vietnam, and Thailand. Third, via joint design and construction projects with Brazil, South Africa, China, India, and Malaysia. At the same time, Russia is primarily targeting potential markets for its light-class AUVs, where entry barriers are lower and demand is growing.
Russia’s most common Remotely Operated Underwater Vehicle, the Marlin-350, illustrates this dual role: it supports rescue operations and offshore energy projects, yet can also be deployed for naval inspection, infrastructure monitoring, and security missions. Modern amphibious AUVs expand this flexibility even further. Equipped with modular sensors and portable analytic instruments, they can map coastlines, survey riverbeds, or analyze water quality. But they can also track enemy systems in littoral zones, support counter-sabotage missions along the Northern Sea Route, search for undersea cables and pipelines, plant listening devices or explosives, and deliver small cargo – such as ammunition, medical supplies, or reconnaissance equipment – to remote areas.
In practice, almost every new Russian underwater platform is engineered for intended duality, enabling rapid transition from civilian tasks to military use as strategic needs evolve. Roughly 70 percent of Russia’s autonomous underwater vehicles s are used for military purposes, with about 14 percent employed in the offshore oil and gas sector and 10 percent in scientific research. Most of these systems are inherently dual-use, allowing technologies developed for industry or science to be quickly adapted for defense.
Harmony and Poseidon
One key initiative is the secret project “Harmony,” an underwater sensor network deployed in the Barents Sea. The system consists of sonar arrays deployed in an arc stretching from Murmansk to Novaya Zemlya and onward to Alexandra Land in the Franz Josef Land archipelago. Project Harmony improves Russia’s ability to detect Western submarines, enabling its own nuclear-armed submarines to move to and from port with minimal risk of detection or interference. Investigative findings also suggest that some components may serve not only for submarine tracking, but also for guiding Russian underwater vehicles, platforms that could be employed for seabed surveillance and potential sabotage operations. The system relies on specialized underwater robotic platforms launched from submarines that place high-power sonar stations on the seabed. These robots then relay collected data to command centers via satellite.
As early as 2016, Russian government-affiliated media announced the deployment of a global maritime surveillance system known as “Harmony,” an underwater hydroacoustic tracking network reportedly capable of detecting ships, submarines, and even low-flying aircraft and helicopters across the world’s oceans.
Sea-bed communication projects
Developing the Northern Sea Route as a strategic national transport corridor is one of the key Moscow’s interests and goal and contributes to the route’s technological advancement. The integration of robotics in the Arctic presents a number of challenges, including the need to develop specialized technologies resilient to low temperatures, along with the creation of appropriate digital infrastructure and the retraining of personnel. The development of shipping along the Northern Sea Route, coupled with the rapid introduction of modern information and communication systems, big data technologies, and artificial intelligence, is leading to the rapid accumulation of relevant digital information.
In this respect, there are several projects conducted by the Central Research Institute of the Navy over the past few years aimed at developing a unified information system for ensuring the safe operation of vessels in ice conditions. In September 2024, the Institute received a patent for the invention of the “Onboard Automated Information and Measuring Complex for the Rapid Collection and Processing of Local Information on the Situation in a Vessel’s Area.” The device automatically collects comprehensive information on hydrometeorological, ice, and navigational conditions in the vessel’s area, as well as enables more accurate measurements of ice and snow thickness. Until the end of 2025, BIK LO is installed on five nuclear-powered icebreakers of Project 10521 and Project 22220. Data from these systems is automatically transmitted to the shore center of the Russian Atom fleet and then to the Unified Platform for Digital Services of the Northern Sea Route.
Along with satellite data and operational information from unmanned aerial vehicles deployed on nuclear-powered icebreakers, data from the Northern Sea Route’s the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) forms the basis of a comprehensive information system to support decision-making by both specialists from the Marine Operations Headquarters of the Federal State Budgetary Institution the Chief Directorate of the Northern Sea Route and ship captains in NSR waters.
Another area of economic significance for Russia’s undersea projects concerns the development of fiber-optic communication lines. In 2025, Russian Arctic Telecom announced plans to implement the Arctic Synergy project, aimed at laying fiber-optic communication lines across Arctic regions. Another project, the Polar Express, seeks to support the development of port infrastructure along the Northern Sea Route and create a regional digital ecosystem. The pipeline-laying process involves a fleet of specialized vessels, including research ships. These vessels will carry out marine surveys, hydrographic and hydrological research, as well as underwater technical operations such as route preparation and the installation of a seabed fiber-optic communication line. They use autonomous underwater vehicles and remotely operated underwater vehicles.
However, there are delays on completion of both projects. Delays stem primarily from the extreme conditions of Arctic navigation and seabed operations, as well as the need to substitute imported equipment. Cable-laying in the Arctic is uniquely challenging due to harsh weather, high logistical costs, and limited infrastructure, making such projects difficult to scale.
Problems
Despite decades of technical experience, Russia’s unmanned sea sector faces structural obstacles. Even before the Ukraine war and the sanctions, Russian experts and producers pointed to major gaps: no unified regulatory framework, weak Artificial Intelligence development, technological difficulties in producing systems for harsh marine conditions, and limited demand from buyers uncertain about the practicality of robotic platforms. Furthermore, across the entire shipbuilding industry there is a significant shortage of administrative and technical personnel, qualified engineers, and skilled workers These issues still slow progress today.
Existing and prospective autonomous maritime projects face significant barriers to accessing satellite data and communications, largely due to the high cost of these services, which makes their use economically unattractive for many companies. Another challenge is competition with established conventional shipbuilding enterprises that maintain strong connections to Russian decision-making circles, limiting opportunities for newer unmanned-systems developers.
A further constraint concerns the integrated use of unmanned platforms. Russia has not yet developed an effective system for coordinating unmanned surface vehicles, autonomous underwater vehicles, remotely operated underwater vehicles and unmanned aerial vehicles in combined operations. Although efforts are underway, the primary difficulties lie in creating the necessary communication and coordination architectures required for fully integrated sea-robotic operations.
Finally, Russia faces demand for unmanned vessels across military, economic, and civilian sectors, but government support overwhelmingly favors naval projects, giving the Navy a dominant role in the field. Civilian applications, such as Arctic/Northen rivers logistics and ferry operations, remain underdeveloped, in part due to shortages of high-tech talent since 2022. Unlike other producer countries, where industry and research institutes are major users of sea robotics, in Russia the Navy is still the primary customer and driving force.
Conclusion
Taken together, these factors show that Russia is advancing its unmanned sea systems for both military and civilian use, yet progress remains constrained by the country’s foreign and security policies, deteriorating relations with Western states, and the impact of sanctions. Despite these obstacles, demand for unmanned systems, particularly for military operations and for economic activity in harsh Arctic and northern maritime environments, will continue to drive development. However, this progress will likely be uneven, delayed, and primarily focused on meeting the needs of the Navy. Moscow can attempt to integrate these unmanned systems into a broader concept for maritime dominance, combining offensive, defensive, and dual-use functions.
Nurlan Aliyev holds a Ph.D. in philosophy and security studies. His research area is primarily focused on Russia’s foreign and security policy, the Arctic, post-Soviet countries, strategic studies, geopolitics and geoeconomics of Eurasia. He is Senior Research Fellow in the European Neighbourhood Chair at the College of Europe in Natolin. Nurlan Aliyev is the author of “Reassessing Russia’s Security Policy”. Since 2005 he has been providing consultancy for various government, non-government and international institutions, including UN organizations, government institutions of the region countries, the EU and U.S. institutions.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Please note that the views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author and do not reflect the official stance of the College of Europe.