Solving the Navy’s Frigate Problem: The Case for Bold, Persistent Experimentation
The MOC
By
Michael Purzycki
January 13, 2026
The U.S. Navy’s recent decision to cancel the Constellation class frigate (FFG-62) after only two ships is unfortunate but not surprising. Based on the FREMM (Frégate Européenne Multi-Mission in French, or Fregata Europea Multi-Missione in Italian), America’s new frigate was supposed to have 85% of the features of the Franco-Italian frigate, and 15% modifications. Over time, however, the Navy made so many modifications that the split between old and new features went from 85/15 to 15/85. The delivery of USS Constellation had already been delayed from 2026 to 2029 before it was finally axed.
What makes this development especially frustrating is that FFG-62 was supposed to avoid the problems that plagued the Freedom and Independence class littoral combat ships (LCS). Engineering defects and rising costs led the Navy to drastically cut those programs short. From an ambition of 55 LCSs, the program will shrink to just 15 ships of the Independence class. The program’s problems were such that it became known as the “little crappy ship.”
Despite the travails of LCS and FFG-62, the U.S. still needs frigates. Anti-submarine warfare remains of paramount importance – Chinese and Russian submarines pose a significant threat to U.S. and allied surface ships in the event of a major war, including and especially aircraft carriers. A new class of frigates to tackle problems like piracy could take a significant burden off the Navy’s Arleigh Burke class guided missile destroyers – these workhorses of the Navy are strained by constant use around the world, and often are plagued by significant maintenance backlogs.
To meet this challenge, the Navy should invoke the spirit of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Long before his ascension to the White House, FDR served as Assistant Secretary of the Navy from 1913-1920. The job was an ambition of his in no small part because his fifth cousin Theodore (at whose instigation the Navy League was founded in 1902) held it before becoming President. He played a pivotal role in managing the Navy’s buildup prior to the First World War, an experience that would serve him well when, as commander in chief, he did the same before the Second World War.
During his first presidential campaign in 1932, Roosevelt spoke at Oglethorpe University in Georgia, and summarized his philosophy for attacking the Great Depression:
“The country needs, and, unless I mistake its temper, the country demands bold, persistent experimentation. It is common sense to take a method and try it. If it fails, admit it frankly and try another. But above all, try something.”
Taking an experimental approach could help the U.S. meet its need for frigates without having to go all the way back to the drawing board. Many key U.S. allies have recently developed or are currently developing modern, highly capable frigates. Between them, France and Italy have built 18 ships of the FREMM design for their own navies, two of which Italy recently agreed to sell to Greece. Britain’s Royal Navy is building the Type 26 frigate, a design so impressive that Norway chose it last year, beating out the FFG-62. In the Pacific, Japan has the Mogami class (which the Royal Australian Navy has opted to procure), and South Korea similarly has the Daegu class, providing a significantly improved anti-submarine warfare capability than the Incheon class that preceded it.
Suppose the U.S. were to order six ships of each of these four allied classes, without any modifications whatsoever. If America is willing to spend the money to build all four types simultaneously, it could fill a great deal of the gap created by the loss of the Constellation class. The procurement of them could go on at the same time as the Navy completes FFG-62 and -63 and does its best to come up with an American-madereplacement.
When built, the four types of ship could each be initially deployed in a region near the home nations of their builders. The FREMM could be based in the Mediterranean, where possible locations include Rota, Gaeta, and Souda Bay. The Type 26 could be homeported across the Atlantic in either Norfolk or Mayport. The Mogami class could be based in either Sasebo or Yokosuka. The Daegu class could be homeported either in Everett (where the first 12 Constellation class frigates were to be based), or in San Diego alongside the remaining Independence class LCSs.
The Navy could then experiment with the capabilities of each class. Through exercises, training missions, freedom of navigation operations, and other non-combat deployments, crews and commanders would judge which variant was best at anti-submarine warfare, which was best at surface warfare, which was most interoperable with allied vessels, etc. On that basis, the Navy could then relocate the ships to where each would be most useful. The same bold experimentation that FDR employed must be exhibited by the civilian leadership today.
There are risks to this approach. As maritime security expert Emma Salisbury wrote in War on the Rocks in 2021, the Navy’s decision to buy two LCS variants, rather than down-selecting to one as originally planned, contributed to the program’s cost increases. The risk of repeating that mistake is minimized by only procuring half a dozen of each allied frigate design. It gives optionality to Navy leaders and allows them to evaluate the quality of foreign shipbuilders.
To reiterate, once each design is selected, all U.S. officials must resist all urges to modify any of the four designs in any way. Salisbury noted recently that a repeated practice of adding “just one more” modification gradually degraded FFG-62 until it strayed far, far away from the original plan. If the U.S. wants a fair number of frigates fairly quickly, it will have to trust its allies to do the job right.
There is no telling what challenges the U.S. Navy may need to tackle in the coming decades. The more varieties of ships it has, the better it can protect America’s interests around the world. An ethos of bold, persistent experimentation can reduce the time it takes for the Navy to arm and prepare itself.
Michael D. Purzycki is an analyst, writer, and editor based in Arlington, Virginia. He has worked for the United States Navy, Marine Corps, and Army.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Michael Purzycki
The U.S. Navy’s recent decision to cancel the Constellation class frigate (FFG-62) after only two ships is unfortunate but not surprising. Based on the FREMM (Frégate Européenne Multi-Mission in French, or Fregata Europea Multi-Missione in Italian), America’s new frigate was supposed to have 85% of the features of the Franco-Italian frigate, and 15% modifications. Over time, however, the Navy made so many modifications that the split between old and new features went from 85/15 to 15/85. The delivery of USS Constellation had already been delayed from 2026 to 2029 before it was finally axed.
What makes this development especially frustrating is that FFG-62 was supposed to avoid the problems that plagued the Freedom and Independence class littoral combat ships (LCS). Engineering defects and rising costs led the Navy to drastically cut those programs short. From an ambition of 55 LCSs, the program will shrink to just 15 ships of the Independence class. The program’s problems were such that it became known as the “little crappy ship.”
Despite the travails of LCS and FFG-62, the U.S. still needs frigates. Anti-submarine warfare remains of paramount importance – Chinese and Russian submarines pose a significant threat to U.S. and allied surface ships in the event of a major war, including and especially aircraft carriers. A new class of frigates to tackle problems like piracy could take a significant burden off the Navy’s Arleigh Burke class guided missile destroyers – these workhorses of the Navy are strained by constant use around the world, and often are plagued by significant maintenance backlogs.
To meet this challenge, the Navy should invoke the spirit of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Long before his ascension to the White House, FDR served as Assistant Secretary of the Navy from 1913-1920. The job was an ambition of his in no small part because his fifth cousin Theodore (at whose instigation the Navy League was founded in 1902) held it before becoming President. He played a pivotal role in managing the Navy’s buildup prior to the First World War, an experience that would serve him well when, as commander in chief, he did the same before the Second World War.
During his first presidential campaign in 1932, Roosevelt spoke at Oglethorpe University in Georgia, and summarized his philosophy for attacking the Great Depression:
Taking an experimental approach could help the U.S. meet its need for frigates without having to go all the way back to the drawing board. Many key U.S. allies have recently developed or are currently developing modern, highly capable frigates. Between them, France and Italy have built 18 ships of the FREMM design for their own navies, two of which Italy recently agreed to sell to Greece. Britain’s Royal Navy is building the Type 26 frigate, a design so impressive that Norway chose it last year, beating out the FFG-62. In the Pacific, Japan has the Mogami class (which the Royal Australian Navy has opted to procure), and South Korea similarly has the Daegu class, providing a significantly improved anti-submarine warfare capability than the Incheon class that preceded it.
Suppose the U.S. were to order six ships of each of these four allied classes, without any modifications whatsoever. If America is willing to spend the money to build all four types simultaneously, it could fill a great deal of the gap created by the loss of the Constellation class. The procurement of them could go on at the same time as the Navy completes FFG-62 and -63 and does its best to come up with an American-madereplacement.
When built, the four types of ship could each be initially deployed in a region near the home nations of their builders. The FREMM could be based in the Mediterranean, where possible locations include Rota, Gaeta, and Souda Bay. The Type 26 could be homeported across the Atlantic in either Norfolk or Mayport. The Mogami class could be based in either Sasebo or Yokosuka. The Daegu class could be homeported either in Everett (where the first 12 Constellation class frigates were to be based), or in San Diego alongside the remaining Independence class LCSs.
The Navy could then experiment with the capabilities of each class. Through exercises, training missions, freedom of navigation operations, and other non-combat deployments, crews and commanders would judge which variant was best at anti-submarine warfare, which was best at surface warfare, which was most interoperable with allied vessels, etc. On that basis, the Navy could then relocate the ships to where each would be most useful. The same bold experimentation that FDR employed must be exhibited by the civilian leadership today.
There are risks to this approach. As maritime security expert Emma Salisbury wrote in War on the Rocks in 2021, the Navy’s decision to buy two LCS variants, rather than down-selecting to one as originally planned, contributed to the program’s cost increases. The risk of repeating that mistake is minimized by only procuring half a dozen of each allied frigate design. It gives optionality to Navy leaders and allows them to evaluate the quality of foreign shipbuilders.
To reiterate, once each design is selected, all U.S. officials must resist all urges to modify any of the four designs in any way. Salisbury noted recently that a repeated practice of adding “just one more” modification gradually degraded FFG-62 until it strayed far, far away from the original plan. If the U.S. wants a fair number of frigates fairly quickly, it will have to trust its allies to do the job right.
There is no telling what challenges the U.S. Navy may need to tackle in the coming decades. The more varieties of ships it has, the better it can protect America’s interests around the world. An ethos of bold, persistent experimentation can reduce the time it takes for the Navy to arm and prepare itself.
Michael D. Purzycki is an analyst, writer, and editor based in Arlington, Virginia. He has worked for the United States Navy, Marine Corps, and Army.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.